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This study is  a  sociological  analysis  of  the establishment and recognition of
family relations in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. How
are close personal relations between adult couples and children and their
parents recognised in the case law of the European Convention on Human
Rights? What kinds of combinations of biological, legal, social and gendered
personal relations are regarded as family life in legal disputes between
individual  applicants  and  Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe?  The
analysis develops a notion of “relational subjects” (Lacey 1996: 150) framed by
perspectives from feminist legal theory, relational sociology and contemporary
debates on the law and politics of family formation, and offers a sociological
reading of relevant ECHR case law. Relevant judgements from 1979–2014 act
as primary data, supported by relevant inadmissibility decisions and reports
from 1960 onwards (90 cases).
In the data, a historical shift from emphasising status (married/unmarried,
male/female) in the earlier judgements and decisions towards identity (sexual
orientation, gender identity, genetic origins, genealogy) in recent case law may
be  identified.  The  notion  of  individual  rights  holders  is  examined  from  a
relational perspective inspired by sociological and anthropological theory and
gender studies in law, emphasising the importance of life-sustaining relations
of care and dependency in the spirit of feminist relational (legal and political)
theory  that  do  not  always  follow  preconceived  structures  of  kinship
recognition. Furthermore, it is enquired whether relations between legal
subjects are more fruitfully viewed as ‘transactional’ or  ‘transcendental’ from
the point of  view of  two differing academic schools in the field of  relational
sociology,  one  among  many  other  general  theories  on  the  constitution  of
society.
It is argued that a process of divergence between alliance (marriage, civil
unions, cohabitation) and filiation (legally recognised parent-child relations)
has been intensified with the emergence of same-sex marriage and civil unions
in the European legal arena in recent years. Politically and legally, alliance is
simpler to transform into a ‘gender-neutral’ legal relation than filiation. Both
gender  and  physical  sex,  as  social  and  biologico-legal  dimensions  of  the
dichotomy of masculine/feminine, provide critical perspectives into the
establishment of relations of filiation. It is argued that from a human rights
perspective a gender-sensitive approach is required in relation to questions of
corporeal  maternity  and  paternity,  as  complex  issues  such  as  access  to
knowledge of one’s genetic origins and the inalienability of the human body in
processes of assisted reproduction crop up in many contexts of which ECHR
case law is just one arena.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
e.g. exempli gratia, “for example”
EU European Union
European Court European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg,
France)
ICESCR International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights
i.e. id est, “that is”
LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Right
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INTRODUCTION: FAMILIES IN A EUROPEAN
CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
We cannot yet imagine what law would look like in a genuinely equal
world peopled by relational subjects connected to each other by mutual
respect for each other’s irreducible difference.1
Nicola Lacey (1996: 150)
What happens when a couple get married or form a civil union and they either
answer “I  do” or sign the piece of  paper given to them by the bureaucrat  in
front of them? What takes place in a delivery room when the details of a baby
born just a few minutes ago are typed by a midwife on a computer and added
to a population database? What happens in a child support officer’s office or
at a fertility clinic when a man signs documents recognising his paternity or
consent for taking part in assisted reproduction? These are all moments, be
they part  of  a  messy event of  nature as in a delivery room or formal as in a
bureaucrat’s office, where and when significant legal relations between people
are created in different contexts: moments when spouses, companions,
mothers, fathers, daughters and sons and relations of affection, loyalty,
obligation,  dependency,  care,  social  status  and  wealth  come  into  being.
Obviously, the form of the acts and techniques of creating legally significant
relations vary from one jurisdiction to another, as legislation and procedures
differ from one State to another. Possibilities of being party to these moments
are not open to everyone, as the creation of each type of relation is subject to
structures and rules which involve one’s legal sex, age, marital status and pre-
existing blood or other relations and circumstances regarding the other
individuals involved.
What is it that binds individuals together as couples, parents, children and
family members in the eyes of law? What are family members to each other, if
looked at from the perspective of human rights thinking, which is essentially
about the relation between an individual or a pair or group of individuals and
their  State  in  question?  This  study  is  an  endeavour  to  analyse  social  and
historical change in applications made to the protection of family life in the
European Court of Human Rights during the first six decades of the existence
of  the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms
from  the  1950s  to  the  early  2010s.  This  historical  era  has  borne  witness  to
fascinating  change  in  the  way  persons,  or  legal  subjects  governed  by  family
law, have been perceived in European human rights jurisprudence, from the
time unmarried mothers had to adopt their own children born out of wedlock
1 Emphasis added.
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in order to be their legal parents2 to the time same-sex couples argue for the
right to marry or to form recognised unions3.  These two examples of  major
shifts in perceiving the right to formally recognised close personal relations –
one effectively argued and achieved decades ago and the other one being
fiercely debated but also widely legislated upon at the moment – display the
importance of status (legal sex; marital status) and identity (gender identity;
sexual orientation) in the realm of the recognition of family relations.
I RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LEGAL SUBJECTS
Who are the main characters of this study, “relational subjects” (Lacey 1996:
150)? Theories concerning the relationship between feminist relational theory
in the field of legal theory and law in general or family law in particular has
been subject to considerable debate, producing a field of scholarship of its own
(see Leckey 2008; Nedelsky 2011;  Mackenzie and Stoljar  2000; Minow and
Shanley 1996). In this study, the notion of relational subjectivity is taken as an
insight that aims to tackle the paradox between the protection of family life, a
bundle of criss-crossing human relations of affection, authority, dependency,
possession and care, from the perspective of an individual rights holder (Held
1998: 508), the subject of international human rights law. Applying this notion
is  also  an  attempt  to  understand  how  the  boundaries  of  who  is  entitled  to
legally protected family relations in the European context are being redrawn
in the early 21st century, with special attention to the importance given to and
the  resistance  against  doing  this  with  regard  to  gender  and  sexuality.  The
possibility  to  form  civil  unions,  marry  and  whether  and  how  to  institute
parental rights to social parents in families formed by same-sex couples has
been and still is one of the most topical themes in the area of family law and
adjacent legal fields in the early twenty-first century (see e.g. Wintemute and
Andenaes 2001; McClain and Cere 2013).
On the level of public debate, this is a civil and human rights issue to be
framed  and  decided  by  citizens,  civil  society  movements,  politicians  and
legislators  on  a  national  level.  The  notion  of  “relational  subjects”4 has been
taken from Nicola Lacey, a British feminist legal scholar, who mentioned this
notion  somewhat  in  passing  in  an  article  inspired  by  the  thought  of  Luce
Irigaray, a French philosopher who has written, for example, on the ethics of
2 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31.
3 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010 and Vallianatos and others v. Greece
[GC], no. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013. For more recent developments outside the scope
of the analysis of this study, see Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015.
Some applications (e.g. Chapin and Charpentier v. France (no. 40183/07), Orlandi and Others v. Italy
(no. 26431/12) are pending on the matter of same-sex marriage in the European Court (European
Court of Human Rights 2015a).
4 See opening quote to this Introduction.
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gender difference and ideals of justice (cited in Lacey 1996; for more detail see
Lacey  1995).  Obviously,  all  subjects  are  “relational”,  as  human  beings  and
persons, even though individual in a number of bureaucratic categorisations,
cannot  exist  without  life-sustaining  relations  to  their  kin,  co-citizens  and
States. However, as noted above, the recognition of human relations deemed
important  and  life-sustaining  by  individuals  themselves  from  a  subjective
viewpoint is not self-evident, and has been restricted and curtailed by States
due  to  a  great  deal  of  considerations,  be  it  the  interest  of  other  persons,
corporations  or  public  policy  (see  Johnson 2013;  Dembour  2006;  McGlynn
2006).
If  the idea of  relational  subjects  and “respect  for  each other’s  irreducible
difference”  (Lacey  1996:  150)  are  taken  seriously  in  the  context  of  human
rights and family law, the dimensions of gender and sexuality are of central
importance in debates on equality and non-discrimination today. However,
just a few decades ago debates on same-sex marriage or same-sex couples
raising children as legally recognised parents would have seemed utopian and
far-fetched  as  homosexuality  constituted  a  crime  in  most  European
jurisdictions (see Grigolo 2003; Cretney 2006; Johnson 2013). The notion of
relational subjects is an attempt to name and analytically dissect the ideal that
activists and advocates arguing, for example, for same-sex marriage in Europe
today are after as they lay claims for equality in an area of legal and political
debate which would have been seen as unfounded in earlier times (Meyer
2013;  Hodson  2011,  2012,  2014).  On  a  more  theoretical  level,  it  means
rewriting certain principles of family law or similar areas of civil law according
to new principles of gender-neutrality and conceptualising intimate
relationships between adults and parental relations between adults and
children in a way that shakes the foundation of kinship as an institution that
articulates the difference of sexes and generations (see Théry 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999)5.  On  this  level,  the  ‘promise  of  equality’  (see  Hart  2009:  557)  that
advocates of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) family rights are after
is a way of testing some of the deepest divisions in our societies, those based
on a person’s biological sex in relation to other persons.
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  analyse  the  history  of  the  formation  and
recognition of family relations in relevant case law of the European Court of
Human  Rights  and  see  how  relational  subjectivity  surfaces  in  relation  to
personal identity, gender and sexuality in this data. Examples of this may be
taken from Belgium the 1970s and the abolishment of discrimination against
children born to unmarried mothers6 or  Austria  in  the  2000s  and  the
possibility of same-sex marriage, access to assisted reproduction and the
5 The articulation of the difference between sexes and generations makes one think of a grid of
sexes and generations that could be similar to Judith Butler’s notion of the “heterosexual matrix”
(1990), but rests on the thinking put forward by Irène Théry on kinship as the institution that
articulates the difference between sexes and generations (1998).
6 See Marckx v. Belgium.
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possibility of step-parent adoption for same-sex couples7. The notion of
relational  subjects  is  also  partly  inspired  by  a  notion  that  has  been  called  a
“self-founded subject” (sujet autofondé) in French academic literature,
discussed by Irène Théry (2007: 582-4), a legal sociologist specialised in issues
of family law. Théry is critical of this notion, but acknowledges it to be found
in the work of Pierre Legendre, a French legal and psychoanalytical theorist,
who has been influential in framing the more value-conservative tones
regarding individualisation and social change in family formation in the
French context (Legendre 1985; Spire 2001)8.  According  to  Théry,  the
Legendrian view of the undesirability of over-empowered and self-constituting
subjects has been developing side by side with technoscientific change in
Western industrialised societies (Théry 2007: 583; see Legendre 1999). A self-
founded subject, it seems, defines herself or himself without responsibility
towards social structures held up by earlier generations, restricting social
institutions  or  even  psychological  categories  and  it  is  this  that  is  seen  as
destructive to social relations by Legendre and the like-minded. Alain Supiot,
a  French  legal  scholar,  has  also  deplored  the  apparent  triumph  of
autonomously  founded  subjects  in  recent  years,  as  demonstrated  by,  for
example,  same-sex marriage,  different forms of  civil  partnerships for same-
sex couples and various forms of instituting parenthood for couples involving
non-heterosexual or transgender persons (2008: 201-202).
The  opposing  camps  in  debates  in  recent  years  over  what  family  is  and
should be have been characterised with a variety of concepts. In a collection of
essays trying to establish dialogue between value-conservative and value-
liberal viewpoints in the context of the United States, What is Parenthood?
(McClain and Cere 2013), the notions of “integrative” and “diversity” models
of family have been adopted. In this schema, the word “integrative” points to
the  primacy  of  a  heterosexual,  marriage-based  family  form  backed  up  with
knowledge from the fields of natural science, theology and natural law and how
this form of family life should be indicated as the one to aspire to in law and
policy (Cere 2009, 2013; Browning 2013). In turn, the “diversity” model
stresses an emic9 point  of  view  to  family  life,  and  knowledge  from  social
sciences and critical perspective such as feminist and minority studies
7 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 57813/00, ECHR 2011 and X
and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 19010/07, ECHR 2013.
8 Legendre’s position has come clear also in some opinion pieces and interviews during debates on
Pacs and same-sex marriage in France. See, for example, interview in the newspaper Le Monde 22
October 2001, where he argues that granting homosexuals "familial status" is equivalent to applying
democratic principles in order to implement a fantasy : "Et les Etats contemporains se lavent les mains
quant au noyau dur de la raison qui est la différence des sexes, l'enjeu œdipien... L'Occident a su
conquérir la non-ségrégation, et la liberté a été chèrement conquise, mais de là à instituer
l'homosexualité avec un statut familial, c'est mettre le principe démocratique au service du fantasme"
(interview in Spire 2001).
9 ’Emic’ refers here to relations defined and named by the subjects in question.
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(McClain  2013;  Stacey  2013).  In  the  abovementioned  volume,  many  of  the
authors pick up this pair of notions and provide their own alternatives. Stacey
(2013: 65) replaces these with “singular (universalist)” and “pluralist”, as the
first  one  stresses  the  functional  and  moral  superiority  of  a  certain  family
structure (monogamous marriage of a man and a woman and their biological
children), while the latter rejects hierarchies of family forms and stresses the
quality of parenting and family life, valuing a diversity of individual identities.
As Stacey notes, “We are engaged, in essence, in ye olde structure versus
process debate about family quality” (2013: 65). In this study, ‘singularist’ and
‘pluralist’ are used throughout to refer to the two opposing views that seldom
have been brought to actual dialogue as in What is Parenthood? (McClain and
Cere 2013).
From an external, singularist point of view that proponents of heterosexual
marriage  champion  as  the  supreme  form  of  family  life,  the  parameters  of
family life adhere to a pre-existing order within which individuals fulfil roles
that  are  open  to  them  on  the  basis  of  their  age,  gender,  marital  status  and
existing kinship ties. This perspective may be founded on religious doctrine
(see Browning 2013), a notion of acknowledging one’s place in relation to the
gendered Other (Théry 1996, 1997, 1998), a Republicanist notion of the citizen
as a gendered being, acting in unison with institution of the universalist
Republic (Robcis 2013), or natural law as a source for a universalist politico-
moral order, as expressed in more conservative readings of the Universal
Declaration of  Human Rights and international  human rights law (Glendon
2009;  Matlary  2009;  Adolphe  2006).  In  sum,  according  to  these  views
described above, family life is a privileged sphere of human existence that may
be entered by marrying a person of  the opposite sex who is  not included in
categories of prohibited degrees of relationships and the appropriate space for
sexual relations and giving birth to children is within (religiously sanctioned)
marriage.  This,  in  turn,  is  supposed  to  reproduce  society  and  maintain  the
familiar  and  habitual  order  of  gendered  relations  that  public  policy  and  an
ordered social life are seen to rest on.
The main characteristics of the singularist order are status – in the form of
marriage, making sexuality and procreation licit and designating a father (see
Leckey 2008: 248) – and a dichotomous gender order: kinship makes sense
only  in  the  form  of  a  collateral  system  where  relations  flow  from  a  double
reference to male and female, the insurmountable limits of classification and
thinking (see Héritier 1996: 19-22). This singularist perspective is met by an
opposing perspective that may be called ‘pluralist’ in the sense of breaking with
pre-existing moral authorities such as religion and forms of expert knowledge
that are seen as conservative. The recognition of the importance of individual
autonomy and identity has been gradually more recognised by the European
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Court of Human Rights as well (see Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom10).
In  the  realm  of  family  relations,  this  can  be  seen  in  the  areas  of  intimate
relations between adults and relations created by means of legal fictions
primarily concerning adoption, but in some contexts also assisted
reproduction.
From this pluralist point of view, individuals are indeed self-constituting
and  self-defining  subjects  when  it  comes  to  conceiving  the  parameters  of
intimate and family relations, and the framework of the external, singularist
form of family life is followed according to one’s conscience. This means that
adult  individuals  may have sexual  relations and cohabit  with persons of  the
opposite or the same sex, and having children can be achieved either coitally
or non-coitally (see Bernat 2002): within marriage, heterosexual cohabitation,
private arrangements such as casual relations, home inseminations, or public
and/or commercial services in fertility clinics providing that the legislation of
the state in question permits this, or by adoption. This tension between two
completely  opposing  views  regarding  what  is  included  within  the  family-
related rights of a person seems irresolvable in the age of international human
rights law as a major source of  advocacy,  activism and litigation.  At root,  it
probably  is.  However,  legislators  have  made  and  constantly  make  choices
concerning these views and their implications in many states, in Europe and
North  America  and  beyond.  The  singularist  view of  family  as  an  institution
governed by the distinction of sexes and generations is superimposed with and
viewed  in  this  study  with  the  help  of  what  Camille  Robcis  calls  the
“structuralist  social  contract”  (2013:  61),  a  set  of  thought  on  the  gendered
aspects  of  kinship  that  have  been  historically  moulded  and  argued  in  the
French intellectual landscape with the help of Lévi-Straussian structuralist
anthropology among other perspectives.
Robcis,  a  scholar  of  French  intellectual  history,  has  characterised  this
notion  as  a  set  of  theoretical  thought  that  was  not  intended  as  political  or
prescriptive  by  its  forefathers  such  as  Claude  Lévi-Strauss,  but  it  was
developed  into  that  direction  in  the  interplay  of  20th  century  French  social
theory and the arena of social and political debate in this polity. Manifestations
of  this  strand  of  thought  became particularly  pertinent  in  public  debates  in
France in the 1990s and the 2000s (Robcis 2004, 2007, 2013) up until recent
years and the legal approval of same-sex marriage in France (Théry 2013). This
set of thought is discussed in this study mainly through the work and views of
Irène Théry (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, see also 2013) and Françoise Héritier, an
anthropologist of kinship studies (1985, 1996, 2009: see also Commission des
lois 2013),  who  have  acted  both  as  academic  commentators  and  high-level
experts in relevant legislative processes in the French context in the 1990s and
the 2000s (Robcis 2013: 251-257).
10 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI. This was a key
case in the European Court of Human Rights granting legal recognition of gender reassignment to
post-operative transgender persons.
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In  turn,  the  pluralist  view  of  family  in  this  study  is  superimposed  and
viewed with theoretical  concepts and notions taken from feminist  relational
theory  (Leckey  2008;  Nedelsky  2011)  and  relational  sociology  as  a  general
theory of society and social life (Donati and Archer 2015; Donati 2011). Claims
for recognition of family formation that bypass demands of status (married or
not) and gender (male and female) that these pluralist views proscribe is an
application of the principle of equality built into human rights thinking (see
Hart  2009,  2012),  as  these  kinds  of  demands  will  hardly  disappear  in  the
future. When judges and legislators evaluate the parameters of family life, for
example, in the European Court of Human Rights, they are not just deciding
about whether to grant public status and possible State subsidies to different
forms of families; they are judging the universality of pluralist demands in the
realm of  family  life.  The  particular  historical  trajectories  of démariage, the
privatisation  of  personal  and  family  relations  (Théry  1993),  and  the
decriminalisation of homosexuality have led to a situation where people may
form  family  relations  by  deciding  what  is  the  most  preferred  solution  for
themselves, at least on the micro-level (see Weeks et al. 2001).
The research question in this  study is  to examine how different forms of
self-defined relational subjectivity have shaped the way how family relations
and the protection of family life under Article 8 and Article 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights are seen today. The case law of the European
Court presents an immensely intriguing timeline of social and legal change in
the field of European human rights norms concerning family life. Examples of
landmark judgements that  present these forms of  relational  subjectivity are
Marckx v. Belgium in 197911 concerning the recognition of unmarried mothers
as official parents of their children, Keegan v. Ireland in 199412 regarding the
status of unmarried fathers, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom13 in
2002 in giving post-operative transgender people the right to marry according
to  their  reassigned  sex  and E.B. v. France in 200814 in arguing that non-
heterosexual individuals are entitled to be evaluated as prospective adoptive
parents  on  a  par  with  heterosexual  applicants.  What  is  it  that  people  are
entitled to in the realm of family life and what is that family relations consist
of?  This  is,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  essential  sociological  questions:  What
holds us together?
11 Marckx v. Belgium.
12 Keegan v. Ireland, no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290.
13 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom.
14 E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008.
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II ECHR CASE LAW FROM A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE
How family relationships are constituted in the field of law is an intriguing and
complex issue from both a practical and a theoretical point of view. This study
looks at how adult-adult and parent-child relations have been dealt with in the
case law focusing on family life in the European Court of Human Rights, an
international legal institution providing authoritative articulations of human
rights  norms  to  be  applied  throughout  Member  States  of  the  Council  of
Europe.  The  multi-level  legal  narratives  described  and  analysed  in  the  case
texts selected for this study illustrate how relationships between people within
the sphere of family life have been reckoned and regulated on the European
level. In addition, it is examined what kind of reasoning is used to argue for
and against the inclusion of various phenomena into the concept of ‘family life’
in contrast to mere ‘private life’ under Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. In common parlance, ‘family life’ is a concept that refers to
the everyday reality experienced by people who say they are part of the same
family, a network of privileged close personal relationships. In the context of
this study, it refers to the distinction made by the European Court between
“family life” and “private life” under Article 8 of the European Convention, but
it  is  also  used  as  a  term  that  perhaps  captures  better  the  level  of  human
relationships in everyday life instead of the mere word “family”.
My data consists of two sets of texts: 1) relevant judgements from between
1979  and  2014  and  2)  relevant  inadmissibility  decisions  and  reports  from
between 1973 and 201415. Judgements act as primary data and offer key cases
that  I  describe  in  more  detail  to  illustrate  the  theme  under  analysis.  This
description and analysis is supported by other, legally and administratively
less  significant  judgements,  decisions  and  reports.  The  judgements  and
decisions have been pre-selected from the Hudoc case law database16 of the
European Court of Human Rights with the help of legal categories (Article 8
and Article  12  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human Rights)  and  keyword
parameters offered by the database (Article 8 and the keyword “family life”;
Article  12  and  no  specific  keyword).  After  this  technical  selection,  relevant
texts have been identified on the basis of the ”Facts” section of each case and
an evaluation on whether they discuss the establishment and recognition of
existing  or  potential  family  relations,  which  are  understood  as  adult-adult
relations and parent-child relations. Thus, the cases discuss situations where
an  adult-adult  relation  or  a  parent-child  is  evaluated  not  the  basis  of  its
interpersonal  qualities,  but  whether  the  biologically  and  socially  defined
subject  positions  give  rise  to  a  relation  being  defined  as  worthy  of  legal
15 See alphabetical case list in Sources and the chronological list in Appendix I.
16 The case law database of the European Court of Human Rights, Hudoc, is available at
http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
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recognition and protection. This has produced a corpus of case texts relating
to 90 different cases of the European Court17.
Obviously, legal documents such as judgements and other case law can in
no way present a full and adequate picture of the real-life situations behind the
complaints  made  to  the  European  Court  in  Strasbourg.  According  to  Pierre
Bourdieu,  who  could  be  described  as  a  pan-sociologist  who  has  written  on
almost all fields of social life, a certain degree of “structural censorship” (1991:
138) takes place always when events and facts of social reality are described
with  the  help  and  for  the  purposes  of  specialised  languages,  such  as  legal
language (see also Hastrup 2003). The main idea of my approach is to treat
case  law  of  the  European  Court  as  textual  empirical  data  of  its  own  kind:
formulaic and limited but multilayered and both technically  and narratively
open to different kinds of analytical and critical readings. Broadly taken, case
texts also describe a certain socio-legal if not an ethnographic reality. What I
argue is that the textual analysis of the case law of the European Convention is
a  chronologically  ordered  and  cumulative  chain  of  reasoning  about  the
meanings attributed to marriage, cohabitation, civil unions and various forms
of creating parent-child relations in an inter-European authoritative discourse
on human rights principles. On the other hand, ECHR case law is the primary
and most empirical material available for analysing what family relations are
taken to be in the realm of European human rights norms. ECHR case law is
also rich material as it reveals the reception of the case in different levels of the
judiciary of the respondent State (see Dembour 2006: 19-29).
As the data in this study is case law, it represents particular and extreme
examples of the social and legal situations of individual applicants in Member
States: for example, when Marckx v. Belgium was decided in 1979, the legal
status of children born to unmarried mothers was not so dire in many other
Member States of the Council of Europe as it was in Belgium18, but it was this
judgement that made the outcome, the prohibition of discrimination of
children on the basis  of  the marital  status of  their  birth mothers,  a  binding
human rights norm. When processing these complaints, the administrative
machinery  of  the  European  Court  has  processed  applications  made  by
individuals, their lawyers and supporting organisations19 into legally
comprehensible  and  comparable  narratives  and  sets  of  facts  upon  which
human rights norms expressed in the European Convention of Human Rights
are applied. As a supranational legal institution, the European Court and its
adjacent institutions have established a system of signification and a technical
language  of  their  own:  a  legal  and  administrative  culture  of  human  rights
17 See Appendix I for a timeline of the data. Case law relating to cross-border family reunification
issues and custody and access disputes have been left outside the scope of this study, as they constitute
vast areas of analysis of their own.
18 See Marckx v. Belgium, para 41.
19 On the role of supporting and intervening non-governmental organisations in litigation in the
European Court of Human Rights, see Hodson (2010).
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maintained  and  perpetuated  by  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  European  Court
and networks surrounding them. These networks are constituted by everyone
in, around and outside the Member States (Dembour 2006) who read, study,
disseminate  and  litigates  on  the  basis  of  existing  case  law,  communicated
through the Internet, academic publications and media (see van der Vet 2014.)
A global culture of human rights thinking and advocacy has been studied
and analysed by many anthropologists (see e.g. Merry 2006, 2010; Wilson and
Mitchell 2003). Iris Jean-Klein and Annelise Riles, anthropologists who have
written widely on human rights,  note that  the “subject  of  human rights has
without a doubt become one of the fastest growing arenas of anthropological
work” (2005: 173).  This is  much due to the use of  anthropological  or  social
scientific expertise in theoretical and practical human rights work. However,
it  has  also  led  to  the  study  of  the  field  of  human  rights  as  forming  various
organisational  or  ideological  cultures  of  their  own,  of  which  the  European
Court  of  Human  Rights  is  a  prime  example.  Indeed,  they  point  out  that
“…recently,  perhaps  because  of  anthropologists’  newfound access  to  human
rights actors and institutions in their capacities as experts, the discipline has
discovered human rights cultures as ethnographic subjects in their own right”
(2005:  182).  Following  the  work  of  Riles  done  in The  Network  Inside  Out
(2000), the culture I refer to is more a network of circulated ideas, norms and
documents that embody this immaterial and transnational set of norms. This
has built up and maintains the system that is known as the European regional
system of human rights protection: the Council of Europe and the European
Court of Human Rights. With the help of means of communication available
today, the judgements and decisions given by the European Court are available
to a vast audience of actual and potential applicants, legal practitioners,
scholars, students, journalists and human rights activists, to be disseminated,
consumed,  appraised  and  criticised,  referred  to  and  reused  in  a  variety  of
contexts. This study, in its own part, is also an artefact of this European culture
of human rights. It is through this network of norms, ideas and knowledge that
this  particular  culture  comes  into  being  and  affects  the  everyday  lives  of
ordinary people through case law and legislative changes in Member States of
the Council of Europe.
In a theoretically ambitious and comprehensive analysis of the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights as a legal phenomenon, Marie-Bénédicte
Dembour  (2006),  a  lawyer  and  legal  anthropologist  working  in  Britain,  has
analysed  selected  ECHR  case  law  from  realist,  utilitarian,  Marxist,
particularist and feminist perspectives, and shows that besides administrative
efficiency and the sanctioning of States Parties in their human rights
commitments, the institutionalisation and proceduralisation of human rights
can have adverse effects, too. Those who can afford the material and personal
costs  of  seeking justice from a supranational  court  tend to be the ones who
benefit from its existence. In this analysis, Dembour argues that human rights
may be characterised in four ways, or under four “schools of human rights”:
given (natural),  agreed upon (deliberated),  fought for (a form of  protest)  or
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talked about (discursive, even nihilist). The view of rights as given refers to a
belief system and a deity behind it that has dictated these rights to us; the view
of rights as deliberated refers to the results of a multilateral political process;
the protest school wishes to see rights as radical tools to achieve new political
ends and the discursive school sees them as speech but as tools for political
change nonetheless (Dembour 2006: 254-255, see also Dembour 2010: 11)
The judgements and decisions analysed in this study have been selected so
that they offer description and narratives of legal conflicts between individuals
and States and the extent to which they engage in evaluating the existence or
denial of recognised family relations between people. To a certain extent, a
case has to offer ‘ethnographic’ or anthropological knowledge on how a
particular State has defined legally valid family relations. This means that the
documents analysed describe complaints which deal with the formation and
recognition of existing or potential family relationships, relations between
individuals  who claim that they share a relation of  family life  and want this
relationship  to  be  accorded  privileges  on  a  par  with  easily  or  automatically
recognised family relationships,  such as opposite-sex marriage and children
born within it whose parentage is not disputed. Due to the subject matter of
this study, the field of private and family life, it can easily be placed in the fields
of multidisciplinary human rights studies, legal sociology and the sociology of
family  and  intimate  lives.  However,  a  similar  analysis  could  have  been
performed  with  data  from  any  other  authoritative  body  dealing  with  the
interpretation of what kind of relations can and should be considered as family
relationships, privileged personal relationships in relation to the State.
The analysis undertaken in this study can be approached from a variety of
perspectives, and feminist legal sociology inspired by anthropological theories
of  kinship  and  relational  sociology  has  been  the  perspective  chosen.  By
examining judgements and decisions from the European Court relating to the
notions of right to respect for family life and the right to marry, I hope to be
able to give a critical account of how the European Court has viewed the notion
of family thus far, and where these developments seem to be pointing to. The
doctrine of the dynamic (also known as contextual or evolutive) interpretation
of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights,  developed  by  the  European
Court  itself,  and  its  implications  to  changing  norms  relating  to  family  and
marriage provides the main interest of this study also from a sociological and
not just from a legal perspective. The dynamic interpretation of the ECHR was
articulated  by  the  European  Court  the  judgement  of Tyrer v. the United
Kingdom in 1973 where it was stated that the Convention is “living instrument
to be interpreted according to present-day conditions”20,  if  a  ‘European
consensus’ can be said to be emerging on a particular issue (Ovey and White
2006: 46-47).
As  those  versed  in  ECHR  case  law  know,  this  is  not  the  whole  story:
Member  States  are  also  given  a  wide  ‘margin  of  appreciation’  to  take  into
20 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, para 31.
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account the particular circumstances of the respondent state and its legal
system (Ovey  and  White  2006:  53).  However,  the  changing  and  contingent
interpretation of the ECHR is what makes its case law so interesting also from
a sociological  point  of  view.  The  analysis  of  the  research  material,  case  law
selected  on  the  basis  on  holding  content  that  is  relevant  to  the  existence  of
potential and established family relations, helps in mapping out what are the
limits of the notion of family in European human rights jurisprudence. Despite
their formal nature, legal texts can provide immensely interesting qualitative
data if read and analysed as legal narratives. Decisions and judgements from
the ECHR contain hugely interesting substance also from the point of view of
sociology and anthropology, especially regarding the formation and
acknowledgement of close relations between people. At the time of planning
this study in the mid-2000s, the approach of reading legal narratives from a
critical sociological viewpoint was greatly inspired by how Derek McGhee has
analysed  English  case  law  relating  to  asylum  claims  on  the  basis  of  sexual
identity (2001). Similar work on the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights  has  been  done  by  Paul  Johnson,  a  legal  sociologist  (2013,  see  also
2015a, 2015b, 2014, 2012a and 2012b).
The  hypothesis  that  guided  this  study  in  2007  at  its  inception  was  that
fundamental changes in the family law in some Member States of the Council
of  Europe,  namely  civil  unions  and  same-sex  marriage,  would  pose  a
continuous  and  serious  challenge  to  singularist  conceptions  of  “the  right  to
respect for private and family life” (Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human  Rights)  and  “the  right  to  marry  and  to  found  a  family”  (Article  12
ECHR) and compel human rights institutions such as the European Court to
fundamentally reconsider what counts as family life. To a large extent, this has
already happened, as in the case of Oliari and others v. Italy in 201521 Member
States  are  advised  to  create  legislation  that  makes  it  possible  for  same-sex
couples to have their relationship recognised by law. The change that has taken
place  during  the  last  ten  years  has  been  in  many  ways  astonishingly  quick
taking into consideration the institutional design of the European Court.
Unfortunately, a wider embrace of minorities might not be easily digested in
the national political and legal systems of Member States, a perennial problem
and tension between supranational human rights jurisprudence and state
sovereignty. What is argued with the help of the empirical data analysed in this
study  is  that  relationship  recognition  (alliance)  and  different  forms  of
instituting parental relations (filiation) should perhaps be even more clearly
distinguished from each other compared to marriage of yesteryear where the
assumption of paternity is key compared to recognised couplehood (interview
of  Théry  in  Grosjean  2012).  Opposite-sex  cohabitation  and  births  outside
marriage have been contributing to the divergence of  marriage and filiation
for a long time (see Kiernan 2001, Bradley 2001), and political mobilisation
21 Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. As this judgement was
given in 2015, it is not part of the data in this study, which is from the 1979 to 2014.
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arguing  for  a  gender-neutral  ethos  of  equality  in  family  law  and  legislative
changes that have taken place in many Member States of the Council of Europe
are all pointing this way.
III STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
This  study  is  divided  into  six  substantive  chapters  in  addition  to  the
Introduction  and  Conclusion.  Chapter  1,  the  first  main  chapter,  offers  a
theoretical  and  conceptual  background  to  the  analysis  undertaken  in  this
study. It starts with the tripartite notion of alliance, consanguinity and filiation
(Lévi-Strauss 1958: 56; 1973: 7) inspired by mainly terminological debates in
classical anthropological studies which offer a frame for the thematic
classification and analysis of my data. This is followed by more contemporary
anthropological and sociological debates on the role of gender and sexuality in
instituting kinship positions in the field of law, historically and politically
situated in French public and academic debate on legislating gender-neutral
civil unions to all couples (Pacs) in the late 1990s and same-sex marriage in
the early 2010s. French academic debate has been chosen as the connection
made in this discourse between anthropological thought and modern-day
political debate on what family is comes out as most pronounced, as in other
European polities reference to disciplines such as anthropology and
psychoanalytical theory has been less common (see Robcis 2013). These two
sets of anthropological thought and debate act as a backdrop for developing
the main concept developed in this study, “relational subjects”, named in the
work of Nicola Lacey (1996: 150) and developed with the notion of “contextual
subjects” in family law and administrative law (Leckey 2008). These debates
are complemented with what “relational” means in a related but separate field
of  inquiry,  relational  sociology  as  a  general  theory  of  society  (see  e.g.
Emirbayer 1997; Powell and Dépelteau 2013; Donati 2011).
In Chapter 2, I proceed to the conceptual history of the notion of family in
human  rights  documents  of  the  United  Nations,  especially  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the drafting history of the definition
of family in it. This is followed by Chapter 3, which describes the concept of
family in European human rights documents,  how the case law data in this
study  was  selected  and  analysed  and  what  kind  of  an  analytical  tool  the
European Court itself offers in its division of relations into biological, legal and
social  relations.  In  the  remaining  Chapters  (4,  5  and  6)  case  law  from  the
European Court of Human Rights is analysed under the rubrics of alliance (4),
consanguinity  (5)  and  filiation  (6).  Chapter  4  pertains  to  dyadic  intimate
relationships between adults and the process of démariage (Théry 1993), that
is, the undoing, privatisation and intimisation of marriage and cohabitation.
In Chapter 5,  I  analyse case law relating to biologically  grounded maternity
and paternity, the building blocks of gendered parenthood. Chapter 6 turns to
case law relating to the intentional creation of family relations through two
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different measures, adoption and assisted reproduction. Due to the richness
of the case law discussed, the same cases might surface in different contexts
and chapters.
The  analysis  of  the  case  texts  proceeds  primarily  with  the  help  of  the
conceptual tools developed for the analysis. The division of relations into 1)
biological, legal and social relations acts as the first bundle of concepts that
has been used by the European Court itself, too22 (see  Lagoutte  2003;
Schwenzer  2007;  Meyer  2006).  This  is  easily  complemented  and  put  into
counterpoint with gender, as it is an evident dimension that operates in the
case  law  but  is  seen  as  so  evident  that  it  needs  no  specific  mention  and
explanation23. A further layer of analysis is added with textual and linguistic
analysis focusing on the representation of the narratives and facts of the case
in  legal  language,  the  construction  of  credible  categories  of  relations  and
evoking signs of an existing socio-legal understanding of relations. In addition
to  qualitative  textual  analysis,  the  analysis  done  in  this  study  is  based  on  a
relational approach of “restructuring relations through rights” (Nedelsky 2011:
313,  2012)  reflected  on  the  case  material  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  on
‘counterpoint’ (Brown 2002) as a style of writing, a form of criticism that aims
as contrasting and highlighting alternatives to the perspectives put forward in
the data.
The purpose of my study is twofold. On the one hand, I wish to examine the
mutually influencing relationship between international law and national legal
cultures  on  the  European  level  in  the  socio-legal  conceptualisation  of  what
kinds of human relations count as family life. Decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights are binding on Member States and require them to change
their  national  legislation  accordingly,  while  the  Court  grounds  its
jurisprudence on doctrines such as “European consensus” (Ovey and White
2006:  235)  on  particular  issues.  On  the  other  hand,  I  wish  to  offer  a
sociologically informed critique of the making of human rights norms
regarding  marriage,  family  and  family  life  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the
Convention and in this European ‘culture of human rights’, and consider what
kind of implications the changes that are underway have for gender equality
and  the  politics  family-making  in  today’s  Europe.  The  aim  is  to  trace  how
different forms of relations between individuals are presented in the relevant
case law and how they are given recognition or rejected.
During the time period under study, 1979–2014, norms regarding what
family  life  is  expected  to  be  and  what  kind  of  relations  are  given  legal
protection  in  the  case  law  European  Convention  have  been  subject  to
enormous  change  due  to  the  doctrine  of  dynamic,  evolutive  and  contextual
interpretation of  the Convention practiced by the European Court,  which is
22 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 18535/91, judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no.
297-C.
23 As noted in X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom [GC], 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgements and
Decisions 1997-IIt of 27 October 1994, Series A no. 297-C.
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also based on an “interpretive ethic” that seeks to provide a moral evaluation
of the case at hand and not to dwell on the original intentions of the drafters
of  the European Convention (Letsas 2010: 509).  The aim of  this  study is  to
offer  a  critical,  feminist  and sociological  reading of  relevant ECHR case law
concerning the establishment of legally and bureaucratically relevant relations
in the sphere of “family life”, a privileged sphere of relations within a larger
realm of “private life” in the case law of the European Court. With getting to
know the history of the concept of family and how family relations are defined
today within a supranational layer of normative commitments between States
and individuals interacting with them we may unravel something more about
social ties, the main object of study of sociology and the intangible glue that
holds people together.
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1 KINSHIP, GENDER AND RELATIONAL
THINKING
The exchange of women is likened to the exchange of words, and this
particular linguistic circuitry becomes the basis for rethinking kinship
on the basis of linguistic structures, the totality of which is called the
symbolic. Within that structuralist understanding of the symbolic,
every sign evokes the totality of the symbolic order in which it
functions. Kinship ceases to be thought in terms of blood relations or
naturalized social arrangements but becomes the effect of a linguistic
set of relations in which each term signifies only and always relation
to other terms.
Judith Butler (2000: 41)
How  and  with  the  help  of  what  kinds  of  concepts  and  theories  to  analyse
change in the way legal family relations are understood in Europe today? In
this  chapter,  I  offer  an  account  of  certain  anthropological  and  sociological
concepts and lines of debate guiding and framing the approach adopted in this
study.  These concepts and debates have helped in viewing what ‘family life’
stands for and what kind of social relations are regarded as ‘family relations’
in  a  contemporary  European  culture  of  human rights  exemplified  in  ECHR
case  law.  The  main  argument  presented  in  this  chapter  is  that  a  traditional
view  of  the  family,  apart  from  viewing  it  through  the  normative  prisms  of
natural law and theology, can be analysed and contextualised with the help of
structuralist anthropological theory and juxtaposed with views from feminist
political  and  legal  theory  and  views  from  relational  sociology  in  order  to
examine  how  family  relations  are  understood  in  European  human  rights
jurisprudence today.
The notion of a “structuralist social contract” is a notion developed by the
historian Camille Robcis (2013) after analysing French historical and
theoretical debates of the 1990s and 2000s on the Republican and gendered
aspects of family formation. Robcis sought out, among other themes, to trace
the roots of  what has been referred to as the “symbolic  order” of  kinship in
French debates around civil unions (pacte civil de solidarité, Pacs legislated
in  1999)  and  same-sex  marriage  in  the  late  20th and  early  21st century.  The
“symbolic  order”  is  a  notion  that  harks  back,  in  these  debates,  mainly  to
structuralist anthropology influenced by the thought of Claude Lévi-Strauss as
expressed in the Structures élémentaires de la parenté (1949)  and
Anthropologie structurale (1958). The thought of the psychoanalytical
theorist Jacques Lacan is often placed in the continuum of the symbolic order
from Lévi-Strauss to contemporary debates (Robcis 2007, 2013, see also Hart
2009). This study focuses on the role of Lévi-Strauss and the sociological and
anthropological import brought to those debates by Irène Théry and Françoise
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Héritier. This notion of a “symbolic order” of kinship and family took up an
existence of its own in the debates in France in the late 1990s as a binary order
of gendered kinship positions that, according to its singularist proponents, was
beyond conceptual modification (Robcis 2013).
In turn, a pluralist view of the family, I propose, may be viewed through the
prisms feminist and queer theory as has often been done (Rubin 1975; Butler
2000, 2002), feminist political and legal theory (e.g. Lacey 1995, 1996; Leckey
2008;  Nedelsky  2011)  but  also  the  with  the  help  of  a  general  theory  of
sociology, relational sociology (Donati and Archer 2015; Donati 2011, Crossley
2010). This perspective provides the possibility for a shift from the dichotomy
of status (adherence to a preconceived order of kinship and gender) to identity
(feminist and non-heterosexual political mobilisation in family issues) to
relations between individual legal subjects and between individuals and
States.  In  short,  I  argue  that  a  sociological  reading  of  the  case  law  of  the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  influenced  by  a  relational  approach  (see
Nedelsky  2011,  2012)  concerning  claims  made  about  family  life  produces  a
pertinent analysis of what constitutes “family life” in Europe today from the
perspective of law and human rights.
1.1 ALLIANCE, CONSANGUINITY AND FLIATION
Of course, the biological family is ubiquitous in human society. But
what confers upon kinship its socio-cultural character is not what it
retains from nature, but, rather, the essential way in which it diverges
from nature. A kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of
descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists only in human
consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the
spontaneous development of a real situation.1
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967: 48-49)
In recent years, there has been a certain trend of reassessing and reappraising
the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the ‘father’ of structuralist anthropology (see
Doran 2013) whose work has been appropriated by a range of scholars from
anthropology to cultural studies and literary theory. Apart from this trend, the
theoretical  work  and  central  concepts  of  Lévi-Strauss’s  work  from the  mid-
1900s were cited widely in political debates concerning civil unions, same-sex
marriage and family formation by same-sex couples in France in the 1990s to
1 Original text in French: “Sans doute, la famille biologique est présente et se prolonge dans la
société humaine. Mais ce qui confère à la parenté son charactère de fait social n’est pas ce qu’elle doit
conserver de la nature: c’est la demarche essentielle par laquelle elle s’en sépare. Un système de
parenté ne consiste pas dans les liens objectifs de filiation ou de consanguinité donnés entre les
individus; il n’existe que dans la conscience des homes, il est un système arbitraire de representations,
non le développement spontané de situation de fait” (Lévi-Strauss 1958: 61).
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the 2010s. In these debates, a widely surfacing but rather opaque concept was
the notion of a “symbolic order” of kinship, a system of signification in which
men and  women may  only  inhabit  spousal,  reproductive  and  parental  roles
that are open to them on the basis of their approved physical sex. (Confusion
between generations has not really been an issue in these debates.) In other
Western polities the same fervent debates on homosexuality and the concepts
of  couple,  marriage  and  family  have  mainly  been  argued  with  the  help  of
arguments from Christian dogma, statistical and other empirical findings from
psychological and social scientific studies (Robcis 2013: 263-4) or purely
subjective and conscience-related arguments.
France provides an interesting exception to this with a political context
where arguments from anthropological theory as well as psychoanalysis have
occupied centre-stage positions in influential arenas such as parliamentary
debates, national daily newspapers as well as academic debate relating to a
wide  range  of  issue  relating  to  gender,  sexuality  and  reproduction  (Robcis
2004, 2013). In my analysis of the tension between traditional and pluralist
views of family relations I take this historically and politically specific
deployment of structuralist anthropological theory as an inspiration to analyse
what it  is  that  connects law and anthropology within the traditional  view of
what  family  is  and  stands  for.  The  tensions  appear  on  a  variety  of  axes:
historical versus ahistorical, descriptive versus prescriptive, natural law versus
positivist  law.  As  debates  on  the  significance  of  the  ‘symbolic  order’  and  its
applicability to recent and current legislative projects demonstrate,
structuralist anthropology is not completely outdated or absent from
contemporary debates anthropological research on families and family law.
But  is  there  anything  there  that  might  be  useful  for  analysing  modern-day
developments?
Robcis has termed the set of theoretical thought appropriated from the
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and the psychoanalytical theorist Jacques
Lacan,  often identifiable by references made to the ‘symbolic  order’,  as  “the
structuralist social contract”. Robcis argues that both Lévi-Strauss and Lacan
were more concerned with developing their theoretical thinking than applying
their  theories  to  practical  political  debates  (2004:  120,  2009:  5).  She
maintains that it was through the popularisation of their thought through
some key “bridge figures” (2013: 6) that some of their most difficult and highly
theoretical concepts were appropriated into political and legislative debates in
contemporary France. In debates concerning gender, homosexuality and
family  in  France,  the  focus  has  curiously  been  a  great  deal  on  theoretical
debate and on the potential effects of allowing e.g. same-sex marriage to the
‘taint’ the fabric of the nation (universalist Republicanism), the public order
or public policy (ordre public) or the psychic construction and well-being of
the children and adults concerned instead. (Robcis 2013.)
Lévi-Strauss  has  been  criticised  for  this  theory  for  presenting  women as
inferior objects of exchange, for example, by Gayle Rubin in her famous essay
The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of ‘Sex’ (1975, see also
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Favret-Saada  2000).  Rubin  built  her  essay  on  criticising  both  the  theory  of
Lévi-Strauss  but  also  the  psychoanalytic  tenets  of  Jacques  Lacan  and  the
importance of the Oedipal complex in the foundation of what is named here as
the symbolic order of kinship. Later, in her influential book Gender Trouble,
Judith  Butler  (1990)  built  on  Lévi-Strauss  and  Lacan  in  mapping  out  her
theory of the heterosexual matrix, a “grid of cultural intelligibility” (1990: 6),
which somewhat resembles the notion of  the symbolic  order of  kinship as a
cultural ideal. However, Lévi-Strauss has noted in his earlier work as well as
in recent years that  his  theory is  a  model  where the position of  women and
men as actors and objects is not the crux of the matter. However, according to
him, in practice,  ethnographic evidence shows that  it  is  predominantly men
who exchange women (1958: 56). Especially in the context of the Pacs debates,
he  stressed  that  the  model  would  (theoretically)  function  just  as  well  with
women exchanging men or groups exchanging men or women (2000: 717).
What is there in Lévi-Straussian thinking that might be helpful in analysing
kinship as a legal and a human rights phenomenon, emphasising how kinship
is  manifested  as  rules  and  structures?  Lévi-Strauss  offers  a  classical
characterisation of the core of human kinship in one of his main collections of
essays, Anthropologie structural (1958).  In  an  essay  on  applying  structural
analysis from Saussurean linguistics anthropology and ethnographic data2, he
proposes that the simplest structure of kinship consists of relations between 1)
siblings,  2)  spouses  and  3)  parents  and  children.  This  emanates  from  his
central  thesis  that  the  incest  prohibition,  the  threshold  in  the  passage  from
nature to culture and human society, leads to the rule of exogamy (“marrying
out),  according to which ‘men’  exchange their  ‘sisters’  with men from other
groups, leading in turn to the alliance of two groups through a union of a man
and  a  woman  who  are  not  siblings.  Within  this  union  they  have  a  child  or
children, which creates relations of filiation between parents and children.
This, according to Lévi-Strauss is the basic “element of kinship” (Lévi-Strauss
1958: 56).
The  idea  of  the  atom of  kinship  has  been  subject  to  some debate  within
classical anthropology, spilling over to psychoanalytical theory as well (Green
1977). In this essay, Lévi-Strauss took up the work of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, a
British anthropologist, who had described the relations between a father,
mother  and  their  child(ren)  as  the  core  of  kinship.  To  Radcliffe-Brown,
relations within what he calls the “elementary family” (or close to what is often
called the “nuclear family”),  are relations of  the first  order.  Relations of  the
second order are those that combine two elementary families, such as relations
between the husband and his siblings and a wife and her siblings. If followed,
this  line of  thinking can be applied to identify relations of  the third,  fourth,
fifth and the umpteenth order when genealogical information is available.
(Radcliffe-Brown 1941: 2, cited in Lévi-Strauss 1958: 60-61). Lévi-Strauss
stresses  that  this  elementary  family  would  be  nothing  without  an  alliance
2 Chapter 2 in volume 1 of Anthropologie structurale (Lévi-Strauss 1958).
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between the two groups, joining the father and the mother, or the husband and
the wife together (1958).
Thus,  Lévi-Strauss  (1958)  sets  off  from  the  viewpoint  that  alliance,  not
descent (or filiation), is the foundation of kinship, as it is a relation of exchange
between kin groups. Motivated by the rule of exogamy, men from different kin
groups enter into relations of reciprocity and alliance through the exchange of
women for the purposes of procreation and the exchange of various material
and immaterial goods. This is “symbolic” to the extent this system of exchange
(or other systems of  gift-giving in classical  Mauss-inspired anthropology) is
played out like a language, where each person, either the one who exchanges
or who is exchanged, can be described in terms which relate to his or her place
and  role  in  that  system.  In  Lévi-Strauss’  words,  “a  kinship  system  is  a
language”3 (1958:  58).  The  idea  in  Lévi-Strauss’  characterisation  in  what
differentiates humans from animals is the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs,
which  kinship  terminology  also  belongs  to.  In  addition  he  stressed  that
terminology and linguistic signs were not at the heart of his analysis, but the
relations between these signs (1958: 57).
The  idea  that  a  kinship  system does  not  consist  of  objective  relations  of
filiation (or descent, depending on the terminology) or consanguinity but of
arbitrary  meanings,  resonates  with  contemporary  debates  on  what  kind  of
relations can be subsumed within the categories of family relations or family
life. Broadly, the forms of kinship that count in conceptualising close personal
relations in this context are dyadic and intimate adult relations and parent-
child relations. These kinds of relations also often constitute a bi-generational
household in contemporary industrial societies. In Lévi-Strauss’ words:
… pour qu’une structure de parenté existe, il faut que s’y trouvent
présents les trois types de relations familiales toujours donnés dans
une societé humaine, c’est-à-dire: une relation de consanguinité, une
relation d’alliance, une relation de filiation; autrement dit, une relation
germain à germaine,  une relation d’époux à épouse,  une relation de
parent à enfant.4
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958: 56)
In order for a kinship structure to exist, three types of family relations
must  always  be  present:  a  relation  of consanguinity, a relation of
affinity, and a relation of descent – in other words, a relation between
siblings, a relation between spouses, and a relation between parent
and child.5
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967: 43)
3 ”Le système de parenté est un langage…” (Lévi-Strauss 1958: 58).
4 Emphasis added.
5 Emphasis added.
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As the quotes above in English and French demonstrate, the key terms alliance
and filiation in French were translated with ‘affinity’ and ‘descent’ in English.
A closer look at these terms with the help of the Oxford English Dictionary
and a French lexicon shows that there is a lot of overlap in the meaning of these
terms in both French and English, which makes the translation of these terms
from  either  language  rather  challenging.  Alliance,  according  to  the OED,
would be synonymous with everything conceivable such as marital relations,
common parentage and consanguinity (Oxford English Dictionary 2012,
“alliance”), which makes it understandable that alliance in French would be
translated  with  affinity,  which  refers  more  precisely  to  relations  created  by
marriage and is the antonym of consanguinity. However, alliance is useful in
emphasising the aspect of being allies, the act of allying together in contrast to
‘affinity’,  which  also  refers  also  to  e.g.  companionship,  friendliness  and
attraction (Oxford English Dictionary 2012, “affinity”).
Consanguinity, in English, refers essentially to “the condition of being of
the same blood” (Oxford English Dictionary 2012, “consanguinity”). In
French,  it  is  defined  as  the  relation  of  the  children  of  the  same  father,  or
broadly  speaking,  as  descent  from  the  same  ancestor  (Ortolang  2012,
“consanguinité”).  Filiation,  in  English,  is  a  less  widely  used  term  than  in
French. For the purposes of this study, it will suffice to distinguish that filiation
refers  to  “the  fact  of  being  the  child  of  a  specified  parent”  (Oxford  English
Dictionary 2012, “filiation”) and more precisely, that this is a legitimate and/or
recognised relation, and that descent refers to genealogical relations that go
beyond one generation. For example, in the state of Quebec in Canada, where
family  law  has  in  many  respects  been  rewritten  completely  in  recent  times
when  it  comes  to  same-sex  marriage  and  opening  adoption  for  same-sex
couples, in legal usage “filiation” is characterised in English as follows:
Filiation is the relationship which exists between a child and the child’s
parents, whether the parents are of the same or the opposite sex. The
relationship can be established by blood, by law in certain cases, or by
a judgement of adoption. Once filiation has been established, it creates
rights and obligations for both the child and the parents, regardless of
the circumstances of the child’s birth.
Ministry of Justice of Quebec (2003, no pagination)
Thus, filiation is what constitutes the relationship that binds a child to her or
his parents. It is often constituted upon consanguinity (shared genetic origin)
and alliance (e.g. assumption of paternity within marriage). In the absence of
these, legal techniques such as adoption may be resorted to.
In this study, I have taken alliance, consanguinity and filiation as guiding
thematic categories under which I organise and analyse my data. 1) Alliance is
taken  to  refer  primarily  to  intimate  unions  between  two  adults,  be  they  of
formal (marriage, civil unions) or informal kind. 2) Consanguinity offers the
platform  for  analysing  the  significance  of  blood  relations,  and  more
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specifically gendered parent-child relations, maternity and paternity and to
what  extent  they  are  governed  by  the  principle  of  consanguinity.
Consanguinity often comes close to what are called biological relations, but in
this study, with biological relations I do not refer to just genetic and gestational
relations, but the ensemble of these between the woman and man from whom
a  child  originates  from  (see  Chapter  3.2).  Even  though  these  parent-child
relations  already  belong  under  the  rubric  of  3)  filiation,  or  organising
intergenerational relations, filiation in the contexts of adoption and assisted
reproduction, fields where relations of consanguinity often do not exist,
highlights the socially constituted nature of these relations and forms a third
category  of  analysis.  These  three  areas  of  analysis  correspond  to  the  three
empirical chapters in this study (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
1.2 SYMBOLIC ORDER OF KINSHIP AND GENDER
Some of France’s most prominent anthropologists, psychoanalysts,
legal scholars, and sociologists were called before the Assembly, the
Senate, and the courts, to discuss the meaning of the couple, the role of
marriage  in  society,  and  the  state  of  the  family…  Within  these
scholarly disputes, two names surfaced with remarkable frequency:
that  of  the  anthropologist  Claude  Lévi-Strauss  and  of  the
psychoanalyst  Jacques  Lacan.  Thus,  in  the  midst  of  parliamentary
debates and procedures, legislators began alluding to some of the most
obscure and difficult concepts of Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, such as the
symbolic order, the Oedipus complex, castration, psychosis, the Name-
of-the-Father,  the  anthropological  invariables  of  society,  and  the
prohibition of incest.
Camille Robcis (2004: 4-5)
In  debates  concerning  the  French  equivalent  of  civil  unions, Pacte civil de
solidarité or Pacs,  legislated  in  1999,  and  same-sex  marriage,  legislated  in
France in 2013, several prominent French intellectuals argued on many
occasions that  opening marriage and filiation to same-sex couples would be
against  the  “symbolic  order”  relating  to  language,  culture,  gender  and
intelligibility (Robcis 2004, 2007 2013). At its barest, this notion refers only
to symbolic  thought and expressing various ideas with the help of  linguistic
signs, words. However, in these debates, it was used to argue the point that
marriage is for heterosexual persons and that legally recognised families
should be composed of a father, mother and children. In this sub-chapter, I
give  an  outline  of  how  the  notion  of  the  symbolic  order  emerged  in
contemporary political and legislative debates relating to marriage and family
in France in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
What  I  wish  to  find  out  is  whether  Irène  Théry’s  idea  of  the  law  as  an
embodiment  of  the  symbolic  order  of  kinship  (see  Théry  1997,  1998)  is
applicable to ECHR case law not just from France (see Hart 2009) but from
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other States as well, and whether the concept of the symbolic order is useful in
trying  to  identify  what  debates  surrounding  families  formation  by  non-
heterosexuals express about the underlying patterns of recognition of family
life in general in European States. The Pacs proposal and its predecessors such
as CUS (contrat d’union sociale) sketched various possibilities for a limited
form of “quasi-marriage” and contained no suggestions to open the realm of
descent  or  filiation  through  adoption  or  artificial  procreation  to  same-sex
couples (Théry 1997, 1998). However, these proposals on civil unions sparked
vivid debate in their time on the limits of acceptability of family formation and
the advent of legally recognised parenting by same-sex couples and
homosexuals in general which continues today as well.
What  distinguished  the  debate  from  similar  ones  in  other  European
countries was how certain strands of French psycho-social theory were evoked
in it and how intellectuals such as philosophers, anthropologists,
psychoanalysts  and  sociologists  took  part  in  the  debate,  saying  that  it  was
against the symbolic order if same-sex couples were granted the possibility of
shared legal parental relations. (Robcis 2013.) The symbolic order of kinship,
family or marriage, in the texts where it has appeared (academic, newspaper
and web articles, opinion pieces, interviews, parliamentary debates), has often
been left to stand on its own. The use of this concept acts as a bridge between
anthropological knowledge, its variability and the changing nature of human
institutions such as kinship and law. It sheds light on why a clear-cut, binary
system of gendered family relations is held so dear by many and why potential
and actual change, such as legislating same-sex marriage, is argued to be both
a  culmination  of  and  an  affront  to  human  rights,  depending  on  the
interlocutor.  It  has  also  offered  an  intellectualised,  secular  alternative  to
religious  doctrine  for  those  arguing  against  civil  unions  and  same-sex
marriage. (Zaoui 2005.)
Irène Théry was an active commentator during the Pacs debate, and not
least because she was asked by the Minister for Justice to write a report on the
reform needs of family law in France. The report, Couple, filiation et parenté
aujourd’hui (Théry 1998), is still today a key reference for understanding these
debates. However, Théry devotes rather little space to the problematic of the
“symbolic order” vis-à-vis same sex unions and non-heterosexual parenting in
this publication. She gives a more thorough account in an article entitled Le
contrat d’union sociale en question (1997) published in the Catholic socialist
journal Esprit.  According to Eric Fassin, a French sociologist, the use of the
expression  “symbolic  order”  proliferated  in  public  debates  following  the
simultaneous publication of this article in Esprit and Notes de la Fondation
de Saint-Simon, a publication of a Paris-based think tank (2001: 225, note 24).
In the article Théry analyses the contrat d’union sociale, CUS, not a concrete
proposal but rather the “juridical idea” of a civil union. The CUS would have
encompassed any kind of partnership between two people without regard to
prohibited degrees of relationships. The eventual Pacs bill did not include this
and was restricted to perceived sexual relations between two adults. Central to
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the  article  was  Théry’s  concern  regarding  the  “passion  of  desymbolisation”
(1997:  175)  of  proposals  such  as  the  CUS.  Her  discussion  on  symbolic
differentiation between the sexes focused on three main points: the couple,
gender and filiation. To Théry, the law had an instituting function: it expresses
and regulates “major anthropological distinctions” (1997: 174), particularly
the difference between the sexes and differences between generations. This is
why, according to this view, marriage and family are not private institutions,
but  public,  as  they  form  the  social  and  institutional  framework  for  the
reproduction of society.
Théry found support  for  her views in the jurisprudence of  the European
Court of Human Rights, which has since its 1981 judgement Dudgeon v. the
United Kingdom from 19816 maintained  that  homosexuality  must  be
decriminalised in order to protect the right to respect for private life. However,
in the Court’s jurisprudence, the sphere of family life, despite encompassing
unmarried  parents,  children  born  outside  marriage  and  various  other
situations that used to be regarded outside the sphere of legitimate family
relations,  did  not  for  a  long  time  extend  to  homosexual  relations  between
adults  or  relations between social  parents and their  children in family units
formed by same-sex couples even on the de facto level before the judgement
of Schalk  and  Kopf  v.  Austria in 2010 (see e.g. Johnson 2013: 113-118).
According  to  Théry  (1997:  173),  the  symbolic  order  was  not  about  the
classification of factual situations but the classification of types of human
relationships. To her, it was about the level on which differences between
people  are  played  out:  the  level  of  the  law  or  the  level  of  facts,  shared
significations  or  private  choices,  the  symbolic  order  or  concrete  situations.
According  to  this  view,  the  function  of  the  law  is  not  to  respond  to  social
phenomena arising from specific  historical  and political  contexts,  but to set
boundaries to people on what can be done: in the Pacs debate, demands for
the recognition of family relationships of people belonging to sexual minorities
were seen by the proponents of the symbolic order as a wish to use the law as
a vehicle for private desires. (Théry 1997.)
In this essay, Théry (1997) states clearly that in her view, “desymbolisation”
in  the  relations  between  the  sexes  cannot  be  regarded  as  progress.  A
symbolised relationship carries the idea of sexuality belonging to the relation
between two people of the opposite sexes. A husband and wife or a cohabiting
couple of the opposite sex are in a relation that carries the symbolic value of
potentially  being  able  to  reproduce  the  human species.  For  Théry,  the  CUS
desymbolised this relation of ‘erotic tension’ stemming from difference and
the  desire  for  the  other.  Théry  derives  much  of  her  thought  between  the
masculine and the feminine from Françoise Héritier when she states that “this
symbolic of the genders, of the masculine and the feminine, exists in all human
societies: it is through which culture gives sense to the sexed characteristics of
the living species that we are, but to which we are not reducible” (1997: 178).
6 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45.
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Théry held up the distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality as a
question of private desires against public family life that reproduces society.
She, much in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights at
the time, wished to grant homosexuals civil and social rights as long as it all
remains in the realm of private life. Homosexuality pertained to the individual,
heterosexuality to relatedness, i.e. genders and generations. To push the limits
a little bit, one could say that “liberté, égalité et fraternité” used to apply to
everyone, as long as they were among the deserving categories: republicanists,
universalists,  heterosexuals  –  or  as  long  as  they  worked,  ate,  drank  and
reproduced as the Republic desired (see Butler 2002: 22).
In  an  interview  with  the  magazine Prochoix in September 1998, Théry
explained her view in even simpler terms. She stressed that she was not
opposed to homosexuals  raising children in situations where they had been
born in a previous heterosexual relationship or been adopted. She explained
that it was only in a situation where two persons of the same sex would adopt
that she was opposed: this would mean an end to the mixity (mixité) in our
genealogical system. A genealogical system, she explained, is not the same as
nature, it is a symbolic system within which we give significations to biological
realities. The Euro-American genealogical system is distinguished by cognatic
descent, that is, we reckon relatedness through both the father and the mother.
Having two mothers or two fathers would de-institute the difference of the
sexes in our kinship system (Fourest 1998: 6). However, later in the interview
Théry stated that she did not think that the symbolic order is ‘immutable’.
With  this  she  seems  to  be  referring  to  the  fact  that  her  line  of  thinking
recognises that the concept of couple encompasses same-sex couples as well.
Marcela  Iacub  (1998,  no  pagination)  a  legal  historian,  took  up  Théry’s
article  discussed  above  and  criticised  the  application  of  the  concept  of  the
symbolic order. Iacub criticised Théry and other ‘iuslacanian’ thinkers for not
making a clear enough distinction between the legal subject and the person.
According to Iacub, the subject of law is an abstract individual, an intersection
of rights and obligations that correspond to a person, but the subject of law is
not  a  person  in  flesh  and  blood.  The  fact  that  the  subject  of  law  has  been
gradually  de-sexed  due  to  more  egalitarian  aspirations  in  the  field  of  civil
rights does not mean that actual persons would somehow cease to exist as men
and  women  or  to  act  out  qualities  perceived  as  feminine  or  masculine.
Desexualisation of the subject of law does not mean the desexualisation of men
and women, if that is what the preservers of the symbolic order would have
been afraid of. As Iacub notes in her critique of Théry, evocations of a timeless
symbolic order delegitimise the possibility of innovation, social change and
egalitarian  aspirations  in  the  field  of  family  policy  and  family  law.  (Iacub
1998.)
In 1998, Françoise Héritier, a prominent French anthropologist, a former
student  of  Lévi-Strauss  and  a  member  of  the  Collège  de  France,  gave  an
interview to the Catholic newspaper La Croix in  which  she  famously
proclaimed that “No society permits homosexual parenthood” (Gomez 1998,
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no pagination, see also Butler 2002). Héritier has noted in an article on the
concept of family written for an encyclopedia of anthropology that there are
certain fundamental characteristics that make a group of people a family: they
live together, they share blood ties and that their form of residence is socially
accepted (Héritier 1991: 293). They resonate with the characteristics of family
laid  out  by  Lévi-Strauss  (1983  [1956])  in  his  article La famille: the family
originates in marriage, it includes the husband, wife and their children who
are  linked  by  juridical  ties,  economic,  religious  and  other  obligations  and  a
clearly  defined  grid  of  sexual  rights  and  prohibitions  as  well  as  a  variety  of
emotions such as love, affection, respect, fear etc. (Lévi-Strauss 1983 [1956]:
71).  Héritier  said  in  the  interview  that  she  did  not  want  to  deliver  a  value
judgement on the acceptability of same-sex parenting. What she stressed was
the division of parenting into its masculine and feminine components and that
this is absent from same-sex parenting.
She laid most emphasis on the fundamental distinction between the sexes:
to  her,  the  anatomical,  physiological  and  functional  dichotomy  is  what  our
ability  to  think  is  based  on.  In  her  view,  thinking  is  primarily  about
classification, classification is the definition of difference and the most
fundamental distinction is drawn between the sexes. Héritier has written
about the distinction between the sexes extensively in her book
Masculin/Féminin: La pensée de la difference (1996) where she has compiled
texts on the anthropology of gender from a period of over a decade. In her view,
the difference between the sexes is the ultimate limit of thought which is based
on the difference between the same and the different and which is present in
all systems of representation and scientific thought from antiquity to this day.
She admitted that she had not studied the debate around the sex/gender
distinction extensively, but stated that she was interested in the notion of the
“social sex” as a construction affecting the division of labour between the sexes,
one  of  Lévi-Strauss’  “three  pillars”  of  family  and  society  together  with  the
prohibition  of  incest  and  a  recognised  union  between  a  man and  a  woman.
(Héritier 1996: 20-1.)
What  this  debate  on  the  symbolic  order  seems  to  boil  down  to  is  the
question whether the symbolic is reducible to the social or whether it acts as a
separate category of analysis. Judith Butler’s analysis of the figure of Antigone,
the daughter of the main character of the Greek tragedy Oedipus, in Antigone’s
Claim focuses  on  the  limits  of  speech  and  “speakability”  in  the  domain  of
kinship,  or  the  problem of  signification  in  the  language  of  kinship.  Butler’s
commentary of  Antigone makes interesting links to modern-day debates on
kinship:  Antigone’s  own  position  in  the  incestuous  web  of  the  Oedipal  tale
means the way she uses kinship terms such as brother and father in ways that
are far from equivocal. It is this ‘misnaming’ that contests the relation between
the signifier and the signified: naming one relation with more than one name
or giving the same name to more than one relation destabilises respect for the
symbolic  order.  (Butler  2000.)  Butler  argues  in  her  analysis  of  other
commentaries of Antigone that Lacan makes “a certain idealized notion of
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kinship into a presupposition of cultural intelligibility” (2000: 3), thus
juxtaposing the symbolic and the social. According to Butler, Lacan says that
the symbolic is not reducible to the social. Butler argues that the distinction
does not hold, as we always refer to social norms (2000: 20-1). Paraphrasing
Lévi-Strauss in Race et histoire (1974), Butler says that “cultures maintain an
internal coherence precisely through rules that guarantee their reproduction”
(2000: 74). Thus, the constitution of these rules demands analysis, but what
is equally interesting is how the rules might mutate when they are put into
practice in everyday life.
Pierre Zaoui, a French philosopher, has noted in his analysis of the debates
surrounding the symbolic order in France that it is evoked in order to recast
authority in the field of social reproduction. The fear of people using the law
as a vehicle for playing out and legitimising private passions is disguised with
referring to structures and principles beyond the reach of positivist and
deliberative law-making. Zaoui argues that the concept of symbolic order is of
a  descriptive  kind  and  that  its  use  as  a  prescriptive  notion  demonstrates  a
confusion between theory and practice. According to Zaoui’s reading of Lévi-
Strauss’ Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949) “the symbolic order in the
Lévi-Straussian sense is neither a strict prescription nor, or actually less a
strict prohibition: it is rather a simple structural order of symbols, describing
only that no communication or exchange between humans can take place
without following a previously fixed order” (Zaoui 2005: 232). Furthermore,
he  stresses  that  “the  notion  of  the  symbolic  order  is  initially  a  strictly
descriptive notion: it articulates how society functions in general, what kind of
types of relations it follows, but not how society should function in detail,
spelling  out  which  terms  and  individuals  it  affects”  (2005:  233).  Zaoui
concludes  that  the  symbolic  order  is  a  scientific,  not  a  practical  notion.
Moreover,  it  is  a  problematically  scientific  notion  because  it  is  not  a
determinate notion, and due to its indeterminate nature, the concept of the
symbolic order is not useful for contesting existing moral and political orders. 7
Fassin  (2001:  226)  points  out  that  the  specificities  of  “our”  genealogical
system, be it characterised as French or Euro-American, became conflated
with  supposed  universal  structures  of  sexual  difference  and  filiation  in  the
Pacs debate. The bilinearity of cognatic descent fits nicely with the cultural
ideal  of  the  institution  of  marriage  inscribing  the  symbolic  and  structural
positions for the sexes and generations. Other forms of reproduction and the
exchange of life-giving substances and capacities are seen as conflicting with
the order of  things and the limits  of  understandable language use.  In short,
different  modes  of  physical  and  social  reproduction  are  seen  as  rejection  of
fundamental categories and a loss of stable points of reference. The concept of
the symbolic order in the French Pacs debates is an intriguing example of a
historical  situation  where  a  theoretical  and  descriptive  concept  became  a
normative and prescriptive one.  The origins of  the concept can be traced to
7 The quotes from Zaoui translated by the author.
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Lévi-Straussian structural anthropology and to Lacanian psychoanalysis, but
the symbolic  order evoked by Théry and her critics  within the Pacs debates
referred to something much more politically and discursively tangible than the
Symbolic that Lévi-Strauss referred to in Elementary Forms of Kinship and
what Lacan picked up on. (See Fassin 2000.)
However,  on  the  analytical  level,  the  usefulness  of  the  concept  of  the
symbolic  order  was  impaired  by  the  fact  that  it  collapsed  sexual  difference,
reproduction and linguistic intelligibility all under the same term: instituting
same-sex marriage or similar unions does not de-institute sexual difference
throughout society, it only takes out sexual difference for abstract subjects of
law capable of entering into a marriage-like contract. Likewise, the recognition
of  same-sex  parenting  does  not  wipe  out  sexual  difference  and  the
symbolic/social  positions  of  mother,  father  and  parent  in  the  collective
imagination of a given society, just like the ‘disobedient’ use of words such as
mother and father in the plural does not irretrievably de-stabilise the shared
meaning  of  those  linguistic  signs.  What  Robcis  puts  forward  is  that
“structuralist anthropology and psychoanalysis were particularly well adapted
to  French  political  culture  because  they  offered  normative  accounts  of
fundamental sexual and social mechanisms that seemed reassuringly
compatible with the secular values of French Republicanism” (2007: ii).
A historical example of Saint-Simonian thinking that fits nicely with the
Republican ideals of the complementarity of the sexes, the idea of the ‘social
individual’, might help in setting the talk about “symbolic order” in context. In
a  historical  review  of  French  feminist  thinkers  from  the  Revolution  to  the
Second World War, Joan Scott (1996) discusses the views of Jeanne Deroin, a
19th-century socialist feminist:
Deroin took up the Saint-Simonian formula for equality in which “the
couple,  man  and  woman”,  was  the  social  individual  without  whose
union “nothing is complete, moral, durable or possible”. Offered as a
critique of the divisiveness of selfish individualism, this idea of the
social individual stressed the complementarity of opposites, the
necessary interrelatedness of qualities thought to be antithetical to one
another,  and  the  complexity  of  concepts  presented  as  singular.  The
individual  was  a  couple,  and  so  Deroin’s  vocabulary  insisted  on  its
duality: she referred to it as “un et une” in the singular, “tous et toutes”
in the plural. Humanity was man and woman: an androgyne in some
of  her  representations,  in  others  the  copulating  couple  whose  union
merged two into one to form a child, in still others the two aspects of
God. The marriage that would regenerate the world was that of two
equals, “whom God has thus joined, no man can separate”.
Joan Wallach Scott (1996: 74)
Thus, along with her ideas of social and political equality, Deroin defended the
idea that together, a man and a woman constituted an important unit for the
reproduction of society. This idea of the “social individual” helps with coming
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to grips with secular and socio-political  ideas of  the complementarity of  the
sexes as opposed to dogmatically imposed order of God-given roles to fulfil.
Deroin’s ideas resonated with those of Irène Théry in the times of the Pacs
debates. What unites these views almost two hundred years apart is the idea
of gendered citizenship: not fulfilling one’s prescribed social role as a man or
woman in the institution of the Republican family amounts to selfishness and
“communitarism”,  the  rejection  of  not  merely  one’s  biological  destiny  but
one’s way of participating in social and political life. Republican civil marriage,
according to Théry,  was for everyone,  as it  unites people regardless of  their
religious or political leanings. However, its claimed universality comes into
question in the context of same-sex unions – Republican marriage caters for
everyone who is willing to fulfil their role as a male or female citizen, but not
to  everyone  regardless  of  who  they  want  to  marry  (prohibited  relations  set
aside for now). What is needed is a reconceptualisation of the social individual:
a family unit is built on the consensual (sexual) union of two individuals, who
enter into a contract of mutual care and assistance, incorporating into this unit
the  minors  that  are  under  the  guardianship  of  either  of  the  partners.  But
exactly this, according to Théry, was the “desymbolising passion” (1997: 175)8
of  CUS,  Pacs  and  any  other  gender-neutral  legislation:  it  would  take  the
colours out of the family, as it were, if it becomes an institution that does not
make a distinction between the sexes within the couple forming the family.
However, by the early 2010s both Théry and Héritier had proclaimed to be
in  favour  of  same-sex  marriage  in  the  debates  preceding  the  entering  into
effect of the law on same-sex marriage in France. In this piece of legislation,
marriage  and  adoption  were  legalised  for  same-sex  couples  in  France,  but
assisted reproduction was left outside this, and the question was referred to
the national bioethics council. Théry was directly asked about her change of
opinion in an in-depth interview (Grosjean 2012). She explained that her
thinking  had  evolved  over  the  years,  inspired  both  through  personal
encounters  and  research  by  other  social  scientists  on  the  importance  of  the
possibility to marry to many homosexuals. In the interview, she explained that
during the Pacs debates in the 1990s she did not quite understand why gay
activists even talked about gay marriage. Citing Jean Carbonnier, a famous
French lawyer and the architect of 20th-century French family law, she noted
that  in  those  days,  “the  heart  of  marriage  is  not  the  couple,  it  is  the
presumption of paternity” (interview in Grosjean 2012, no pagination)9. In
2012 she was ready to reformulate this into “the heart of marriage is no longer
the presumption of paternity, it is the couple”. Along with the couple as the
most constitutive element of marriage, she contended that marriage was and
is a historically changing and contingent institution. (Grosjean 2012.) In a
collection of articles edited by Théry, published in 2013 to counter a report by
8 ”…passion de désymbolisation” (1997: 175).
9 “Le cœur du mariage ce n’est pas le couple, c’est la présomption de paternité.” (See Grosjean
2012.)
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a  conglomeration  of  conservative  NGOs  regarding  the  proposed  changes  to
family law, she offers a variety of arguments that illustrate her views at the
time  same-sex  marriage  in  France  was  legalised  (Théry  2013).  Countering
positions  against  same-sex  marriage,  adoption  by  same-sex  couples  and
opening  assisted  reproduction  to  female  couples,  she  argues  her  points  in
order to contribute to a “democratic, informed, and serene” (Théry 2013: 9)
debate. According to her, “opening marriage and adoption to same-sex couples
will not destroy marriage, family, difference between the sexes or civil status”
(2013: 11)10.
Héritier, too, confirmed in an interview in 2013 her view on the historicity,
evolving  nature  and  contractual  essence  of  marriage.  “The  social  order  has
always been created by the human mind and has corresponded to the demands
of  a  certain  era,  with  the  transmission  of  institutions  over  time”11 (Gairin
2013). In her expert statement to the Law Commission of the Senate, the upper
chamber of the French parliament in 2013, she explained her positions in more
detail: she stressed the variability and manipulability of kinship categories.
According  to  her,  anthropology  has  come  up  with  typologies  of  kinship
relations from different cultures, and each of them has its own internal logic.
The rules within these systems are open to change, variation and evolution,
and our culture is one among many. She argued to the Law Commission that
these kinship systems are creations of the human mind and that contemporary
European kinship rules are characteristics of a reality among others which has
evolved over time. (Commission des lois 2013.) Here we see that she evokes
the ‘limits of intelligibility’ contrary to her position at the time of the Pacs
debates (interview in 1998, previously in this chapter). Furthermore, she
stresses in her presentation to the Law Commission that filiation as a concept
needs to be separated from genetics and gestation12 as it refers to the social
rule that determines the attachment of a child to a certain group (Commission
des lois 2013, see also Héritier 2009: 170-171). So, despite the deployment of
the symbolic order and the difference of the sexes, the unsurpassable limits of
human thinking, both the views of social scientists and legislators may and do
change. One may ask what happened to the structuralist social contract along
the way – has it  been left  to the opponents of  same-sex marriage and other
forms  of  gender-neutral  family  formation?  Does  it  remain  a  curiously
complicated historical construction, or does its value lie more in making sense
of a traditional view on alliance and filiation?
10 ”… l’ouverture du mariage et de l’adoption aux couples de même sexe ne détruira ni le mariage,
ni la famille, ni la différence des sexes, ni l’état civil”. Translation by the author.
11 ”L'ordre social a toujours été créé par l'esprit humain et correspondu à des impératifs qui étaient
ceux d'un moment donné, avec ensuite transmission d'institutions au long cours.”
12 Referred to as “engendrement” (genetics) and “enfantement” (gestation).
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1.3 RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY AND FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY
The word family indicates relationships: it is a relationship, not a place
or something like a locale. All the language that we adopt to describe
what we ‘see’ beyond single individuals is essentially relational. Words
have  meaning  only  if  they  refer  to  relations:  in  a  sense,  words  are
relations. All our thinking processes are relational: they connect and
refer  through  relations,  and  to  this  extent  they  are  served  by  the
mediation of language, which is a great collective, symbolic and
relational image.
Pierpaolo Donati (2011: 15-16)
The two sub-chapters preceding this  one offer  a  discussion first  on classical
concepts  in  the  anthropology  of  kinship  that  are  helpful  in  grouping  my
analysis under the main rubrics of alliance, consanguinity and filiation and in
shedding light on how classical concepts and theories of this field of study in
anthropology reach out to both academic and political  debate today.  In this
sub-chapter I wish to offer a discussion on how social and legal relations are
understood,  on  one  hand,  from  the  perspective  of  relational  sociology,  a
general  theory  of  society,  and  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  perspective  of
feminist political and legal theory, focusing on relations as ties between people
that structure and orient our lives both on a practical and on an ethical level.
My aim is to try and draw essential points from these two strands of thinking
for the purposes of my analysis. In the context of this study, “relational” refers
primarily towards recognising the multiple and, contingent ways humans
relate to each other in the realm of family life. Thus, “relational subjects” for
the purposes of this study are understood mostly in the spirit of feminist
political  and  legal  theory  that  Leckey  calls  “relational  theory”  (2008).
According to this view, the applicants in the case law analysed in this study are
embedded in webs of affective human relationships that they wish to call
family relations or family life in the context of their national legal systems and
the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights.  Behind  this,  another  more
abstract  view  of  “relational”  emerges  as  stressing  a  certain  view  of  viewing
social, political and legal reality, where relations exist also between individuals
and institutions such as ‘family’, ‘State’, ‘law’ or ‘human rights’.
This is where a relational view of society and social theory comes in useful
as elaborated in the various strands of relational sociology, a general theory of
society  in  contrast  to  conceptualising  human societies  as  made  up  of  “solid
societies of social structures” (Dépelteau 2013: 166). As François Dépelteau
has noted, “relational” is a term that crops up in numerous different contexts
in scholarly texts within the social sciences and humanities (2013: 9). He goes
on to characterise this as a “relational turn” (2013: 51). As he notes, there is
not much that scholars of relational sociology agree upon apart from the fact
that they call their main object of inquiry “relations”. One of the major bones
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of contention is how the ontological status of relations is seen: are they seen as
transactions between social actors (e.g. Dépelteau 2013: Crossley 2013;
Crossley 2010; Emirbayer 1997) within a single-level ontology or are relations
seen to possess an existence of their own as well as causal powers – “emergent
properties”, as Archer (2013: 152) would have it. Donati and Archer (2015, see
also Archer 2012 and Donati 2011) argue that relations are entities of their own
with emergent properties, and see the views of Dépelteau (2008, 2013) and
Emirbayer (1997), for example, as “relationists”, not grasping the emergent,
causal  and  independent  nature  of  social  relations.  The  view adopted  in  this
study  tips  closer  to  the  seeing  relations  according  to  the  transactional  and
“relationist”  perspective,  but  the  work  of  Donati  and  Archer  merits  to  be
discussed here as they have developed the notion of relational subjectivity,
albeit from a different viewpoint, in their recent book The Relational Subject
(2015).  However,  to them, this  can be an aggregation of  individuals,  be it  a
couple or a larger group of persons. As opposed to the “transactionalists” they
argue against, their multi-level ontology, the emergent properties of relations
and  mentions  of  concepts  such  as  ‘the  common  good’  that  resonate  with
Catholic  Social  Teaching,  an  important  point  of  reference  to  both  of  them13
may allow to characterise them as “transcendentalists” in the context of social
ontology, too.
Together with The Relational Subject (Donati and Archer 2015), Pierpaolo
Donati’s Relational Sociology (2011) may be counted among the few attempts
by  a  in  recent  years  to  deliver  a  comprehensive  account  of  what  relational
sociology constitutes from the viewpoint of one or two like-minded scholars.
A similar, but differently based account has been given by Crossley in Towards
Relational Sociology (2010). Donati’s Relational Sociology, however,
happens  to  make  direct  links  to  his  earlier  and  ongoing  research  in  family
sociology. To Donati, social relations, instead of ‘social facts’, structures or
subjects,  are  the  basic  cells  that  make  up  human  society,  and  provide  an
alternative take on the constitution of society compared to the tension between
structure and agency (Donati 2011). He is also specialised in family sociology,
and indeed a lot  of  the examples he cites in this  theoretical  piece are taken
from micro or macro level family sociology. Judging by these examples cited
from Relational Sociology (2011), he is not a proponent of a pluralist view of
family formation at all. However, the theory of relational sociology as a general
sociological theory may be read and appropriated in counterpoint (see Chapter
3.3) from a pluralist point of view, as it may be applied to shift the focus in
both  theoretical  and  empirical  accounts  of  family  life  to  relations  between
13 Archer and Donati also operate with many concepts that, most probably due to their
involvement in the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, bear resemblance to remnants of the
language of Catholic Social Teaching in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international
human rights documents up until this day. For publications discussing the relation of contemporary
sociology and Catholic social teaching as well as for personal reflections on these themes by Archer,
Donati and others see Sharkey (2012).
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subjects instead of their immutable, fixed or prescribed statuses or identities.
Thus, Donati’s views on the significance of social relations in the constitution
of society and on the symbolic and structural aspects of kinship provide food
for thought for conceptualising what a theory of ‘relational subjects’ in family
life might look like.
Donati  identifies  the  earliest  traces  of  relational  sociology  in  “Georg
Simmel’s ‘relational turning-point’” (2011: 6) and in Marcel Mauss’ theory of
gift exchange (2011: 6). He does not see Durkheimian social facts as the main
object of sociological inquiry, but social relations: “the object of sociology is
neither the so-called ‘subject’, nor the social system, nor equivalent couplets
(structure and agency, life-worlds and social system, and so forth), but is the
social relation itself”” (2011: 4-5)14. Furthermore, Donati draws a lot from
some of  the main notions of  the ‘structuralist  social  contract’  (Robcis  2013)
even  though  he  does  not  call  it  by  that  name.  Especially  in  discussing  the
examples of relational sociology that he takes from the field of family
sociology, he argues in favour of understanding family relations as pertaining
to a field of ‘symbolic’ (linguistic) significations and structural distinctions.
According to him:
Durkheim developed a strongly integrative (and radically holistic)
theory of social relations, which underlies their symbolic character (as
‘collective conscience’) and structural character (as ties) produced by
society. From him emanated the French school (including Mauss and
Lévi-Strauss) who conceive of social relations as essential cognitive
structures of society, understood as a collective order of exchange
through which is generated and regenerated the passage from nature
to culture.
Pierpaolo Donati (2011: 78)
Thus, to Donati, the semantics of social relations are referential (symbolic) and
structural  (tie/link).  True  to  his  engagement  with  critical  realism,  he
continuously tries to find a mid-way between Durkheimian views of society as
an  organic  whole  and  what  he  calls  ‘relationist’  or  postmodern  views  of  the
society as made up of individuals. According to Donati:
Relational sociology sides neither with individualism nor with holism.
In fact, it opposes both the under-socialized vision and the over-
socialized  vision  of  the  human  being.  It  affirms  the  existence  of  an
order of reality that sociology, whether classical or modern, still has
not understood. Society is neither an organic body nor a sum of
individuals. It is, instead, a relational configuration which goes
beyond  the  simple  sum  of  individuals  but  never  goes  so  far  as  to
become a holistic body.
14 Emphasis original.
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Pierpaolo Donati (2011: 64)
To Donati,  a  pluralist  view of  family would most probably be guilty  of  both
what he deplores as postmodernism (nihilism?) and ‘relationism’, which he
sees  as  promoting  a  postmodern  and  individualist  mode  of  thought  where
relations emerge from the subjects  or terms that  they link:  “…[R]elationists
see the relation as the merging of  the terms it  links.  In this  way,  we meet a
relativist  and  pragmatist  vision  which  views  the  relation  as  a  form  of
determinism in its own right!” (2011: 66). This resonates with the Legendrian
idea  of  “autonomously  founded  subjects”  as  analysed  by  Théry  in  the
Introduction.
However,  what  Donati  does  not  take  up  is  that  his  general  views  on  the
significance of relations and relational configurations as the basis of social life
and society do not need to be applied to call  for  the singularist  view of  ‘the
family’ he takes up in his examples. A relational (or what he probably would
call  relationist)  view  of  society  might  just  as  well  draw  attention  to  the
significance  of  social  relations  regardless  of  the  gender  and  many
characteristics of the subjects concerned. After all, critical realism, and, as a
continuation of the critical realist tradition, relational sociology does give
significance  to  social  change  and  the  agency  of  individual  subjects.  Indeed,
according  Donati,  social  change  as  described  according  to  the  relational
paradigm  takes  place  in  the  following  manner:  the  context  of  subjects
produces  the  dynamics  of  relations  and  social  interactions,  which  lead  to
emerging social forms.15 When articulating what family is, Donati builds on a
structuralist-symbolic foundation: “… [T]he relationship that we call a family
is  not  only  a  product  of  perceptions,  sentiments  and  empathy,  but  is  a  fact
which is  both symbolic  (‘a  reference to’,  i.e. re-fero)  and structural  (‘a  bond
between’, i.e. re-ligo). As such, it does not depend on the subject even though
it can be actualized (‘live’) only through subjects” (2011: 16). In more everyday
terms, he deplores the view he argues postmodern ‘relationists’ have of family
relations: “The family is figured as a construct, according to choice, and with
this it loses the characteristics of a deep inter-subjective relation based on the
encounter  of  a  man  and  a  woman  and  on  reciprocal  exchanges  between
generations. Family and work become human only under certain conditions
and  specific  moments”  (2011:  21).  It  seems  that  according  to  Donati,  the
dichotomy  of  masculine/feminine  provides  a  great  deal  of  these  conditions
and moments when it comes to viewing certain sets of relations as constituting
family life.
Throughout Relational Sociology,  Donati takes up ethical considerations
and examples where he often deplores what is happening in the world today.
Many of these examples concern family formation or family life, but some of
them are related to social relations in the field of work or in the era of digital
and mass communication. Furthermore, he dresses these comments on many
15 See Figure 5.4 in Donati (2011: 178).
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occasions in the rhetoric of Catholic social thought, stressing the significance
of  what  is  ‘human’,  deploring  the  ‘de-humanising’  aspects  of  contemporary
social life and stressing the significance of the ‘common good’. So, according
to Donati, a relation between two adults is not enough to make a couple or a
family  –  he  very  much refers  to  the  structural  (man/woman)  and  symbolic
(linguistic)  aspects  and  the  gender/generation  grid.  But  what  if  a  group  of
people look like a family and function in every possible way as a family, but is
based on a dyadic same-sex relationship? In fact, sociology would indeed be
quite blind as a discipline and as a way of thinking to what is going on in society
if  it  blatantly  refused  to  see,  acknowledge  and  analyse  new  forms  and
configurations of social and family life that emerge around it.
It is only possible to get away from the current disarray in sociology
about what the family ‘is’, by grasping the autonomous reality of this
relation on its own terms. But what does the ‘relational reality’ of the
family consist of? …we see individuals but we speak on the supposition
of relations. The word family indicates relations. All the language that
we  adopt  to  describe  what  we  see  beyond  single  individuals  is
essentially that of relations. The words make sense only if they refer
back to relations.
Pierpaolo Donati (2011: 129)
If read and replied to in counterpoint, the quote above captures the idea of a
pluralist view of family life: by describing certain relations as family life (such
as same-sex adult relations or non-genetic parent-child ties in families formed
by same-sex couples), actors also create relations in time and space. These
aspirations may then be taken to the public sphere and be formed into political
and legal claims such as complaints to national courts and the European Court
of Human Rights. Furthermore, Donati argues about family and social change:
The point is that to grasp social change in the family, it is necessary to
regard it as a social relation and to maintain the connections between
the family as an inter-subjective relation… and as an institutional
relation… For this, it is necessary that the observer adopts a point of
view  on  the  basis  of  which  the  family  cannot  be  reduced  to  a
summation of individual life courses or to a contingent interlocking of
them.
Pierpaolo Donati (2011: 187-8)
But  what  if  “summation  of  individual  life  courses”  and  “contingent
interlocking of them” constitute family relations to a great number of actors?
My argument is that Donati’s ideas of relational sociology in general and most
of  his  ideas  of  relational  family  sociology  are  very  much  applicable  to  the
pluralist  view  of  the  family,  even  though  he  argues  the  opposite  in  family-
related  issues.  Also,  many  of  the  ethical  aspects  he  is  after,  namely  social
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cohesion,  reciprocity  and  common  good  may  be  very  much  advanced  by
adopting a wider notion of what may constitute a family.
Nicola  Lacey,  a  British  legal  theorist,  has  introduced  the  notion  of
“relational subjects” (1996: 150, see second opening quote in the Introduction)
somewhat inadvertedly in an article of hers in which she discussed ethical
orientation of legal theory from a feminist perspective. She builds her analysis
of equality, rights and subjectivity on critical legal theory and feminist
concerns. According to her, equality and rights “are in pluralist discourse
salient markers, supposed guarantees, of universal citizenship and legal
subjecthood” (1996: 147). Both the concepts of equality and rights have been
subject  to  feminist  critique,  which,  together  with  critical  race  theory  and
Marxist perspectives
…has traced the ways in which rights presuppose a particular view of
the subject and of that subject’s place in the world. The rights bearer is
an individual who is defined in terms of certain powers and capacities:
in a sense this subject is alienated even from himself, in that he stands
in a relationship of ownership to his defining characteristics.
Furthermore, his relation to the world and to other subjects is, when
mediated  in  terms  of  rights,  essentially  that  of  subject  to  object:  the
having of rights is the having form of property, for which one competes
with others, which one asserts or defends competitively as against
others, and which are enforced coercively against others.
Nicola Lacey (1996: 147)
Lacey goes on to ask how rights could be seen differently in order to avoid this
orientation  of  competitive  individualism.  She  argues  that  it  is  possible  to
reimagine rights from the viewpoint of critical and feminist scholarship. Here,
she  takes  up  the  thinking  of  Luce  Irigaray,  a  French  philosopher  and
psychoanalytical  theorist.  According  to  Lacey,  Irigaray  argues  that  “a
relational conception of rights would have to be premised on the recognition
of irreducibly different subjectivities which relate in an intransitive way to
another” (1996: 147). However, as Lacey points out, Irigaray’s thinking (1996,
see also Lacey 1995) is difficult to translate into the language of formal rights
and the law, as an ethics of sexual difference might, if viewed in a simplistic
and stereotypical manner, produce problematic and disastrous effects from
the point of view of gender equality (1996: 149).
Robert  Leckey,  a  Canadian  legal  scholar,  has  combined  liberal  feminist
theory to the study of family law and administrative law in his book Contextual
Subjects (2008). The main argument Leckey puts forth is that family law and
administrative law, the fields his analysis focuses on, have begun to perceive
contextual  subjects  (subject  =  legal  person)  as  the  main  characters  of  these
fields, as well these areas of law also becoming contextual subjects (subject =
area of study) themselves. Leckey offers a very intriguing and useful approach
to the study of family law and administrative law with his combination of legal
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contextualism and feminist relational theory: he argues for “the emergence of
a new conception of the legal subject using relational theory” (2008: 7). In the
context of Leckey’s study (2008: 7), “relational theory” is a strand of political
philosophy and feminist political theory, informed by an ethics of care in the
spirit  of  the  work  of  Carol  Gilligan  (1982)  and  Eva  Feder  Kittay  (1999),  for
example. According to Leckey
Relational theory is not an officially constituted school, and its
boundaries  are  contestable.  It  can  be  seen  as  comprising  several
connected  and  overlapping  areas  of  work.  One  proposes  and
elaborates  an  ethic  of  care.  Such  scholarship  draws  attention  to  the
crucial relations of dependence and care on which each individual
inevitably relies at some point.
Robert Leckey (2008: 7)
Leckey goes on to describe that relational theory tends to emphasise
differences between men and women in their  orientation to care,  be it  on a
level of principle (‘ethics of care’ v. ‘ethics of justice’) or practice and everyday
life,  where  women  perform  most  care  duties  in  society  (2008:  7).  Leckey
complements  this  strand  of  thinking  with  literature  on  rights  as  relational,
where  rights  are  “cast…  as  tools  revisable  in  the  service  of  desirable
relationships” (2008: 7). This line of legal thinking has most extensively been
dealt with in Law’s Relations by  Jennifer  Nedelsky  (2011),  a  scholar  on
relational autonomy, a field of study which strives to reconfigure liberal ideals
of  autonomy.  Envisioning  subjects  as  relational  is  not  emancipatory  or
liberating  as  such:  a  (married)  woman  stripped  of  legal  capacity,  a
construction of Western political and legal thinking from less than 100 years
back  depending  on  the  State  in  question  was  a  person  utterly  enmeshed  in
relations where the needs or status of others such as her husband or her
children defined what she was. What thinking on relational autonomy tries to
capture is how to combine what is good in abstract (legal) individualism and
subjectivity  while  at  the  same  time  taking  into  account  the  importance  of
relations of care and ethical responsibilities towards other persons. (Nedelsky
2011; see also Choudry and Herring 122-127.)
What  I  wish  to  draw  from  Leckey’s  work  is  primarily  his  concept  of
‘contextual  subjects’  as  a  conception  of  the  legal  subject  that  has  been
constituted with an emphasis on relations between subjects and the particular
circumstances they inhabit. Even though Leckey is writing about the Canadian
legal context, his characterisation of the third quarter of the 20th century is
apt: he argues that
…relational theory illuminates family law during the period 1950-
1975.  Family  law,  at  that  time,  produced  a  thick  legal  subject,  one
embedded – to an extent asphyxiating for some – in social  relations
and religious traditions. In contrast to relational theory’s
exhortations, family law showed itself to be markedly acontextual in
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methodology. A couple of statuses structured the field dichotomously:
married/unmarried and legitimate/illegitimate. For the most part,
lacking the privileged status entailed an unpleasant packet of negative
consequences without contextual examination as to whether
particular circumstances warranted other treatment.
Robert Leckey (2008: 248)
Leckey, too, discusses the possibility of naming his view of legal subjectivity
“relational  subjects”,  but  in  his  study,  contextualism  is  such  an  overriding
theme that is emerges as the most pertinent field of analysis. He sees that the
notion of contextual subjects is more helpful in his analysis especially in the
field of administrative law, where he says a view of subjects as “relational” tips
the  scales  in  advance  towards  mutuality,  reciprocity,  cooperation  and
communication, or what he calls “relational theory’s normative commitment”
(2008: 255-256). He argues that “two conceptions of a relational approach are
intelligible: one strong, one weak” (2008: 256). The strong conception aims at
emancipating  individuals,  such  as  women  who  have  been  in  asymmetrical
relationships such as traditional marriage arrangements, and enhancing their
autonomy.  The  weak  conception  does  not  share  the  strong  normative
commitment of the strong one, but aims at developing normative thought and
applying  a  relational  approach  to  contexts  where  it  has  not  been  developed
before. Most importantly, it “seeks to assess situations through its lens of the
descriptive premise of subjects as embedded and to identify and analyse the
way  that  existing  rights  structure  existing  relationships”  (2008:  256).  This
study strives to carry out an exercise according to the latter approach, probably
falling back to the first one at times.
1.4 DISCUSSION: WEBS OF ALLIANCE AND FILIATION
… self-ownership requires a conceptual division between the self as a
subject  and  the  self  as  a  physical  object.  Since  women  are  under-
represented as active agents in language, law, political discourse, and
the symbolic order generally, ‘self’-ownership for women appears
irregular.
Davies and Naffine (2001: 41)
ECHR case law constitutes a vast sea of knowledge that comes with significant
legal  and political  authority in the Member States of  the Council  of  Europe.
The concepts discussed in the first  sub-chapter,  alliance,  consanguinity and
filiation, offer anthropological themes under which case law may be grouped
and analysed. In contemporary circumstances, ‘alliance’ translates as the act
of  forming  couples  and  usually  living  together,  possibly  getting  married  or
forming a civil union on the way. Consanguinity, or the metaphor of ‘shared
blood’ refers to genetic and gestational ties but perhaps instead of slicing it up
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to genetic and gestational relations, the notion of biological relations might
convey the ensemble of the whole process of conceiving a child, pregnancy and
childbirth in which not just pregnant women but their intimate partners are
party to on the level of everyday life. Relations of filiation are often registered
and instituted on the basis  of  consanguinity,  but if  we wish to look at  what
filiation ultimately rests on, it is not shared genetic substance as such but the
predetermined form of recognising certain interpersonal relations as valid in
relation to the community and State question. Adoption and assisted
reproduction provide contexts where relations of filiation are constituted on a
more technical level, both legally and biotechnologically.
Debates surrounding the notion of a ‘symbolic order’ of kinship acting as a
barrier to legislative changes such as instituting civil unions and marriage for
same-sex  couples  and  recognising  children  born  from  non-coital  forms  of
reproduction associated with these unions have been played out mainly in
France and the French-speaking academic sphere, so they have a certain
limited  and  localised  colour  to  them.  However,  the  link  made  and  the
continuum  provided  by  classical  anthropological  thought  and
psychoanalytical approaches to modern-day debates concerning what family
‘is’  and  may  be  made  up  of  on  the  level  of  persons,  sexes,  genders  and
orientations  is  particularly  interesting  and  provides  a  mirror  to  the  less
‘intellectualised’ debates in the English-speaking academic world where the
notion of a ‘symbolic order’ has rarely been mentioned. Lévi-Straussian (and
Lacanian) thinking and its latter applications to these debates over the decades
has been criticised by feminist commentators on both sides of the Atlantic for
universalist and patriarchal views on the incest taboo and for conceptualising
the  exchange  of  women  as  the  threshold  of  culture.  However,  as  Camille
Robcis (2004) points out, ‘founding fathers’ of this particular discourse such
as Lévi-Strauss were probably not motivated by great political passions when
theorising on this issue and it can be argued that the foundations of this debate
provided  by  this  line  of  thought  need  not  be  interpreted  as  providing
normative answers.
Taking stock of the thought of Lévi-Strauss is useful for understanding the
theoretical  context  and  the  wider  meaning  of  the  concept  of  the  ‘symbolic
order’ of kinship, referred to in the Pacs and ‘mariage pour tous’16 debates,
but it is better seen as a product of its time instead of a normative account of
what  might  be  the  universal  ‘anthropological’  characteristics  of  human
families.  Certain  parallels  may  be  drawn  between  the  French  political  and
legislative arena and a European culture of human rights: in both contexts of
discourse and debate, presenting rights-related arguments that refer to divine
authority,  religious  tradition  or  ‘nature’  would  not  be  seen  as  convincing,
rather very subjective. Scientific, or theoretical arguments, in turn, are evoked
in  these  contexts,  but  they  too  come  under  a  variety  of  guises:  statistical
16 ”Marriage for all”, the slogan of the campaign for same-sex marriage in France in the early
2010s. See Robics (2015).
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information or outcomes of empirical research, or in the French variety, in a
mixture  of  philosophy,  social  theory  and  a  certain  secular  dogma  of  legal
tradition, or a Legendrian ‘anthropological function of law’ to act as the source
of  reason  (see  Supiot  2008)  in  an  uncertain  and  irrational  world.  A  certain
quasi-universalism and an  illusion  of  inclusion  seems  to  be  a  basic  tenet  in
both spheres of political and legal activity. Universalism entails the promise of
formal  equality,  but  tends  to  be  blind  to  the  particular,  be  it  gendered
individuals, sexual orientation, gender identity or historically moulded social
contexts, such as the emergence of non-heterosexual family formation due to
the decriminalisation of homosexuality and the popularisation of human
rights rhetoric in civil society activism.
In sum, it can be said that both as a political philosophy and a set of legal
principles,  human rights have moved away from dogmatic  doctrine and the
conception  of  such  principles  as  ‘given’.  Instead,  human rights  reside  in  an
intersection  of  the  three  latter  categories  drawn  by  Dembour  (2010):
deliberated, fought for and talked about. In addition, claims for recognition of
family formation that forego demands of status (married or unmarried) and
gender (male and female) that external views proscribe is an application of the
principle  of  equality  built  into  human  rights  thinking.  The  framework  of
analysis that is applied in the three subsequent chapters of this study places
biological,  social,  legal  and  gendered  relations  in  the  webs  of  alliance
(marriage and démariage), consanguinity (maternity and paternity) and
filiation (adoption and assisted reproduction as paths to maternity, paternity
and  parenthood  in  general).  From  the  point  of  view  of  feminist  relational
theory this leads to conceiving family relations being relations bestowed upon
particular, legal and abstract subjects whose “irreducible differences” (Lacey
1996: 150) are taken into account. This intersection of various forms of family
relations  between  individuals  with  forms  of  kinship  produces relational
subjects in the field of family law.
It  is  argued in this  study that  the notion of  ‘relational  subjects’  acts  as a
nodal  idea  of  trying  to  make  sense  of  what  the  collision  of  human  rights
thinking and family law in this particular historical juncture is producing. In
this  schema,  structure  refers  to  the  existing  status  of  subjects,  be  it  male,
female, married or unmarried, for example. In these structures, which
somewhat vary between different States and relevant legislation, kinship and
family are understood as systems or institutions where subjects may inhabit
certain  symbolic  positions  of  wife,  husband,  mother,  father,  daughter,  son,
sister  and  brother  according  to  their  gender  and/or  marital  status.  In  the
context  of  defending  a  traditional  view  of  family,  structure  and  symbolic
positions are usually defended as natural, immutable and perhaps
transcendental. Agency, then, may be of individual kind on the micro-level of
everyday life or of a politicised kind and channelled through political activism,
advocacy and/or academic debate, which is often inspired by identity politics,
namely feminist and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender)
perspectives.  In the context  of  a  pluralist  view of  family,  various reforms of
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family  law  and  policy  are  advocated  for  in  order  to  make  e.g.  marriage  or
recognition of parent-child relations more flexible and less bound in gender or
presumed heterosexuality. The dichotomies of structure and agency, status
and identities or traditional and pluralist views of family may be broadened
with a relational analysis of family formation in contemporary Europe, which
may take the significance of relations between individuals as its starting point.
A  gender-sensitive  relational  analysis  may  also  escape  the  pitfall  of  formal
gender-neutrality turning into gender-blindness. After all, as may be learned
from the ‘structuralist social contract’ (Robcis 2013), gender is an inescapable
category  and  distinction  both  on  physical  and  social  levels  and  built  into
human  society  as  one  of  the  main  relations  structuring  social  life par
excellence.
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2 CONCEPT OF FAMILY IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
For both sides of the debate, at issue is not only the question of which
relations of desire ought to be legitimated by the state, but of who may
desire the state, who may desire the state’s desire.
Judith Butler (2002: 22)
How does the concept of family relate to thinking about human rights? What
is written in international human rights documents and treaties concerning
family  and  marriage?  What  kind  of  implications  does  this  have  for  the
protection  of  vulnerable  categories  of  people  such  as  women,  children  and
minorities? In short, to what kind of a family do human beings have a ‘right’
in the realm of human rights law? These are some of the questions that need
to  be  addressed  before  embarking  upon an  analysis  of  how family  relations
have  been  defined  and  conceived  in  the  case  law  of  the  European  Court  of
Human Rights. At first sight, one might wonder whether family relations have
anything to do with human rights at all. Human rights may be understood in
a fairly narrow, politically liberal way pertaining to individual civil and
political rights and the protection of individual liberties in the public sphere.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, a resolution adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations is the founding document of a
“culture  of  human rights”  (Hastrup  2001,  2003)  emerging  after  the  Second
World War.  Its  content has acted as an inspiration for international  human
rights treaties within the United Nations and regional human rights systems
such  as  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  Universal  Declaration  contains  a
“definition”  of  family  and  a  confirmation  of  the  right  to  marry  in  one  of  its
Articles (Article 16), and some of the other Articles in it provide support for
mainly economic and social rights concerning family life.
The UDHR is widely read, commented on and circulated also today even
though almost seventy years have passed since it was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948 (the International
Day of Human Rights). However, from the point of view of international law
its status is somewhat ambivalent: legally it is a mere declaration and thus not
officially binding on the States that adopted it. On the other hand, it is often
argued  to  represent  customary  international  law  and  thus  to  act  as  an
influential document of legal authority (see e.g. Adolphe 2006: 370). Together
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, adopted
in  1966)  and  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural
Rights (ICESCR, adopted in 1966), it forms the International Bill of Human
Rights, which is the core of global human rights law within the United Nations.
From  these  documents,  the  ICCPR  and  the  ICESCR  are  binding  in
international law, as most States in the world have ratified them, making them
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part of their international obligations. Later on, the United Nations has come
up with specific international treaties on the rights of vulnerable categories of
people,  such  as  women  (Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of
Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW, adopted in 1979) and children
(Convention of the Rights of the Child, CRC, adopted in 1989).
In this chapter I wish to find out where the formulations of the Universal
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  concerning  family  as  the  “natural  and
fundamental” unit of society emanate from. According to these sources, to
what extent is family a public form of organising household relations and to
what extent is it protected by privacy, both as an institution and as an entity of
social life tying people together in a web of close personal relations? Is it an
institution that exists to protect intimate and affective relations within the
private sphere, or an institution that exists to make people act and desire in
the way the State wishes them to do?1 In this chapter, I will give a brief look
into the drafting history of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and especially the “natural and fundamental” (see Article 16(3) UDHR)
character of  family as a  concept and institution,  comparing it  to documents
and  sources  that  display  similar  phraseology.  The  history  of  political  and
philosophical  thought  on  the  pre-political  and  pre-legal  essence  of  human
pairing and reproduction goes of course much further in history. The main aim
in this chapter is to find out where the wording of the definition of family in
the  Universal  Declaration  has  come  from,  as  it  is  so  widely  disseminated,
quoted,  marvelled  upon  and  argued  with  also  today  in  academic  research,
popularised human rights education and advocacy. I argue that this is often
done  by  taking  these  words  at  commonsensical  value,  detached  from  the
ensemble of its original context, language and the philosophical and doctrinal
tones it conveys. Indeed, Article 16 of the UDHR and many other human rights
documents and treaties are used to argue both for and against changes in how
family  is  understood  today,  showing  that  they  are  words  that  are  hoped  to
“make things happen” according to the “discourse” school of human rights (see
Dembour 2006, 2010).
2.1 FAMILY IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is proclaimed in Article 16(3)
that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State”2. Variations of this
proclamation or other phrases concerning family as a concept appear in many
human  rights  conventions  on  both  the  global  level  and  within  regional
1 See opening quote by Butler (2002).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, General
Assembly of the United Nations. See Treaties and Related Documents in Sources.
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systems,  and  these  provisions  are  quoted  widely  when  discussing  the
relationship  between  international  human  rights  norms  and  family  law  in
national  legal  systems.  In  this  chapter  I  offer  a  rather  detailed  exegesis  of
Article 16(3) of the UDHR because this particular phrase seems to offer if not
a definitive key, at least an interesting historical keyhole through which to
obtain  a  view  into  the  building  blocks  of  discourses  on  family  and  human
rights  in  the  era  after  the  Second  World  War.  The  drafting  process  of  the
UDHR  and  the  outcome,  the  Declaration  itself,  are  often  hailed  as  a
multilateral success story, where representatives of various philosophical,
religious and political traditions came together and managed to come up with
a document that has stood the test of time as the cornerstone of international
human  rights  legislation  (Glendon  2001).However,  already  during  the  time
when the UDHR was being drafted, the whole idea of a universally applicable
declaration  of  human  rights  was  subject  to  critique  by  the  American
Anthropological Association (1947). The statement focused on cautioning the
drafters  of  positioning  one  culture  as  more  valuable  than  another,  and  was
driven  by  anti-colonialist  concerns.  (See  also  Morsink  1999:  ix,  and  Engle
2001).
Article  16  of  the  UDHR  articulates  the  ‘right  to  marry  and  to  found  a
family’:
(1)  Men  and  women  of  full  age,  without  any  limitation  due  to  race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent
of the intending spouses.
(3)  The  family  is  the  natural  and  fundamental  group unit  of  society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16
Firstly this provision protects the civil right to marry the person of one’s choice
(of the opposite sex) free from coercion and interference by the State as to the
combination  of  one’s  and  one’s  partner’s  ethnic  or  religious  identity,  for
instance. The equality of husbands and wives, which was not a legal let alone
a social reality in the late 1940s in many European States or other parts of the
world, is an important claim in this provision. The Article does not explicitly
leave  out  the  possibility  of  other  kinds  of  unions  or  say  anything  about  the
supremacy  of  marriage  as  a  way  of  organising  relations  of  affection  and
dependency,  but  as  Rhoda  Howard-Hassmann  points  out,  it  would  be
“sociologically  anachronistic  to assume that the drafters… of  the UDHR did
not have in mind a heterosexual family” in the late 1940s (Howard-Hassman
2001: 74). One could add that the Declaration does not touch upon differences
of  legal  status  between  children  born  to  unmarried  parents  and  married
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parents which would have been a more temporally close concern in the mid-
20th century.
The first section stresses the equality of the spouses, but even more than
that it emphasises the prohibition of any interference as to who one can marry
in light of the marriage partner’s ethnicity, nationality or religion. In the post-
Holocaust world after the Second World War it was of utmost importance to
stress that the marriage prohibitions between Jews and non-Jews that were in
place in Nazi Germany (see Burleigh and Wipperman 1991) were never to be
repeated. However, the absence of this kind of interference was a distant goal
just like the equality of women and men in marriage: in several states in the
United States so-called ‘miscegenation’ laws prohibiting marriage between
persons of different skin colour were still in place. Such laws were repealed on
the  federal  level  only  in  1967  with  the  Supreme  Court  decision Loving v.
Virginia3.  These  laws  were  ruled  unconstitutional  by  the  United  States
Supreme Court in 1967, but the last acts were repealed as late as 20004. Thus,
it took almost twenty years for the promise of the Universal Declaration to be
given formal power in the United States, which, after all, had been convening
and leading the drafting process of the UDHR. Today, there is wide-ranging
debate on whether lifting the bans on interracial marriage would be analogous
to allowing same-sex marriage. (Novkov 2008.)
A  parallel  to  the  definition  of  family  in  the  UDHR may  be  taken  from a
prime example of Catholic statecraft, the Constitution of the Republic of
Ireland from 1937. This particular Article of the Constitution of Ireland, still in
force today, reads:
The  State  recognises  the  Family  as  the  natural  primary  and
fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and
superior to all positive law.5
Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, Article 41
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, family is ”the natural
primary and fundamental unit group of society” and according to the UDHR
it is the ”natural and fundamental group unit of society”. Only two words are
in different places, and the substantial content is the same.
Stéphanie Lagoutte and Ágúst Thór Árnason (1999), a legal scholar and a
legal philosopher, offer a fairly balanced but somewhat simplistic analysis of
the definition of family in Article 16 of the UDHR:
3 The Supreme Court of the United States judgments McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) repealed a ban
on cohabitation between blacks and whites, and Loving v. Virginia (1967) the ban on interracial
marriage.
4 Alabama was the last State to repeal its ban on interracial marriage (Gevrek 2014: 57).
5 See Constitution of the Republic of Ireland under Sources.
57
In addition to declaring that the family is the fundamental group unit
of society, article 16 also proclaims its "natural", essential quality; a
family finds its roots in nature and biology: sexuality, procreation,
birth, aging, death. Defining the family as a "natural" unit also refers
to natural law: the family as an essential and natural part of a society
made  up  by  human  beings.  This  definition  of  family  is  a  direct
translation of the anthropological theorization of kinship: it
emphasizes the structural aspects of family, no matter when or where
it is being studied. The definition synthesizes the biological and
sociological dimensions of family.
Lagoutte and Árnason (1999: 338)
Lagoutte and Árnason rightly point out the rooting of Article 16 and the UDHR
in general in natural law. The problem with the definition of family in Article
16(3)  in  today,  as  the  UDHR  is  so  widely  circulated  and  disseminated  in
various  rather  secular  contexts,  is  that  the  word  “natural”  in  the  context  of
family and human rights thinking is often taken in too simplistic a manner,
reducing it to a view of biology and the scientific facts of human reproduction
lifting a certain mode of social organisation, a heterosexual nuclear family, as
superior to others. After all, human rights thinking is all about transcending
nature and biology, also when it comes to the protection of family and seeking
justice, which has nothing to do with the life of humans or any other animals
from the perspective of evolutionary theory, for example. Furthermore,
Lagoutte and Árnason make a rather bold assertion by saying that Article 16(3)
would be “a direct translation of the anthropological theorization of kinship”
(1999: 338), as they offer no clue to what kind of anthropological research this
theorisation refers to. One is only left to assume that they refer to the vast
scholarship of social and cultural anthropology accumulated during the past
century or so. After all, the term “anthropological” means rather different
things when comparing ethnographic studies, medical anthropology or
dogmatic anthropology, which comes closer to theology.
In  his  detailed  history  of  the  drafting  of  the  Universal  Declaration,
Johannes  Morsink,  an  American  historian,  devotes  a  short  passage  to  the
drafting process of Article 16 of the UDHR. It is noted that Charles Malik, a
Lebanese Christian statesman and philosopher, was deeply involved in the
drafting  of  this  particular  passage  of  the  Declaration.  (Morsink  1999:  252-
257.) Malik was a scholar of Neo-Thomist philosophy (Morsink 1999: 30), a
branch of philosophy inspired by the thought of Saint Thomas of Aquinas from
the 13th century, which has become the ‘official philosophy’ of the Catholic
Church. As is demonstrated in the following comparison and analysis of the
definition  of  family  in  the  Constitution  of  Ireland  and  the  Universal
Declaration, dating from the same period and taking their language from the
same sources (Catholic social thinking, formulated in papal encyclicals), the
word ’natural’ should in the context of the UDHR be understood to refer more
narrowly to the vocabulary of Neo-Thomist thinking and natural law.
Concept of Family in International Human Rights Law
58
Natural law, as a field of juridical thought, relies on the work of a long line
of philosophers from St Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century to Enlightenment
thinkers in the 18th century such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
Baron Montesquieu, for example. It may be defined in the field of philosophy
as “a system of right or justice held to be common to all humans and derived
from  nature  rather  than  from  the  rules  of  society,  or  positive  law”
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2014, no pagination). Many natural law thinkers
relied on Christian doctrine and tried to articulate to what extent principles of
natural law could be revealed through human reasoning in relation to divine
revelation. What is at stake and what was most essential in the work of natural
law  thinkers  over  centuries  was  how  humans  may  apply  logic  and  find
principles of justice with the help of thinking and reasoning. (Encyclopedia
Britannica  2014.)  In  the  context  of  the  relation  of  human  procreation,  the
raising and socialisation of offspring and social organisation, “natural” family
still  refers  more  to  how  humans  make  sense  of  natural  facts  and  “human
nature” and derive principles of justice from facts and their own thought.
Like virtually all human rights documents, the Universal Declaration holds
an  anti-discrimination  clause  in  Article  2,  spelling  out  that  “everyone  is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. The
list is not exhaustive, so sexual orientation is most often argued to be covered
by ‘sex’, or that failing, by ‘other status’. This is where the ‘promise of human
rights’ and the dynamic and evolutive possibilities of political mobilisation
with the help of human rights rhetoric and principles of international law may
be located. As the principle of equality is evaluated from different viewpoints
in  different  times  and  epistemic  contexts,  “new”  groups  such  as  sexual  and
gender minorities may take up the language of human rights in their struggles,
be it relating to recognition of informal family relations or not. The Universal
Declaration  contains  other  Articles  as  well  that  deal  with  the  protection  of
family relations, albeit not so directly. Article 25 expresses an entitlement to
certain economic and social rights:
(1)  Everyone  has  the  right  to  a  standard  of  living  adequate  for  the
health  and  well-being  of  himself  and  of  his  family,  including  food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2)  Motherhood  and  childhood  are  entitled  to  special  care  and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy
the same social protection.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25
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The second paragraph of Article 25 is especially important, as it sets children
born out of wedlock on a level plane with children born in legally sanctioned
marriage when it comes to social protection, something that still took decades
to  become  an  established  fact  in  the  majority  of  European  legal  cultures.
However, the passage does not address differences in legal status, which have
had immense importance for the transmission of wealth and property. In the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, children born to unmarried
mothers  were  set  on  a  par  with  children  born  in  wedlock  in  1979  in  the
judgement of Marckx v. Belgium. However, by this time most member States
of  the  Council  of  Europe  had  remedied  the  status  of  children  born  out  of
wedlock, and a few states with a strong legacy of Code Napoléon (Napoleon’s
law collection  from 1804,  see  Iacub  2004),  such  as  Belgium,  lagged  behind
(see Kirchner 1999).
At  the  time  of  its  drafting,  the  UDHR was  subject  to  critique  due  to  the
danger of the end product being a declaration written from an ethnocentrist
Western viewpoint in a statement made by the executive board of the
American Anthropological Association (1947), the largest association of
anthropologists in the world. In 1999, the AAA produced a new “Declaration
of Anthropology and Human Rights” (American Anthropological Association
1999), anchoring itself more firmly in contemporary human rights rhetoric.
(See Engle 2001.) The two documents have been as opposite in intent
regarding the universality of human rights, but Engle argues that “both argue
for the protection of culture” (2001: 537). Over the years, the AAA has shown
more  professional-cum-political  involvement,  for  example  when  it  made  a
statement concerning the current debate on same-sex unions in the United
States, condemning the proposed constitutional amendment consecrating
marriage for heterosexual couples (American Anthropological Association
2004).  This  demonstrates  that  anthropological  knowledge,  just  like
international human rights law, may also be applied to different temporal and
epistemic contexts and be argued to support political projects which represent
underprivileged groups. In the times when the UDHR was created, the AAA
saw it fit to try and temper colonial and imperialist tones, whereas in the early
2000s  when  the  definition  of  marriage  gave  rise  to  heated  debates,  AAA
anthropologists  delivered  a  note  on  the  variability  of  human  social
organisation.
2.2 DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE DEFINITION OF
FAMILY IN UDHR
In 1946 John Humphrey, a Canadian legal scholar, became the director of the
Human Rights  Division  of  the  newly  created  United  Nations  Secretariat.  In
1947  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second World  War,  a  Commission  on  Human
Rights was set up by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
The Commission appointed a committee to draft a bill of rights that could be
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adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The
committee appointed Charles Malik as its rapporteur. The committee decided
to give Humphrey the task to conduct a survey of the world’s constitutions and
other rights documents and to give a first draft for the Universal Declaration.
(Curle 2007.) According to Glendon (2003: 30) and Morsink (1999: 6-8) the
Humphrey draft (Draft outline 1947) was based on a 400-page survey of world
constitutions and rights documents (Documented outline 1947). This survey
held a lot of clauses taken from Latin American constitutions (Glendon 2003)
and featured several mentions of the word ‘family’ but it does not contain any
definition as such of what ‘family’ would be taken to mean. Most important of
all,  it  makes  no  mention  of  the  Constitution  of  Ireland  from  1937,  which
contains a definition of  family which is  almost verbatim the same as in the
Universal Declaration.
The Humphrey draft itself, the Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights,
makes no mention of the word family. One can only speculate whether this was
because Humphrey and his assistants thought that family relations were not
supposed to be the object  of  international  human rights norms in the same
way than in the end product, the adopted version of the Universal Declaration.
Article 13 of the Humphrey draft does contain a mention of marriage (which
resembles Article 12 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the right
to marry): “Every one has the right to contract marriage in accordance with
the laws of the State” (Draft Outline 1947: 6). However, from the point of view
of  universal  or  even  international  norms  this  kind  of  an  article  does  not
proclaim anything as such. If, for example, “the laws of the State” would not
allow people belonging to different ethnic groups to marry, this kind of a clause
would not be very effective in deeming this kind of legislation as unacceptable.
Morsink’s historical study (1999) of the drafting process of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights based on the preparatory documents that have
been preserved for later generations shows that Malik would have wanted to
include even stronger indicators of Neo-Thomism in Article 16(3), but that the
main division over the representatives of the States in the drafting process was
perhaps rather between defining family with reference to a deity. However, the
word  ‘natural’  was  disputed  too,  but  at  root,  the  understanding  of  family
composed of a heterosexual union with the task of having a raising children
was  not  disputed  by  the  drafters.  Morsink  describes  with  the  help  of  the
travaux préparatoires (“preparatory works”)6 how  Malik  proposed  in  the
second session of the Commission that Article 16 should be phrased as follows:
“The family deriving from marriage is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society. It is endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights antecedent to
all positive law and as such shall be protected by the State and Society” (quoted
in Morsink 1999: 254). The only member of the Commission who was against
6 ”Preparatory works” refer to drafting documents, available from relevant archives which are
sometimes referred to in both in the historical and legal interpretation of the will and intention of the
drafters.
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Malik’s definition of the family was the representative of the Soviet Union who
stressed that “various forms of marriage and family existed in the world… each
form corresponding to the special economic conditions of the people
concerned”  (Morsink  1999:  255).  The  representative  of  Belgium,  in  turn,
proposed a two-part vote on Malik’s proposition. The first part was accepted
and the latter part declined (Morsink 1999: 255).
Morsink describes that Malik argued that the word ”Creator” did not carry
theological  meaning  in  this  case,  and  it  could  be  interpreted  to  refer  to
”Nature”, for instance (1999: 256). Thus, Malik managed to get his first version
of  the  Article  in  the  draft  that  was  discussed  in  the  third  session  of  the
Commission. He appealed to his fellow drafters that the phrase ”the natural
and fundamental group unit of society” should be included in the Declaration,
because  that  was,  in  his  opinion,  the  most  important  part  of  his  suggestion
(Morsink 1999: 256). France, Belgium and the United States stood behind this.
The  representative  of  Uruguay,  suggested  that  the  word  ’natural’  would  be
omitted, as “…the essential point was to state that the family was the
fundamental group unit of society and that it was the cell around which a State
was  formed;  the  way  in  which  family  was  constituted  was  of  secondary
importance” (quoted in Morsink 1999: 256). Morsink (1999: 284-285) notes
that  the  word  was  allowed  to  remain  as  the  reference  to  a  Christian  deity
needed to be omitted. In any case, ‘natural’ in Article 16(3) of the UDHR refers
strongly to natural law, not nature or biology as such.
When describing the origins of article 16 of the UDHR, Morsink presents
his own, slightly anachronistic view that the proposal by Uruguay would have
protected the possibility of non-heterosexuals to found a family. It is hard to
believe that the representative of Uruguay or anyone else would have had this
in mind in 1948 concerning non-heterosexual sexuality and family formation,
as  in  those  times,  outlived  homosexuality  and  family  life  were  not  really
conceived  to  have  anything  to  do  with  each  other.  Nevertheless,  Morsink
writes that
…[t]he Uruguay proposal  would have protected the right to found a
family on the part of those whose sexual inclination is not heterosexual
and still have done justice to the anthropological data which tell us that
over the long haul the monogamous, heterosexual marriage is the best
device a society’s continued existence.
Morsink (1999: 256)
It  remains  unclear  what  Morsink  really  means  by  ‘anthropological’  here:
differences between cultures, cultural diversity or the quest for universal traits
of humanity within the discipline of anthropology? In this passage, Morsink
refers to a classical text by Lévi-Strauss, his essay called the ”The Family” (La
famille), but seems to have strayed from Lévi-Strauss original focus, as in this
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essay, Lévi-Strauss does not present ‘anthropological data’ or analysis that
would somehow champion monogamy or heterosexuality (Lévi-Strauss 1971)7.
In  the  essay,  Lévi-Strauss  sets  out  to  answer  the  question  “What  is  a
family?” He stresses that “the family should not be approached in a dogmatic
way”  (1971:  338)  and  that  “this  is  one  of  the  more  elusive  questions  in  the
whole  field  of  social  organisation”  (1971:  338).  He  states  that  “monogamic
[sic], conjugal family is fairly frequent…” but that “…the high frequency of the
conjugal type of grouping does not derive from a universal necessity” (1971:
338). He goes on to ponder: “It is at least conceivable that a perfectly stable
and durable society could exist without it. Hence the difficult problem: if there
is  no natural  law making the family universal,  how can we explain why it  is
found practically everywhere?” (1971: 338). In trying to answer this question,
he identifies three characteristics: that family originates in marriage, consists
of  a  husband,  wife  and  children  born  in  this  union,  and  that  members  of  a
family are linked to each other by legal, economic, religious and other kinds of
rights  and  obligations  as  well  as  by  sexual  rights  and  prohibitions  and
psychological  feelings  (1971:  339).  Most  of  the  essay  is  devoted  to  going
through ethnographic data available from various parts  of  the world,  but as
always, Lévi-Strauss refrains from delivering value judgements and directs his
attention on structures: for example, to him it is more interesting that the
division of labour between the sexes exists in all societies, not so much how it
is divided (1971).
Daniel  Cere,  an  American  scholar  of  religious  studies,  has  also  offered  a
detailed look into the history of the drafting of the definition of family in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He credits the Neo-Thomist content
to  a  memorandum  prepared  by  the  International  Federation  of  Christian
Trade  Unions  (IFCTU)  and  given  to  Malik  for  the  drafting  process.  (Cere
2009). The memorandum by J.P.S. Serrarens, General Secretary of the IFCTU,
draws clearly from Catholic social teaching and papal encyclicals, and phrased
the definition of family in a manner very similar to the one that ended up in
the UDHR:
The free development of the human personality implies that man has
a  right  to  marry  and  to  raise  a  family.  The  family  is  the  natural,
primary and fundamental unit of society; it is older than society itself
and  has  unalienable  rights  antecedent  and  superior  to  positive  law.
The  family  must  therefore  be  protected  by  society  and  have  its  free
development and its security of life ensured.
J.P.S. Serrarens (1947: 4)
This all offers some explanation how the drafting of Article 16(3) of the UDHR
was influenced by different actors such as Malik himself and Serrarens. How
about the Constitution of Ireland? In an article on the origins of the definition
7 Lévi-Strauss (1971) is the English translation of Lévi-Strauss (1956).
63
of family in the Irish Constitution, Finola Kennedy (1998) argues in favour of
attributing the content of Article 41, the definition of family as the “natural
primary and fundamental unit group of Society” to Edward SJ. Cahill, a Jesuit
priest and academic and his book Framework of a Christian State (1932).
In this article, Kennedy (1998) offers a discussion on different accounts of
who actually influenced Éamon de Valera, an Irish politician in the early 20th
century  and  a  key  architect  of  the  Constitution  on  the  whole  (see  Ó  Tuama
2011).  What  is  essential  in  Kennedy’s  article  is  the  confirmation  that  the
substance of Article 41 can be identified in specific papal encyclicals of the late
19th and early 20th century, namely Rerum Novarum (1891), Casti Connubii
(1930) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931), which celebrated the 40th anniversary
of Rerum Novarum.  In  the  context  of  Irish  constitutional  history,  Kennedy
argues that
… [Cahill’s]  writings  derived  from the  Encyclicals,  which,  without  a
shadow of doubt, are reflected in Article 41 of the Constitution. Cahill
states that while the individual is “the fundamental element in all civil
society”,  “the  natural  and  primary  unit  in  the  State  is  not  the
individual,  but  the  family”.  Cahill  quotes  from  Pope  Leo  XIII’s
Encyclical, Rerum Novarum: The family is a society limited indeed in
numbers, but no less a true society, anterior to every kind of State or
nation, invested with rights and duties of its own, totally independent
of the civil community.
Finola Kennedy (1998: 362, note 11)
According to a different translation given to the global public by the Vatican
today  (Rerum  Novarum  1891),  the  same  passage  of Rerum Novarum cited
above goes as follows:
No human law can abolish the natural and original right of marriage,
nor  in  any  way  limit  the  chief  and  principal  purpose  of  marriage
ordained  by  God's  authority  from  the  beginning:  “Increase  and
multiply.”… Hence we have the family, the “society” of a man’s house -
a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society,
and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and duties
peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State.
Rerum Novarum, para 12
In the following paragraph that deals with the naturalness of private property
as a prerequisite for a father to support his wife and children, it is articulated
that  “[a]  family,  no  less  than  a  State,  is,  as  We  have  said,  a  true  society,
governed by an authority peculiar to itself, that is to say, by the authority of
the father” (Rerum Novarum, para 13). Further on in the encyclical, it is said
that mothers should not be forced by economic necessity to take up
employment outside the home. In Rerum Novarum,  it  is  also  said  that
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“[w]omen… are not suited for certain occupations; a woman is by nature fitted
for home-work [sic], and it is that which is best adapted at once to preserve
her modesty and to promote the good bringing up of  children and the well-
being of the family” (para 42) . The main content of the IFCTU Memorandum
(Serrarens 1947) was clearly based on the main teachings of Rerum Novarum.
Obviously, these passages reflect the era when they were written, the late
nineteenth century, and the teaching of the Catholic Church on these issues.
The central idea in these encyclicals was how to foster a social order where
the  needs  of  the  working  class  and  the  poor  would  be  taken  care  of  while
protecting private ownership and political stability. When it comes to the view
these  documents  had  on  the  roles  of  men  and  women  and  the  division  of
labour  between  husband  and  wife,  tasks  were  clearly  defined.  Particularly
important in this frame of thinking was that a sufficient family wage should be
paid to the husband, who was unquestionably the head of the household. The
place  of  wives  and  mothers  was  in  the  home,  because  that  was  where  their
primary  function  to  be  fulfilled  was  situated.  (Kennedy  1998.)  What  is
important and interesting in the drafting history and the sources of the
wording of, for example, Article 16(3) of the UDHR is that words, especially
weighty ones in adopted human rights documents, cannot be taken just at their
face value and dictionary definition. “Natural” and “fundamental” take on very
different  meanings  from  their  commonplace  meanings  when  they  are  put
together,  and  convey  a  set  of  philosophical,  historical  and  doctrinal  tones.
When religious  conservatives  argue  that  they  hold  the  truth  to  what  Article
16(3) of the UDHR actually means, they are right from a certain, historical and
contextualised point of view. But when these words were placed in a document
like the UDHR which has such timeless and universal aspirations, they were
left  to  stand  on  their  own  and  to  acquire  new  definitions  and  meanings  as
vehicles of political and legal change.
2.3 FAMILY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
Most human rights instruments in the United Nations system touch upon
rights  relating  to  marriage  and  family  formation,  but  they  tend  to  do  so  in
rather  commonsensical  and  vague  terms.  After  finding  out  where  the
definition of family in the UDHR came from, this sub-chapter offers a look into
the what legally binding international treaties the UDHR has influenced most
directly. The treaties discussed here are the ICCPR (International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights), ICESCR (International Convention on
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights),  CEDAW  (Convention  on  the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) and CRC (Convention on the
Rights of the Child). As the rest of this chapter and the empirical analysis in
this study (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) demonstrate, family is not taken to be only the
family envisaged in papal encyclicals neither by bodies of the United Nations
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interpreting the meaning of global human rights treaties of the United Nations
such as the Human Rights Committee (the body interpreting the ICCPR) nor
by the CEDAW Committee.
The  1966  United  Nations  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political
Rights, a legally binding international State-level treaty with nearly universal
ratification, articulates many of the rights set out in the UDHR in more specific
terms. Article 23 does this with the ‘right to marry and to found a family’:
(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and
is entitled to protection by society and the State.
(2) The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to
found a family shall be recognized.
(3) No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent
of the intending spouses.
(4) States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps
to  ensure  equality  of  rights  and  responsibilities  of  spouses  as  to
marriage,  during  marriage  and  at  its  dissolution.  In  the  case  of
dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any
children.
ICCPR, Article 23
Interestingly, the ICCPR places “the family” and its natural and fundamental
character and its need for State protection as the first component of the Article,
after  which  the  provisions  concerning  marriage  are  spelt  out.  This  would
suggest  a  more  foundational  character  being  given  to  “the  family”  –  as  the
foundation of society (all societies?) it articulates the need and the purpose for
men and women of marriageable age to marry. The non-discrimination clause
in article 26 is especially important, intending to protect “against
discrimination  on  any  ground  such  as  race,  colour,  sex,  language,  religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status”.
In  addition,  Article  10  of  the  ICESCR,  the  International  Covenant  on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that:
(1) The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded
to  the  family,  which  is  the  natural  and  fundamental  group  unit  of
society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for
the  care  and  education  of  dependent  children.  Marriage  must  be
entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.
(2)  Special  protection  should  be  accorded  to  mothers  during  a
reasonable  period  before  and  after  childbirth.  During  such  period
working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate
social security benefits.
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(3) Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination
for reasons of parentage or other conditions.
Article 10, ICESCR
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentions ’family’ in
several of its documents, but it has not given a further definition on what it
stands for compared to General Comment 19 of the Human Rights Committee.
The  task  of  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee  is  to  monitor  the
implementation  of  the  ICCPR.  The  Human  Rights  Committee  is  an
independent  body  made  up  of  experts  in  the  field  of  international  human
rights law. The HRC has actually found that the mention of ‘sex’ as a basis for
discrimination  also  covers  sexual  orientation.  This  emanates  from  the
complaint of Toonen v. Australia from 19928 to the Committee where the
Committee deemed the existence of anti-sodomy laws in the state of Tasmania
as  discriminatory.  The  Committee’s  decisions  are  not  legally  binding,  but
politically  persuasive  recommendations.  In  this  case,  the  state  of  Tasmania
repealed its anti-sodomy laws a few years later in 1997. In contrast to decisions
on complaints brought to the HRC, General Comments are documents where
the Committee explains it interpretation of the provisions contained in the
ICCPR. In 1990, the Committee published its General Comment No. 19, where
it interprets Article 23 of the ICCPR on the protection of the family and the
right to marry. The Committee refrains from giving a substantial definition of
the family, relegating the task to States Parties and the meanings given to the
concept in their national legal systems:
The Committee notes that the concept of the family may differ in some
respects from State to State, and even from region to region within a
State,  and  that  it  is  therefore  not  possible  to  give  the  concept  a
standard definition. However, the Committee emphasizes that, when a
group of persons is regarded as a family under the legislation and
practice of a State, it must be given the protection referred to in article
23. Consequently, States parties should report on how the concept and
scope  of  the  family  is  construed  or  defined  in  their  own society  and
legal system. Where diverse concepts of the family, "nuclear" and
"extended",  exist  within  a  State,  this  should  be  indicated  with  an
explanation of the degree of protection afforded to each. In view of the
existence of various forms of family, such as unmarried couples and
their children or single parents and their children, States parties
should also indicate whether and to what extent such types of family
and their members are recognized and protected by domestic law and
practice.9
8 Toonen v. Australia, Communication 488/1992, UN Document CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992.
9 United Nations Human Rights Committee (1990), para 2.
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UN Human Rights Committee
What is essential here is the use of the principle of subsidiarity10: evaluation of
what kind of relations and of which degree of proximity are deemed as family
relations is handed to States, which resembles the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation  in  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (see  Spano  2014).
Reluctance to producing a universal definition of family might seem toothless
from the Human Rights Committee, but it shows the humility of the experts in
question. Compared to the drafters of the Universal Declaration, they do not
take such as strong stand on what the family might be. Thus, the Committee’s
reluctance to provide a definition leaves space for new interpretations and the
incorporation of a wider spectre of relations between people. When discussing
the right to marry, the Committee does give a tentative definition of a couple:
“The right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate
and live together”11.  The  right  to  marry  refers  more  to  the  possibility  of
contracting  a  marriage  together  with  a  partner  of  the  opposite  sex  of  one’s
choice, without State interference. This provision becomes more concrete
when thinking about racial and religious discrimination: the miscegenation
laws  banning  inter-racial  marriage  in  the  United  States  prior  to  their
dismantlement  are  a  prime  example.  Obviously,  there  is  always  a  certain
degree  of  State  intervention  into  the  right  to  marry,  primarily  related  to
prohibited degrees of relationship, which vary from one State to another.
Due to the history of human rights or rather the lack of human rights in the
context of vulnerable categories of people, it has been seen necessary by States
within the United Nations system to create global human rights conventions
that focus on the status of women (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women CEDAW, 1979) and children (Convention
on the Rights of the Child CRC, 1989), for example. Article 16(1) of CEDAW
notes that  women must be in an equal  position to men in when it  comes to
marriage, divorce and the legal effects of marriage:
1.  States  Parties  shall  take  all  appropriate  measures  to  eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality
of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent;
10 Subsidiarity as a principle of international law, too, is linked to the philosophy of the Catholic
Church and Catholic Social Teaching. See Carozza 2003.
11 United Nations Human Rights Committee (1990), para 5.
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(c)  The  same  rights  and  responsibilities  during  marriage  and  at  its
dissolution;
(d)  The  same  rights  and  responsibilities  as  parents,  irrespective  of
their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases
the interests of the children shall be paramount;
CEDAW, Article 16(1)
In essence, principles of the UDHR have been spelt out in more detail in 16(1)
of CEDAW, like in ICCPR and ICESCR. However, the text of CEDAW departs
further  from  the  language  of  the  two  conventions  mentioned  above.  It
develops  principles  of  gender  equality  in  a  way  that  goes  further  than  the
liberal tradition prevalent, for example, in the United States would allow, and
thus the United States is  one of  the few countries in the world that  has not
ratified it. (United Nations Treaty Collection, CEDAW.) Furthermore, Article
5(a) of CEDAW is also contentious in tone for the conservatively inclined as it
states the following as its aim:
To  modify  the  social  and  cultural  patterns  of  conduct  of  men  and
women,  with  a  view  to  achieving  the  elimination  of  prejudices  and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women;
CEDAW, Article 5(2)
This formulation goes to show that the results of international drafting may
also  produce  rather  progressive  and  radical  expressions  of  political  will,
developing the content given to human rights more than could be done by re-
interpreting existing documents and treaties.
The  definition  of  family  or  the  lack  thereof  is  unlikely  to  change  in  the
committees interpreting human rights treaties of the United Nations.
However, notions of what family entails and how it is understood in modern-
day  global  human  rights  advocacy  can  be  seen,  for  instance,  in  the  Beijing
Declaration, the final document of the Fourth World Conference on Women in
1995, which pays only slight tribute to Catholic social doctrine evident in the
UDHR:
Women play a critical role in the family. The family is the basic unit of
society and as such should be strengthened. It is entitled to receive
comprehensive protection and support. In different cultural, political
and  social  systems,  various  forms  of  the  family  exist.  The  rights,
capabilities and responsibilities of family members must be respected.
Beijing platform for Action, para 29
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Family  is  named  as  “the  basic  unit  of  society”,  but  it  is  not  spelt  out  who
constitute a family. The Beijing document was, indeed, a ‘bitter fruit’ to many
conservative and religious communities due to its progressive tone (Glendon
1995).
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) from 1989 is an important
global human rights convention when it comes to the protection of family life,
and the interpretation of key Articles is subject to fierce debates. The text of
the Convention begins with a Preamble that still holds echoes of the Universal
Declaration:
The States Parties to the present Convention… convinced that the
family,  as  the  fundamental  group  of  society  and  the  natural
environment  for  the  growth  and  well-being  of  all  its  members  and
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and
assistance  so  that  it  can  fully  assume  its  responsibilities  within  the
community…
CRC, Preamble
Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child deals with the principle
of non-discrimination:
(1)  States  Parties  shall  respect  and  ensure  the  rights  set  forth  in  the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.
(2) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that
the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
CRC, Article 2
Together with Article 2 above, Article 5 gives space to a broader definition of
family than the model of the nuclear family:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or
community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other
persons  legally  responsible  for  the  child,  to  provide,  in  a  manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention.
CRC, Article 5
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The  expression  ‘members  of  the  extended  family  or  community’  and  the
mention of ‘local custom’ give way to the variability of family forms, to which
families formed by non-heterosexuals and trans persons can be argued to take
part.  So  many  States  in  Europe  and  beyond  have  legalised  same-sex  civil
unions or same-sex marriage, so it could be seen as a recent “local custom” in
many parts of the world.
In  debates  about  the  legitimacy  and  ethics  of  non-heterosexual
parenthood, the first paragraph of Article 7 of the CRC has often been evoked
as the legal basis for the child’s right to ‘have a mother and a father’:
The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
CRC, Article 7
Articles  2  and  7  of  the  Convention  are  the  ones  that  are  usually  cited  when
arguing for a particular view on the protection of family life, be it singularist
or pluralist (see Chapter 1.1). Article 2(1) prohibits discrimination against the
child and her/his parents “…irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or
legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”. One
of the most central and most cited Articles of the Convention is Article 7(1).
Both pluralists and singularists have deployed this Article to argue their
viewpoints – pluralists for the recognition of, for example, parenting by same-
sex  couples  (Walker  2001,  Hodson  2011,  2012),  singularists  for  the
preservation of marriage and family as exclusively heterosexual institutions in
the face of law (Glendon 2009, Adolphe 2006). The right to know one’s parents
is  often advocated as the right to know one’s  origins,  be it  in the context  of
adoption or assisted reproduction with donated sperm or eggs. Article 7 is also
often  deployed  to  argue  that  a  child  must  have  two  parents  of  the  opposite
sexes.  Singularists  argue  that  it  is  distorting  and  illogical  to  interpret  that
‘parents’ could be of the same sex (see Adolphe 2006, Browning 2013) while
pluralists stress that everything depends on how family in defined in a given
legal context (see Walker 2001, Hodson 2012).
2.4 DISCUSSION: FROM NATURAL LAW TO LACK OF
DEFINITION
The  universal  conception  of  the  person…  is  displaced  as  a  point  of
departure  for  a  social  theory  of  gender  by  those  historical  and
anthropological positions that understand gender as a relation among
socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts. This relational or
contextual point of view suggests that what the person “is”, and indeed,
what  gender  “is”,  is  always  relative  to  the  constructed  relations  in
which it is determined. As a shifting and contextual phenomenon,
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gender  does  not  denote  a  substantive  being,  but  a  relative  point  of
convergence  among  culturally  and  historically  specific  sets  of
relations.
Judith Butler (1990: 15)
On the basis of the research done by Morsink (1999), Cere (2009) and Glendon
(2010) it is evident that the form of the language of Article 16 in the Universal
Declaration of  Human Rights was inspired by Neo-Thomist  philosophy and
Catholic social teaching. However, as over sixty years have shown, those words
have  been  understood  in  a  variety  of  ways,  which  goes  to  show  that  the
meaning of  Article  16  is  often  taken  to  be  something  else  than  what  that
particular  phrase  or  specific  words  in  a  certain  order  would  indicate.  If  the
language and style of  16(3) was taken from Catholic  social  teaching,  does it
mean that these Articles, or even the Universal Declaration as a whole, should
be read as a set of ethical guidelines emanating from a specific philosophical
and  religious  tradition?  Or  could  it  be  that  the  Universal  Declaration  is  a
document inspired, among other traditions, by Neo-Thomism and Catholic
social  thought,  but  over  time  it  has  acquired  a  variety  of  other  meanings
according  to  the  political  projects  of  its  readers,  and  that  it  is  a  malleable
formulation to be applied according to the spirit of the day? My answer would
be to favour the latter approach, but not to forget where the language has been
cited from. Some might think that such an important document carrying such
a strong legacy of a particular world view would be somehow discouraging for
divergent  ways  of  thinking  and  future  political  projects.  However,  such
exegesis is helpful in taking a critical distance from any authoritative
documents and seeing them as products of their time.
‘Family’ has usually been left intentionally undefined in international
human rights documents – otherwise Articles dealing with the protection of
families, family relations and family life could not be thought of as universally
applicable.  Actually,  Article  16(3)  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human
Rights  is  quite  exceptional,  as  it  does  offer  some  kind  of  a  definition,  even
though it is a more open-ended version of what Malik, who has been identified
as  its  main  architect  (Morsink  1999)  would  have  preferred.  However,  the
textual appearance of this Article as a linguistic formulation pays close
resemblance to the language of Catholic social ethics as a comparison to Article
41.1.1  of  the Constitution of  the Republic  of  Ireland shows.  Some might say
that they are mere words in a certain order. However, the language deployed
shows that in 1948, the States voting for the adoption of the Declaration saw it
fit to deploy language similar to Catholic social doctrine, which is evident in
other parts of the Declaration as well. Undoubtedly, Catholic social ethics is a
mode  of  thought  that  captures  many  essential  strains  of  thought  of  human
rights thinking. However, when it comes to family as a gendered institution,
the legacy of a particular current of religiously coloured philosophical thought
is problematic. Probably the rights of women and children as legal subjects in
their  own  right,  not  subjected  to  the  power  of  the  head  of  the  family,  the
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husband and the father, would not have been developed to the same extent as
they have been in the form of CEDAW and CRC if they had been interpreted
in the spirit of Neo-Thomism and Catholic social doctrine. Obviously, due to
the history of the origins of the concept of family in the Universal Declaration,
many value-conservative interpretations of what family means today resonate
clearly with the language and the spirit of the Universal Declaration. However,
despite  being  a  product  of  multilateral  drafting  and  without  a  comparable
historical  precedent,  the  Declaration  itself  is  a  politically,  religiously  and
historically situated document and needs to be treated as such.
The definition or the lack of definition of family will hardly change in the
United Nations. Those in favour of a singularist approach argue that Article
16(3) of the Universal Declaration the “family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society” has been established as part of customary international
law (Adolphe 2006: 370). However, a great many States have already given a
new  interpretation  of  what  family  is,  by  legalising  same-sex  marriage  with
(more  or  less)  the  same rights  and  obligations  as  in  opposite-sex  marriage.
This is due to a further interpretation of the promise of equality inherent in
the Universal Declaration itself. Contemporary debates on the status of sexual
and gender minorities in international human rights protection are, to many
people, a logical consequence of the human rights rhetoric and the principles
of equality and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the Universal
Declaration  and  other  major  human  rights  documents  of  the  era  after  the
Second World War. As the same Articles and formulations in, for example, the
Universal Declaration or the Convention on the Rights of the Child, can be and
are used to argue completely opposing viewpoints, does this mean that human
rights provisions are mere vehicles of the political desires and imagination that
various groups argue for when presenting their view on what is right? Relying
on  Dembour  and  her  typology  of  different  schools  of  human  rights  (2006,
2010), this could well be the case.
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3 ANALYSING FAMILY RELATIONS IN
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Since philosophical commonplaces do not have a nontemporal
significance and implication, their determination depends upon the
concrete context in which they operate. For this reason, the principle
of equality in law and morality cannot de defined or understood, like
the formal and mathematical equality, abstractly and a-historically.
In  the  same  way,  the  idea  of  justice  leads  to  different  practical
requirements in various and diverse societies and eras.
Chaïm Perelman (1980: 158)
Just like the United Nations in the role of an intergovernmental organisation
and a regime of international law, the regional organisations of the Council of
Europe and the European Communities (now known as the European Union)
were created in the 1940s and 1950s with the aim to avoid the atrocities of the
Second  World  War  happening  again.  The  Council  of  Europe  (an
intergovernmental organisation completely separate from the European
Union) took as its central task to promote democracy, human rights and the
rule of law, while the European Communities began to hinge Western
European nations together through economic integration, starting with coal,
steel, and the former enemies France and Germany in order to integrate them
economically  for  the  sake  of  both  peace  and  prosperity.  Nowadays,  despite
being a primarily economic and political union of independent States, the
European  Union  has  also  become  an  intergovernmental  structure  for  the
promotion  of  democracy,  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  together  with
intergovernmental organisations more specifically devoted to the promotion
of human rights and democracy,  such as the United Nations,  the Council  of
Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 1948, regardless
of  being  just  a  ‘declaration’  and  thus  not  legally  binding  on  the  States  that
adopted  it,  has  been  a  seminal  document  for  binding  international  human
rights treaties within the United Nations and beyond. It has acted as a catalyst
for regional human rights instruments such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was adopted by the Council
of  Europe  in  1950  and  has  been  further  elaborated  through  14  additional
protocols over the years1. To this day, the Council of Europe and the European
Court  of  Human Rights  form the  most  sophisticated  regional  human rights
system in the world as the European Court in Strasbourg has developed such
1 See http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005. (Accessed 16
October 2015).
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a vast body of case law on the European Convention. (Ovey and White 2006:
1-6.)
In this chapter, I will first give an overview of how the concept of “family”
has been dealt with in human rights documents within the regional, European
context. These documents consist of treaties of the Council of Europe and of
the  European  Union.  As  the  Council  of  Europe  with  its  European  Court  of
Human  Rights  in  Strasbourg  and  the  European  Union  with  the  European
Court  of  Justice  in  Luxembourg  are  in  a  mutual  relationship  both
institutionally and jurisprudentially, the treaties these Courts interpret are
also of high relevance to each other. In the following sections, I describe the
conceptual tools with which I approach my data. With the help of definitions
and notions provided by the jurisprudence developed by the European Court
of  Human  Rights  itself,  a  typology  of  biological,  legal,  social  and  gendered
relations is developed in this study. This typology is used as a tool for analysing
relevant case law in the three subsequent empirical chapters. This chapter goes
on to map how the data for this study, case law on the recognition of family
relations  in  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  Strasbourg,  has  been
selected  and  analysed  in  order  to  provide  a  sociological  and  qualitative
analysis of how privileged personal relationships are protected in case law of a
supranational human rights court.
3.1 FAMILY IN EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS
I cannot see any reason why legal recognition of reassignment of sex
requires that biologically there has also been a (complete)
reassignment; the law can give an autonomous meaning to the concept
of  “sex”,  as  it  does  to  concepts  like  “person”,  “family”,  “home”,
“property”, etc. 2
Judge Van Dijk of the European Court of Human Rights, 1998
The  Council  of  Europe  is  by  far  the  most  firmly  established  of  all  regional
human rights systems in the world. This is mainly due to the wide ratification
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms
and the existence of the European Court of Human Rights which develops the
interpretation of the Convention in its case law. The European Convention has
been  subject  to  thousands  of  legally  binding  judgements  as  it  permits
individual  complaints  arising  from  legal  disputes  between  individuals  and
States. Thus, if a legal complaint in the national legal system of a Member State
of the Council of Europe has exhausted the possibilities of complaining further
to  a  higher  level  within  the  national  system,  of  which  the  highest  is  usually
2 Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998-V, Dissenting opinion, para 8.
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called  “supreme  court”  or  the  like,  the  applicants  may  complain  to  the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  which  may  grant  them  a  favourable
judgement and order the State in question to pay damages to the applicant(s),
or not if the case is not deemed that relevant or the issue at hand remains in
the margin of appreciation of the State (see Johnson 2013: 69-76)
Marriage  and  family  life  have  been  dealt  with  in  several  human  rights
treaties of the Council of Europe as well as treaties of the European Union. The
foundation of human rights protection in the Council of Europe is the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms opened
for State signatures in 1950 and its optional Protocols (especially Protocol 12,
adopted  in  2000,  with  regard  to  the  prohibition  of  discrimination)  and  the
European Social Charter (adopted in 1961, revised in 1996). European human
rights norms have also been interpreted in the context of the Treaties of the
European Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(proclaimed  in  2000,  entered  into  force  in  2009  as  part  of  the  Treaty  of
Lisbon) provides further elaboration of human rights norms relating to family
life, too.3
A considerable part of the case law of the European Convention on Human
Rights touches upon the protection offered by Article 8 of the Convention, the
right to respect for private and family life, the home and correspondence. Out
of the almost 38,700 judgements and decisions delivered by the machinery of
the European Court between 1959–2014 and available on the Hudoc database,
1,365  documents  (some  of  them  overlapping  and  concerning  the  same
complaint) have been delivered concerning Article 8 with the keyword “respect
for family life” in the search function of the database of ECHR case law, Hudoc.
Out of these documents, about 560 are judgements where a Chamber of the
European  Court  has  admitted  the  case  for  full  procedural  treatment  and
delivered a reasoned judgement on it with a composition of seven judges. 40
of these judgements have been sent additionally to the Grand Chamber, the
highest  instance  in  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  where  cases  of
exceptional complexity are adjudicated with a larger group of seventeen
judges.4 Decisions,  a  category  of  lower  importance  in  the  hierarchy  of
documents in the ECHR system, constitute legally and sociologically relevant
material  if  they  pronounce  the  application  made  against  a  certain  Member
State inadmissible, that is, not worthy of full court procedure and a judgement.
It is here where many applications to the European Court have ended up over
the decades: for example, many complaints to the Court by same-sex couples
for the protection of private and family life were deemed inadmissible because
it was not seen to be within the scope of the European Convention to protect
3 See list of relevant Treaties in Sources.
4 Hudoc database, situation on 4 April 2016.
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same-sex adult relationships when they were legally not in the same position
as opposite-sex married couples or cohabitees5 (Grigolo 2001, Johnson 2013).
As noted by Ovey and White in a textbook on the European Convention as
a  whole,  “the  rights  protected  in  the  European  Convention  draw  their
inspiration from the Universal  Declaration,  but do not simply duplicate the
rights referred to there” (2006: 2). The European Convention was adapted to
the interests, needs and the context of the twelve original signatory States6,
mainly Western European States, bearing in mind the horrors of the Second
World  War  and  the  threat  of  communism  perceived  at  the  time  (Ovey  and
White  2006:  2).  The  European  Convention  was  drafted  in  the  late  1940s,
opened  up  for  signature  in  1950 and  entered  into  force  in  1953  after  it  was
ratified by the first wave of Western European States. Later on, especially after
the breakdown of the Soviet Union, a great number of Eastern European States
joined the Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention on Human
Rights. After its emergence in the 1950s, the European Convention has been
further developed through optional Protocols, ratified by Member States. A lot
of the norms developed through these Protocols relate to technical or
procedural matters. However, for example Protocol 12 elaborates the
prohibition of discrimination but has not been ratified by all Member States.
The wording of Article 8 of the European Convention, the most often cited
right in the cases analysed in this study, is illuminated to a certain degree by
the travaux préparatoires (preparatory works) of the European Convention
from  the  time  it  was  being  written  in  the  era  after  the  Second  World  War.
Article  8 of  the European Convention reads that  “Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. In
the preparatory works on Article 8 of the ECHR, the first source cited is Article
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is worded as follows
No one shall  be subjected to arbitrary interference with his  privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.7
Preparatory works on Article 8 of the ECHR
Thus, what the European Convention says about family life relates to the
protection  of  privacy  understood  as  the  private  sphere  of  close  personal
relations, one’s domicile and communications. In addition, there is Article 12
5 For example, S. v. United Kingdom, no. 11716/85, Commission decision 26th August 1986, C. and
L. M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, Commission decision of 9 October 1989, Kerkhoven,
Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, no. 15666/89, Commission decision of 19 May 1992.
6 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom (Ovey and White 2006: 2)
7 See http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005. (Accessed 16
October 2015).
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of  the  European  Convention,  which  says  that  “Men  and  women  of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to
the  national  laws  governing  the  exercise  of  this  right”.  Thus,  what  the
European Convention says about family formation and family life  relates to
the  protection  of  privacy,  the  right  to  marry  and  to  reproduce  according  to
accepted norms, but the ECHR does not contain a definition or a proclamation
of what family “is” in the spirit of Article 16 of the UDHR with its definition of
family  as  “natural”  and  “fundamental”  unit  of  society.  In  short,  the  words
signalling the legacy of Catholic Social Teaching have not been included.
The word ‘family’ does not appear on its own, only as part of the concept of
“family life”. However, in the decades that follow the drafting of the
Convention,  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  family  has  indeed  come  under
scrutiny in the European Court, but due to the phrasing of Article 8, it needs
to be phrased as “right to respect for (private and) family life”. Thus, ‘private
life’ acts as the main sphere to be protected, including a wide array of issues
such as identity (see e.g. Goodwin v. the United Kingdom from 20028 on
transgender identity) and sexuality (e.g. Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom from
19819).  Family  life  is  a  privileged  sphere  within  private  life,  and  the  liminal
category of ‘de facto family life’10 has recently been enlarged to apply to same-
se  couples  as  well  in Schalk  and  Kopf  v.  Austria11.  As  we  can  see  from
paragraph 2 of Article 8, this is a qualified right, where the exercise of the right
can be limited due to a number of reasons relating to the functioning of the
State  or  the  well-being  of  its  citizens.  For  example,  in  the  1950s  there  were
several complaints filed against the Federal Republic of Germany because of
its legislation criminalising homosexual relations. All of these complaints were
deemed inadmissible, as the existence of these laws was seen as legitimate for
the ‘protection of health and morals’ (Grigolo 2001: 1029, see also Johnson
2013:  22-29).  Balancing between this  main substance of  Article  8 and State
interests listed above is what makes the case law under Article 8 so interesting
also from a sociological point of view.
Thus, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights reflected the
need to protect  privacy and family life  as well  as  one’s  home from arbitrary
interventions of the State:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2)  There  shall  be  no  interference  by  a  public  authority  with  the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
8 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI.
9 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45.
10 “De facto is defined to mean “in fact, in reality, in actual existence, force, or possession, as a
matter of fact” by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED 2015). This translates also to “family life in
practice” or “informal family life” in the context of the ECHR.
11 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 94.
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is  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ECHR, Article 8
Furthermore,  Article  12  of  the  Convention  reads  “Men  and  women  of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to
the  national  laws  governing  the  exercise  of  this  right.”  Article  12  has  been
subject  to  much  less  jurisprudence,  as  it  surfaces  in  a  little  over  150
judgements and decisions of which less than 27 are judgements by the the end
of 2014. These judgments do not all concern the “right to marry” but “the right
to marry and to found a family” more broadly.12 However, this Article has been
the bone of contention in recent case law regarding the right to marry in the
context of same sex-couples, such as Schalk and Kopf v. Austria from 201013.
It  has  also  been  challenged  in  the  case  of  a  transgender  person  who  was
married before her gender recognition process from male to female was
completed in Hämäläinen v. Finland from  2014,  a  Grand  Chamber
judgement14. The wording of Article 12 leaves a wide margin of appreciation to
Member States, as the wording of the article relegates the exercise of the right
back to national legislation. So far, in the judgements mentioned above, the
European  Court  has  ruled  that  the  European  Convention  does  not  lend
support to the interpretation that States could be pushed to provide the
possibility of same-sex marriage.
Article 14 is also of great importance, as it is often technically paired with
Article 8 in order to evaluate the case from the point of view of the prohibition
of discrimination in the context of, for example, the right to respect for family
life:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall  be  secured  without  discrimination  on  any  ground  such  as  sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.
ECHR, Article 14
Of significant importance to the protection of family life is Protocol 12 of the
European Convention, which focuses on the prohibition of discrimination as
its Article 1 proclaims:
12 Hudoc database, 1 April 2015.
13 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010.
14 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, ECHR 2014.
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The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination  on  any  ground  such  as  sex,  race,  colour,  language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any
ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
Protocol 12, ECHR
Protocol 12 was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2005. However, it
has been ratified only by less than twenty states of all 47 Member States, thus
not being a very effective instrument in the protection of minorities or other
groups subject to discrimination.15
The Council of Europe is the organisation between a considerable number
of  other  intergovernmental  documents  and  treaties  in  the  region  of  Europe
and  Eurasia.  However,  none  of  them  are  of  the  same  importance  as  the
European Convention of Human Rights as it has accumulated such a vast body
of case law. In any case, a glimpse into other key documents of the Council of
Europe and the European Union helps to shed light on how the protection of
“family” is phrased in documents that have appeared after the European
Convention. The European Social Charter, another document of the Council of
Europe, has not been of central importance in defining European human
rights policies,  but it  does offer  a  view into how rights related to family life
have been conceived from the viewpoint of social rights. In its first, original
version, adopted in 1961, the most important rights related to family life
replicated the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
4.  All  workers  have  the  right  to  a  fair  remuneration  sufficient  for  a
decent standard of living for themselves and their families…
16.  The  family  as  a  fundamental  unit  of  society  has  the  right  to
appropriate social, legal and economic protection to ensure its full
development.
17. Mothers and children, irrespective of marital status and family
relations, have the right to appropriate social and economic
protection.
European Social Charter, 1961
The  family  is  a  “fundamental  unit  of  society”  in  the  spirit  of  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and non-marital mothers and children deserved
a special mention even in the pre-Marckx era. In its revised version from 1996,
15 Protocol 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG. (Accessed 9th
April 2015.)
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family is the fundamental unit of society, but the protection of mothers and
children has changed into the protection of children and young persons.
Compared  to  the  earlier  version,  a  provision  was  added  concerning  the
protection of combining work with family responsibilities:
16.  The  family  as  a  fundamental  unit  of  society  has  the  right  to
appropriate social, legal and economic protection to ensure its full
development.
17. Children and young persons have the right to appropriate social,
legal and economic protection…
27. All persons with family responsibilities and who are engaged or
wish  to  engage  in  employment  have  a  right  to  do  so  without  being
subject to discrimination and as far as possible without conflict
between their employment and family responsibilities.
Revised European Social Charter, 1996
The  Council  of  Europe  and  the  European  Union  are  two  separate
intergovernmental  organisations,  but  they  are  linked  to  each  other  in
important ways. For over twenty years, membership of the Council of Europe
and  ratification  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  have  been
central requirements that new Member States of the European Union need to
fulfil since the accession criteria to the EU were defined in 199316. Thus, for
example, the decriminalisation of homosexuality is a human rights norm that
new Member States of the EU have to abide with – a norm that has not been
seen as such by many States within the United Nations on a global level (see
O’Flaherty  and  Fisher  2008).  The  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the
European  Union  was  incorporated  in  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  signed  by  EU
Member States in 2007, and came into effect in 2009 when the its ratification
process  came  to  an  end.  It  is  an  example  of  the  evolution  of  human  rights
principles in Europe, giving an indication of the changes that have taken place
within  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  compared  to  the  wide
geographical  and  political  scope  of  the  Council  of  Europe  or  the  ‘universal’
human rights documents of the United Nations. 17
16 These are referred to as the “Copenhagen criteria”, see “Accession Criteria” in Sources. The
condition of adhering to the European Convention on Human Rights in order to be a Member State of
the European Union is spelled out in Article 6(3) of the Treaty of the European Union (amended
version known as the Lisbon Treaty): “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the
Union’s law”. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, see Treaties in Sources.
17 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, see Treaties in Sources.
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The interrelationship of the Council of Europe and the European Union, or
the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union as a
political  entity  has  been  tested  as  the  EU was  to  become a  signatory  of  the
European Convention. This means that even though the European Union is
not a sovereign state like the other signatories of the Convention, it would be
bound  by  the  human  rights  norms  of  the  Convention  directly  and  not  just
through its Member States. The accession of the European Union to the ECHR
became an obligation in 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force,
and the accession negotiations and legal processes related to it have been in
process since. In December 2014, the European Court of Justice delivered a
negative opinion on the accession of the European Union to the European
Convention,  and  at  the  moment  the  accession  process  has  come  to  a
standstill18.
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union deals
with respect for private and family life in the spirit of Article 8 of the European
Convention: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family
life, home and communications”. Article 9 of the Charter, which articulates the
‘right to marry and right to found a family’ is especially notable as it makes no
mention of gender: “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed  in  accordance  with  the  national  laws  governing  the  exercise  of
these rights”. On the other hand, like Article 12 of the European Convention,
it relegates the responsibility back to individual States. Paragraph 1 of Article
21  is  also  hugely  important,  as  it  explicitly  mentions  sexual  orientation  as
unacceptable grounds for discrimination:  “Any discrimination based on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features,
language,  religion or belief,  political  or  any other opinion,  membership of  a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited.” Article 23, in turn, articulates that “[e]quality between men and
women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay”.
This  is  important  in  cases  of  spousal  or  partner  benefits  as  well  as
arrangements relating to parental care.
Compared to the European Convention, the Charter is also important as it
includes  children’s  rights.  In  Article  24,  the  well-recognised  doctrine  of  the
‘best interest of the child’ is made explicit:
(1)  Children  shall  have  the  right  to  such  protection  and  care  as  is
necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely.
Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern
them in accordance with their age and maturity.
18 See Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 of the European Court of
Justice on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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(2)  In  all  actions  relating  to  children,  whether  taken  by  public
authorities or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a
primary consideration.
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, Article 24
Furthermore, Article 33 refers to the protection of ‘the family’:
(1) The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection.
(2) To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the
right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with
maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave
following the birth or adoption of a child.
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, Article 33
What family is,  then,  in a European culture of  human rights,  is  subject  to a
temporally situated and shifting interpretation of the principles spelt out in
these  documents.  What  is  understood  as  “family”  varies  a  great  deal  across
States and different parts of their populations due to (but not restricted to)
differences in political and religious outlooks and pure personal opinion. As
can be seen from the timeline of case law analysed in this study19, during the
last few decades of the 20th century, the most pertinent legal questions in the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  have  been  the  status  of  marriage  and
children born to unmarried mothers20 as  well  as  the  decriminalisation  of
homosexuality21 and  the  boundary  between  private  and  family  life22.  In  the
2000s and 2010s, the focus in ECHR case law on the parameters of family life
has been even more on gender and sexuality in the context of same-sex
couples, single non-heterosexuals and transgender persons.
3.2 INTERPRETATION OF ECHR AND TYPES OF
FAMILY RELATIONS
The  interpretation  of  the  European  Convention  is  a  highly  specialised  field
practiced  by  the  judges  elected  to  their  positions  to  reflect  and  to  provide
expertise on the Member States of the Council of Europe. One judge is elected
in respect of each Member State and is also supposed to provide expertise on
the  State  in  question  when  adjudicating  cases  in  groups  of  judges  (see  e.g.
Dembour  2006:  19-29).  The  interpretation  of  the  Convention  is  subject  to
certain main principles or doctrines developed by the Court over the course of
19 See chronological list of data in Appendix I.
20 Marckx v. Belgium.
21 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom.
22 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.
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its existence. For understanding the context and language used in the case
texts,  the main principles are discussed here:  dynamic interpretation of  the
European Convention, emerging European consensus, the margin of
appreciation afforded to Member States, negative and positive duties to
promote human rights and autonomous concepts within the case law.
The dynamic and contextual interpretation of the European Convention is
a guiding principle developed by the European Court of Human Rights itself
in  its  jurisprudence  over  the  years  (Ovey  and  White  2006:  44-45,  Johnson
2013:  84-85).  This  technique,  also  called  evolutive  interpretation,  was  first
applied by the Court  in 1978 in the case of Tyrer v.  the United Kingdom23:
“The Court  must… recall  that  the Convention is  a  living instrument which…
must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”24.  Judged  by  its
literal appearance, this doctrine offers the possibility of accommodating social
and political change. However, due to its institutional design, the Court more
often reacts to existing circumstances and legal change that has already taken
place in a considerable number of European States, i.e. Member States of the
Council of Europe, parties to the European Convention. This is what is called
emerging European consensus (Johnson 2013: 77) when a number of States
have already enacted legislation regarding a certain right, other States lagging
behind these developments are expected to follow suit in order to produce a
Europe-wide norm and level of human rights protection. Marckx v. Belgium
(1979) acts as a textbook example of this, as at the time Belgium was one of the
very  few  States  that  had  not  made  the  status  of  children  born  within  and
outside  marriage  equal.  The  practical  problem  with  the  relevance  and
applicability  of  the  European  Convention  is  that  as  Member  States  of  the
Council  of  Europe  span  from  Iceland  to  the  Russian  Federation,  lack  of
consensus prevails on numerous issues. Thus, States are often accorded a wide
margin of appreciation to decide what is appropriate for the prevailing social,
cultural and moral climate in the country (see Ovey and White 2006: 52-54).
It is this doctrine that most often produces negative judgements from the
European Court as a certain issue is then regarded as falling outside the need
to  pronounce  a  new  norm  that  Member  States  must  then  change  their
legislation to comply with.
Negative duties to respect human rights fall on States concerning the need
to make sure that people are free to act without unnecessary State interference
(for example, in this study, interference in the right to marry between in-laws,
that is, non-consanguineous relatives25)  and  positive  duties  oblige  States  to
advance the flourishment of human rights actively. Positive duties may well be
effectively argued for, but they tend to be caught in the limbo of the margin of
appreciation (Ovey and White 2006: 51-52). ‘Family’ and many other complex
and  extra-legal  concepts  that  are  hard  to  pin  down,  are  regarded  as
23 The case concerned the legality of corporal punishment in a school on the Isle of Man.
24 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, para 31.
25 See B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, no. 36536/02, 13 September 2005 and Chapter 4.1.
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“autonomous  concepts”  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the  ECHR.  According  to
Letsas, this means that
…  domestic  law  classification  is  relevant  but  not  decisive  for  the
meaning of the concepts of the Convention. This is what the adjective
‘autonomous’ stands for: the autonomous concepts of the Convention
enjoy a status of semantic independence – their meaning is not to be
equated  with  the  meaning  that  these  very  same  concepts  possess  in
domestic law.
George Letsas (2007: 42)
As  Letsas  elaborates,  the  purpose  of  the  doctrine  of  autonomous  concepts,
developed in the judgement of Engel v. the Netherlands in 197626 concerning
disciplinary  measure  targeted  at  soldiers,  is  that  Member  States  are  not
allowed to circumvent the human rights guarantees of  the ECHR by merely
naming a concept differently than the European Court. As noted in the quote
above, the definition given by a State to a concept is relevant, but not the whole
truth,  as an evaluation of  the concept by a supranational  court  may help in
transcending the legal  realm and imagination of  a  particular Member State.
(Letsas 2007: 40-46.)
Thus,  the  Court  operates  in  its  jurisprudence  so  that  concepts  that  are  of
substantial importance, such as “family”, “home” or “property” (see opening
quote to this sub-chapter by Judge Van Dijk of the European Court27) obtain a
meaning of their own within the case law of the European Court. For example,
what  “marriage”  means  in  the  legal  and  political  context  of  the  Republic  of
Ireland is different than in context of the Netherlands, and the European Court
is  supposed to give a meaning of  its  own based on the interpretation of  the
European Convention, which, then, probably falls between these two extremes
in the European context.28 Due  to  the  formulaic  language  applied  in  the
reasoning of the Court, the focus in the analysis performed in this study is on
extra-legal  knowledge  and  definitions  given  on  what  family  life  and  family
relations might be.
26 Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22.
27 Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998-V, Dissenting opinion, para 8.
28 The European Court first pronounced this principle in the inadmissibility decision of Twenty-
one detained persons against Germany from 1968 where a group of prisoners complained of
inadequate remuneration of work carried out during their time in prison: ”Whereas the term ”civil
rights and obligations” cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law of the High
Contracting Party concerned but relates to an autonomous concept which must be interpreted
independently, even though the general principles of the domestic law of the High Contracting Parties
must necessarily be taken into consideration in any such interpretation…”. Twenty-one detained
persons against Germany, 3134/67…, Decision, Commission (Plenary), 6th April 1968.
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Stéphanie Lagoutte (2003), a legal scholar and an expert on ECHR case law
who has performed a study of the concept of family life in the ECHR29 (see also
Liddy  1998;  Stalford  2002;  Gouttenoire  2008),  points  out  that  there  is  no
precise definition to be found for what the term “family life” covers neither in
the text of the Convention itself nor its travaux préparatoires (Preparatory
Work on Article 8). The European Court has consistently professed a so called
“contextual approach” to the interpretation of the Convention, which means
focusing attention to the facts  of  the case and the issues that  it  gives rise to
(Lagoutte 2003: 293). Thus, by refraining from reviewing the domestic law of
its States Parties on an abstract level, it may keep a distance to taking a moral
stand  on  sensitive  issues  such  as  sexual  mores  or  abortion.  However,  the
notion  of  family  life  is  a  prime  example  of  an  “autonomous  concept”  to  be
interpreted independently of the domestic (national) law of the States Parties
(Letsas 2007). Furthermore, dynamic interpretation of the Convention is
closely linked to the notion of family life in its case law; norms related to family
life  are  to  be  interpreted  in  a  manner  that  reflects  social  change  in  States
Parties,  which  is  linked  to  emerging  consensus  in  States  Parties  on  various
issues relating to moral standards. (Lagoutte 2003: 292-4.) Lagoutte states
that “family life protected by ECHR Article 8 is an individual attribute: it is not
the family per se that is protected, but the family life of the individual” (2003:
294). However, the concept of family life does not solely concern relationships
between individuals, but other elements pertaining to their personal life as
well, such as identity, family home and social life. The notion of family life is
not completely straightforward, but supposedly this makes it possible to
include other aspects within it besides interpersonal relationships.
Interpersonal relationships falling within the ambit of the notion of family life
are, for example, relations between married and unmarried (opposite-sex)
couples and legally recognised relationships between parents and their
children, including foster parents and step-parents.
Historically, the European Court of Human Rights has operated and still
operates with a clear distinction between “private life” and “family life” in case
law concerning Article 8 of the Convention. Family life is part of private life,
but consists of a privileged set of close personal relations within it, based on or
comparable to a grid of genders and generations of heterosexual marriage and
family  formation  (see  Chapter  1.2).  Respect  for  one’s  home  and
correspondence is also covered by Article 8, but these two fields of application
have not produced as much case law as the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘family
life‘  have.  The  concepts  of  ‘family’  as  a  social  and  political  institution  and
‘family life’ as a sphere of private life are not interchangeable, as ‘family’ is a
concept  relating  to  an  abstract  structure  of  relations  behind  everyday
practices, and ‘family life’ refers to the protected sphere of everyday life that
29 In this article Lagoutte also refers to her unpublished PhD dissertation concerning the same
theme (University of Aarhus and University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), defended in Paris 21 June
2002.
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Article  8  seeks  to  protect.  For  the  purposes  of  my  analysis,  I  define  family
relations as a set of State-recognised privileged personal relations between
individuals that embody or emulate genealogical principles of prohibited
degrees of relationships and genetically reckoned descent. This resonates with
Irène  Théry’s  widely  cited,  Freudian-inspired  notion  that  family  is  an
institution that articulates the difference between the sexes and the difference
between generations (Théry 1996, see also Fassin 2000 and Théry 2007).
However, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the relations that people
classify as family relations from an emic point of view are not always subject
to genetic or other kinds of juridical proof, but tend to both follow and offer
variation in terms of gender and sexuality to established forms of heterosexual
family formation – hence the word ‘emulate’ in my definition. The question of
privilege is  important in relation to the State,  as  only certain forms of  close
personal relations (monogamous sexual adult-adult relations, parent-child
relations) count as family relations and involve officially sanctioned rights and
duties between the persons concerned. One might call one’s closest friends
‘family’, but these kinds of constellations of relationships are rarely argued to
exist  in  the  eyes  of  the  State.  A  couple  or  a  group  of  individuals  enter  into
family  life  when  they  organise  their  life  jointly  according  to  genealogical
principles of classification between categories of persons and possibly make
these relations official e.g. through marriage or declaration of paternity. On
the other hand, as kinship relations are to a great extent linguistic categories
forming  kinship  systems  and  ’languages’  of  their  own  (see  Lévi-Strauss
1958:58  and  Chapter  1.1),  it  is  important  to  note  that  variation  and  social
change  usually  occur  with  the  help  of  applying  existing  structures  and
categories. Thus, if a child has two parents of the same sex, they might be called
“two mothers” or “two fathers” e.g.  in media parlance,  even if  this  does not
coincide  with  what  these  family  members  call  each  other  or  how  they  are
referred to by State bureaucracy or domestic legislation. Law has an important
role in this field as it participates in the creation of widened and re-negotiated
categories e.g. in the case of family formation by non-heterosexuals.
According to the ECHR, married couples and children born to them within
marriage all share family life by definition.30 The  automatic  inclusion  of
marriage-based relationships raises the question of gender-neutral marriage,
already a legal  reality  in several  Member States as well  as  civil  partnerships
which are possible in a few other States party to the European Convention. The
judgement of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria from 2010 contained modest support
for the idea that relationship of a same-sex couple constitutes family life, and
not just private life, but the bone of contention in the case, same-sex marriage,
was not interpreted as a right protected by the European Convention. Case law
in this area is under continuous contestation and strategic litigation by LGBT
organisations.  Even  though  same-sex  couples  sharing  family  life  instead  of
private  life  has  so  far  received  only  modest  and  disparate  forms  of  support
30 Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 21 June 1988, Series A no. 138, see Kilkelly (2001: 15-19).
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from the European Court, what Lagoutte argued already in 2003 is true: “…by
accepting  a  larger  and  more  elusive  definition  of  family  life,  the  European
Court of Human Rights has also created a greater uncertainty in its practice”
(2003: 306). This “uncertainty” does not necessarily mean a dismal future in
the realm of protection of family life but, rather, a wide forum of contestation
when it comes to established norms of family life and a great deal of work for
the European Court as new applications keep coming in. It also goes to note
that the ‘uncertainty’ referred to by Lagoutte in 2003 did not really refer to the
issue of non-heterosexual family formation, as at the time such relations were
squarely  in  the  realm  of  private  life,  not  family  life  in  the  case  law  of  the
European Court.
As Lagoutte has pointed out in her analysis, relationships between family
members are identified and evaluated by the European Court with the help of
the concepts of biological, legal and social relationships. In the case of Kroon
and others v. the Netherlands 31in 1994 the European Court noted that
In  the  Court’s  opinion,  “respect”  for  “family  life”  requires  that
biological and social reality prevail over a legal presumption which,
as in the present case, flies in the face of both established fact and the
wishes  of  those  concerned  without  actually  benefiting  anyone.
Accordingly,  the  Court  concludes  that,  even  having  regard  to  the
margin of appreciation left to the State, the Netherlands has failed to
secure to the applicants the “respect” for their family life to which they
are entitled under the Convention.
Kroon and others v. the Netherlands, para 40
In this particular case, the absent husband of a woman who had given birth to
a child born out of a new relationship was designated as the father of the child
because the woman was still officially married to her him when the child was
born. Under Dutch law, the husband whose whereabouts were not known after
he left his wife was the only one who could contest his paternity. In the case
law  of  the  European  Court,  the  convergence  of  biological,  legal  and  social
relations emerges at least implicitly as a cultural ideal, as such situations are
less prone to disputes about the existence of family life between the individuals
concerned.
Lagoutte argues that situations where two of the three types of
relationships exist tend to fall into the category of family life, but standing
alone these types of relationships do not usually constitute family life (2003:
292).  A classic  example of  a  legal  and social  relation is  adoption,  which has
existed as a legal fiction from the time of codification of Roman law (Maine
1861; see also Schneider 1987: 172). Families in which children who have been
born with the help of artificially assisted reproduction using donated gametes
are another contemporary example. Biological and legal relationships could be
31 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 18535/91, 27 October 1994, Series A no. 297-C.
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said  to  exist  in  situations  where  social  ties  between  a  biological  and  legal
parent and her or his child are fully or quasi-nonexistent, for instance when
the primary family context for a child is long-term foster care but s/he remains
legally related to her or his biological parent(s), or in the case of absent parents
(most often fathers). As to the third combination of two types of relations, in
the case law of the ECHR there are cases where the existence of a biological
and social relation has been evoked as the basis for its acknowledgment as an
official relation.
As Lagoutte has pointed out, standing alone these types of relations are not
enough to be acknowledged as family relations that constitute family life. For
example, a purely biological relationship exists between a sperm or egg donor
and the child born with the genetic imprint of the donor. For example, it has
been established in the case law of the ECHR that a sperm donor does not have
rights over a child born with the help of this donation32. Purely legal relations
must be rare, but could be said to exist between official guardians and their
adopted children who have been placed elsewhere to be cared for. Purely social
relations  are  perhaps  most  interesting  in  today’s  situation,  where  the  social
and legal recognition of purely social parenthood of e.g. non-biological parents
in families formed by same-sex couples is subject to political debate, as this
type of family relations tries to make its way towards official acknowledgement
through intra-familial adoption or other measures where the social relation
would be turned into a social and legal relation.
Irène Théry (1996) offers a similar typology of family relations in her article
Différence des sexes et différence des générations which appeared in the Left-
leaning Catholic  journal  Esprit  in the heyday of  the Pacs debates in France.
She identifies three elements of family relations: 1) biological, 2) domestic and
3) genealogical. In essence, these three elements are the same that have been
described above: biological relations are the most self-explanatory element,
domestic relations are equivalent to social relations and genealogical relations
are equal  to legal  relations,  albeit  from a slightly different point of  view. To
Théry, biological relations are factual and thus subject to proof. However, she
does  not  touch  on  whether  this  is  merely  genetic  proof  and  how  gestation
would be seen in contrast  to genetic  ties  in the case of  maternity.  Domestic
relations are also a question of facticity for Théry. She prefers this term to
‘social’  or  ‘psychological’  parenthood,  as  she  emphasises  the  importance  of
cohabitation in the constitution of these kinds of relationships. The third type
of relations, genealogical relations, is not subject to proof, but to the process
of institution, i.e., they are instituted. (Théry 1996.)
When naming these relations ‘genealogical’ Théry makes reference to the
work of Pierre Legendre, a psychoanalyst, jurist and a specialist in canon law
(see e.g. Legendre 1985), who stresses that filiation becomes intelligible only
when it places individuals in a symbolic system of kinship (Théry 1996: 78).
Thus, Théry’s distinction of biological, domestic and genealogical relations
32 J.R.M. against the Netherlands, no. 16944/90, Commission decision of 8 February 1993.
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offers a  more “sociological”  alternative to the notion of  biological,  legal  and
social  relations,  which  does  not  really  problematise  the  substance  of  these
different types of relations. In Théry’s schema, the idea of genealogical
relations  provides  the  most  interesting  object  of  reflection,  as  it  in  a  way
integrates biological, legal and social relations under the same notion and
stresses their  intertwinement.  Individuals  are may be abstract  subjects  with
entitlements, duties and criss-crossing relations, but they can also be situated
in a genealogical grid where everyone has their specific location according to
their sex and generation. This imaginary genealogical grid is a way to illustrate
what the symbolic order of kinship might look like in practice.
Théry  starts  off  with  thoughts  on  the  family  as  an  institution,  asking
whether it has changed from an institution transmitting moral and economic
patrimony to a relational network that focuses on the construction of personal
identities. She associates institutions with solidarity, duty and chains of
relations that extend over generations, whereas she sees networks as
characterised by personal  demands and desire (1996: 66).  The division into
public and private, close to the view of the European Court, can be seen right
away:  family  is  connected  with  ‘suprapersonal’  values,  such  as
intergenerational  solidarity  and  chains  of  human  reproduction.  Other
arrangements  may  appear  similar,  but  they  are  not  seen  to  have
intergenerational connections or to participate in the reproduction of society;
by being private, they are singular, cellular and ephemeral. These private
networks do not participate in the process on instituting: “the characteristic of
humanity is to institute, that is to place into signification” (Théry 1996: 67).
This Legendrian notion of the importance of placing human relations in a pre-
given, pre-ordered and gendered structure is highly interesting as it offers the
possibility of opening these pre-given categories to new definitions.
How could one conceptually reconcile the idea of kinship as articulating the
difference between the sexes and generations and the empirically evident
change, albeit controversial (political demands, legislation, reinterpretation
on  non-discrimination  in  family  matters)  taking  place  in  several  Western
societies regarding how family is understood? As noted by Théry, the idea of
the institution of family articulating the difference between the sexes and
between generations is an abstraction based on all forms of family and kinship
known (1999: 166, see also Fassin 1998). Perhaps the interesting question to
ask  is  not  whether  a  phenomenon  such  as  family  formation  by  same-sex
couples  is  compatible  with  an  order  of  gender  and  generation,  with  the
answers being “yes or “no”, but to what extent this follows the patterns and
models already given by the idea of a grid of gender and generation. If there is
no gender differentiation between the two adults who head a group of persons
they call their family, there are often a variety of other traits they share with
the majority of  families in a given society,  such as a relationship of  alliance
between these two adults, a common residence, and responsibilities to
nurture, care and provide for the possible minors in the family.
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I suggest that the typologies of family relations spelled out by Lagoutte
(biological, social and legal) and Théry (biological, domestic and genealogical)
should be complemented with a fourth dimension of the order of family life,
namely  gendered  relations,  as  it  is  an  essential  part  of  what  the  European
Court, or Théry, for that matter, deem intelligible. However, due to a quasi-
egalitarian rhetoric of gender-neutrality especially evident in legal language, it
is not usually spelt out. As to the evidence of a gendered dimension of family
relations  in  my data  from the  European  Court  of  Human Rights,  a  passage
from the judgement of X, Y, and Z v. the United Kingdom from 199733 may be
cited.  In  this  judgement,  the  European  Court  gave  its  closest  definition  of
family life to date:
When deciding whether a relationship can be said to amount to ’family
life’, a number of factors may be relevant, including whether the couple
live together,  the length of  their relationship and whether they have
demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children
together or by any other means.
X, Y and Z v, the United Kingdom, para 36.
The European Court has consistently applied these criteria in its case law, but
the context of X, Y and Z and its gender-bound outcome highlight the gender-
blindness  of  the  definition.  In  this  judgement,  adjudicated  by  the  Grand
Chamber, the highest and most authoritative body of the European Court, X,
a post-operative female-to-male transgender person, his female companion Y
and  their  child  Z  conceived  by  artificial  insemination,  sought  to  have  X
registered as the father of Z in her birth certificate. English law at the time still
regarded X as a woman, and the European Court ruled in favour of the United
Kingdom in the case34.  Judging  by  the  wording  of  the  definition,  the
relationships between X, Y and Z would seem to fulfil the criteria of family life.
However,  they  fell  short  of  it  as  they  did  not  fulfil  the  criteria  of  the  rather
unspoken  and  implicit  order  of  the  complementarity  of  the  sexes,  as  X’s
reassigned male gender was not fully recognised.
Thus, I argue that there is a fourth type of relationship that exists in the
sphere  of  family  life  in  the  ECHR  besides  biological,  legal  and  social
relationships, which cover most of the tangible and conceptual aspects related
to family relations, but leave the gendered aspects of these relations
untouched. This fourth type of gendered relations may be called ‘structuralist’
as well for the sake of congruence with the notion of the ‘structuralist social
contract’ and the ‘symbolic order’, contributions to this area of debate from the
French  academic  and  political  arena  discussed  later  in  this  chapter.
Comparing  the  notion  of  sexes  and  generations  as  the  grid  of  kinship,  the
cultural ideal this notion represents can be mapped on the following schema.
33 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II.
34 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 36.
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The  order  of  family  life  in  the  case  law of  the  European  Court  rests  on  the
convergence  of  four  types  of  relations  between  family  members:  biological
(genetic), legal (State-recognised), social (lived-out) and gendered (sexed)
relations.35
The  typology  described  above  is  not  supposed  to  be  interpreted  as  a
normative structure; it is meant to reflect the importance given in evaluating
and balancing different forms of relations in the cultural ideal of the symbolic
order in arenas where it has been potentially applied, such as the Pacs debate
in France or the case law of the ECHR. The ideal of gender and generation is
firmly  rooted  in  the  idea  of  the  mutual  complementarity  of  the  female  and
male sexes not just in procreation, but in the constitution of society and the
human mind itself. It does not merely indicate that a child should have two
parents but that they should be of opposite sexes; this principle can be found
in much social-psychological and psychoanalytic theory as well as in various
religious doctrines. The model described above incorporates this assumption
of opposite-sex parenting, and is emphasised greatly in contemporary debates
such  as  the  French Pacs and  same-sex  marriage  debates.  This  is  why  many
situations where social and official relations converge, such as extra-familial
adoption and family formation with the help of  donated eggs or sperm, are
seen as complying with the symbolic order because they pay a resemblance to
‘natural facts’.
3.3 SELECTION OF DATA AND ANALYTICAL
APPROACH
The imposition of form produces the illusion of systematicity and, by
virtue  of  this  and  the  break  between  specialized  and  ordinary
language which brings it about, it produces the illusion of the
autonomy of the system.
Pierre Bourdieu (1991: 141-2)
The texts analysed in this study make up a corpus of two different categories
of  documents  from  the  electronic  archives  the  European  Court  of  Human
Rights, judgements and decisions. In a couple of cases, reports have replaced
decisions or have been analysed in addition to judgements36. Judgements are
the  primary  data  described  and  analysed  in  this  study,  due  to  their  legal
relevance  as  often  they  have  been  landmark  cases  and  also  because  all
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights have been published in
35 See also Hart 2009, where a visual version of this schema has been presented.
36 This has been if a judgment or decision has not been issued (see W. v. the United Kingdom) but
the complaint has included qualitatively interesting information or when a report from the
Commission has added substantial information to the case (Marckx v. Belgium, report of the
Commission).
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full in the Hudoc online database37. Decisions, which have all been published
since  1987,  are  secondary  data,  shedding  light  on  the  epistemic  boundaries
and shifts concerning what kind of applications have been deemed relevant for
full Court proceedings in different decades. From an extra-legal, sociological
and narrative point of view, both types of documents may contain data that is
relevant for the purposes of this study. Other types of documents exist in the
system  of  the  ECHR,  too,  but  judgements  and  decisions  are  the  ones  that
provide a description of an application from its statement of facts to the
outcome  of  the  application,  be  it  a  decision  of  inadmissibility  (not  legally
relevant for court procedure) or a judgement (regardless of the outcome of the
case, the application presents a case that is relevant to the interpretation of the
European Convention). Furthermore, there are “friendly settlements” when
the application has been settled without court proceedings, and sometimes
cases are “struck off the list” of pending cases if a solution has been reached
between the applicant and the State in question.
The judgements and decisions analysed in this study have been selected
from the electronic database of the European Court of Human Rights, Hudoc.
The primary data, judgements that concern the establishment of family
relations  date  from  1979  (Marckx v. Belgium)  to  2014  (Hämäläinen v.
Finland). Hudoc does not contain judgements from before 1979 which would
have  been  relevant  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  study,  the  recognition  of
interpersonal family relations. The year 2014 is the last year from which cases
have  been  taken  up  for  analysis  in  this  study,  bringing  forth  relevant  cases
concerning surrogacy (Mennesson  v.  France,  Labassee  v.  France) and
marriage (Hämäläinen v. Finland). Thus, the selection of the case law has first
proceeded on the basis of subjective evaluation by the author, and secondly on
the need to draw a time limit in order to define and delimit the scope of a study
that is also historical in nature. For identifying relevant texts from the Hudoc
database, I have done a technical pre-selection of all judgements and decisions
with the Hudoc keyword (according to the indexation available in the search
tool of the database) Article 12 (right to marry) or Article 8 and “family life”,
leaving out case law under Article  8 that  was not indexed with the keyword
“family  life”.  This  amounts  to  1,479  judgements  and  decisions  (listed  as  “in
English) from 196338 up until 31 December 201439.
The  availability  of  case  law  in  the  Hudoc  database  is  as  follows:  all
judgements from 1959 onwards are available. The “key cases” or pairs of cases
that I discuss as the main substantive and illustrative examples of the themes
in this study are all judgements. All decisions, either by the full-time Court or
the part-time Commission of Human Rights (a former screening body) from
1986 onwards are also available on Hudoc. Some of the admissibility decisions
37 Available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
38 The first potentially relevant case thus being X. v. Belgium, no. 1488/62, Commission decision
of 18 December 1963.
39 As on the Hudoc database on 9th April 2015.
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between  1955  and  1986  are  available  on  Hudoc,  as  noted  by  the  European
Court in 2013:
Availability of case law on Hudoc database
ECHR body Document type Time period Availability
Commission Admissibility decisions 1955–1986 Some d’s*
Commission Admissibility decisions 1986–1998 All
Court Screening panel decisions 1959–10/98 All
Court Admissibility decisions 11/98 → All
Court Judgments 1959 → All
* Some published decisions
Source: Hudoc User Manual (2013)
More documents are added to the Hudoc database continuously, but from the
point of view of this study, early decisions missing from Hudoc would probably
not offer any vitally important information. Thus, in this study judgements act
as primary data and decisions as secondary data, and inadmissibility decisions
from before 1987 (less than 10) act  as historical  examples of  inadmissibility
decisions that have been made public between 1959 and 1987 (European Court
of Human Rights 2009).
The  European  Court  of  Human Rights  began  functioning  in  1959.  For  a
long  time,  it  was  an  institution  which  operated  on  a  part-time  basis  and
convened for a few days per month. A body called the “Commission of Human
Rights” delivered admissibility decisions and acted as a screening body for the
European Court. In 1998 Protocol 11 came into force and the previous two-tier
was replaced with a full-time Court. Since 1998 applicants have been able to
address  their  cases  directly  to  the  European  Court.  All  in  all,  only  122
judgements and decisions published in the series “Reports of judgements and
decisions” were given between 1959 and 1986. After that, over 9,600
judgements and published decisions were given between 1987 and 2008
(European  Court  of  Human Rights  2009).  In  turn,  according  to  the  Hudoc
database, between 2008 and 2014 over 17,300 judgements and decisions were
given by the European Court  of  Human Rights.40 As noted by Johnson,  the
European  Court  deems  about  90  per  cent  of  the  applications  it  receives  as
inadmissible, so judgements are given and inadmissibility decisions are
published only on a small number of complaints (Johnson 2013: 14, see also
Dembour 2006: 23) regarding the huge number of applications the European
Court processes nowadays.
In this study, a judgement or decision has been classified as relevant if the
facts of the case (paragraphs under the heading “The Facts” in the beginning
of each document) have displayed a dispute concerning the establishment
40 According to a Hudoc search 10 April 2015.
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and/or the recognition of a parent-child relation or an intimate and enduring
relation  between  two  adults.  Thus  they  touch  upon  the  establishment  of
existing  or  potential  family  relations,  those  being  relations  of  marriage,
cohabitation and parent-child relationships in regular births, assisted
reproduction and adoption. Cases dealing with custody and/or right of access
between parents and children or cases involving the protection of family life in
the context of immigration deportation issues have been left out, as the
disputes in these kinds of cases do not, to an extent significant to this study,
involve the existence or the recognition of a family relation – rather, the
protection of an existing relation is under jeopardy. Likewise, cases concerning
taking children into public care fall outside the ambit of this study as the issue
at  stake  is  not  the  existence  of  a  recognised  relation  but  rather  State
interference in the maintenance of these relations. Cases concerning the
existing or potential family life of convicted prisoners have also been left out
in order to focus more clearly on everyday settings and households.
The case texts can be divided into two parts: first come the facts of the case,
which, depending on the case, unravels as a brief summary of details relevant
to the case or as a life-history type of narrative. Second comes the description
of the course of the case in the legal system of the respondent State and in the
European Court. This is followed by an examination of the legal problems in
the case and the decision given by the European Court of Human Rights. To a
certain extent, the life-history and the legal narrative are intertwined. My
analysis  proceeds from describing the context  of  the life  history to the legal
dissection  of  the  relations  argued  for  or  against.  With  the  help  of  the
conceptual tools described above, the question of what kinds of relations count
in different cases and contexts is evaluated. Each thematic section focuses first
on a key case or a pair of cases that are most relevant to the theme at hand.
After that, other cases or inadmissibility decisions are discussed to enrich the
description and analysis of that thematic category.
The  aim  of  the  selection  process  has  been  to  highlight  complaints  with
sociological  and  anthropological  relevance.  The  relevance  of  a  single
complaint or case in such matters goes before quantitative appreciation of a
mass of identical complaints. For example, cases concerning the recognition
or  rejection  of  maternity  such  as Marckx v. Belgium (1979)  or Odièvre v.
France (2003) are few in numbers but high in relevance and importance and
lengthy when it comes to the page-count of these documents. In turn, cases
concerning paternity are high in numbers but very often similar to each other.
A  chronological  analysis  is  not  to  indicate  that  an  evolutionary  line  can  be
drawn to show that the case law of the European Court is proceeding towards
a self-evidently more enlightened view. Rather, the aim is to highlight shifting
epistemic contexts which make different considerations relevant and pertinent
at a given time. The data selected for this study has been grouped under the
classical anthropological rubrics of alliance, consanguinity and filiation (see
Chapter 1.1), which help in setting individual decisions and judgements into a
wider context, which has also influenced the analysis of the texts themselves:
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“Alliance” refers to adult couples, marriage and cohabitation; “Consanguinity”
to the making and breaking of biological maternity and paternity; “Filiation”
refers to the making of parent-child relations through the legal and medical
techniques of adoption and assisted reproduction. A particular case might be
discussed  in  more  than  one  thematic  category  or  chapter.  The  relational
substance  in  the  cases  is  analysed  with  the  help  of  the  notion  of  biological,
legal,  social  and  gendered  relations  (see  previous  sub-chapter)  in  order  to
evaluate  the  importance  of  one  or  more  types  of  relations  in  particular
contexts.
In addition to thematic classification and an analysis of the significance of
biological, legal, social and gendered relations in each case, attention is given
to the linguistic  guise of  these relations in the documents and the language
applied by the European Court and the imposition of a formalised language of
the European Court of Human Rights for turning life narratives into legal fact.
This approach draws from Pierre Bourdieu and his writings on specialised
languages and how they hold up power relations (1991) and on Jennifer
Nedelsky’s ideas concerning relational analysis of legal disputes (2011, 2012).
On a larger, sociological scale this study is inspired by Bourdieu’s thinking on
the role of language in producing and maintaining symbolic power and the role
of specialised languages in this task (1991: 137-159). Kirsten Hastrup, a Danish
anthropologist,  argues  that  relying  on  this  notion  from  Bourdieu  on  the
imposition of form that “…because human rights are cast in the genre of legal
language, they rely heavily on their form for authority. Their nature is form
and, along with other genres that  depend on form, the law also legitimately
exercises a violence of the freedom of interpretation” (2003: 24).
Jennifer  Nedelsky  provides  carefully  thought  out  approach  focusing  on
relationality  in  legal  theory  in  her  magnum  opus  so  far, Law’s Relations
(2011). In the context of law and politics, relational analysis and methodology
according to Nedelsky should focus on what kind of relations rights create, not
just between people on an inter-individual scale, but between individuals,
groups and institutions:
Rights structure relations of power, trust, responsibility and care. This
is as true of property and contract rights as it is of rights created under
family  law.  All  claims  of  rights  involve  interpretations  and
contestation.  My  argument  is  that  these  inevitable  debates  are  best
carried on in the following relational terms. First, one should ask how
existing laws and rights have helped to construct  the problem being
addressed. What patterns and structures of relations have shaped it,
and how has law helped shape those relations? The next questions are
what values are at  stake in the problem and what kinds of  relations
promote such values. In particular, what kind of shift in the existing
relations would enhance rather than undermine the values at stake?
There may, of course, be more than one value at stake, and they may
compare with one another. For example, the relations that enhance the
freedom and autonomy of the renter may decrease the security and
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freedom of the landlord. What interpretation or change in the existing
law  would  help  restructure  the  relations  in  the  ways  that  would
promote a given value?
Jennifer Nedelsky (2011: 74)
Thus, as Nedelsky points out following this paragraph, a distinction between
rights and values is  made.  According to her,  rights may be characterised as
rhetorical  and institutional  devices for promoting values that  are held dear,
such  as  autonomy  or  equality  (2011:  74).  In  the  context  of  this  study,
Nedelsky’s framework may be put to work in the following way: what kinds of
relations between individuals (such as a dyadic intimacy between adults or a
parent-child relation) or between an individual and the State (e.g. questions of
status and recognition, such as married or not, legal parent or not) exist in the
case at hand and how has existing domestic law influenced the setting in the
case text? What is the relation argued for in the case like, how does it lack legal
recognition and what kinds of values are argued to be secured if the relation in
question is recognised?
In a later and much shorter text (Nedelsky 2012) based on the thinking and
approach developed in Law’s Relations, Nedelsky offers a bullet-pointed
version of the questions which she describes as her “relational approach”:
1. How did existing definitions of rights generate the conflict or debate
at hand?
2.  What  values  are  at  stake  in  the  particular  conflict,  for  example,
autonomy, political freedom, equality?
3. What structures of relations foster those values; in particular, is
there a shift in the existing structure that will better foster the value at
stake?
4. Which approach to the right in question will best (or better) foster
that structure of relations?
Jennifer Nedelsky (2012: 235)
These questions act as an inspiration to the relational analysis undertaken in
this study. What is important is how “existing definitions of rights” frame and
posit the relations of the applicant to the European Court vis-à-vis her family
members, or the gendered interpersonal relations in question in the case at
hand,  as  well  as  to  the  State  in  question  and  to  the  prevailing  definition  of
‘family’  as  an  institution,  bundle  of  relations  and  an  object  of  protection  in
family  law  and  human  rights  law.  In  my  data,  the  core  value  discussed  is
usually equality, sometimes autonomy, and often the degree of autonomy that
is given to individuals in defining their family relations. What then is sought
both  by  the  European  Court  and  the  counterpoints  and  critique  in  the
discussion relates to the two last questions, seeking a way of re-structuring the
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interpersonal relations in the case vis-à-vis the State in order to better foster
the value or values discussed in the case.
In the process of  writing,  guidance has been taken from Wendy Brown’s
notion of ‘counterpoint’ as a technique of critique and a style of writing (Brown
2002). In essence, it helps in entering into debate with the case text at hand,
the notions expressed in it and the normative content it conveys. The exercise
at  hand  is  not  really  to  argue  ‘against’  the  text  but  to  open  up  different
perspectives and what various audiences of the text may draw from it, be they
familists, feminists or something else. According to Brown:
Counterpoint, whether in music, painting, or verbal argument, is more
complex and productive than simple opposition and does not carry the
mythological or methodological valence of dialectics. Counterpoint is
a deliberate art, at once open ended and tactical, that emanates from
an antihegemonic sensibility and requires at least a modest embrace
of spectral multiplicity to be comprehended. Counterpoint involves,
first,  the  complicating  of  a  single  or  dominant  theme  through  the
addition of contrasting themes or forces; it undoes a monolithic
element through the multiplication of elements. Second, counterpoint
sets off or articulates a thematic by means of contrast or juxtaposition;
it highlights dominance through a kind of reverse othering.
Wendy Brown (2002: 568)
Brown argues in favour of counterpoint as a resource for “renewing political
theory's political concerns, renovating its identity, and developing its capacity
to  intervene  in  the  restructuring  of  intellectual  life”  (2002:  568).
Counterpoint, then, acts as a form of critique, an academic practice of reading
and writing that  aims at  clarifying what a text  and the person or institution
behind it is trying to argue and establish. As Brown and Janet Halley (2002)
have noted elsewhere, critique is a scholarly practice that may be accused of
elitism and weak effects on quotidian injustice and political struggles, but it is
still a vitally important exercise for questioning consensus and underlying
assumptions of sets of thought or political and legal projects.
For example, Anastasia Vakulenko has taken up Brown’s view of
counterpoint as a technique of criticism and writing and sees that
…counterpoint provides a technique for critical analysis, which does
not insist on the correctness of its approach. Rather, it presents a set of
observations in counterpoint to other arguments advanced on the
subject.  It  thus  offers  perspective,  rather  than  objectivity  or
comprehensiveness.
Anastasia Vakulenko (2012: 8)
As a sociological study of legal documents and debates surrounding them, this
is what this study aims to do as well: rather than just offer a critical reading
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and simplistic answers to the questions posed from a certain point of view, this
study aims to enrich and complexify the discussion of the questions at hand.
Paying attention to national and historical context, the extra-legal dimensions
of the case texts such as sociological or anthropological debates behind them
or  the  expert  knowledge  referred  to  hopefully  help  both  the  author  and  the
reader to form an informed and balanced view of the complex issues discussed
in the case texts.
3.4 DISCUSSION: TYPES OF FAMILY RELATIONS IN
THE ECHR
As political theorists, we do not need to develop original theories of
rhetoric, semiotics, or interpretation, but to be effective readers of texts
– events, canonical works, or historical developments – and to be as
rigorous and self-reflexive as possible in the construction of our own
arguments,  we need to consult  the fields that do make these studies,
especially literary, rhetorical, and visual theory.
Wendy Brown (2002: 572)
The European Convention provides a set of human rights principles that have
been interpreted in a vast number of cases since the European Court of Human
Rights began functioning sixty years ago. A considerable number of that case
law concerns the protection of private and family life, spheres of human rights
protection that are closely intertwined but at times sharply contrasted: “family
life”  is  a  privileged  sphere  within  the  larger  realm  of  private  life,  and  even
though, due to the accumulation of case law and change in epistemic contexts
on the European level, it has become more inclusive, it is still mainly held up
by the perceived need to protect also the institutions of heterosexual marriage
and gender-specific parental roles. However, certain change has taken place
during the past decade, as same-sex couples are seen to share de facto family
life according to the reasoning of the European Court in Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria from 2010.
Despite the institutionalisation of human rights in international politics
and their highly formalised and juridical character in supranational
institutions, I argue, following Dembour (2006, 2010) that even when highly
formalised and processualised, human rights are primarily a discursive
category, words that make things happen. In Who Believes in Human Rights?
Dembour (2006) offers a formidable theoretical and analytical account of the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. She analyses selected ECHR
case law from realist, utilitarian, Marxist, particularist and feminist
perspectives,  and  shows  that  besides  administrative  efficiency  and  the
sanctioning of States Parties in their human rights commitments, the
institutionalisation and proceduralisation of human rights can have adverse
effects, too. Those who can afford the material and personal costs of seeking
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justice  from a  supranational  court  tend  to  be  the  ones  who  benefit  from its
existence. (Dembour 2006: 254-255, see also Dembour 2010: 11.)
The European Court itself offers a wide variety of definitions and tools for
analysing its case law (see Johnson 2013: 69-88). In many ways, it has created
a specific genre of legal texts and a language of its own in order to ‘standardise’
the applications it receives, which are often, of course, already written in this
language  by  lawyers  and  interest  groups  backing  the  individuals  acting  as
applicants. The application of human rights principle to disputes between
individuals and States may be evaluated with the help of a vocabulary derived
from the European Convention, a learned skill possessed by those versed in
ECHR case law. These texts are then studied in a variety of contexts: by (law)
students in classes on human rights law in universities, by practicing lawyers
in working for national Governments and in the private sector, by scholars for
the sake of research, by activists in strategic litigation organised by NGOs and
so  on.  Only  a  certain  set  of  the  facts  of  each  case  are  displayed  in  the
documents, but they suffice for this study to provide legal narratives that shed
light on the variety of situations and contexts upon which the notion of what
‘family’ means in European human rights jurisprudence is built.
The  data  selected  for  this  study  from  the  vast  case  law  of  the  European
Court  of  Human  Rights  provides  a  corpus  of  legal  narratives  that  offer  the
possibility to analyse how and under what circumstances formally recognised
family relations come into being in European human rights jurisprudence. The
typology of biological, legal, social and gendered relations acts as a conceptual
framework  for  dissecting  and  discussing  what  is  seen  as  relevant  and
important in deeming whether an intimate relation between two adults or a
parent-child relationship is seen as worthy of State recognition and protection.
If the principle of positive duties of the State to promote human rights in the
realm of family life is taken seriously and dynamically, States are then obliged
not just to recognise but also to accommodate for different types of supportive,
nurturing and affective relations. This is where the essence of “relational
subjects”  comes  in:  due  to  a  high  degree  of  self-definition  of  identities  and
relations, recognition for a variety of close personal relations is sought. Often
these judgements and decisions involve same-sex couples and/or transgender
persons, as it is their situation and incompatibility with a rigid conceptual and
normative  grid  of  genders  and  generations  that  produces  the  legal  disputes
and claims ruled upon in ECHR case law.
The empirical analysis in the following chapters (4, 5 and 6) will proceed as
follows: first, the content of relevant cases will be described, focusing on the
facts  of  the  case,  which  Convention  rights  were  evoked  and  what  was  the
outcome in the European Court. The description of case material will, in each
sub-chapter, focus on a key case, a pair of key cases or a thematic succession
of relevant case law. Specific attention will be given to definition of family life
and family relations given by domestic Courts from the respondent State, the
applicants  and  the  European  Court  as  well  as  extra-legal  expert  knowledge
cited in case texts. Attention will be given to the production of ECHR case law
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from  the  point  of  view  of  the  imposition  of  form,  i.e.  dressing  the  legal
narrative  in  question  under  the  formulaic  language  of  the  European
Convention on Human Rights. The substantive analysis of the issue at stake
will  be  analysed  with  the  help  of  Nedelsky’s  questions  (2012:  235)  on  the
possible restructuring of relations through rights in order to protect core
values,  but judging what might be the core value(s)  at  stake might not be a
straightforward  question.  The  analysis  in  each  sub-chapter  and  chapter  is
written out striving to offer pertinent counterpoints and critique to the
empirical and normative issues at hand.
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4 ALLIANCE: MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS
AND COHABITATION
Just as the State has left religion to the believers, it is asked nowadays
to leave conjugality to individuals.1
Irène Théry (1993: 16)
Which comes first in constituting a family, a (sexual) relationship between two
adults2 or the dyad made up by a woman giving birth and her child, like in the
case of Marckx v. Belgium3?  Conventional  wisdom  would  tell  us  that
courtship, engagement, marriage and a honeymoon come first in this order,
children arrive sometime after the nuptials or later. When not constrained by
convention,  this  chain  of  events  might  be  made  up  of  getting  to  know each
other,  dating,  moving  in  together,  having  children  and  possibly  getting
married or concluding a civil union somewhere along the way, or some of these
elements in a different order. These are descriptions of how the constitution
of  a  socially  and  legally  recognised  form  of  couplehood  often  goes  in  the
European  context.  However,  the  question  posed  in  the  opening  of  this
paragraph is not really about the temporal chain of events in the constitution
of family life.  The question is  about how a couple relationship (adult-adult)
and  a  parental  relationship  (adult-child)  relate  to  each  other  when  the
presence of legally relevant family relations is being evaluated. Alliance, as an
anthropological term, refers to the act of forming a socially recognised union
between two individuals, most often a woman and a man, which also leads to
connecting two kin groups. The universal but culturally variable principle of
incest prohibition produces the rule of exogamy, which means that one needs
to find a spouse who is not too closely (see discussion in Chapter 1.1). The rules
on who is too closely related and who is not has varied from one society and
era to another as we will soon see in Chapter 4.1.
An analysis of the constitution of family relations in any legal culture would
not be sufficient without at  least  a  brief parcours through the meaning and
significance of established forms of alliance. This chapter aims to do that by
analysing  relevant  case  law  from  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights
regarding the process of the privatisation of marriage and similar relationships
in Western States during the latter half of the twentieth century, or démariage
(Théry  1993).  The  term comes  from Irène  Théry  and  her  book Démariage:
Justice et la vie privée (1993), where she performed an analysis of the change
1 “De même que l’État a abandonné la religion aux religieux, il lui est demandé aujourd’hui
d’abandonner la conjugalité aux individus” (Théry 1993: 16). Translation by the author.
2 The examination of intimate relations between adults in this study is restricted to couple
relations: both polygamous and polyamorous relations have been left outside the scope of this study.
3 Judgment of Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31.
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the  institution  of  marriage  has  been  going  through  in  the  French  context
during the latter half of the 20th century. The title does not merely refer to a
"decline  of  marriage"  as  such,  but  to  the  increased  privatisation  of  the
arrangement  of  close  relations  within  the  realm  of  intimate  relations  and
family formation. The importance of formal marriage and the requirements
imposed by it might be ‘in decline’, but this is not directly linked to how people
give  value  to  morals  or  close  relationships  as  such. Démariage may be
translated as “de-marriage” or the undoing of marriage, and it captures nicely
the  decline  of  marriage  as  a  strong  social  constraint  on  a  collective,  even
though in certain social and cultural niches such as religious communities and
on a personal level it might still be important to many people (see also Eekelaar
2006: 26 and Heaphy 2015: 118).
Thinking of current debates raging in the United States and Europe about
the  acceptability  of  same-sex  marriage  (see  e.g.  McClain  and  Cere  2013),  is
‘marriage’  the  same  thing  as,  say,  a  century  or  so  ago,  when  the  notion
coverture meant that wives were fully merged into the legal identities of their
husbands and thus married women did not constitute legal subjects in their
own  right?  (See  Davies  and  Naffine  2001:  63.)  As  later  chapters  will
demonstrate,  the  majority  of  families  in  the  historical  and  geographical
context of the ECHR are based on the union of a woman and a man of some if
not life-long duration and the parties to this dyadic union are often the ones
bearing  the  main  responsibility  for  their  offspring.  However,  how  human
reproduction works on the ground level is a different thing, and in many cases
leading to legal disputes marriage merely provides a framework for trying to
make sense of it all, sometimes failing miserably.
Judgements  and  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  that
touch upon the intimisation of marriage as a state-sanctioned institution and
describe the transformation of the role of a sexual relation between two adults
as  the  basis  of  family  life  can  be  divided  into  four  categories:  1)  state
intervention  in  the  right  to  marry,  2)  possibility  of  divorce,  3)  transgender
marriage and 4) forms of same-sex unions such as registered partnerships and
same-sex marriage where it has been legislated. The first category discussed
in  this  sub-chapter  is  of  great  anthropological  import,  as  it  deals  with
interventions  in  the  right  to  marry. B.  and  L.  v.  the  United  Kingdom from
20054 is  a  reminder  of  remnants  of  complex  rules  of  incest  prohibition  in
European legal  systems and how they collide with the abstract  principles of
human  rights  law  in  the  European  Convention  and  modern-day  notions  of
individuality.  Cases  in  the  second  category  deal  with  the  possibility  of
obtaining a divorce. The most notable cases in this respect, Airey v. Ireland
from 19795 and Johnston and others v. Ireland from 19866 and a few of the
other  cases  shed  light  on  the  fact  that  divorce  has  not  been  regarded  as  a
4 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, no. 36536/02, 13 September 2005.
5 Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32.
6 Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112.
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human right as such, as for long it was not available all Member States of the
Council of Europe.7
The  third  and  the  fourth  categories  deal  with  more  or  less  recent  legal
developments in what could be termed the “de-gendering” of marriage8, and
the possibility of transgender and non-heterosexual individuals to marry or to
form civil unions. Both categories display a wealth of data. However, almost
all of the cases dealing with the right to marry for transgender people come
from the United Kingdom and were fairly similar in their argumentation and
outcome before Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom from 20029, which
established the right of post-operative transgender persons to obtain a legal
identity in accordance with their reassigned gender identity and thus also the
right to marry according to their reassigned gender. The theme of same-sex
marriage was deliberated in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria from 201010, in which
the European Court offered modest support to the idea that same-sex couples
share de facto family life, but that Article 12 of the European Convention could
not be interpreted to mean that States had to offer same-sex marriage11.
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber judgement of Hämäläinen v. Finland from
201412 illustrates the difference between the right to marry at a certain point
in time and the right to remain married after gender recognition.
4.1 STATE INTERVENTION IN WHO ONE MAY MARRY
The key case under the rubric of state interference in the right to marry is the
judgement of B. and L. v. the United Kingdom from 2005. The case report is
quite short, but it offers a glimpse into the complicated history of English law
on prohibited degrees of affinity and how the rules concerning the prohibited
degrees  of  relationships  spelt  out  as  far  back  as  in  the  Old  Testament  were
transposed into secular law in England. Marriage prohibitions are also at the
core of the anthropological study of kinship: who are seen as too close to mate
and what is seen as beneficial to the community or society in question. Other
7 Malta was the last European State to legalise divorce in 2011when a referendum on allowing
divorce was held (“MPs in Catholic Malta pass historic law on divorce”, 25 July 2011, BBC online news
item). The Republic of Ireland has allowed divorce after a referendum held in 1995. On the process in
Ireland, see Burley and Regan (2002).
8 The term ”degendering marriage” has been thought up by many scholars, for example Barker
(2012: 121) and Ball (2014: 136), but usually the term is used descriptively to sum up on a debate as a
passing mention.
9 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI.
10 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010.
11 A few cases (e.g. Chapin and Charpentier v. France (no. 40183/07), Orlandi and Others v. Italy
(no. 26431/12) are pending on the matter of same-sex marriage and will probably shed light on the
definition of marriage in the ECHR in 2015 or later (European Court of Human Rights 2015a).
12 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, 16 July 2014.
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cases in the history of the ECHR that deal with State interference in the right
to  marry  deal  with  other  forms  of  prohibited  relations,  such  as  marriage
between a stepfather and a stepdaughter13,  a  young  man  eloping  with  an
underage girl14 and the possibility, or rather the impossibility of contracting a
posthumous marriage15. All of these complaints and cases deal with the kind
of anthropological import present in B. and L. –  who  may  marry  who  and
according  to  rules  laid  down  by  whom,  which  are  intertwined  with
communally held moral convictions that marrying a relative not just through
consanguinity  but  through  marriage,  a  child  or  a  dead  person  is  abhorred.
Other complaints and cases in this category deal more with the interests of the
State in posing obstacles to marriage: serving in the army creating restrictions
on marrying16,  or  not regarding a certain form of  marriage as valid,  such as
marriage celebrated through religious rituals17 not recognised by the State or
different rules regarding marriage for different ethnic groups18.
From an anthropological point of view, the judgement of B. and L. v. the
United Kingdom is  a  prime example  of  the  remnants  of  complicated  incest
prohibitions and marriage rules. In common parlance in Western countries,
‘incest’ tends to be understood to refer to prohibited sexual relationships
between close relatives such as parents and children or between siblings.
However,  incest  prohibitions  are  not  just  about  forbidding  sexual  relations
between people with a close blood relationship. As Adam Kuper (2002) points
out, this is the meaning the word has today, and it is also associated closely
with  child  abuse.  Within  anthropological  scholarship  and  in  the  past  the
concept of incest has been wider. Anthropological scholarship studies rules of
what is  considered as incest  or  prohibited degrees of  relationships and how
these boundaries vary from one culture to another. For example, in England,
the concept of incest used to encompass relations through marriage, which led
to  marriage  prohibitions  between  not  just  blood  relatives  (due  to
consanguinity)  but  also  between  in-laws,  due  to  understandings  of  what
affinity is (Kuper 2002).
Stephen Cretney (2003), a British legal historian, offers a detailed history
of the treatment of prohibited degrees of relationships in his account of the
history of English family law. In English law, prohibitions to marry a relative
through marriage, such as one’s sister-in-law or brother-in-law were not
reformed in a single piece of  legislation that  would have made the situation
symmetrical in terms of gender and degree of proximity. Instead, legislation
13 Waser and Steiger v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 31990/02, 23 October 2006.
14 Khan against the United Kingdom, no. 11579/85, Commission decision of 7 July 1986.
15 M. v. Federal Republic of Germany, no. 10995/84, Commission decision of 13 December 1984.
16 Dimitra Staiku v. Greece, application no. 35426/97, Commission decision of 2 July 1997.
17 X against the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 6167/73, Commission decision of 18 December
1974, Decision and reports XX, p. 64.
18 Selim v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 47293/99, ECHR 2001-IX. See also Selim v. Cyprus (friendly
settlement), no. 47293/99, ECHR 2002-VI.
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was reformed in a piecemeal fashion, responding to individual cases and life
histories,  or  large-scale  historical  events  such  as  the  First  World  War,  after
which many women and the brothers of their dead husbands wanted to marry.
The history of prohibited degrees of marital relationships in English law is by
no means clear or straightforward.  Prohibitions on marrying the brother or
sister of one’s former spouse were lifted one by one over a long period lasting
from the 19th century to the early 20th century, so symmetrical relationships
such  as  marrying  the  sister  of  one’s  former  wife  for  men  or  marrying  the
brother  of  one’s  former  husband for  women were  not  made  possible  at  the
same  time.  Personal  Acts  of  Parliament  were  a  way  of  getting  around  the
restrictions,  as  mentioned  in  the  case  material  of B.  and  L.,  but  this  was  a
costly, complicated and a one-by-one solution to this issue. (Cretney 2003, see
also Héritier 1993.)
B. and L. v. the United Kingdom was about a couple, an older man and a
younger woman, who had been father-in-law and daughter-in-law – that is, L.,
the woman, had been married to B.’s  son,  C.,and L.  and C.  had had a child
together. After L., the woman, separated from her husband C., she and B., a
divorcee, began cohabiting, and L.’s and C.’s child lived with them. Thus, the
child was living with his mother and his grandfather, who also happened to be
his ‘stepfather’. In 2002, B. inquired from their local Superintendent Registrar
whether  B.  and  L.  could  marry.  The  Superintendent  Registrar  replied  that
under  English  law  at  the  time,  the  Marriage  Act  1949  as  amended  by  the
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, this was impossible
unless B.’s ex-wife (C.’s mother), and C. (B.’s son and L.’s ex-husband), were
both dead.19 There  was  one  possible  way  around  the  marriage  prohibition,
which was the Personal Bill procedure available in the Parliament. Over the
years,  some  couples  with  a  similar  degree  of  affinity  had  succeeded  in
obtaining the possibility to marry through a personal petition in the form of a
“personal legislative project” made to the Parliament.20 However, in order to
succeed one needed to know about the procedure and devote both time and
money to it.
When complaining to the European Court, B. and L. invoked Article 12 of
the European Convention, and no other rights stipulated in the Convention.
They argued that the prohibition in place “denied them the very essence of the
right to marry”21 and  that  the  restriction  was  ”disproportionate  and
unjustified”22 . They also pointed out that Personal Acts that had been passed
for other couples undermined the importance of the prohibition. Furthermore,
they argued that:
19 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, paras 7-12.
20 Personal bills mentioned in B. and L. v. the United Kingdom are the Valerie Mary Hill and Alan
Monk (Marriage Enabling) Act 1985 (para 21) and Sonia Ann Billington and Norbury Billington
(Marriage Enabling) Bill 1985 (para 23).
21 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 28.
22 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 28.
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… the majority in the report before the House of Lords were in favour
of lifting the restriction as serving no purpose. Even the minority were
more concerned about the relationship of step-father and step-
daughter,  in  which  respect  the  prohibition  was  in  the  end  removed.
There were, in the applicants' view, no sensible or coherent distinctions
between  their  situation  and  that  of  other  categories  which  were
permitted (step-father and step-child, brother-in-law and sister-in-
law etc.).
B. and L. V. the United Kingdom, para 29
Regarding  the  position  of  L.’s  and  C.’s  son,  they  argued  that  he  actively
supported B.’s  and L.’s  plans to marry and “wanted to be part  of  a  ‘normal’
family”23.  The  Government  defended  the  legislation  in  place  due  to  the
“complexity or relationships”24 in question, potential harm to third parties and
the protection of morals. Regarding L.’s and C.’s child, the situation could be
“deeply confusing and disturbing”25. The Government maintained that the
restriction could be defended as part of the national legislation that Article 12
very  much refers  back  to  and  necessary  “…given  the  risk  of  such  marriages
undermining the foundations of the family and altering relationships between
affines; public views on the moral limits of permissible relationships within
the family and the risk of public outrage; and the role of law in defining and
reinforcing family relationships”26.
The  European  Court  elaborated  that  the  English  legislation  in  question
”aimed  at  protecting  the  integrity  of  the  family  (preventing  sexual  rivalry
between parents and children) and preventing harm to children who may be
affected by the changing relationships of the adults around them”27 and
deemed these to be legitimate aims. It noted that there was no legislation in
place to deter parents-in-law and children-in-law from having sexual relations
together and such relationships did sometimes take place as the case at hand
demonstrated. In addition, as it was legally possible to contract such marriages
with the help of the Personal Bill procedure, the European Court reasoned that
there  was  no  categorical  ban  of  marriages  such  as  B.’s  and  L.’s  proposed
marriage. According to the European Court ”[t]he inconsistency between the
stated aims of the incapacity and the waiver applied in some cases undermines
the rationality and logic  of  the measure”28. Thus, the European Court ruled
that there had been a violation of Article 12 of the European Convention.
So,  what  were  these  restrictions  based  on?  To  go  far  back,  the  Old
Testament,  more  specifically  Leviticus  18:  6-18.  The  old  Judaic  rules
23 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 29.
24 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 31.
25 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 31.
26 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 32.
27 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 37.
28 B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, para 40.
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prohibited sexual relations with certain categories of both consanguineous
relatives29 and affines30.  Verses  6-13  prohibit  relations  with  mainly
consanguineous  female  relatives  in  relation  to  a  male  Ego:  mother,  step-
mother (father’s wife), sister, half-sister, niece and aunt. In verses 14-18, the
prohibitions deal with relatives through marriage:
14 Do not dishonor your father’s  brother by approaching his  wife to
have sexual relations; she is your aunt.
15 Do not have sexual relations with your daughter-in-law. She is your
son’s wife; do not have relations with her.
16 Do not have sexual relations with your brother’s wife; that would
dishonor your brother.
17 Do not have sexual relations with both a woman and her daughter.
Do  not  have  sexual  relations  with  either  her  son’s  daughter  or  her
daughter’s daughter; they are her close relatives. That is wickedness.
18  Do  not  take  your  wife’s  sister  as  a  rival  wife  and  have  sexual
relations with her while your wife is living.
New Living Bible 2007, Leviticus 18: 6-18
In the Catholic Church these verses gave rise to a complex system of marriage
prohibitions, but they could be overcome by dispensation from the Pope. In
England,  the content of  these verses were worked into a table of  prohibited
degrees  of  relationships,  known  as  ‘Archbishop  Parker’s  Table’,  which  was
adopted in the Canons of the Church of England in 1603 and included in the
Book  of  Common  Prayer  in  1662.  So,  even  after  Reformation  English  law
prohibited certain potential marriages according to rules spelt out in Leviticus,
and  in  contrast  to  mediaeval  canon  law  of  affinity  offered  no  dispensation.
(Bennett  1998:  668.)  However,  these  rules  were  formally  situated  in
ecclesiastical  law.  They  were  engrained  in  secular  legislation  in  1835,  when
Lord Lyndhurst’s Act turned them into effective legislation (Cretney 2003: 39,
see also Héritier 1993: 125-138).
From the point of view of the right to marry as a right guaranteed by the
European Convention, B. and L. is a highly interesting case from the point of
view of anthropological scholarship, as it displays a question where a complex
bundle of incest prohibitions that have travelled from one culture and era to
another and human rights principles, yardsticks of ethical principles specified
in  our  culture  and  era,  come  together.  Héritier  (1993),  who  has  analysed  a
variety of historical traditions related to the question of incest of the second
degree, meaning prohibited degrees of relationships not on the basis of genetic
29 I.e. blood relatives.
30 I.e. relatives through marriage or “in-laws”.
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relatedness but of ties created by marriage; offers a general framework of the
avoidance of contact between blood relatives through the same sexual partner,
which applies to B. and L. as well. However, she also points out the question
of maintaining social order and hierarchies between male head of a kin group
through the avoidance of sexual rivalry between brothers, fathers and sons and
so on (see 1993: 20).
From the perspective of normativity, it is a key judgement as it sets doctrine
emanating  from  religious  authority  such  as  biblical  rules  and  canon  law  in
opposition with human rights doctrine. What was at some point regarded as
necessary for order and stability in society is seen as irrational, backward, and
standing for “no just cause” as noted in a committee report on the possibility
of  lifting these prohibitions in the United Kingdom in the 1980s (Report  by
Group… 1984).  However,  the  juxtaposition  of  tradition  and  religiously
inspired norms of prohibited degrees of affinity against human rights law in
this manner is not this self-evident. What is most interesting in B. and L. is
how ancient Judeo-Christian incest prohibitions are juxtaposed with
modernity and the idea of individual human rights. The judgement led to the
lifting of such marriage prohibitions with the Marriage Act 1949 (Remedial)
Order 2006. In conjunction with the preparation of this Act, opposition was
still  voiced  by  some Christian  communities,  and  also  after  2006 priests  are
exempt from marrying couples within the former prohibited degrees of affinity
with  the  help  of  a  conscience  clause.  (Draft  Marriage  Act  1949  [Remedial]
Order 2006.)
B. and L. is not the only complaint made to the European Court of Human
Rights concerning marriage prohibitions between affines. In Waser and
Steiger against Switzerland from 200631 a couple composed of a man and a
woman who was the daughter of the man’s former wife sought to marry after
living together and having children. Interestingly, the arguments put forward
by  the  Federal  Tribunal,  the  highest  court  where  the  complaint  was  made
before reaching the European Court, stressed “peace within the family” as the
rationale behind the law:
The federal Tribunal concluded that the prohibition was absolute and
its ratio legis (legal rationale) was the maintenance of peaceful
relations within the family. In addition, the federal Tribunal judged
that such a marriage would have been destabilising for the immediate
family,  especially to the parent of  the child finding him or herself  in
this situation as well as for his/her brothers and sisters.32
31 Waser and Steiger against Switzerland, 31990/02, decision of 23 October 2006.
32. Original quote: "Le Tribunal fédéral en conclut que l’interdiction était absolue et sa ratio legis
était le maintien de la paix familiale. Au surplus, le Tribunal fédéral jugea qu’un tel mariage eût été
déstabilisant pour la famille proche, notamment le parent de l’enfant se trouvant dans cette situation
ainsi que ses frères et sœurs". Waser and Steiger against Switzerland, “En fait”, available only in
French. Translation by the author.
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Waser and Steiger v. Switzerland, “En fait”
The applicants lodged their complaint to the European Court in 2002, but the
Swiss  government  and  the  applicants  reached  a  friendly  settlement  as
marriage prohibitions between affines were suppressed when Switzerland
adopted legislation for registered partnerships for same-sex couples in 200533.
Thus, unlike in the United Kingdom, enacting separate partnership legislation
led  to  suppressing  the  remnants  of  affinity-based  marriage  prohibitions.  In
United Kingdom, they have been suppressed as well in 2007 (Draft Marriage
Act  1949  [Remedial]  Order  2006),  but  after  approving  civil  partnership
legislation that entered into force in 2004.
Other decisions and judgements involving state intervention in the right to
marry are to do with other prohibitions, such as age, retroactivity and mental
incapacity, or the interests of the State and other institutions and the powers
of  the  State  in  delegating  the  right  to  contract  marriages  to  religious
communities. In Khan against the United Kingdom (1986)34 a 21-year-old
man had run away with a 14-year-old girl. The couple had sought permission
from the father of the girl to marry, but due to his refusal they ran away and
held an Islamic marriage ceremony. They lived together for over a year before
the  father  of  the  girl  took  her  away.  The  young  man  was  charged  with
abducting the girl “from the possession of the father”35 and having sex with a
girl under 16 years of age, both breaches of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The
young man received a prison sentence of nine months. To the European Court,
he evoked Articles 9, 12 and 14 and complained that the Sexual Offences Act
interfered with his possibility of “manifesting his religion through his marriage
under Islamic law”36, “prevented him [from] consummating his marriage and
founding a family”37 and that he was “discriminated against in that the judge
failed  to  take  into  consideration  his  religion,  under  which  it  is  considered
lawful for a girl to marry on attaining the age of 12 years without her parents’
consent”38. The European Court considered his complaint inadmissible.
A somewhat similar case was X. against the Federal Republic of Germany
from  1974.  In  this  complaint,  the  applicant  and  Mrs  Y  had  considered
themselves to be married after having intercourse after “having read out verse
16 of the 22nd chapter of the second book of Moses in the Old Testament”39.
The complaint was deemed manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible, as the
Commission considered that “[m]arriage is not considered simply as a form of
33 Waser and Steiger against Switzerland, “En Droit”.
34 Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 11579/85, Commission decision of 7 July 1986.
35 Khan v. the United Kingdom, p. 254.
36 Khan v. the United Kingdom, p. 254.
37 Khan v. the United Kingdom, p. 254.
38 Khan v. the United Kingdom, p. 254.
39 X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 6167/73, Commission decision of 18 December 1974,
Decision and reports XX, p. 64.
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expression of thought, conscience or religion but is governed by the specific
provision of Article 12 which refers to the national laws governing the exercise
of  the  right  to  marry”40. In contrast to Khan, no crime had taken place as
supposedly the parties to the marriage rite were of marriageable age, but the
role of the State in having the last word in what is to be considered a marriage
despite of religious views and convictions is demonstrated in these two cases.
In  this  vein,  the  State  also  draws  the  line  in  matters  concerning  who  can
perform marriages: in Spetz and others against Sweden41 Pentecostal pastors
of a certain congregation had their licenses for performing marriages revoked
by the Swedish authorities  due to supporting “breakaway movements” from
the  Pentecostal  Church.  In  turn,  in  the  case  of Selim v. Cyprus42 a  Turkish
Cypriot was not allowed to contract civil marriage with his Romanian fiancée.
The problem was due to a clash of the Cypriot and Turkish legal systems on
the island, and the situation was remedied with an Act applying to all of Cyprus
allowing  civil  marriages  before  the  European  Court  would  have  given  a
decision on the matter. However, it goes to show that limiting marriage to civil
marriages, the domain of the State is not the only way to draw the line on what
is considered a valid marriage.
In M. against  the Federal  Republic  of  Germany43 the issue at  stake was
posthumous, retroactive marriage. A woman whose fiancé had disappeared in
the Second World War in 1944 wanted to marry him retroactively, as she gave
birth to their child during the same year he disappeared. The application was
unsuccessful in her legal system, and indeed the Commission, too, considered
that “men and women of marriageable age” excluded deceased persons. This
may seem trivial, but at the same time it demonstrates in very tangible terms
that  marriage,  by  definition,  is  a  union  of  two  parties  who  may  give  their
consent to it in person. In De Francesco against Italy44 and De Luca against
Italy45 this  same  theme  was  approached  from  the  perspective  of  mental
incapacity in consenting to a marriage. For the applicants, De Francesco and
De Luca, who were the couple who wanted to get married, the problem was
that close family members of the fiancé opposed to the marriage due to alleged
mental incapacity and being placed under wardship. However, in these cases
the  issue  at  stake  was  also  the  length  of  proceedings.  However,  the
Commission declared the complaints inadmissible.
Corporations such as aristocratic families, may have more direct interests
in trying to interfere in the right to marry. An example of such a corporation is
given by Zu Leiningen against Germany46 where the rights and privileges of
40 X v. the Federal Republic of Germany p. 65.
41 Spetz and others v. Sweden, no. 20402/92, Commission decision of 12 October 1994.
42 Selim v. Cyprus (friendly settlement), no. 47293/99, ECHR 2002-VI.
43 M. v. Federal Republic of Germany, no. 10995/84, Commission decision of 13 December 1984.
44 Giuseppe de Francesco v. Italy, no. 13741/88, Commission decision of 12 March 1990.
45 Giuseppa de Luca v. Italy, no. 13823/88, Commission decision of 12 March 1990.
46 Zu Leiningen v. Germany (dec.), no. 59624/00, ECHR 2005-XIII
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members of nobility were tied to marrying according to family traditions, first
stipulated  in  the  Family  Codes  of  aristocratic  families,  and  after  they  were
abolished, protected by testamentary freedoms. Thus, this affected a certain
class  of  privileged  people  living  today.  The  European  Court  did  not  have  to
decide the case as the complaint was withdrawn. In Staiku against Greece47
the  issue  at  stake  was  that  joining  the  army  affected  the  possibility  of  the
applicant  to  marry.  The  applicant,  a  nurse  by  profession,  joined  the  Greek
armed forces in 1960. Seven years later she was dismissed as she had married
within less than five years from joining the armed forces, which was against
regulations. Her dismissal was later seen as having breached her fundamental
rights and she was re-hired in the 1980s. After being re-hired she requested to
be  promoted  to  the  rank  she  would  have  obtained  if  she  had  not  been
dismissed. It was this in her complaint that was deemed inadmissible by the
Commission.
4.2 SEPARATION, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE
The key cases related to the possibility to obtain a divorce and remarry are two
relatively old cases from the Republic of Ireland, Airey v. Ireland from 197948
and Johnston and others v. Ireland from 198649.  A  constitutional  ban  on
divorce  was  introduced  in  Ireland  in  1937,  and  the  ban  was  lifted  in  1997
following a referendum on the matter in 1995 (Burley and Regan 2002). The
judgements given in these cases did not grant a human right to divorce as such.
From a contemporary perspective, it is indeed interesting that a human right
to marry has been seen as a key civil and political right and can be read from
e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 16) and the European
Convention (Article 12), but to this day a right to get out of a marriage has not
been recognised.
In Airey v. Ireland Mrs. Airey, a married woman with four children and of
a “humble family background”50,  had  tried  to  obtain  a  decree  of  judicial
separation from her husband,  who had been convicted of  assaulting her.  As
divorce was not possible in Ireland at the time, a decree of judicial separation
was  the  best  option  available  for  leading  separate  lives  in  the  situation  of
marital breakdown. During her process in the European Court, she had
applied for annulment of her marriage from an ecclesiastical tribunal as well. 51
Due  to  her  financial  situation,  Mrs.  Airey  could  not  afford  the  High  Court
proceedings to obtain such a decree, and she did not get legal aid either, as it
47Staiku v. Greece, no. 35426/97, Commission decision of 2 July 1997.
48 Airey v. Ireland, no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32.
49 Johnston and others v. Ireland, no. 9697/82, 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112.
50 Airey v. Ireland, para 8.
51 Airey v. Ireland, paras 8-9.
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was not provided for judicial separation or other civil matters52. Thus, her right
to  try  to  obtain  a  decree  of  judicial  separation  due  to  physical  and  mental
cruelty from her husband, one of the accepted grounds for judicial separation,
was not realistic as she could not afford the proceedings.
The Airey case was technically most concerned with Article 6, the right to
access to court, but Article 8 was evoked, too. A violation of both rights was
found, so the lack of access to court for separation proceedings was seen as a
right pertaining to private and family life even in the absence of divorce. The
European Court argued in Airey:
In Ireland, many aspects of private or family life are regulated by law.
As regards marriage, husband and wife are in principle under a duty
to cohabit but are entitled, in certain cases, to petition for a decree of
judicial separation; this amounts to recognition of the fact that the
protection of their private or family life may sometimes necessitate
their being relieved from the duty to live together. Effective respect for
private or family life obliges Ireland to make this means of protection
effectively accessible, when appropriate, to anyone who may wish to
have recourse thereto. However, it was not effectively accessible to the
applicant : not having been put in a position in which she could apply
to the High Court… she was unable to seek recognition in law of her de
facto separation from her husband. She has therefore been the victim
of a violation of Article 8...
Airey v. Republic of Ireland, para 33
Dembour has hailed the Airey judgement as an early feminist victory in her
analysis of case law of the European Court, as in her words, it is a rare example
in  the  history  of  the  ECHR  where  the  European  Court  “used  its  legal
imagination in order to relieve the predicament of a woman” (Dembour 2006:
215). The main point of the European Court was that rights guaranteed by the
European Convention should not be “theoretical and illusory” but “practical
and effective”53. Thus, it was not enough to deplore that Ms Airey could not
afford  Court  proceedings,  the  system  should  be  modified  so  that  everyone
regardless of their financial means have access to court also in civil matters. In
essence, a right to divorce was not discussed as such, but the unavailability of
a proceeding that helps in ending marital relationship was seen as a violation
of the right to private and family life.
Johnston and others v. Ireland from 198654 is in some ways comparable to
Airey  from  a  male  point  of  view,  as  it  is  relevant  to  the  privatisation  and
intimisation  of  dyadic  relationships  between  adults  and  the  process  of
démariage (see Théry 1993).  However,  in this  case the possibility  to divorce
and remarry and the possibility of a child born out of wedlock to be recognised
52 Airey v. Ireland, para 11.
53 Airey v. Ireland, para 24.
54 Johnston and others v. Ireland, no. 9697/82, 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112.
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were deeply intertwined. The applicants were a cohabiting couple, Mr
Johnston, Ms W and their child. Mr Johnston got married in 1952 and three
children were born of the marriage. In 1965, Mr Johnston and his wife began
to live in separate parts of the family home. Both of them formed relationships
with other people with and lived with their partners in self-contained flats in
the house until 1976, when Mrs Johnston moved away. Mr Johnston had been
living with Ms W for seven years when they had a child in 1978. Mr and Mrs
Johnston  were  unable  to  divorce  under  the  Irish  legislation  in  force  at  the
time55, but Mr Johnston made arrangements to the benefit of Ms W and their
daughter.56
In front of the Commission, Mr Johnston, Ms W and their child complained
of the “absence of provision in Ireland for divorce and for recognition of family
life of persons who, after the breakdown of marriage of one of them, are living
in a family relationship outside marriage”57.  They evoked Article  8 (right to
respect for private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience
and religion), Article 12 (right to marry and to found a family) and Article 13
(right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention as well as Article 14
(prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 and Article
12).  In  the  end,  the  European  Court  only  found  a  violation  of  Article  8
regarding  “the  legal  situation  of  the  third  applicant  under  Irish  law…  as
regards all three applicants”. It did not find a violation of Article 8 or Article
12 due to the inability of Mr Johnston and Ms W to marry.
In contrast to Airey, Johnston (discussed in chapter 5.3 also in the context
of paternity out of wedlock) dwells very much on the absence of the right to
divorce, or the resulting inability to remarry, and the argument was built on
Article 8 and Article 12. In this case, the European Court found that the lack of
recognition  of  the  relationship  Mr  Johnston  had  with  his  child  born  out  of
wedlock but with a woman he was cohabiting with constituted a violation of
Article 8, but the lack of recognition of the relationship between him and his
cohabitee and their impossibility to marry due to him not being able to divorce
his wife did not. The European Court offers an interesting discussion why no
right to divorce may be understood to emanate from Article 12:
The Court agrees with the Commission that the ordinary meaning of
the  words  "right  to  marry"  is  clear,  in  the  sense  that  they  cover  the
formation of marital relationships but not their dissolution.
Furthermore,  these  words  are  found  in  a  context  that  includes  an
express reference to "national laws"; even if, as the applicants would
have it, the prohibition on divorce is to be seen as a restriction on
capacity to marry, the Court does not consider that, in a society
adhering to the principle of monogamy, such a restriction can be
55 A constitutional ban on divorce was introduced in Ireland in 1937, and the ban was lifted in 1997
following one unsuccessful referendum and a successful one in 1995. See Burley and Regan (2002).
56 This case is discussed also in Chapter 5.3 on paternity.
57 Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 38.
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regarded as injuring the substance of the right guaranteed by Article
12...
Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 52
The  European  Court  went  on  to  refer  to  the travaux préparatoires
(preparatory works) of the European Convention and how Article 12 was based
on Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which stipulates
the right to marry and to found a family free from racial, nationality-based or
religious  discrimination  if  of  full  age.  The  drafting  history  of  the  European
Convention was cited to note that the latter part of Article 16(1) of the UDHR
stipulating that men and women “are entitled to equal rights as to marriage,
during marriage and at its dissolution” was not included in Article 12 of the
ECHR as only a right to marry was to be guaranteed.58
The decision of Kubiszynn against Poland59 from 2003 is slightly related
to Airey in the sense that  it  concerns a divorce proceeding intertwined with
criminal proceedings due to marital violence. However, the issue at stake was
not the unavailability  of  divorce as such,  and the complaint  had more to do
with the applicant, the wife, alleging unfair treatment by the judiciary as well
as  the  length  of  divorce  proceedings.  In  turn,  the  decision  of J.G. against
Ireland60 from  1987  was  somewhat  similar  to Johnston, as the applicant
desired  to  obtain  a  divorce  due  to  leaving  the  Roman Catholic  Church.  The
case was struck off the list due to the outcome of Johnston. The decision of X
against Switzerland from 198161 concerned a slightly similar situation where
an Argentinian national was unable to remarry in Switzerland due to having
obtained only a judicial separation, not a divorce in his country of origin. This
complaint,  too,  was  considered  inadmissible.  Obstacles  to  marrying  again
after separating from one’s previous spouse have not surfaced in the European
Court  just  from countries  not  granting  divorce  such  as  Ireland  up  until  the
mid-1990s. In the decision of K.M. against the United Kingdom62 from 1997
the possibility of remarriage was affected by a divorce battle where the parties
cross-petitioned each other and the process led to an error in the court system.
In the judgement of Berlin v. Luxembourg from 200363 and the judgement of
Aresti Charalambous v. Cyprus from 200764 the issue at stake was the length
of divorce proceedings.
In the judgement of F. against Switzerland65from 1987 the applicant faced
a temporary prohibition on remarriage imposed by the Swiss courts following
58 Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 52.
59 Kubiszyn v. Poland, no. 37437/97, 30 January 2003.
60 J.G. v. Ireland, no. 9584/81, 8 May 1987, struck off the list.
61 X. v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 9057/80, 5 October 1981.
62 K.M. against the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30309/96, 9 April 1997.
63 Berlin v. Luxembourg, no. 44978/98, 15 July 2003.
64 Aresti Charalambous v. Cyprus, no. 43151/04, 19 July 2007.
65 F. v. Switzerland, no. 11329/85, 18 December 1987, Series A no. 128.
115
his third divorce due to being the party at fault. Such a restriction was possible
under the Swiss Civil Code under a provision that dated from 1912.66 Such a
waiting period had been a legal possibility in the Federal Republic of Germany,
which  abolished  it  in  1976,  and  in  Austria  that  abolished  it  in  198367. The
reason provided in the narrative was that he got married to his third wife after
a  few  days  of  acquaintance  and  filed  for  divorce  less  than  two  weeks  after
getting married to her. As setting a remarriage ban was possible in Swiss law,
he was given a three-year ban on remarrying due to his behaviour towards his
third wife.  In front of  the Commission,  he complained that  his  rights under
Articles 12 (right to marry and to found a family), 8 (right to respect for family
life) and 3 (prohibition of degrading treatment) had been violated, of which
the  Commission  found  the  complaint  admissible  under  Article  12.68 The
European  Court  compared  the  situation  of  Mr  F  to  the  situation  of  Mr
Johnston by arguing that
…furthermore,  and above all,  F’s  situation is  quite distinct  from Mr.
Johnston’s,  since  what  was  at  issue  in  the  case  of  the  latter  was  the
right of a man who was still married to have his marriage dissolved.
If national legislation allows divorce, which is not a requirement of the
Convention, Article 12 (art. 12) secures for divorced persons the right
to remarry without unreasonable restrictions.
F. v. Switzerland, para 38
Thus, the European Court regarded the marriage ban disproportionate to the
aim pursued, and found a violation of Article 1269. However, while noting that
such waiting periods had been abolished in neighbouring States and that the
Convention had to be interpreted according to present-day conditions, it also
found that
… the fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself
in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not
necessarily imply that that aspect offends the Convention, particularly
in a field - matrimony - which is so closely bound up with the cultural
and historical traditions of each society and its deep-rooted ideas
about the family unit.
F. v. Switzerland, para 33
This would also mean that if a State would remain among few others that stick
to a singularist notion of marriage, this would not, as such, pose a problem to
66 F. v. Switzerland, para 22.
67 F. v. Switzerland, para 33.
68 F. v. Switzerland, para 26-27.
69 F. v. Switzerland, para 40.
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the marriage legislation in that State being compatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
4.3 TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND RIGHT TO MARRY
…[A]ny solution of the problem which would amount more or less to a
perfect  legal  fiction of  a "change of  sex" would be confronted by the
problem of interference with the relations to third persons under
Family Law and the Law of Succession. Thus there arose the question
whether the transsexual could be permitted to enter into mar[r]iage
with a member of his former sex. The applicant, who was himself the
father  of  a  daughter  was  an  example  of  such  consequences  which
would follow from the legal recognition of "change of sex”... Her
applications aimed at being fully legally recognised as a woman.
Therefore they concerned not only the applicant's private sphere but –
on the contrary – her legal status in public and in society.70
Government of Federal Republic of Germany, 1977
In  the  twenty  first  century  the  right  of  transsexuals  to  personal
development  and  to  physical  and  moral  security  in  the  full  sense
enjoyed  by  others  in  society  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  matter  of
controversy  requiring  the  lapse  of  time  to  cast  clearer  light  on  the
issues involved. In short, the unsatisfactory situation in which post-
operative transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite one
gender or the other is no longer sustainable.71
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, 2002
The passages cited above show how the way transgender persons have been
perceived in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has changed
during  a  quarter  of  a  century  from  doubt  and  apprehension  to  a  relatively
warm embrace. The first passage is from the first case introduced to the ECHR
system  involving  the  situation  of  transgender  persons,  the  decision  of X.
against the Federal Republic of Germany from 1977, and the latter one from
the Grand Chamber judgement of Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom
from 2002. It is notable that the opening sentence about the lack of scientific
consensus sounds very similar to the argumentation of the European Court in
the  case  of Fretté v. France72 concerning  the  advisability  of  childrearing  by
homosexuals (see Chapter 6.1). Furthermore, it is interesting that reassigning
a person’s legal sex, in effect a mere written record, is seen as a “perfect legal
70 X. against the Federal Republic of Germany, 6699/74, Commission decision 15th December
1977, D. R. 11, p. 16, IV A 3), para 3., argument of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
71 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI, para 90.
72 Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, ECHR 2002-I.
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fiction” (see first opening quote to this section). Are there legal fictions that
are  more  permissible  than  others,  such  as  adoption  and  the  assumption  of
paternity  in  marriage,  and  others  that  are  seen  to  be  more  in  the  realm  of
individual  desires  and  ‘make-believe’  in  the  spirit  of  the  proponents  of  the
symbolic order gender and kinship? Despite the judgement given in Goodwin
in 2002, not all obstacles to the full enjoyment of one’s rights when undergoing
gender reassignment have been lifted, they have just become more
complicated, as in the Grand Chamber judgement of Hämäläinen v. Finland73
in 2014.
There  has  been  a  plethora  of  cases  dealing  with  the  legal  status  of
transgender  persons  in  the  European  Court,  most  of  them from the  United
Kingdom and similar to each other in the legal problems discussed. Goodwin
in 2002 constituted the turning point,  as  it  recognised,  among other issues,
the right to marry according to one’s reassigned gender. However, same-sex
marriage  has  by  broadening  the  definition  of  marriage  made  some  of  the
questions  pertinent  from  another  angle  by  linking  the  right  to  marry  for
transgender  persons  and  the  possibility  of  same-sex  marriage.  For  many
reasons, marriage for fully completed post-operation transgender persons
seems to have been easier to accept in the case law of the European Court than
same-sex marriage. Transgender identity is and has been more medicalised
phenomenon than homosexuality, which translates it into a field of scientific
facts, easier to comprehend and digest in a court setting that homosexuality,
which is more ambiguous and has been understood as a less clear-cut manner
of  behaviour  or  an  immutable  characteristic  on  an  individual  (see  McGhee
2001, Heinze 2001).
This  can  be  seen  in  the  outcomes  of Goodwin and Schalk  and  Kopf  v.
Austria from 201074: the European Court has accepted that post-operative
transgender persons must be able to marry a person of the opposite sex, while
it did not find in 2010 that the European Convention supported the right to
same-sex marriage. These judgements will be analysed below in this chapter,
but for the purposes of introducing the issue, it seems that the claims made by
transgender persons who wish to conform to the established gender order of
marriage may be regarded as a human rights under the European Convention,
but same-sex marriage falls outside this order as the Convention, in the end,
does not say much about marriage as it does not protect the right to get out of
a marriage either, as seen in the previous sub-chapter. We can see that many
applicants have indeed argued their cases with statements that emphasise that
they can and do fulfil  the criteria of  consummation and living together in a
heterosexual  relationship  just  as  any  other  heterosexual  couple.  But  how
essential  is  the  act  of  consummation  as  a  marker  of  marriage  in  the  21st
century?
73 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, 16 July 2014.
74 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010.
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The key cases under the rubric of transgender marriage are Goodwin and
I. v. the United Kingdom from 200275 as the judgements were delivered on the
same day. The path of transgender persons in the European Court has been a
long and arduous one when it comes to the legal recognition of their reassigned
gender. Full recognition of one’s reassigned gender identity entails a variety of
measures, such as adopting a new first name, obtaining new identification and
other official documents with the new name and a mention of one’s gender –
and the right to marry according to one’s gender. Most of these cases in the
European Court have come from the United Kingdom, and from the case law
it  can  be  learned  that  the  medical  treatment  of  “gender  dysphoria”  and  its
recognition  in  the  British  health  care  system  was,  for  a  long  time,  more
advanced than the legal recognition of the identities of post-operative
transgender persons in the country. This does not mean that interesting and
important case law has not come from other Member States, but the key case
in this area, the Grand Chamber judgement of Goodwin in 2002 acts as the
culmination of a string of cases76 from the United Kingdom which were quite
similar to each other in content.
In Goodwin the applicant had been born in 1937 and was a post-operative
male-to-female transgender person. She had experienced a variety of
treatments  from “aversion  therapy”  in  the  early  1960s  to  hormone  therapy,
grooming  classes  and  voice  training  in  the  1980s,  finalised  by  gender
reassignment surgery in 1990.77 Over the years, she had experienced
harassment  at  work  which,  according  to  her,  was  not  seen  as  sexual
harassment in the English legal system as she was still officially a man. She
claimed that she was still experiencing problems at work in a different job as
she had had to submit her National Insurance Number to her employer, who
had then found out her previous male identity. She also described how she was
not entitled to benefits available for women in the United Kingdom at the time,
such as lower retirement age (60 years for women and 65 years for men) and,
for example, lower insurance premiums for car insurance. Furthermore, she
had left many opportunities available for both genders unpursued such as a
remortgage offer or claiming a winter fuel allowance as such offers required
producing  a  birth  certificate  or  other  identification  which  revealed  her
previous identity.78
In  the  European  Court,  the  case  of Goodwin touched  upon  a  variety  of
issues in English law where the gender of the person in question mattered:
choosing one’s name; the possibility to marry according to one’s gender; birth
certificates and other identity documents; National Insurance contributions,
75 I. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25680/94, 11 July 2002.
76 Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106; Cossey v. the United Kingdom,
27 September 1990, Series A no. 184; Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, 30 July 1998,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V.
77 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para 13.
78 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, paras 15-19.
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i.e. social security; state pensions and one’s gender-related retirement age in
the United Kingdom at the time, revealing one’s identity, including previous
name in the context of employment and instances of rape and imprisonment.
In Goodwin, the crux of the matter for the European Court was that the British
health care system recognised gender dysphoria and provided treatment for it
from public  funds,  but  the  legal  recognition  of  one’s  reassigned  gender  was
imperfect and did not reflect the outcome of the treatment given:
The  Court  is  struck  by  the  fact  that  nonetheless  the  gender  re-
assignment which is lawfully provided is not met with full recognition
in law, which might be regarded as the final and culminating step in
the long and difficult process of transformation which the transsexual
has  undergone.  The  coherence  of  the  administrative  and  legal
practices  within  the  domestic  system  must  be  regarded  as  an
important factor in the assessment carried out under Article 8 of the
Convention. Where a State has authorised the treatment and surgery
alleviating the condition of a transsexual, financed or assisted in
financing the operations and indeed permits the artificial
insemination of a woman living with a female-to-male transsexual (as
demonstrated in the case of X., Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom, cited
above), it appears illogical to refuse to recognise the legal implications
of the result to which the treatment leads.
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para 78
As Goodwin had constructed her complaint mainly under Articles 8, 12 and 14,
of which the complaints under Article 8 and Article 12 were successful, first
came the recognition of her gender identity as right to respect for private life,
and flowing from this, the right to marry according to her reassigned gender.
Interestingly, the European Court referred also to Article 9 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that ”[t]he right to marry and
the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national
laws  governing  the  exercise  of  these  rights”.  The  Goodwin  judgement  and
reference to the Article 9 of the Charter were to be of great importance in the
key case concerning same-sex marriage, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria in 2010.
The right under Article 8 to respect for private life does not however
subsume all the issues under Article 12, where conditions imposed by
national laws are accorded a specific mention. The Court has therefore
considered  whether  the  allocation  of  sex  in  national  law  to  that
registered  at  birth  is  a  limitation  impairing  the  very  essence  of  the
right to marry in this case. In that regard, it finds that it is artificial to
assert that post-operative transsexuals have not been deprived of the
right  to  marry  as,  according  to  law,  they  remain  able  to  marry  a
person of their former opposite sex. The applicant in this case lives as
a  woman,  is  in  a  relationship  with  a  man  and  would  only  wish  to
marry a man. She has no possibility of doing so. In the Court's view,
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she may therefore claim that the very essence of her right to marry has
been infringed.
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para 101
The judgement of I. v. the United Kingdom79, although not as widely known
or cited, was decided on the same day as Goodwin by the Grand Chamber. The
content of the legal complaint was the same, and a violation of Articles 8 and
12 was found but not a violation of Article 14.
Rees v. the United Kingdom, W. against the United Kingdom, Cossey v.
the United Kingdom, and Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom were
cases decided between 1986 and 1998 where the essence of the complaints was
pretty much the same than in Goodwin and I. v. the United Kingdom, but the
European  Court  decided  against  the  applicants  and  left  the  recognition  of
reassigned  gender  identity  to  the  margin  of  appreciation  of  the  United
Kingdom. In Rees v. the United Kingdom from 198680, a female-to-male post-
operative transgender person complained of not being able to amend his birth
record in the English system. In Britain, birth certificates have been, and to a
certain extent still are, important identification documents compared to many
other States. This is why transgender cases from the United Kingdom in the
ECHR system have focused, one after the other, so much on the issue of birth
certificates and birth registers. For a long time, the reasoning behind it was as
follows:
An entry in a birth register and the certificate derived there from are
records of facts at the time of the birth. Thus, in England and Wales the
birth certificate constitutes a document revealing not current identity,
but  historical  facts.  The  system  is  intended  to  provide  accurate  and
authenticated evidence of the events themselves and also to enable the
establishment  of  the  connections  of  families  for  purposes  related  to
succession, legitimate descent and distribution of property. The
registration records also form the basis for a comprehensive range of
vital statistics and constitute an integral and essential part of the
statistical study of population and its growth, medical and fertility
research and the like.
Rees v. the United Kingdom, para 21
Furthermore, in Rees81, the legal foundation of marriage as a union between
persons of the opposite sex was presented as follows:
In English law, marriage is defined as a voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.... Section 11 of the
79 I. v. the United Kingdom.
80 Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106.
81 Rees v. the United Kingdom, para 26.
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Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 gives statutory effect to the common-law
provision that a marriage is void ab initio if  the  parties  are  not
respectively male and female.
Rees v. the United Kingdom, para 26
Unsurprisingly, the European Court found in 1986 in Rees that
In the Court’s opinion, the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 (art.
12) refers to the traditional marriage between persons of opposite
biological sex. This appears also from the wording of the Article which
makes it clear that Article 12 (art. 12) is mainly concerned to protect
marriage as the basis of the family.
Rees v. the United Kingdom, para 49
In W. v. the United Kingdom from 198982, the applicant argued the case
from a different angle than in Rees:
The applicant alleges a violation of this provision because she cannot
marry a man and adopt children with him. She submits that her case
is different from the Rees case as she could consummate marriage with
a man. She considers that the development of the personality and self-
fulfilment  through  a  legally  recognised  life-long  union  are  as  valid
objectives  encompassed  by  the  right  to  marry  as  the  founding  of  a
family by way of procreation.
W. v. the United Kingdom, para 40
The similarity of W. to Rees was the problem of amending the vital statistics
register.  A  very  influential  case  from  the  English  legal  system  was  the
reasoning  of  Justice  Ormrod  in Corbett v. Corbett,  a  case  from  1971  which
dwelt  on  the  validity  of  a  marriage  between  a  post-operative  transgender
person and a man. Justice Ormrod was both a medical doctor and a lawyer,
and the arguments developed in Corbett, encompassing the importance of
consummation,  too,  formed  the  basis  of  the  view  of  the  government  of  the
United Kingdom defending its policies in the European Court in these cases.
(See Collier 1995: 118-21.)
Complaints concerning transgender identity recognition emerged from
other Member States as well.,  such as France,  Ireland and Sweden83.  In the
decision of Eriksson and Goldschmidt v. Sweden from 198984 the applicants
82 W. v. the United Kingdom (Report of the Commission), no. 11095/84, 7 March 1989.
83 See also B. v. France, 25 March 1992, Series A no. 232-C; L.F. v. Ireland, no. 28154/95,
Commission decision of 2 July 1997.
84 Eriksson and Goldschmidt v. Sweden, application no. 14573/89, Commission decision of 9
November 1989.
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argued that they were just like a heterosexual couple, which resonates with the
argumentation in W. v. the United Kingdom cited above:
The applicants are living in a heterosexual relationship. Their request
for  a  marriage  licence  was  rejected  by  the  Parish  Civil  Registration
Office (pastorsämbetet)  of  Mockfjärd  on  11  November  1984  on  the
ground that both applicants were of female sex.
Eriksson and Goldschmidt v. Sweden, “The Facts”
At the time, Sweden allowed the change of one’s legal sex, but not the right to
marry. What can be seen both in W. and in Eriksson and Goldschmidt was that
the applicants argued that the relationships they wanted to make official were
heterosexual relationships, either implying or stating explicitly that
consummation could take place.
The advent of same-sex partnerships has created a legal problematic of its
own  which  would  only  be  solved  with  allowing  same-sex  marriage.  In  the
inadmissibility decisions of Parry against the United Kingdom85 and R. and
F. against the United Kingdom86 from 2006 transgender applicants had been
and continued to be married to the partners they had before embarking upon
their gender reassignment processes. As the reassigned gender of the
applicants was to be recognised, their marriages to their spouses would cease
to exist. The options available were divorce and changing the relationship into
a civil partnership, as after the reassignment process both parties to the union
were  legally  of  the  same  sex.  The  complaint  was  deemed  inadmissible,  as
changing one’s status from married to being in a civil partnership was deemed
proportionate  in  the  case.  As  to  the  concept  of  marriage,  it  was  left  to  the
Member State and its margin of appreciation, as Article 12 was said to enshrine
only the right to marry between a man and a woman.
The Grand Chamber judgement of Hämäläinen v. Finland given in 201487
reflected the same question. The situation of the applicant, a male-to-female
transgender person, and her wife, was further accentuated by the fact that they
had a child together and that a divorce was against their religious convictions.
In  addition,  the  applicant’s  wife  did  not  consent  to  their  marriage  being
transformed into a registered partnership (rekisteröity parisuhde), the form
of civil unions available for same-sex couples in Finland since 2001 because
she did not regard herself as “a lesbian”88. Thus, Hämäläinen could not finalise
her gender reassignment process and obtain a new social security number, and
remained male in the eyes of the law despite changing her name and obtaining
some identity documents with this name. In Finland, the form of civil unions
for same-sex couples known as registered partnerships offer almost all the
85 Parry v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42971/05, ECHR 2006-XV.
86 R. and F. against the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006.
87 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, 16 July 2014.
88 Hämäläinen v. Finland, paras 17 and 55.
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rights conferred to married couples, the main differences being not being able
to take a common surname, or to adopt children jointly. Likewise, there is no
presumption of parenthood within a registered partnership regarding the
female  partner  of  a  woman  giving  birth.  Same-sex  couples,  usually  female
couples, may seek for second-parent adoption after the birth of a child.
In the case of Hämäläinen and her wife, not much would have changed, as
Hämäläinen’s paternity within marriage remained and her parenthood to the
child was not under threat89.  The  main  practical  problems  arising  from the
change in status would be that the couple would not be able to benefit from a
presumption of paternity or parenthood if new children were born, and joint
adoption would be impossible. However, the text of the case does not spell out
what these practical implications would be, so their resistance to the change
in status may be seen as almost purely a question of principle. The outcome of
the case, no violation of Article 8 or Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article
8, reflects the reluctance of the European Court to judge the question of same-
sex  marriage  as  a  human  right  and  the  fact  that  these  questions  are,  in  a
European setting, usually left to national legislatures.
flandmark  judgeAs  Hämäläinen  and  her  wife  were  not  allowed  by  the
Finnish authorities to remain married after official gender recognition, they
were offered the possibility of converting their union into a registered
partnership, which did not suit them due to questions of identity and personal
conviction,  as  Hämäläinen’s  wife  did  not  consider  herself  homosexual  and
divorce was against their religious convictions90. Thus, on a general level, the
case of Hämäläinen v. Finland calls for clearly distinguishing issues of gender
identity and sexual orientation from each other in the context of marriage. The
paradox in Hämäläinen v. Finland was that  she was granted an exemption
when  it  came  to  the  paternity  of  the  child  the  couple  had  had  during  the
marriage  –  the  relation  of  filiation  was  not  altered  or  under  any  risk  to  be
altered due to the gender recognition. So, why the exception in the parent-
child  relation  and  not  in  the  marital  relation?  As  a  few  States  offered  the
possibility of such an exception regarding transgender persons in a marriage
existing before a sex reassignment process91,  it  would  have  been  a  humane
option in Hämäläinen’s case as same-sex marriage was not available.
The case of Hämäläinen v. Finland highlights how important it is not to
confound gender identity and sexual orientation, as it might not respond at all
to what the parties to the marriage deem important. Hämäläinen and her wife
had  married  with  the  intention  that  they  would  remain  married,  and
Hämäläinen’s  wife  was  willing  to  remain  married  despite  her  husband
deciding to go through a gender reassignment process. From an external point
of  view they were required to fulfil  the legal  categories open to them on the
basis of their legal sexes, but from their own, emic point of view they wanted
89 Hämäläinen v. Finland, para 86.
90 Hämäläinen v. Finland, para 44.
91 Hämäläinen v. Finland, para 32.
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to remain married and felt that it was unfair that the State would require them
to end their marriage and transform it into a different form of a union. This
case also highlights the problems the existence of registered partnerships and
similar forms of civil unions open to same-sex couples in the absence of same-
sex marriage: if compared to each other, civil unions emerge as a category of
quasi-marriage, less valuable in the eyes of the State than full marriage. In this
particular case of Finland the practical differences that emerge are the issue of
adopting  a  joint  surname and  the  possibility  of  adopting  together,  but  on  a
more general level we may ask if partnerships and marriage are equal if they
are not called by the same term. In the case of Finland and Hämäläinen, the
question  will  be  solved  by  legalising  same-sex  marriage,  approved  by  a
parliamentary vote in 2014 and to be finalised by 2017.
4.4 SAME-SEX COUPLES, MARRIAGE AND
COHABITATION
Same-sex marriage has in many ways become the debate of our time, as it is
so  widely  discussed,  debated  and  every  now  and  then  legislated  upon  in
different States. It has mobilised a huge variety of gay rights and civil society
activists, religious groups and politicians for or against. As examples from a
number of  mainly Western and often European States demonstrate,  it  is  no
longer  situated  in  the  imaginary  realm  of  utopian  legal  debate,  but  it  has
become  law  in  various  parts  of  the  world.  But  regardless  of  these
advancements, sexual minorities are a group that is very much unprotected by
the international human rights regime, and this is very much how the situation
remains in the 2010s on a global level. Some basic guidelines on how to apply
international law to the protection of LGBT persons have been articulated in
the Yogyakarta Principles from 200792 (see O’Flaherty and Fisher 2008), but
there  are  no  legally  binding  provisions  in  human  rights  conventions  of  the
United Nations concerning sexual orientation and gender identity. In many
parts  of  Europe  and  North  America,  sexual  minorities  are  to  a  great  extent
deemed worthy of protection. While the Council of Europe and the European
Court  of  Human  Rights  have  taken  some  very  important  steps  in  recent
decades regarding the protection of sexual minorities, the European regional
human rights system, too, remains relatively conservative vis-à-vis the rights
of non-heterosexual persons. In the United Nations system protection is even
weaker: despite the decision of Toonen v. Australia93 in  1992,  where  the
existence of anti-sodomy laws was deemed discriminatory and discrimination
on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation  was  classified  as  sex  discrimination,  the
92 See the Yogyakarta principles at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm.
Accessed 15 November 2015.
93 Toonen v. Australia, Communication 488/1992, UN Document CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992.
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United Nations machinery is still reluctant to consider sexual orientation as a
human rights issue due to the fierce opposition of some States.
The history of dyadic sexual relations between adults of the same sex in the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  is  a  long  and  arduous  one,  even  though
important  steps  have  been  taken  from  time  to  time.  Before  2010  and  the
judgement of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria given in that year94 there was no case
law  articulating  whether  there  is  a  right  to  marry  or  the  right  to  form
recognised civil unions for same-sex couples under the European Convention.
The judgement did not find support in the European Convention to the idea
that the right to contract same-sex marriage is a human right. However, there
have been various decisions and judgements that dealt with recognising same-
sex cohabitation, and often these fell in the categories of housing or social and
health insurance. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria from 2010 is the most substantial
case so far to dwell on the prospect of same-sex marriage to be covered by the
European Convention. Since the judgement was published, it has been subject
to a number of analyses which highlight different aspects of it. In essence, the
judgement recognised that same-sex couples share de facto family life, not just
mere private life. In this sense, the judgement was first in its kind. However,
the actual outcome of the case was that Article 12 of the European Convention
could not be read to guarantee a right to marry for same-sex couples. In a way,
in  the  light  of Schalk and Kopf,  same-sex  marriage  is  a  political  and  legal
‘luxury’ that may be offered by a State if the national legislator so happens to
decide. Of course it is possible that European consensus builds up on the issue
and same-sex marriage will become so widely legislated in Member States of
the Council of Europe that eventually the European Court will interpret Article
12 in favour of it. However, the wording of Article 12 (above) is not exactly very
promising,  as  the  right  to  marry  is  relegated  almost  entirely  to  “the  laws
governing the exercise of this right”.
The  case  concerned  a  same-sex  couple  who  judicially  challenged  the
inability to contract a marriage. Schalk and Kopf were a male couple in their
forties living in Vienna. In 2002, they contacted their local Office for Matters
of Personal Status95 and asked the officials to open a process for obtaining the
possibility to marry. The Vienna Municipal Office replied the same year and
told the applicants that they could not marry because they were of the same
sex, and the Austrian Civil Code stipulated that marriage partners must be two
persons  the  opposite  sex.  The  second  instance  where  Schalk  and  Kopf
complained  to,  the  Vienna  Regional  Governor,  stood  by  the  view  of  the
Municipal Office and stated that the Article 12 of the European Convention
proclaimed  the  right  to  marry  to  apply  to  an  opposite-sex  couple.96 The
applicants proceeded to a constitutional complaint, evoking the right to
94 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010.
95 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 8.
96 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 10.
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respect for private and family life and the principle of non-discrimination.
Schalk and Kopf argued that
… the notion of marriage had evolved since the entry into force of the
[Austrian] Civil Code in 1812. In particular, the procreation and
education of children no longer formed an integral part of marriage.
According  to  present-day  perceptions,  marriage  was  rather  a
permanent  union  encompassing  all  aspects  of  life.  There  was  no
objective justification for excluding same-sex couples from concluding
marriage, all the more so since the European Court of Human Rights
had acknowledged that differences based on sexual orientation
required particularly weighty reasons by way of justification.
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 11
In 2002, the applicants complained of the fact that in Austria at the time, there
was  no  civil  partnership  legislation  nor  same-sex  marriage.  The  law  on
registered partnerships was passed in 2009 and came into effect in 2010, the
same  year  the  ECHR  judgement  was  given.  In  the  European  Court,  the
applicants evoked Article 12 and Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.
The  European  Court  deemed  these  complaints  admissible  but  found  no
violation or either Article.
What is important is that despite the outcome of the judgement, same-sex
couples were seen to share family life in contrast to earlier case law according
to which they shared only private life. The European Court noted that “rapid
evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many
member States”97 and that “[c]ertain provisions of European Union law also
reflect  a  growing  tendency  to  include  same-sex  couples  in  the  notion  of
“family””98. It proceeded to argue that
In view of this evolution, the Court considers it artificial to maintain
the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple
cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently,
the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living
in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”,
just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation
would.
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, paras 93-94
In contrast to Schalk and Kopf, the Grand Chamber judgement of Burden
v. the United Kingdom99 from 2008 deserves to be discussed in conjunction
with  the  question  of  same-sex  marriage,  or  rather  regarding  what  is  not
97 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 93.
98 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 93.
99 Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, ECHR 2008.
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deemed  as  analogous  with  same-sex  partnerships.  In  this  case,  two  elderly
sisters living together complained that they should have been able to contract
a  civil  partnership  or  to  receive  similar  tax  exemptions  and  benefits.  Even
though the case does not, as such, deal with the distinction between private
and family life or discrimination thereof, the issue of limiting marriage-like
partnerships to sexual relationships is a question that deserves discussion. The
sisters,  born in 1918 and 1925,  lived together in a house they had inherited
from their parents. According to the case material, they “lived together, in a
stable, committed and mutually supportive relationship, all their lives”100 of
which over thirty years in the house they owned together. They complained of
the fact that one of them would be subject to a higher degree of inheritance tax
compared to if they were a married couple (wife and husband) or a same-sex
couple in a civil partnership. In the United Kingdom, property that is passed
from one spouse to another is exempt of inheritance tax. From December 2005
onwards,  parties  to  civil  partnerships  have  been  seen  as  spouses  for  the
purposes of inheritance taxation.101
What  made  this  case  peculiar  was  also  that  in  Britain  the  threshold  for
inheritance tax is very high compared to many other European States – GBP
300,000 at  the time of  the Burden case being heard in Strasbourg – so the
situation of sisters Burden represented the plight of a thin slice of society who
are already well off. In the end the Grand Chamber came to the conclusion that
there had been no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken
in  conjunction  with  Article  1  of  Protocol  1  (peaceful  enjoyment  of  one’s
possessions).  However,  the  case  did  provide  an  ample  opportunity  for  the
European Court and its Grand Chamber to dwell on the object and purpose of
marriage, civil partnerships (as they are called in Britain) and the demarcation
of relations involving intimate, sexual relations and kin relations.
Undoubtedly,  “stable,  committed  and  mutually  supportive  relations”  may
exist between a plethora of different categories of persons such as parents and
children,  siblings,  friends  and  so  on.  One  might  well  argue  what  have  sex,
romantic  love  or  prohibited  degrees  of  relationships  have  got  to  do  with
“stable,  committed  and  mutually  supportive  relations”.  However,  civil
partnerships and equivalent arrangements were created for the sake of claims
for equality between heterosexual and non-heterosexual couples, and they stay
within the logic of this framework.
On the  basis  of  the  argumentation  of  the  Grand Chamber,  it  seems  that
placing informal unions of siblings on a par with marriage and civil
partnerships would have been an uncomfortable step for the European Court,
as then it would have placed ‘unions of blood’ in an analogous position with
marriage,  the  original  blueprint,  albeit  by  proxy.  From  the  outset,  it  seems
extraordinary that the Burdens decided to make their claim for eased
inheritance taxations in terms of an analogy to civil partnerships. Obviously,
100 Burden v. the United Kingdom, para 10.
101 Burden v. the United Kingdom, para 15.
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English inheritance taxation places marriage, and from 2005, civil
partnership, as privileged relations, and this can be criticised from a variety of
positions  (see  e.g.  Barker  2006).  However,  taxation  rules  constitute  an
altogether different issue that deals with the distribution of goods between
heirs and society at large. Categories of close relationships that qualify for tax
exemptions, e.g., in inheritance issues are rules open to manipulation distinct
to  the  larger  framework  of  marriage  and  civil  unions,  and,  if  an  analogy  to
prohibited  degrees  of  relationships  and  incest  prohibitions  is  allowed,  lie
within the society in question to be changed.102
In the judgements of Vallianatos and others v. Greece from 2013103, the
issue at stake was whether the Greek Government had discriminated against
same-sex couples when enacting a law allowing civil unions for opposite-sex
couples, a kind of a lighter form of marriage. The complaint was brought to the
European Court  not just  by one or two individuals  but in the name of  eight
different individuals under two different complaints, both of which were
supported by non-governmental organisations. The structure of the complaint
was that “relying on Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14, that the fact
that the ‘civil unions’ introduced by Law no. 3719/2008 were designed only for
couples composed of different-sex adults had infringed their right to respect
for their private and family life and amounted to unjustified discrimination
between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter”104.
The arguments given by the Greek Government for creating this kind of a new
form of partnerships105 are particularly interesting. The aim of the law on civil
partnerships, it appears, was not really to given more a wider variety of options
for  opposite-sex  couples  to  lead  the  kind  of  life  and  enter  into  the  kinds  of
unions they chose, but to regulate reproduction outside marriage, as children
born to cohabiting or officially single women were often left without the
parental protection of the father:
…the legislation on civil unions should be viewed as a set of provisions
allowing parents to raise their biological children in such a way that
the father had an equitable share of parental responsibility without the
couple being obliged to marry. Civil unions therefore meant that, when
the woman became pregnant, the couple no longer had to marry out
of fear that they would not otherwise have the legal relationship they
desired  with  their  child  since  he  or  she  would  be  regarded  as  being
born  out  of  wedlock.  Hence,  by  introducing  civil  unions  the  Greek
legislature had shown itself to be both traditional and modern in its
thinking… [T]he legislature had sought to strengthen the institutions
of marriage and the family in the traditional sense, since the decision
to  marry  would  henceforth  be  taken  irrespective  of  the  prospect  of
102 See Schneider (1984) for a succinct analysis of No Just Cause (Report by a Group… 1984).
103 Vallianatos and others v. Greece [GC], no. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013.
104 Vallianatos and others v. Greece [GC], para 3.
105 See Vallianatos and others v. Greece [GC], para 10.
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having a child and thus purely on the basis of a mutual commitment
entered into by two individuals of different sex, free of outside
constraints. …[T]he introduction of civil unions for same-sex couples
would require a separate set of rules governing a situation which was
analogous to, but not the same as, the situation of different-sex couples.
Vallianatos and others v. Greece, paras 62-63
However, the Grand Chamber of the European Court found by sixteen votes
not one that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with
Article  8:  the  applicants  had  been  subject  to  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
their sexual orientation as the Greek law on civil partnerships excluded same-
sex couples.  The European Court  did not want to establish that  there was a
‘European  consensus’  on  offering  same-sex  couples  the  possibility  of  a  civil
partnership, but pointed out that “a trend is currently emerging with regard to
the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-sex relationships”106,
and  that  the  Greek  Government  had  not  given  reasons  weighty  enough  to
establish that enacting a legislative instrument separate from marriage that
excluded same-sex couples would have been justified. The European Court
noted that
The  aim  of  protecting  the  family  in  the  traditional  sense  is  rather
abstract  and  a  broad  variety  of  concrete  measures  may  be  used  to
implement it… Also, given that the Convention is a living instrument,
to be interpreted in present-day conditions… the State, in its choice of
means designed to protect the family and secure respect for family life
as  required  by  Article  8,  must  necessarily  take  into  account
developments in society and changes in the perception of  social  and
civil-status issues and relationships, including the fact that there is not
just  one way or one choice when it  comes to leading one’s  family or
private life[.]
Vallianatos and others v. Greece, para 84
The protection of same-sex sexual relationships has proceeded in the
European Court through different phases, starting with attempts to
decriminalise homosexual conduct and proceeding to discuss what constitutes
as private life, family life and respect for the home, all under Article 8. ‘Respect
for the home’ is important here, as some of the pivotal cases have concerned
cohabiting  same-sex  couples  where  the  surviving  partner  after  the  death  of
another has been unable to secure a lease.107
First attempts to challenge legislation criminalising homosexual activity
came from the Federal Republic of Germany, attacking paragraph 175 of the
106 Vallianatos and others v. Greece [GC], para 91.
107 S. v. United Kingdom, no. 11716/85, Commission decision 26th August 1986 and Karner v.
Austria, no. 40016/98, ECHR 2003-IX.
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penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany. The European Commission of
Human Rights, the screening body of the European Court that existed at the
time, declared these complaints inadmissible (Grigolo 2001, Johnson 2013).
The  principle  of  the  decriminalisation  of  homosexuality  was  tackled  in  the
judgement of Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom108, which became a landmark
judgement  in  the  European  Court  regarding  the  decriminalisation  of
homosexual activity. The case was brought to the ECHR by Jeffrey Dudgeon,
an activist of the Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association in 1975. In 1981 the
European  Court  delivered  a  judgement  on  the  case  and  ruled  that  the  anti-
sodomy laws in Northern Ireland violated the right to ‘respect for private life’
under  Article  8  of  the  Convention.  By  this  time,  other  parts  of  the  United
Kingdom no longer had laws in place criminalising homosexual activities. In
the  cases  of Norris v. Ireland from 1988109 and Modinos v. Cyprus from
1993110 the  European  Court  delivered  similar  decisions,  condemning  the
criminalisation still in place in the respondent States. Ireland and Cyprus
changed their laws in 1993 and 1995 respectively.
However, in Dudgeon the European Court  was still  of  the opinion that  a
certain degree of control with respect to homosexuality was justifiable, which
meant that different ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual
relations were allowed. Differences in age of consent were condemned in
Sutherland v. the United Kingdom from 2001 in which the complaint to the
European Court was made in 1994111. However, the complaint did not lead to
a reasoned judgement per se as the case was struck off the list of pending cases
due to legislative changes in the United Kingdom equalising age of consent in
heterosexual and homosexual relations. The fact that homosexual
relationships were seen as part of one’s private life, not family life, remained a
constant dictum for about three decades.  For example,  in the decision of X.
and Y. against the United Kingdom112 where  a  British  man,  Y,  and  and  a
Malaysian  man,  X,  tried  to  live  together  in  the  United  Kingdom,  but  as  X’s
temporary  residence  permit  was  not  renewed,  they  could  not  remain  in  the
UK. The Commission found that “[d]espite the modern evolution of attitudes
towards homosexuality… the applicants’ relationship does not fall within the
scope of the right to respect for family life ensured by Article 8”113.
In the decision of S(impson) v. the United Kingdom from 1986114, a British
woman had filed a complaint against the order to be evicted from the dwelling
she had been sharing with her female partner. Her partner had been the secure
tenant of  the lease,  and after  her death Simpson was to be evicted from the
108 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45.
109 Norris v. Ireland, 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142.
110 Modinos v. Cyprus, 22 April 1993, Series A no. 259.
111 Sutherland v. the United Kingdom (striking out) [GC], no. 25186/94, 22 March 2001.
112 X. and Y. against the United Kingdom, no. 9369/81, Commission decision of 3 May 1983.
113 X. and Y. against the United Kingdom, p. 221.
114 S. v. United Kingdom, no. 11716/85, Commission decision 26th August 1986.
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property.  Under  domestic  law,  that  being  Section  30  of  the  Housing  Act  of
1980, ‘living together as husband and wife’ or common law marriage is one of
the  conditions  entitling  a  survivor  of  a  couple,  married  or  unmarried,  to
succeed to a tenancy after the secure tenant dies. In front of the Commission
of Human Rights, Simpson complained that respect for her private and family
life had been interfered with and that she had been discriminated against
because she was of the wrong sex in the given situation, so she invoked Articles
8 and 14 of the Convention. However, the Commission admits in its decision
that if she had been of the male sex she would have been treated differently. It
also “finds that the aim of the legislation in question was to protect the family”
and that the “aim itself is clearly legitimate”115.
In the decision of Röösli v. Germany116 from 1996  a  man who had  been
living with his male partner in a rented flat in Munich was subject to eviction
after his partner’s death. According to the case material, the Münich District
Court argued that ”…the views on marriage and family had changed in society
and justified the extension of the said provision to heterosexual couples.
However,  homosexual  or  lesbian  couples  were  not  similarly  accepted  in
society”117. In the European Court, Röösli evoked Article 14 taken together with
article 8. The Commission argued that as Röösli had been living alone after his
partner’s  death,  and that  his  relationship with his  deceased partner did not
amount to family life:
The question remains, however, of whether it was justified to protect
families but not to give similar protection to stable homosexual or
lesbian relationships. The Commission recalls that the family, to which
the relationship of heterosexual unmarried couples living together as
husband  and  wife  can  be  assimilated,  merits  special  protection  in
society  and  that  there  is  no  reason  why  a  High  Contracting  Party
should not afford particular assistance to families. The Commission
therefore accepted that the difference in treatment between the
surviving partner of a homosexual or lesbian couple and somebody in
the same position whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be
objectively and reasonably justified.
Röösli against Germany, ”The Law”
In  the  2001  decision  of Mata Estevez v. Spain from 2001118 the  issue  at
stake was not succession to a tenancy, but the situation was quite similar as
the  other  half  of  a  male  couple  had  died  in  an  accident  and  the  surviving
partner claimed a survivor’s pension, arguing his case with Article 14 taken in
conjunction with Article 8.
115 S. v. United Kingdom, para 7.
116 Röösli v. Germany, no. 28318/95, Commission decision of 15 May 1996.
117 Röösli v. Germany, “The Facts”.
118 Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), no. 56501/00, ECHR 2001-VI.
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The  applicant  complained  of  the  difference  of  treatment  regarding
eligibility for a survivor’s pension between de facto homosexual
partners and married couples, or even unmarried heterosexual
couples who, if legally unable to marry before the divorce laws were
passed in 1981, are eligible for a survivor’s pension. He submitted that
such difference in treatment amounted to unjustified discrimination
which infringed his right to respect for his private and family life. He
relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.
Mata Estevez v. Spain, p. 3
The complaint made by Mata Estevez was unsuccessful, as the European Court
relied on its previous case law, such as X. and Y. against the United Kingdom
and S. against the United Kingdom.119
The turning point tenancy succession concerning same-sex couples took
place only in 2003 in the judgement of Karner v. Austria from 2003120. Mr
Karner, the applicant, had a homosexual relationship with another man, W.
They began living together in 1989. In 1991, W discovered he was terminally
ill. W. designated Karner as the successor of his estate. After the death of W.,
the  landlord  brought  proceedings  against  Karner  in  order  to  terminate  the
tenancy.  The  local  District  Court  and  the  Regional  Civil  Court  were  of  the
opinion that the 1974 Rent Act applied also to same-sex partners. However,
the landlord took the case to the Supreme Court, which decided that the term
‘life companion’ should be interpreted in the way the legislators intended in
1974,  which  did  not  include  homosexual  relationships.  In  Section  14,
paragraph 3 of the Austrian Rent Act ‘life companion’ was defined as “a person
who has lived in the flat with the former tenant until the latter's death for at
least  three years,  sharing a household on an economic footing like that  of  a
marriage”121.  The Supreme Court  quashed the decision of  the Regional  Civil
Court and terminated the lease.
An application to the European Court was made in 1998. Karner himself
died in 2000, four years after the decision of the Supreme Court. The Austrian
government  requested  that  the  case  would  be  struck  out  of  the  list  of  cases
pending in the European Court, as the applicant was deceased and had no
heirs wishing to pursue the case. Karner’s representative stressed that the
issue at hand was an important domestic legal issue in Austria and a relevant
issue  pertaining  to  human  rights  protection  at  large.  The  European  Court
found that if Karner had been a woman, he would have been able to succeed
to W.’s tenancy. Thus, he was given differential treatment because of his sex
(or sexual  orientation).  The Court  found that  Article  14 was applicable.  The
Austrian government maintained that “the aim of the relevant provision of the
119 Mata Estevez v. Spain, p. 4.
120 Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, ECHR 2003-IX.
121 Karner v. Austria, para 19.
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rent Act had been the protection of the traditional family”122. It is interesting
to note that according to this interpretation, ‘traditional family’ also includes
unmarried  heterosexual  cohabitation,  not  just  families  formed  by  legally
sanctioned marriage. The European Court accepted that “protection of the
family in the traditional sense is, in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason
which might justify a difference in treatment”123. The European Court found
that the Government had not given reasons that were weighty enough to justify
the interpretation of the Supreme Court. It is important to note that in Karner,
the issue at stake was ‘respect for the home’ under Article 8 of the Convention.
Thus it did not touch upon ‘family life’ or deliver a ‘gay-friendly’ decision as
such in favour of recognising same-sex partners as family members.
The  outcome  of  Karner  was  reiterated  by  the  European  Court  in  the
judgement of Kozak v. Poland from 2010124,  which  also  dealt  with  the
entitlement to a tenancy of a flat in the context of a male couple after the death
of one of one partner. The European Court found a violation of Article 14 taken
in  conjunction  with  Article  8,  thus  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  sexual
orientation.  It  is  in  this  judgement  that  the  European  Court  applies  a
commonsensical meaning of the word “relational” pertaining to relations
between applicants:
However, in pursuance of that aim a broad variety of measures might
be  implemented  by  the  State...  Also,  given  that  the  Convention  is  a
living  instrument,  to  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  present-day
conditions… the  State,  in  its  choice  of  means  designed  to  protect  the
family and secure, as required by Article 8, respect for family life must
necessarily take into account developments in society and changes in
the perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, including the
fact that there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere of leading
and living one's family or private life.125
Kozak v. Poland, para 98
Thus, shortly before Schalk and Kopf during  the  same  year,  the  European
Court gave in Kozak indirect but surprisingly strong support to the idea that
same-sex couples are entitled to their  “way” or “choice” in life.  However,  in
Schalk and Kopf this materialised only to the extent that de facto family life
applied to same-sex couples as well. However, regarding the stern placement
of homosexual relations in the realm of private life but not family life in earlier
years,  the  European  Court  has  come  a  long  way,  culminating  so  far  in
Vallianatos (and Oliari  and  others  v.  Italy in  2015)  even  if  not  all  the  way
towards gender-neutral alliance. The question that remains is whether
122 Karner v. Austria, para 35.
123 Karner v. Austria, para 40.
124 Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, 2 March 2010.
125 Emphasis added. The passage is quoted in X. and Others v. Austria, para 139.
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different forms of alliance – marriage, civil unions and cohabitation as de facto
family life – are equal enough compared to each other.
4.5 DISCUSSION: TOWARDS GENDER-NEUTRAL
ALLIANCE
The  results  of  more  than  a  century  of  anthropological  research  on
households, kinship relationships, and families, across cultures and
through time, provide no support whatsoever for the view that either
civilization or viable social orders depend upon marriage as an
exclusively heterosexual institution. Rather, anthropological research
supports  the  conclusion  that  a  vast  array  of  family  types,  including
families built upon same-sex partnerships, can contribute to stable and
humane societies. 126
American Anthropological Association (2004, no pagination)
These cases, described and analysed under four rubrics – state intervention in
the right to marry, the possibility of divorce, transgender marriage and same-
sex marriage – highlight the importance of alliance among personal relations
in the sphere of family life. Alliance, in contrast to filiation, often comes before
filiation in the constitution of a family unit, be the unit understood as a formal
or informal union of two adults: cohabitation, marriage or civil union. What is
interesting from a sociological  and anthropological  point  of  view is  how the
historical process of démariage (Théry 1993), the undoing of the practical and
symbolic importance of marriage, interacts with the idea of human rights or
individual rights in general. In the context of B. and L. v. the United Kingdom,
marriage prohibitions stemming from religious tradition were at odds with
contemporary notions according to which a union is acceptable if it does not
involve  close  blood  relatives,  i.e.  a  parent  and  his  or  her  child  or  siblings.
Affinity created through marriage in the form of acquiring “in-laws” is not seen
as a bar to marriage as the parties are not genetically related. Of course this is
just the essence of the rule of incest in our Euro-American culture today, and
exceptions such as ties created by adoption may fall in the same category. As a
concept, démariage is  both  about  undoing  marriage  –  “de-marriage”,  as  it
were – in the sense of seeing the possibility of separation and divorce as part
of the concept of marriage. In a more general and less literal sense, it is about
the privatisation of marriage as an institution giving a certain status individual
couples vis-à-vis the State.
The cases in the first category help in reflecting on the role of the State as a
“guarantor of reason”, as one of Legendre’s central ideas has been translated
126 A statement made by the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association on 25th
February 2004 commenting on the constitutional amendment proposed by President George W. Bush
to bar marriage from same-sex couples. (See American Anthropological Association 2004)
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to English (Robcis  2013:  257,  Green 2005: 257,  Spire 2001) which refers to
certain  commonly  shared  rules  that  dictate  that  persons  entering  marriage
must  be  alive,  of  full  age,  of  a  capacity  to  consent  to  the  marriage  and  the
marriage must be performed by a person representing an institution that has
been vested with the authority to do so. However, the conflict of the role of the
State  as  representing  reason  shows  that  what  is  deemed  as  rational  and
‘reasonable’  is  subject  to  shifts  in  epistemic  contexts,  as  marriage  rules
regarding  affines  (the  “in-law”  category  of  relatives)  were  not  seen  as
compatible  with  an  individualised  legal  culture  of  human  rights  in  the
European context. The démariage thesis would provide that marriage can be
both undone and re-constituted with another person, and prohibitions
concern categories of persons that are blood relatives, who share a genetically
and a scientifically determinable link. This does not mean that analogies could
not be drawn, as for example same-sex marriage has been built on the same
categories and prohibitions as opposite-sex marriage. In Nedelskyan terms, in
B. and L. and Waser and Steiger, relations were restructured with the help of
human rights law from the European Convention so that non-consanguineous
relations would not create and obstacle in marrying a person of one’s choice
even  though  he  or  she  was  an  affine,  regardless  of  the  private  turmoil  or
indignation it might produce.
Within established international and European human rights
jurisprudence,  the  right  to  marry  a  person  of  one’s  choice  is  regarded  as  a
fundamental human right as long as the person one wants to marry is of the
right  sex,  age  and  falls  into  other  categories  of  an  acceptable  spouse.  These
criteria  vary  from  one  State  to  another,  especially  today  regarding  the
possibility of same-sex marriage in many European jurisdictions. The
possibility of divorce, regardless of its commonplace nature and reduced social
stigma in contemporary European societies, has very rarely been addressed as
a human rights issue. The European Court of Human Rights is careful not to
touch on weighty ethical questions such as abortion on demand127, and divorce
seems to fall, at least historically, in this same category. However, under the
European Convention on Human Rights, as the right to marry under Article
12  is  subject  to  the  national  legislation  in  place  in  the  Member  State  (“…
according  to  the  national  laws  governing  the  exercise  of  this  right”),  so
Member States are fairly free to decide what constitutes marriage in their
respective jurisdictions. However, the right to marry seems lop-sided if there
is no recognised possibility of undoing an existing marriage and remarrying.
But as divorce has been legalised all European States by legislatures
sometimes  organising  a  referendum  in  order  to  canvas  public  opinion128,
human rights institution have been relieved on taking a stance whether there
is a human right to divorce or not.
127 On the issue of abortion, see A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, ECHR 2010 (not in
data).
128 Malta was the last State to legalise divorce in 2011 (“MPs in Catholic… 2011).
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The last two categories display contemporary debates focusing on the “de-
gendering” of marriage (see Barker 2012: 121 and Ball 2014: 136). This may be
understood as the expansion and/or redefinition of the concept of marriage.
What seems to be the crux of the issue is that the nature, form and purpose of
sexual  activity  of  marriage  have  become  more  and  more  private  issues.  In
certain legal systems, the physical act of consummation of marriage still plays
a role, but for the most part, contemporary secular law is not that interested in
what happens or does not happen in the bedrooms of  married couples.  The
logic  of  consummation  is  mainly  linked  to  reproduction,  but  the  advent  of
various forms of fertility treatments due either to physical infertility or lack of
a  partner  of  the  opposite  sex  have  brought  about  the  debate  concerning  “a
human right to reproduce non-coitally”129, i.e., coitus is not a prerequisite for
legitimate reproduction. Iacub (2009) raises interesting questions about the
role of impotence and infertility within the institution of marriage. The ability
to  procreate  and  the  act  of  consummation  have  been,  and  still  are,  key
elements  of  marriage  in  many  religious  legal  traditions.130 From today’s
viewpoint, could one establish that same-sex marriage is a logical outcome of
the  privatisation  of  marriage  as  an  institution  where  the  physical
consummation of  marriage or its  absence are not grounds for declaring the
marriage null and void? In the case law of the European Court, transgender
persons  and  the  right  to  marry  are  seen  as  less  problematic  as  marriage  is
upheld  as  a  union  between  a  man  and  a  woman.  Even  though  the  issue  of
consummation is not touched upon, it is evident that it is not relevant in the
context of post-operative transgender persons wishing to marry according to
their reassigned gender. As a person’s physical characteristics are medically
and  surgically  altered  to  match  their  psychological  identity,  marrying
according to one’s reassigned gender is not a matter of physical identity, as it
was e.g. in the impotency trials in France in 19th and 20th centuries described
by Iacub (2009: 101-124).
Case  law  touching  upon  the  right  to  marry  for  transgender  persons  and
same-sex couples rest on an uncomfortable double bind, as they highlight the
importance of  both legal  sex as an administrative category and the physical
characteristics  of  a  person,  be  they  surgically  modified  or  not.  Judgements
such as Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom are needed to confirm the
right of an individual to obtain the medical and legal changes needed in order
to be able to express one’s identity and live according to it. However, all of this
rests on the idea marriage is a union of a man and a woman capable of an act
of coitus – it does not have to comprise the possibility of the act of coitus being
fertile. This illustrates what even contemporary notions of marriage, to some
129 The closest the European Court has come to acknowledging such a right was in the judgment of
S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 57813/00, ECHR 2011. (See sub-chapters 6.3 and 6.4 on assisted
procreation).
130 Otherwise, as in one of Iacub’s sources, a judgement from France in given in 1808 (Cour d’appel
27 Jan 1808-2-214), reads, persons of the same sex could be married (see Iacub 2009: 105).
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extent, rest on, and raise the question of whether it really is of interest to the
State today what people are capable of doing in their bedrooms. True respect
for private life and intimacy need not concentrate on such matters?131 This
would be the perspective of démariage in  this  context,  as  the  rethinking  of
privacy  and  intimacy  would  amount  to  restructuring  relations  in  order  to
protect not just equality but the most private and intimate expressions of a
person, too.
Same-sex marriage is seen as more problematic than transgender marriage
by  the  European  Court.  Is  this  a  conceptual  problem,  ‘marriage’  meaning  a
union  between  a  man  and  a  woman  by  definition,  or  a  politically  and
temporally bound problem, pointing to the lack of European consensus in the
matter? The case material in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria seems to point to the
latter alternative, as the Court did acknowledge the existence of de facto family
life between a same-sex couple, a minute victory of sorts in itself. If marriage
is to be understood as a private contract, intimacy should be left to the truly
private sphere. If transgender persons are allowed to marry, the male-female
dichotomy has already been understood in a broader manner than in the days
when a person’s legal sex assigned at birth was the one that mattered. As same-
sex marriage is a reality in close to a dozen Member States of the Council of
Europe132,  the original  physical  sex of  the marriage partners really  does not
play such an important role in defining marriage and marital relations in many
existing legal arenas.
As  can  be  seen  from  the  earlier  case  law  regarding  same-sex  relations,
decriminalisation  and  equalising  the  age  of  consent  were  first  steps  in
recognising that homosexual relations were worthy of protection within the
sphere of private life, and of the home as well as noted in the tenancy cases
discussed above, culminating in Karner v. Austria. What comes across from
these narratives is that the concepts of ‘private life’ or ‘home’ did not recognise
the fuller picture of an enduring relationship between two persons of the same
sex. Schalk  and  Kopf  v.  Austria came  to  mean  that  same-sex  couples  may
share de facto family life, but despite the victory in Vallianatos and others v.
Greece in setting same-sex and opposite-sex couples on a par with each other
regarding  access  to  civil  unions,  this  might  not  be  enough to  make  alliance
gender-neutral.  As  may  be  read  from  the  Grand  Chamber  judgement  of
Hämäläinen v. Finland, according respect and recognition to intimate dyadic
relationships between adults is a tricky business. It may be argued that civil
unions often emerge as a less valued category compared to marriage, as they
constitute a category of their own, and usually including less entitlements than
131 Such a focus on respect for privacy and intimacy has been raised by the Finnish legal historian
Anu Pylkkänen (2012) and resonates with the idea of critique of the “sexual family” of Martha Fineman
(1995).
132 For same-sex marriage and civil unions, see survey of comparative law in Oliari and others v.
Italy from 2015, paras 53-5. For a similar survey from the point of view of transgender persons, see
Hämäläinen v. Finland from 2014, paras 31-33.
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in  marriage.  Marriage  has  changed  considerably  over  the  centuries  to
embrace, at least on the level of gender-neutral language in legislation, the full
capacities of women as legal subjects. Why is it then barriers between ‘quasi-
marriage’  and  marriage  exist?  This  depends  on  what  marriage  is  seen  to
represent  today:  in  Théry’s  words,  what  is  at  the  heart  of  marriage  (or
alliance?),  is  it  the  couple  or  the  presumption  of  paternity  (Théry  cited  in
Grosjean  2012)?  In  many  legal  systems,  the  emphasis  is  still  on  the
presumption of  paternity and the triad of  husband,  wife and child(ren) that
marriage creates, not just the marrying couple. If the protection of privacy and
intimacy is taken seriously and reproduction is not seen as a vital function of
marriage, the shift described by Théry is very apt indeed. If, from a Nedelskyan
viewpoint, the objective is to protect values such as equality, non-
discrimination, public recognition of sexual ad gender identities and close
personal relations, sexual relations between adults resulting in cohabitation
and companionship should be protected in the same manner be they
heterosexual, homosexual or anything else. Here, equality as symmetry is
easily instituted, and judging by the outcome of Oliari and others v. Italy133 in
2015, a certain amount of consensus between European States may be said to
have  emerged.  However,  shifting  emphasis  in  marriage  (and  alliance)  from
paternity to couplehood does not mean that the conundrum of paternity would
not need to be handled, and this is what happens in the following chapter.
133 Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015 (not in data).
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5 CONSANGUINITY: MATERNITY AND
PATERNITY
No  uncertainty  can  exist  about  knowledge  on  maternity.  A  woman
who gives birth is a mother and a woman cannot help but know that
she  has  given  birth;  maternity  is  a  natural  and  social  fact.  But  a
considerable gap in time separates any act of coitus from the birth of
a child; what is then the connection between the role of a man in sexual
intercourse and childbirth? Paternity has to be discovered or invented.
Unlike maternity, paternity is merely a social fact, a human invention.
Carole Pateman (1988: 35)
This chapter discusses how relations of consanguinity, or relations of ‘shared
blood’, between parents and children are recognised and come into being in
the realm of  law,  specifically  the case law of  the European Court  of  Human
Rights. This is broken down to the very asymmetrical categories of genetic and
gestational maternity and genetic paternity. As can be seen from the case law
described  in  this  chapter,  maternity,  too,  and  not  just  paternity,  can  be
technical  and  complicated  when  it  comes  to  the  legal  recognition  of  the
relation between a birth parent and a child. Paternity, in turn, is in essence a
socially  constructed  relation  on  the  basis  of  certain  assumptions  and
declarations,  and  genetic  proof  is  sought  only  if  deemed  relevant.  Both
maternity  and  paternity  may  be  subject  to  recognition  and  disavowal,  but
especially in the case of paternity, historical change in the form of existence
and availability of genetic testing has transformed how it is attributed.
However,  even in the case of  near conclusive scientific  proof,  paternity as a
legal relation does not rest solely on genetic relations.
This chapter focuses on consanguinity, meaning biological or genetic and
gestational  relations  and  the  question  of  knowing  one’s  origins,  a  recurring
theme in human rights debates concerning parentage in various contexts. In
this  study,  I  apply  the  term  ‘biological’  to  refer  to  something  more
comprehensive than mere genetic relations. In the context of maternity, coital,
genetic and gestational relations often go together, and form not just a physical
but a psychological and emotional relation, be it positive or negative, with the
foetus and the child born. In the context of paternity, coital and/or genetic
relations may be assumed under biological relations. In some contexts, as can
be seen from the case law analysed in this chapter, unrecognised fathers may
have been involved in the day-to-day reality of the gestational process if they
have been in a close relationship with the birth mother1.  For  the  sake  of
accuracy, I will use ‘genetic’ and ‘gestational’ when narrowly applicable and
‘biological’  when  a  larger  ensemble  of  relations  such  as  this  is  at  stake.
1 For example Keegan v. Ireland, no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290.
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Furthermore, maternity and paternity refer to the legal relations of parentage
in question and ‘motherhood’ and ‘fatherhood’ to the social aspects of parental
relations.
Compared  to  case  law dealing  with  the  various  kinds  of  conflicts  arising
from determining paternity, cases concerning the constitution or the denial of
maternity in the ECHR are numerically scarce but tend to be qualitatively and
historically dense textual accounts. Well-known and widely commented cases
such as Marckx v. Belgium from 19792 and Odièvre v. France from 20033 offer
a lot of food for thought, as well as perhaps less widely studied judgements and
decisions dealing with the practice of anonymous birth and giving children up
for adoption4. What these cases have in common is that they shed light on the
constitution  of  maternity  as  a  socio-legal  relation,  as  a  formally  recognised
parent-child relation between a woman and a child. In contrast to paternity
cases, the question at hand often concerns the rejection of maternity after a
child  is  born.  Complaints  coming  from States  such  as  Belgium,  France  and
Italy where the Napoleonic code (Code Napoléon, 1804) has been influential
in setting norms of family law display how, contrary to the ancient principle of
Roman law, mater semper certa est (“the  mother  is  always  known”)5,
maternity relied not so much on the fact of giving birth, but on a woman’s (and
a man’s) status: the main difference was whether the parents of the child were
married  or  not.  This  way  of  thinking  is  still  reflected  in  the  practice  of
anonymous birth. A woman may give birth anonymously or keep her identity
secret in France, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Greece,
Italy, Russia and Ukraine (Simmonds 2013: 263).
In some of these countries, the practice has been introduced in recent
times,  but  in  others,  such  as  France,  it  has  a  long-standing  history  and  has
been made use of by different groups of women in different eras. Iacub has
provided  an  interesting  account  of  the  practices  of  dealing  with  and
circumventing maternal filiation in her book L’Empire du ventre (“Empire of
the belly”,  2004).  As the subtitle  of  the book, Pour une autre histoire de la
maternité (“For  another  history  of  maternity”)  suggests,  her  account  of  the
practices  of  recognition  of  maternity  without  giving  birth,  anonymous  birth
and  modern-day  surrogacy  arrangements  offer  an  alternative  history  of
maternity in 19th and 20th century France. Findings concerning the French
legal and political context is not always directly applicable to other European
national contexts, but, for example, modern-day examples of dealing with
infertility through arrangements that raise questions on whether they are illicit
2 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31.
3 Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III.
4 For example, Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, 10 January 2008, Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09,
25 September 2012.
5 See Digest of Justinian 2.4.4.3 and, for example, the judgement of the Supreme Court of Ireland
M.R. and D.R. & others v. An t-Ard-Chlazraitheoir & others [2014] IESC 60 (07 November 2014), para
69, in Sources.
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surrogacy arrangements have wider relevance, as similar cases can be found
from ECHR case law as well6. The book is a rich and historicised reminder of
how  maternity,  or  maternal  filiation,  the  recognised  socio-legal  relation
between a mother and a child, is not really as certain as we tend to think it is.
This can be seen in ECHR case law as well: Marckx v. Belgium acts as a starting
point to this trajectory, showing that without the legal recognition of the act of
birth as the fundamental element of a mother-child relation, the woman giving
birth and the child born would be legal strangers to each other. Furthermore,
contemporary issues surrounding maternity brought about by different forms
of medically assisted reproduction such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and the
possible separation of genetic and gestational maternity, situations of egg
donation and/or surrogacy have their earlier counterparts such as certain form
of births out of wedlock, recognising a child without giving birth to one and
anonymous births. (See Iacub 2004.) In short, contrary to Carol Pateman in
the opening quote to this chapter (1988: 35), maternity is by no means self-
evident.
The establishment or disestablishment of legal relations between children
and  their  parents  provides  some  of  the  most  fascinating  examples  of  the
variety  of  administrative  techniques  and  solutions  deployed  in  the
establishment of family relations. This is most evident in cases where children
have  been  born  outside  marriage  and  their  establishment  of  relations  of
filiation to putative or actual mothers and fathers. The adage in the legal code
of the Roman emperor Justinian from the 6th century, mater semper certa
est, is deeply ingrained in European legal imagination and maternity is often
thought to follow unquestionably from the fact of birth. However, in
jurisdictions modelled the Napoleonic Code, the status of children born out of
wedlock has been subject to very different notions of establishing parentage,
which categorised children as either ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ depending
on whether they were born to a married couple or not. (Iacub 2004.) Thus, the
(partly historical) question of status is not just about married and unmarried
men and women but to a great extent about children and their standing vis-à-
vis each other in a given State.
The judgement of Marckx v. Belgium delivered by the European Court of
Human Rights in 1979 was a decisive point in setting the standard of the equal
treatment of all children regardless of the marital status of their parents in
European human rights law. In the judgment, the problem from a socio-legal
point of  view was that  by virtue of  giving birth,  Marckx did not become the
mother  of  her  child,  but  needed  to  recognise  and  adopt  her.  Giving  birth
anonymously, which is dealt with in the French context in Odièvre v. France,
Kearns v. France7 and Godelli v. Italy8, is a reverse kind of a situation, where
6 Giubergia and others v. Italy, 15131/89, Commission decision of 5 March 1990 and N.Q., M.S.
and S.S. v. Italy, 12612/86, Commission decision of 9 March 1990, discussed in Chapter 6.2.
7 Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, 10 January 2008.
8 Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09, 25 September 2012.
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the  woman  giving  birth  did  not  want  that  a  legal  relation  is  established
between her and the child she gives birth to. However, the French practice of
accouchement sous X stems  from  the  same  moral  and  legal  tradition  that
made Marckx have to recognise and adopt her child: the disassociation of birth
and female parentage due to the protection of family relations legitimated by
marriage.
The establishment of fatherhood differs fundamentally from the
establishment of motherhood, as it most commonly rests on the principle of
pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant9,  that  the man married to the woman
giving  birth  becomes  the  father  of  the  child.  Thus,  as  Carole  Pateman  has
argued10, “paternity is a human invention” and, to a large extent, a social and
legal  construction.  I  would  add  that  both  maternity  and  paternity  as  legal
relations are human inventions but structured differently, and paternity relies,
in  most  situations  that  do  not  end  up  in  the  courts,  on  a  relation  of  trust
between the mother and the father as it is based on a marital assumption or an
act of recognition, and, to a limited extent, is characterised by a certain degree
of contractual agreement. The ways to establish paternity when children are
born out of wedlock or when the marital assumption is not reliable vary from
one legal system to another. So do the means for contesting this assumption,
who  is  entitled  to  this  contest  paternity  –  the  husband  of  the  mother,  the
mother herself or a third party, the extramarital biological father, for example
– and in what kind of a time frame. However, the breadth of ECHR case law
on  the  establishment  of  paternity  shows  that  disputes  arise  in  a  variety  of
circumstances.  A  dispute  regarding  the  establishment  or  contestation  of
paternity may be brought about by a biological father against a legal father, by
a legal father against the mother, by mothers wanting to establish the paternity
of a child born out of wedlock or by the adult child her or himself.
Case  law  concerning  paternity  in  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights
forms a rather different set of data than case law concerning maternity. When
cases  dealing  with  maternity  are  few  in  numbers  but  dense  in  detail  and
significance,  case  law dealing  with  paternity  is  abundant  in  the  numbers  of
relevant  cases  but  less  dense  in  detail  and  significance  when  it  comes  to
individual judgements and decisions. In this study, paternity cases have been
selected  and  analysed  under  two  main  rubrics.  The  first  category  1)  is
constituted of cases where the question of status in the form of being married
or not to the mother of the child affects the possibilities of establishing a legal
relation between the biological father and the child. In many of these cases,
there has been a strong desire from the part of the biological father to form a
relation with the child or children. The second category 2) is concerned with
the disavowal or establishment of paternity, and where legal time-limits and
9 Digest of Justinian, 2.4.5 “…pater vero is est, quem nuptiae demonstrant”, which may be
translated into English as “the father indeed is declared by marriage”. Translation found in Watson
(1998: 44), cited in Duggan (2014: 4, footnote 10).
10 See opening quote to this chapter by Carole Pateman (1988: 35)
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scientific proof in the form of DNA evidence are evaluated in a legal setting. In
many of these cases, the fathers are reluctant towards establishing the relation
or have died before the case has been brought up. Some of the cases in either
category provide male counterparts  to the case of Marckx and highlight the
almost inexistent rights of unmarried fathers in some of the legal contexts
discussed during the early decades of  the ECHR litigation.  Today,  when the
legal status of children born outside marriage has improved, unmarried
paternity is seen to have a value of its own especially regarding the right of a
child  to  know  her  origins  and  establish  her  or  his  identity.  However,  even
though DNA testing offers near-conclusive proof of genetic relations and
greater certainty on establishing legally valid relations, any proof of a family
relation needs to be evaluated in the legal context to have effect, and there
remains a difference between the right to know one’s origins as a part of one’s
genealogy and identity and the right to have paternity recognised as a relation
producing material effects such as the transmission of wealth.
5.1 SINGLE MOTHERHOOD IN MARCKX V. BELGIUM
The judgement of Marckx v. Belgium from  1979  may,  in  this  study,  be
described  as  the  “mother  of  all  key  cases”.  It  concerned  a  case  where  Paula
Marckx,  a  single  woman,  gave  birth  to  a  child  and  challenged  the  need  to
establish her legal relation to the child through recognising and adopting her,
which  was  the  practice  in  Belgium  still  in  the  1970s11.  However,  when  the
mother recognised and adopted her own child, this affected the child’s
inheritance rights, and even after becoming legally affiliated to her mother, the
child  remained  a  stranger  to  her  mother’s  family  members,  and  could  not
inherit them if they had not made a will in her favour. This also meant that if
the mother died, her relatives could not become guardians of the child.
Michael  Goldhaber,  an  American  legal  journalist  who  has  written  a
popularised  account  of  the  main  import  of  the  European  Court  of  Human
Rights to human rights protection in Europe, offers a colourful account of the
story behind the Marckx case. Paula Marckx, it appears, never was a shrinking
violet: she has established herself as a household name in Belgium by working
as a model,  writing a novel,  working as a journalist  interviewing big names
from Franco to Shirley MacLane, and she was the first female pilot working at
Antwerp airport12.  (Goldhaber  2007.)  Goldhaber  reports  that  Paula  Marckx
first wrote to Strasbourg in her own name, but received a reply saying that she
had no standing in the case as her rights as a mother had not been violated
11 In the eyes of the Napoleonic code and legal systems modelled upon it such as in Belgium,
‘illegitimate’ children had the status of a foundling, regardless of the physical relationship to the
mother. See Lasok (1996).
12 For more biographical details, see Paula Marckx’s biography, published in English in 2010
(Marckx 2010).
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(2007: 17). She rewrote the complaint in the name of her child, and leaked the
letter to a fellow journalist. The letter made headlines: “Je suis un bébé et je
porte plainte…” (”I am a baby and I make a case...”). In September 1974, the
complaint was deemed admissible. Leonora Van Look, a family law research
assistant at the Catholic University of Louvain and an acquaintance of an
acquaintance of Paula Marckx, began to help her with the legal paperwork and
soon became her legal representative. In July 1976 they went to Strasbourg to
be heard at the European Commission of Human Rights, at the time the first
instance of the ECHR machinery. This was Van Look’s first court case, and this
was  the  first  time  a  female  lawyer  presented  a  case  in  the  system  of  the
European  Court.  According  to  Goldhaber,  who  interviewed  Paula  and
Alexandra  Marckx  and  Van  Look,  there  was  widespread  support  for  the
Marckx case from people involved in the process and from the media as well
as individual decision-makers, such as Leona Detiege, a single mother and an
alderman who later became Antwerp’s mayor. (Goldhaber 2007: 18-9.)
When looking  at  the  documents  available  from the  European  Court,  the
Marckx saga is revealed in a more legal and technical manner, but this does
not  make  the  narrative  any  less  fascinating.  Paula  Marckx  began  her  legal
process  by  lodging  a  complaint  against  the  Belgian  state  in  March  1974  on
behalf of herself and her daughter who she had given birth to in October 1973.
She reported the birth to her local registration officer, as was required at the
time by the Belgian Civil Code concerning children born to unmarried women.
Soon after reporting the birth, Marckx was summoned by a District Judge in
Antwerp to appear in court to be informed about the “methods available for
recognising her daughter”13.  Three  days  later  she  recognised  her  child  as
stipulated by the Belgian Civil Code. A year later, in October 1974 she adopted
her daughter as required by Belgian law. Certain kinds of enquiries had to be
made within the procedure and some expenses were incurred in the process,
which was concluded almost six months later in April 1975, when a judgement
confirming the adoption was delivered. However, the decision was retroactive
so Marckx was the guardian of her daughter from the date of adoption.
In the admissibility decision for the case from 1975 (a document preceding
the judgement which declares the case worthy of legal proceedings in the
European Court), the Belgian government argued in favour of maintaining a
close link between family and legitimate marriage: “[T]he main aim [was] to
protect  legitimate  families  and  encourage  marriage.  It  would  be  illogical  to
attempt to encourage marriage and at the same time put children born out of
wedlock on exactly the same footing as legitimate children”14. Due to this, the
procedure for creating a recognised family relation between the unmarried
mother and her child was quite detailed:
13 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, paragraph 9.
14 Marckx v. Belgium, 6833/74, Commission decision of 29 September 1975 on the admissibility of
the application, p. 127-128.
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The applicant acknowledges that under Belgian law there is one way
of increasing an illegitimate child's rights, namely adoption. She states
that she has just adopted her daughter, for which she had to apply to a
notary and spend 4,500 Belgian francs (roughly 550 French francs) to
set proceedings in motion, although many unmarried mothers are in
financial straits. The police then made enquiries of her neighbours;
enquiries of this nature might damage the prospects of improving an
illegitimate child's legal status by adoption, for instance as a result of
the neighbours' prejudices against unmarried mothers. Moreover, she
had to go to a police station to fill in a questionnaire which included
the  question  ”Why do  you  want  to  adopt  the  child?”.  The  police  also
inspected  her  flat  and  investigated  her  financial  situation.  The
applicant  considers  that  such  an  investigation  might  perhaps  be
justified in the case of a person wishing to adopt someone else’s child
but that it is scarcely appropriate that it should be made by the police.
Marckx v. Belgium, Commission decision, p. 129
The quote above illustrates that the process of adoption between an unmarried
mother and her child was by no means a simple formality: the amount of work
required by both the mother and the authorities in the process indicates that
the aim of the legislation was indeed to discourage births outside marriage and
to regulate the conduct of unmarried women if they happened to give birth to
children out of wedlock. In short, if an unmarried woman gave birth to a child,
her fitness to be a legal parent had to be evaluated. The Commission report on
the case15 sheds even more light on the details of the case. The police asked her
neighbours’  opinion  on  her  “maternal  qualities”;  she  was  summoned to  the
police station and asked questions on her private life, such as her motives to
adopt the child, and the police visited her home to obtain information on her
accommodation and income.16
Marckx and her daughter argued their case in Strasbourg by claiming that
Belgian  legislation  concerning  children  born  out  of  wedlock  “violated  the
family life of the child because it hinders the establishment of legal relations
between the mother and the natural child”17. Further, they argued that
legislation that aims to protect family life must promote the establishment of
legal  relation  based  on  blood,  because  “…  this  solution  corresponds  to  the
truth. Indeed, maternity, be it legitimate or natural, is a fact subject to direct
15 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, report of the Commission.
16 ”Sa vie privée a été l’objet de plusieurs enquêtes: la police a interrogé ses voisins pour demander
leur opinion sur les “qualités maternelles” de la requérante; elle a été convoquée au commissariat de
police pour être interrogée sur sa vie privée, entre autre sur ses motifs d’adopter son propre enfant; la
police a effectué une visite à domicile pour demander des renseignements sur ses conditions de
logement et ses revenus.” Marckx, report of the Commission, para 50.
17 ”… la législation belge porte atteinte à la vie familiale de l’enfant puisqu’elle entrave
l’établissement de liens juridiques entre la mère et l’enfant naturel”. Marckx, report of the
Commission, para 22.
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proof”18.  The  Belgian  Government  argued  that  leaving  the  mother  free  to
decide whether or not to recognise her child was favourable to the child being
adopted by prospective adoptive parents. In opposition to this, the applicants
argued that the birth mother could not really remain anonymous as according
to  Belgian  law  the  name  of  the  mother  must  be  mentioned  on  the  birth
certificate19. The Government also argued in formalised ECHR language that
maintaining the existing treatment of children born to unmarried mothers was
necessary in a democratic society, as it had as its aim to promote marriage and
the so-called ‘legitimate family’.20
The Government of Belgium admitted that the “legislative dispositions
[concerning the establishment of filiation] date from the introduction of Code
Napoléon in 1804 and [had] not been modified since, even though on many
other  points  the  legal  situation  of  natural  children  has  been  subject  to
legislative improvements”21.  The  Government  further  argued  that  not  all
unmarried  mothers  were  as  eager  as  Paula  Marckx  to  take  up  their  role  as
mothers: “If a mother is not married, it is by no means certain that she will be
able to assume, alone and without the support of a man who has committed
himself to it, the burdens of maternity”22. Later on, it complemented this by
arguing  that  under  article  203  of  the  Belgian  Civil  Code,  upon  marriage
spouses  enter  into  a  contractual  relation  to  feed,  maintain  and  raise  their
children23. The Belgian Government made reference to the French practice of
anonymous  birth,  reminding  that  a  woman  can  conceal  her  identity  when
giving birth. In contrast, in Belgian law, “the medical secret has to yield before
the legal obligation to record the identity of the mother”24. Thus, it was argued
by the Government that this way the liberty of the woman to assume or not to
assume her maternity is respected.
In the mindset of the State that had not substantially modified its law on
filiation since the dawn of the Napoleonic Code, a birth outside marriage was
to be understood as a mishap, accident or the result of irresponsible behaviour.
18 Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission, para 22.
19 Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission.
20 ”… cette ingérence est actuellement nécessaire dans une société démocratique à la protection de
la morale, de l’ordre et des libertés d’autrui, puisqu’elle aurait pour but de promouvoir le mariage et la
famille dite légitime”. Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission, para 29.
21 “Ces dispositions législatives datent de l'introduction, en 1804, du Code Napoléon et n'ont
jusqu'à présent pas été modifiées, méme si, sur plusieurs autres points, la situation juridique des
enfants naturels a fait l'objet d'améliorations législatives”. Marckx v. Belgium, report of the
Commission, para 31.
22 ”Si la mère n’est pas mariée il n’est pas du tout certain qu’elle sera disposée à assumer, seule et
sans le concours d’un homme qui s’est engagé, les charges de la maternité”. Marckx v. Belgium, report
of the Commission, para 33.
23 Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission, para 41.
24 ”… [le] secret médical doit céder devant l’obligation légale de divulguer l’identié de la mère”,
Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission, para 33.
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An unmarried woman was not seen as a fully competent parental subject and
could  not  be  assumed to  bear  a  direct  legal  relation  of  responsibility  to  her
child, as without the material and moral support of a husband, she could not
be expected to offer a decent future for her child. If she expressed her wish to
become the legal parent of her child, she became a full parent.25 However, the
child  remained  a  legal  stranger  to  her  or  his  maternal  family  members:
grandparents,  aunts,  uncles and so on.  In fact,  the Government argued that
the only difference in treatment between legitimate and adoptive children was
that the adopted child did not acquire inheritance rights towards the relatives
of the adoptive parents; this was because the relatives might be opposed to the
adoption26.
In her complaint to the European Court, Marckx evoked Article 8 (the right
to respect for private and family life, the home and correspondence) and 14
(the  prohibition  of  discrimination  on  any  ground  such  as  sex,  race,  colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association  with  a  national  minority,  property,  birth  or  other  status).  She
evoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 with respect to discrimination
“between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ children and between unmarried and
married mothers”27.  When  the  case  was  heard  in  the  European  Court,  the
representative of the Belgian Government contended that the “issues raised by
the applicants [were] essentially theoretical in their case” and that since the
adoption of the child born by her mother in October 1974, her “position vis-à-
vis her mother has been the same as that of a ‘legitimate’ child”28. The judges
of  the  European  Court  did  not  agree  with  the  submission  of  the  Belgian
Government. Regarding the merits of the case, the Court held that “Article 8…
makes no distinction between the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate’ family”29.
Furthermore, the Court noted that a resolution from 1970 of the “Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe regards the single woman and her child
as one form of family no less than others”30.
Thus, the Court referred to a resolution adopted by an intergovernmental
body of the Council of Europe, the institution behind the Convention and the
Court,  in  order  to  justify  its  view.  Actually,  Belgium  had  signed  the
international Brussels Convention of 12 September 1962 on the Establishment
of Maternal Affiliation of Natural Children prepared by the International
Commission on Civil Status which entered into force on 23rd April 1964, but
had not ratified it yet at the time when the Marckx case was in the Belgian legal
system. The Council of Europe concluded its Convention on the Legal Status
25 ”… la tutelle lui appartient en plein droit”. Marckx v. Belgium, report of the Commission, para
41.
26 Marckx v. Belgium (judgement 1979), para 56.
27 Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31 (judgment), para 22.
28 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment, para 26.
29 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment, para 31.
30 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment, para 31.
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of Children born out of Wedlock on 15th October 1975, and it entered into force
on 11th August 1978. However, at the time Belgium had not signed or ratified
this  treaty.  Nevertheless,  a  Bill  was  submitted  to  the  Belgian  parliament  on
15th February 1978 which was to establish the principle of mater semper certa
est in the Belgian Civil Code and place ‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ children
on the same footing in the face of law.
In its decision, the Court held that there had been a breach of Article 8 with
respect to both Paula Marckx and her daughter in establishing her daughter’s
maternal affiliation and that there had also been a breach of Article 14 taken
in conjunction with Article 8 with respect to both applicants. It also held, in
addition to a variety of legal considerations raised in the case, that there had
also been breaches of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 as to the extent
in law of the child’s family relationships and the patrimonial rights relied on
by both her and her mother. In its decision, the Court relied on the facts of the
present case but also on intertextual  references made to a resolution by the
Council of Ministers. The Marckx case  also  laid  an  important  precedent
regarding  unmarried  mothers  and  the  legal  rights  of  children  born  out  of
wedlock,  and  thus  constitutes  a  text  which  is  referred  to  often  in  the
subsequent case law of the European Court.
The case illustrates how the principle of mater semper certa est is actually
no more ‘natural’ or immediate than the legal assumption of paternity, as it is
a socio-legal construct in the same way as other legal principles. In this case,
the adoption of the child born by her birth mother constituted a legal fiction
that turned the biological link between the child and the mother into a legally
recognisable relation. The Marckx case demonstrates the constructedness of
legal mother-child relations: the mere fact of birth does not make a mother,
but the registration of the birth in her name. Since the judgement of Marckx
v. Belgium in 1979, the marital status of the mother does not affect the
certainty  of  motherhood  in  ECHR  case  law,  so  this  judgement  gave  a  final
confirmation to the principle of mater semper certa est in European human
rights law. However, some legal scholars seem to disagree, to a certain extent,
on whether this principle is in use in France and Belgium. In an introductory
article to a volume dedicated to explore the relationship between legal,
biological and social relations in determining parentage, the Ingeborg
Schwenzer is of the opinion that
Most legal systems still firmly base the law concerning motherhood on
the principle of mater semper certa est,  namely that the woman who
gives birth to the child is his or her legal mother. France and some legal
systems closely affiliated to France, however, do not follow this
principle. In these systems, a woman only becomes the legal mother of
a child either by designation in the record of birth [reference is made
to Belgium], by acknowledging him or her, or by virtue of the so-called
possession d’état, or the lived-out mother-child relationship.
Ingeborg Schwenzer (2007: 3-4)
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In  contrast,  in  an  article  in  the  same  volume  concerning  Belgium,  Gerd
Verschelden (2007: 64) argues that in Belgium, it is obligatory to mention the
name of the mother on the birth certificate in order to establish maternal
filiation. This legal obligation was created in 1987 when the Belgian legislator
thus accommodated the requirements of the judgement of Marckx v. Belgium
from 1979.
What might explain this divergence in views concerning the applicability of
mater semper certa est? As Schwenzer mentions following the passage quoted
above,  France  also  recognises  anonymous  birth,  which  is  another  way  of
weakening the ‘certainty’ of motherhood at birth. However, what seems to be
important  here  is  which  way  the  assumption  of  motherhood  goes:  if  the
woman giving birth to the child is assumed to be the mother, the technicalities
of birth registration are secondary. What constituted the root of the problem
in Marckx was that due to her marital status, the biological relation of Paula
Marckx  to  her  child  was  unrecognised,  despite  the  labour  (pun  intended)
involved. However, the views of Schwenzer (2007) and Verschelden (2007)
show how differently the applicability of the certainty of motherhood can be
viewed.
5.2 ANONYMOUS BIRTH, ADOPTION AND CONCEALED
ORIGINS
In Odièvre v. France31 from  2003,  a  key  case  concerning  anonymous  birth
where an adult woman born through anonymous birth (accouchement sous X)
sought  the  possibility  to  find  out  the  identity  of  her  biological  parents  and
siblings, the European Court of Human Rights decided in favour of the French
government, ruling that retaining identifying information on her birth mother
and  biological  kin  did  not  violate  her  right  to  respect  for  private  life  under
Article 8 of the European Convention. Ten years later, in Godelli v. Italy32, a
similar case as it also involved an adult woman seeking for information on her
origins, the European Court decided in favour of the applicant. However, in
Godelli it was explicitly stated that the difference in the outcomes of these
cases  did  not  stem  from  a  change  in  principle  towards  the  practice  of
anonymous birth, a reality in both countries still today, but from the difference
in the availability of non-identifying information on the birth mother to adults
born through anonymous birth33.
A biographical account, a book called De mère inconnue (“Of an Unknown
Mother”), has been written about Odièvre’s legal battle in the European Court
(Mendehlson and Marchand 2004). This book describes Odièvre as a modest,
timid and frail  young woman who had suffered from long-standing anguish
31 Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III.
32 Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09, 25 September 2012.
33 Godelli v. Italy, para 52.
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and psychological distress during her life. In this biographical account, much
of  her  anguish  and  distress  is  attributed  to  her  knowing  that  she  was  an
adopted child. The book was written by Didier Mendehlson, Odièvre’s lawyer,
and Isabelle Marchand, a journalist involved in the process. The voice of the
narrator is that of Mendehlson, who relates the story of Odièvre and her legal
battle  as  well  as  contributions  of  various  professional  and  academic
commentators to the debate concerning anonymous birth. The book is an easy-
to-read and popularised account of the life of Odièvre and the reception of her
case  in  the  European  Court.  Several  associations,  NGOs  and  experts  are
strongly  of  the  opinion  that  anonymous  birth  should  be  suppressed34, and
advocacy against the practice of anonymous birth is ongoing. From the point
of view of these actors, the outcome of Odièvre v. France was disappointing;
after all, a Grand Chamber judgement was given in the case, and the with ten
votes against seven, the Court found that there had been no breach of Article
8 or Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 835.
France  has  the  longest  and  most  consistent  history  in  the  practice  of
anonymous birth which is known also as accouchement sous X, “birth under
X”.  This  refers  to  the  practice  of  marking  the  folder  of  a  child  born
anonymously with an X in maternity wards. (Mendehlson and Marchand
2004.)  The  applicant  in  the  case,  Pascale  Odièvre,  was  born  in  1965.  Her
mother, a woman unable to take care of her child due to her financial situation
and the refusal of her partner, the father of the child, requested that the birth
be  kept  secret.  The  child  was  placed  with  the  Child  Welfare  Service  at  the
Health and Social  Services Department (DASS) and remained in the care of
the département of Seine until 1969, when an adoption order in favour of Mr
and Mrs Odièvre was made when the child was four years old. In 1990, when
Ms Odièvre was 25 years old, she was able to consult her file and some non-
identifying information on her biological parents and siblings. Details of the
possible abandonment and the biological parents’ “physical appearance,
mental outlook, health, social background and occupation”36 were gathered by
the authorities in order to facilitate the placement of the child, and were kept
on file.
Odièvre  found  out  from  her  files  that  her  biological  parents  had  been
cohabiting for several years in modest circumstances. Ms Berthe (a fictitious
name  appearing  in  the  documents),  the  biological  mother,  was  not  in  paid
employment. The father worked as a painter and decorator. He was married
to another woman and had a daughter born in wedlock taken care of by her
mother. Ms Berthe and her companion had one child, a son born in 1963 who
was less than two years older than Odièvre. Odièvre’s biological father refused
to take on the new child and Ms Berthe was willing to follow his wish. Odièvre
also learned that her biological parents had two other sons after her own birth
34 See Irène Théry’s recommendations in Théry (1998).
35 Odièvre v. France, para 56.
36 Odièvre v. France, para 12.
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in  1965  who  had  also  been  “born  under  X”.  The  DASS  refused  to  release
information  on  her  biological  brothers  as  it  would  have  been  a  breach  of
confidence  under  French  law.  In  1998  Ms  Odièvre  began  her  legal  process
against  the  French  authorities  by  applying  to  the  Paris tribunal de grande
instance to seek an order for the release of information concerning her birth
and copies of any relevant documents. She received a reply from the tribunal
saying that she should apply to an administrative court in order to obtain an
order for the release of the information she sought, but that this would be in
conflict with French law on the matter.
In the ECHR admissibility decision, the French Government accused her
of  not  exhausting  national  remedies  in  the  case,  but  the  complaint  was
declared admissible. Ms Odièvre complained to the European Court that “she
was unable to obtain identifying information about her natural family and had
thereby been prevented from finding out her personal history”37. She evoked
Article 8 of the Convention, arguing that “[e]stablishing her basic identity was
an integral part of not only her ‘private life’, but also of her ‘family life’ with
her natural family, with whom she hoped to establish emotional ties were she
not prevented from doing so by French law”38. Ms Odièvre and her lawyer thus
tried to push the limits of ‘family life’ under the Convention to cover legally
unestablished  links  with  her  biological  parents  and  siblings.  The  French
Government refuted this claim and said that “only the applicant’s family life
with  her  adoptive  parents  could  come  within  the  scope  of  Article  8”  as  the
applicant had never met her biological mother and she had never expressed
any  interest  in  establishing  a  link  between  them.  The  European  Court
considered the applicant’s claim from the perspective of private life, as it did
not consider her relationship with her adoptive parents but the circumstances
in which she was born and the identity of her biological parents and brothers.
In its judgement, the European Court accorded a wide margin of appreciation
to France in protecting the identity of women giving birth anonymously and
found that Ms Odièvre’s right to respect for family life had not been violated.
The outcome of the case shows that when it comes to the notion of family
life  in  the  European  Court,  legal  relations  are  supreme  to  other  forms  of
relations. The notion of private life does not rest so heavily on intersections of
interpersonal relations – it encompasses an individual’s identity and personal
development. However, the privacy of the birth mother and the ‘natural family’
of the abandoned child went before the ‘need to know’ of the child. Judging by
the history of the practice of anonymous birth, its raison d’être seems to have
been the privacy of the woman deciding to give up her child, as the reasons for
giving the child away may be resulting from difficult and distressing situations:
young age, abandonment by the biological father, extreme poverty, adultery
and, in some cases, even rape or incest. The legal tie between a mother and a
37 Odièvre v. France, para 24. The expression of ’natural’ family relations in the case material refer
simply to births outside marriage and ensuing biological relations.
38 Odièvre v. France, para 25.
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child is thus not created by the mere fact of birth, but also by the willingness
of the birth mother to take on the status of maternity towards a child. On the
other  hand,  questions  of  class  should  not  be  overlooked:  for  the  State,
anonymous  birth  also  paves  the  way  to  transfer  children  from  the
‘undeserving’ poor to ‘deserving’ adoptive parents, whose status is protected
by keeping certain information undisclosed.39
In the judgement of Kearns v. France from 200840, an Irish woman who
had gone to France to give birth in order to benefit from accouchement sous X
sought to reverse her decision and re-obtain the child she had given birth to.
Kearns was a married woman living in Ireland who had had an extramarital
relationship and wanted first to give the child up for adoption. However, she
later hoped to reverse her decision when she said she had convinced her
husband  to  recognise  the  child.  The  biological  father,  also  joined  in  the
proceedings  and  wanted  to  obtain  custody  of  the  child. In February 2002
Kearns went to a hospital in Northern France with her mother and a French
lawyer and requested to give birth anonymously. Ten days later she gave birth
to child. On the day after the birth, she had an interview with the social services
with her mother and a nurse acting as an interpreter.  On the same day she
signed a document which placed the child in the care of the French State. She
also stated that the child was born outside marriage and was not recognised
by a father. In the documentation, the reasons for the placement were to be
kept  secret  from  the  child  until  she  reached  majority  and  would  be  able  to
obtain non-identifying information of her origins. When signing the
appropriate paperwork, Kearns was given a period of two months to change
her  mind  about  the  adoption.  The  relevant  legislation  (348-3  of  the  French
Civil Code) also gave a six-month time limit for the reversal of the adoption for
the  second  parent  if  he  did  not  entrust  the  child  to  the  State  authorities.
However,  this  applied  only  if  paternity  had  been  established,  and  in
accouchement sous X neither maternity nor paternity is established. Kearns
also signed a separate deed for consenting to the future adoption.41
The child was placed in the care of  adoptive parents in 2002.  Sometime
during  the  first  half  of  2002,  the  child’s  biological  father  learned  about  the
birth and brought action in Ireland for the recognition of his rights over the
child. In decisions given in July and August a Circuit Family Court in Ireland
announced that  the adoption process in France should not proceed further.
Kearns went to France in late July 2002 to the hospital in which she gave birth
and to the local social services and requested that the child be returned to her.
39 This resonates with a view expressed by Cadco (Coordination des actions pour le droit à la
connaissance des origins), an organisation lobbying for the right to origins, according to which
expressed a view cited in the book that the law concerning anonymous births (loi Mattei) was made for
adoptive parents and that it protects their interests first and foremost (Mendehlson and Marchand
2004: 87).
40 Kearns v. France, judgment no. 35991/04, 10 January 2008.
41 Kearns v. France, paras 7-15.
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The social services refused, as the two-month time limit applying to her had
passed.  Kearns applied to the Lille tribunal de grande instance and sought
that  the  adoption  decision  be  annulled.  She  submitted  that  she  had  acted
under family pressure and that she had not fully understood the procedure as
she  did  not  speak  French.  The  biological  father  also  intervened  in  the
proceedings.42 The first instance of the French judicial system did not rule in
Kearns’ favour. She appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ruled, in turn, that
the adoption should be reversed and the child returned to Kearns. The main
premise for the decision was that despite the information given to her, she had
been under the impression that a six-month time limit applied to both her and
the biological father. The prefect of the département du Nord complained
against this decision to the Court of Cassation, arguing that a child who had
not been recognised by her mother could be taken into State care without her
consent. The Court of Cassation quashed and annulled the Court of Appeal’s
judgement and put an end to the dispute.43 The Court of Cassation ruled that
the Court of Appeal had not properly applied the provision of the Social Action
and  Families  Code  which  “provides  that  children  whose  parentage  has  not
been  established  or  is  unknown  and  who  have  been  entrusted  to  the  Child
Welfare Service for more than two months are deemed to have been taken into
State care”44.
In  her  submission  to  the  European  Court  in  2004,  Kearns  said  that  her
right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention
had  been  breached.  The  biological  father  also  intervened  as  a  third  party,
submitting  that  “his  intention  had  always  been  to  be  a  good  father  to  his
daughter and to look after her, but that the French authorities’ interference
had  prevented  him from having  a  normal  family  life  with  her”45. The Court
considered, without further elaboration, that the relationship between the
applicant and her child came within the sphere of family life. In its reasoning,
the Court aligned the substance of the case with that of Odièvre: “… the Court
observes that  it  is  confronted in the present case with interests  that  are not
easily  reconciled:  those of  the biological  mother,  the child and the adoptive
family. There is also a general interest at stake... In striking a balance between
these different interests, the child’s best interests should be paramount.” The
‘general interest’ the Court refers to is spelled out in Odièvre v. France:
There is also a general interest at stake, as the French legislature has
consistently sought to protect  the mother's  and child's  health during
pregnancy  and  birth  and  to  avoid  abortions,  in  particular  illegal
abortions, and children being abandoned other than under the proper
procedure.  The  right  to  respect  for  life,  a  higher-ranking  value
42 Kearns v. France, paras 16-20.
43 Kearns v. France, paras 21-26.
44 Court of Cassation judgment, cited in Kearns v. France, para 25.
45 Kearns v. France, para 71.
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guaranteed by the Convention, is thus one of the aims pursued by the
French system.
Odièvre v. France, para 45
The  possibility  of  anonymous  birth  as  a  question  of  ‘general  interest’  might
seem  somewhat  outdated  in  today’s  Europe.  However,  it  has  been  strongly
favoured in many predominantly Catholic European jurisdictions that have an
uneasy relationship with abortion. The “right to respect for life” is framed as a
reason for the institution of anonymous birth. What is interesting is that the
mother-child bond amounts to family life even in the context of anonymous
birth.  As  we  saw  in Odièvre,  the  relationship  of  a  child  given  away  in
accouchement sous X to her biological mother did not amount to family life.
An explanation for this asymmetry could be that the birth mother is faced with
the dilemma of giving the child away and keeping it: birth mothers retain the
possibility of affirming the mother-child bond; they can opt in for the mater
semper certa est principle. The child, in all her or his incapacity as a newborn
infant, is subject to the protection of the State and the legal, legitimate family
she is made part of.
The case was not ruled in favour of Kearns by the European Court, which
places it in line with Odièvre and the supremacy of the legitimate (biological
or adoptive) family. The act of incorporating a child legally into an adoptive
family is so robust that a violation of Article 8 has seldom been found in such
cases.  In  the  judgement  of Keegan v. Ireland46from 1994 a violation of the
rights of the biological father of a child given to adoption was found. This case
presented a situation where the biological father had no rights over a child who
was born as a result of a relationship and subsequent cohabitation after the
relationship with the mother had broken down. However, the emphasis in this
case was on the non-existent rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock
in Irish law prior to this judgement from the European Court.
Eva  Steiner,  a  French  legal  scholar  working  in  England,  describes  the
practice  of  anonymous  birth  as  deeply  intertwined  with  different  phases  of
French political and legal history and with a specific conception of parenthood
based on choice. Steiner notes that
… the procedure of accouchement sous X in France has stood the test
of  time through completely different ages and political  cultures,  and
has  left  its  mark  in  an  enduring  legacy  expressed  currently  in  its
modern form in the Civil Code. Given the elevated status and authority
accorded by the French people to their Civil code, often described as
the  true  Constitution  of  France,  one  could  even  argue  that  the  right
mothers have to give birth anonymously under Article 341-1 of the code
amounts today to a quasi-constitutional right.
46 Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290.
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Eva Steiner (2003: 430)
She argues that the concept of parenthood in French family law is based on
“an  adult-centred  individualistic  philosophy  of  freedom of  choice”  in  which
“parenthood is perceived as a set of duties that parents are free to take upon
themselves  if  they  so  wish”  (2003:  430).  According  to  Steiner,  before  the
recent amendments to French laws on filiation, parenthood outside marriage
did not follow from the mere fact of birth, but had to be formally acknowledged
(in the spirit of the Napoleonic Code). Since July 2006, the law on filiation in
France has stipulated that a woman giving birth to a child outside marriage is
designated as her mother by entering her name to the birth certificate. Fathers
need  to  recognise  the  child,  but  this  can  happen  before  birth,  on  the  birth
certificate (acte de naissance) or at a later point in time. Steiner explains this
philosophy of parenthood by a long-standing distrust of French legal thinking
towards children born out of wedlock. She argues that as making wills is not
general practice in France, one’s status as a recognised child is very important
in matters of inheritance which rest, for the most part, on intestate succession.
Thus,  for  the  sake  of  the  protection  of  assets  and  property,  marriage-based
family  relations  have  been  key  in  the  succession  of  property  from  one
generation to another,  and establishment of  legal  parentage has historically
been made very difficult for children born outside marriage. (Steiner 2003.)
What emerges from the debates on accouchement sous X is that there are
two ways of looking at the practice of anonymous birth from the point of view
of the pregnant woman. The first one stresses autonomy and liberty of choice,
which offers the woman the possibility to reject maternity. If a woman gets
pregnant, she is not ‘doomed’ to unwanted motherhood, as she can exercise
her liberty to give the baby away.  According to Lefaucheur (2004: 331) this
stance has been backed up by feminist arguments in the French context and
can  be  characterised  as  a  form of  post-conception  autonomy in  the  form of
delayed abortion. Obviously, most of these arguments apply to abortion as well
in States where women can have abortion on demand, i.e. because they do not
want to carry a pregnancy to term. However, this view ignores the relationship
of  anonymous  birth  has  with  the  disassociation  of  the  act  of  birth  and
maternity  which  can  be  seen  in Marckx v. Belgium and  the  close  history
anonymous birth shares with the treatment of illegitimate births in the
Napoleonic Code.
From  a  more  sceptical  viewpoint,  one  can  argue  that  the  possibility  of
anonymous birth actually curtails the autonomy and subjectivity of women as
reproductive agents and possible parents – even if a woman gives birth, she is
not regarded as a legal, responsible parent unless she has entered or enters
into a contractual  relation where she expresses her willingness to take up a
parental role. This contractual relation is established either vis-à-vis the father
of  the  child  and  the  State  in  cases  of  marriage,  joint  parental  authority  or
recognition,  or  vis-à-vis  only  the  State  when  the  father  is  unknown  or  the
relationship  with  him  has  not  been  established  through  recognition  or  a
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paternity  suit.  Thus,  the  promise  of  liberty  and  autonomy  offered  by  this
particular way of arguing for it seems as false – if the mater semper certa est
principle is not applied, women are in some ways treated as incomplete legal
subjects who cannot be presumed to act as responsible adults and parents.
A  much  earlier  decision  of X. against the United Kingdom47 in  1977
displayed a situation that was similar to Kearns. Interestingly, the complaint
concerned  a  young  French  woman living  in  France  who went  to  the  United
Kingdom to give birth and to give the baby away. She got pregnant when she
was  eighteen  years  old.  The  relationship  with  the  father  of  the  child  broke
down before she could tell him about the pregnancy, as he died in an accident
a  month  later.  Due  to  lack  of  resources  and  fearing  disapproval  from  her
family,  X.  wished  to  have  an  abortion.  She  contacted  an  abortion  clinic  in
London. The pregnancy was too advanced for abortion, so the doctor proposed
a caesarean section and giving the child up for adoption. After the birth, the
child was given to a married couple, two doctors, of whom the wife gave up her
job in order to take care of the child.48 The caesarean section produced after-
effects, and the applicant had to have her uterus ablated a few months later.
As her hopes of future pregnancies ended, she refused to give her formal
consent to the adoption. The adoptive parents began legal proceedings against
X.  In  February  1976,  when  the  child  was  two  years  old,  the  High  Court  of
justice pronounced the adoption.  This was following the Adoption Act  from
1958, which allows the adoption to be pronounced without the consent of the
birth mother “if the refusal does not seem reasonable”49.
In her complaint to the European Court, X maintained that pronouncing
the adoption against her will violated her right to respect for family life under
Article  8.  The  British  Government  argued  that  domestic  remedies  had  not
been exhausted, and that X “should have claimed effective custody of the child
before the judgement ordering the adoption”50. However, the Commission did
not  pay  much  attention  to  this  as  the  application  was  inadmissible  for  a
different reason. Referring to Marckx and  some  other  decisions,  the
Commission reiterated that “the relations between a child born out of wedlock
and its natural parents are covered by the concept of ‘family life’” 51. In the case
at  hand,  X had handed her child over for adoption at  the moment she gave
birth. As the Commission noted, “[b]y virtue of her own decision there was no
family life between herself and her son during the first months”52. When she
desired to take her child back, the possibility had been taken away by a court
decision.
47 X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7626/76, Commission decision of 11 July 1977.
48 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 164-165.
49 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 165
50 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 165
51 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 166.
52 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 166.
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Both in the Adoption Act 1958 of the United Kingdom and Article 10 of the
European Convention on Adoption, supposed to articulate principles common
to the Member States of the Council of Europe, family rights and obligations
are terminated between the birth parents and the child when the adoption is
pronounced. In the case material, the pronounced adoption was characterised
as “a specific act of interference of a particularly serious nature”53. Article 8
does not oblige the State to restore family life when it has been disturbed by
the actions of the persons involved, but it does afford protection against
actions of public authorities that make resuming family life impossible. In the
case  at  hand,  X’s  conduct  had  led  to  the  actions  of  the  public  authorities.
However, according to the case material, it is a “generally accepted principle
in  the  field  of  adoption  [that  it]  must  not  be  ordered  without  the  mother’s
consent”54 and  that  this  consent  could  be  overruled  only  in  exceptional
circumstances determined by law. According to Article 5 (2) of the European
convention on Adoption the mother’s consent cannot be overruled “save on
exceptional  grounds  determined  by  law”  and  the  Adoption  Act  1958  in  the
United Kingdom gave an exhaustive list of such situations, of which one was
the refusal of the mother being “unreasonable”.55
In  the  light  of  these  parameters,  the  Commission  was  faced  with  the
following question:  “After living for two years in its  adopted family was the
child's  interest  in being adopted both from the point of  view of  breaking its
links  with  its  mother  and  that  of  consolidating  its  links  with  the  adopters
already so clear that the adoption should be ordered against the mother's will
thus destroying all possibility of family life between her and the child?”56 It is
mentioned in the case material that the Commission had at its disposal “all the
evidence carefully collected by the court”57. Interestingly, the evidence quoted
“conclusions  reached  by  the  psychiatrists  called  by  both  sides,  all  of  whom
stated  there  was  a  danger  of  short  or  long  term  negative  effects  on  the
development  of  the  child's  personality  if  it  came  back  to  live..  with  its
mother”58. The Commission came to the conclusion that to “protect the health
and  overriding  interests  of  the  child”  it  had  to  hold  up  the  adoption.  The
complaint was declared manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible.59 As
a decision in the ECHR system, X. against the United Kingdom is  an  early
precursor of Kearns v. France, as it confirms the primacy of adoptive relations
once they have been established.
53 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 166.
54 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 166.
55 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 166.
56 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 167.
57 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 167.
58 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 167.
59 X. against the United Kingdom, p. 167-168.
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5.3 NATURE, NURTURE OR STATUS? FATHERS
SEEKING RECOGNITION
Case law concerning the constitution of  fatherhood as a parental  relation in
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  is  vast  if  all  complaints  relating  to
paternity,  right of  access of  fathers to their  children and custody battles are
taken together. In this and the following sub-chapter, I wish to concentrate on
judgements  that  focus  on  how paternity  as  a  legal  relation  is  constituted  in
European  human rights  jurisprudence.  The  first  set  of  cases  dealing  with  a
willingness  and  a  desire  to  establish  a  relation  of  paternal  filiation  are
discussed  in  this  sub-chapter,  and  they  offer  descriptions  of  rather  clear
conflicts of biological paternity against legal paternity. The latter set of cases
discussed in the following sub-chapter (5.4) deal with rejection of paternity by
presumed fathers, established according to a legal assumption or following a
paternity  suit  initiated  by  the  mother  of  the  child  or  the  child  herself.  The
historical shift in the certainty of biological fatherhood due to the emergence
of  genetic  (DNA)  testing  has  in  many  ways  re-structured  the  field  of
constituting paternity. However, as the case law illustrates, paternity cannot
be solely reduced to a genetic tie, as other considerations may play a part as
legal authority reserves the supreme right to decide otherwise. In any case,
DNA  testing  has  in  many  ways  “biologised”  (Machado  2008)  paternity,
perhaps leaving less influence to other considerations which in the absence of
DNA testing have led to also misattributing paternity.
The judgement of Johnston  and others  v.  Ireland from 198660 has been
presented by Meulders-Klein (1996: 492) as a kind of a male counterpart to
the Marckx case, as it establishes the right of the child born outside marriage
to establish maternal and paternal ties with her parents. The applicants were
a cohabiting couple and their child. Mr Johnston got married in 1952. In 1965,
Mr Johnston and his wife began to live in separate parts of the family home.
Mr Johnston had been living with Ms W. for seven years when they had a child
in 1978. According to the case material, Mr Johnston was named as the father
of  the  child  in  the  Register  of  Births.  Mr  and  Mrs  Johnston  were  unable  to
divorce under the Irish legislation in force at the time, but Mr Johnston had
made arrangements to the benefit of Ms W. and their daughter. In front of the
Commission  on  Human  Rights,  Mr  Johnston,  Ms  W.  and  their  child
complained  of  the  “absence  of  provision  in  Ireland  for  divorce  and  for
recognition of family life of persons who, after the breakdown of marriage of
one of them, are living in a family relationship outside marriage”61. The Court
held “unanimously that the legal situation of the third applicant under Irish
law  gives  rise  to  a  violation  of  Article  8  (art.  8)  as  regards  all  three
60 Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, discussed also in Chapter
4.2. The Johnston case is also relevant to the privatisation of dyadic relationships between adults and
Théry’s (1993) démariage thesis, even though it did not recognise a right to divorce per se.
61 Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 38.
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applicants”62. In contrast, it did not find a violation of Article 8 or Article 12
due to the absence of divorce in Irish legislation and the resultant inability of
Mr Johnston and Ms W to marry.63
The inadmissibility decision of B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic
of Germany from 198464 is also closely linked to the Marckx case in relation
to the status of children born outside marriage. The decision shows how the
status of unmarried mothers and fathers was by no means symmetrical. In the
case, R., B. and J., their child, lived together. R., the unmarried father of J.,
complained  that  there  was  no  way  for  him  to  jointly  exercise  the  care  and
custody  of  J.  except  marrying  B.,  the  mother  of  J.  According  to  relevant
legislation at the time (Section 1705 BGB), all other forms of recognising J.,
namely  a  declaration  of  legitimacy  (Ehelicherklärung), adoption or
appointment as guardian (Vormund) meant that the mother lost the right to
care and custody of  the child.  When the applicants argued their  case in the
European Court, they referred to Marckx v. Belgium in their defence:
The applicants point out that in the Marckx judgement, the Court, on
the  one  hand,  recognised  that  support  and  encouragement  of  the
traditional family was in itself legitimate or even praiseworthy, but,
on the other hand, the court underlined that, in the achievement of this
end, recourse must not be had to measures the object or result of which
was to prejudice the “illegitimate” family. In their opinion the freedom
of  the  individual  to  marry  or  not  to  marry  is  curtailed  by  the  legal
situation complained of because, in order to obtain the joint right to
care and custody of his child, an unmarried father has no other choice
than to marry the mother of his child.
B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 138
The  Government  of  the  then  FRG  argued  that  “non-conjugal  partnerships
differ  so  much  from  marriage,  with  its  legal  conditions  and  effects,  that  a
different regulation of the right to care and custody is absolutely necessary”65.
By  this,  the  Government  referred  to  the  presumedly  more  frugal  nature  of
‘non-conjugal partnerships’, i.e. unmarried cohabitation or similar
arrangements. Interestingly, the Government referred to demographic data
from a source it left unidentified: “…the number of non-conjugal partnerships
is  increasing,  but  according  to  studies  so  far  available  on  this  subject,  only
about 26% of these partnerships exist for more than three years, and, in any
event,  their  duration  is  very  rarely  longer  than  half  a  childhood”66. The
62 Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 86.
63 Johnston and others v. Ireland, para 86.
64 B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 9639/82, Commission decision of 15
March 1984.
65 B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 138.
66 B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 137.
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applicants refuted the Government’s claims of demographic developments by
pointing out that “the present legal situation with regard to children born out
of  wedlock  [is  not]  based  on  extensive  examinations  and  research…  the
legislator mainly considered statistics from the statistical yearbook of the
Federal Republic”67. This critique from the applicants is indeed noteworthy, as
in  this  and  other  instances  of  referring  to  extra-legal  scientific  or  academic
knowledge the information referred to is usually rather commonplace, even
superficial68.
When declaring the application inadmissible, the Commission on Human
Rights stated that it
…finds that the special situation of the child born out of wedlock is an
objective and reasonable justification for the German legislator's
decision to confer the right of care and custody with regard to a child
born out of wedlock exclusively to the mother instead of to both
parents, even if they live together. The fact that some States may have
regulated the problem in a different manner does not contradict this
finding, as it is in the national legislator's discretion to choose between
several  possible  solutions  to  a  problem,  as  long  as  the  regulation
chosen respects the obligations undertaken by the ratification of the
Convention.
B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 142
The  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  declared  this  complaint
inadmissible,  leaving  it  to  the  discretion  of  the  Member  State  to  decide
whether the parent-child bond between an unmarried father and child needed
to be recognised. In the decision, the respondent Government argues “…R. is
not  prevented  from  actually  living  together  with  his  child  and  the  child's
mother. The law merely denies him the legal position of a person having the
care  and  custody,  following  the  applicant  R.'s  decision  not  to  formalise  his
relations with the mother”69.The comment of the Commission resonates with
the judgement of X., Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom from 199770, where the
representative of the British Government “pointed out that the applicants were
not restrained in any way from living together as a ‘family’ and they asserted
that the concerns expressed by them were highly theoretical”71.  The  case
concerned a post-transition female-to-male transgender person, his female
partner and their child conceived by artificial insemination. Obviously, the
67 B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 138.
68 On extra-legal knowledge applied in ECHR case law, see discussion of Jolie v. Belgium (this sub-
chapter) and X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (chapter 6.3).
69 B., R. and J. against the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 137.
70 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, no. 21830/93, 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-II.
71 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 46, discussed in Chapter 6.3.
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Governments in ECHR cases need to construct their arguments to defend their
positions, but this has been a form of argument found in several cases indeed 72.
The decision of Jolie v. Belgium from 198673 offers  similar  setting  of
unmarried family life. A child had been born to a woman who was still officially
married  albeit  separated  from  her  husband.  She  sought  a  divorce  and  the
husband brought a case disclaiming paternity of the child which went through.
However, due to Belgian legislation at the time, this left the child as an enfant
adultérin, a child born of an adulterous relationship, and his biological father
was  unable  to  recognise  him  as  he  had  been  born  within  300  days  of  the
divorce,  a  time  limit  that  the  marital  assumption  of  paternity  covered.  The
mother  and  the  biological  father  had  another  child  as  well  born  later,  and
recognising  this  child  born  out  of  an  unmarried  and  not  an  “adulterous”
relationship,  which  was  possible,  would  have  left  the  two  children  in  very
different positions vis-à-vis their biological and social father74. The complaint
was  deemed  admissible  by  the  Commission,  but  was  not  heard  by  the
European Court as a friendly settlement was reached because Belgian
legislation was altered in 1987 to conform to the standards required by the case
of Marckx v. Belgium,  judged  already  in  197975.  What  is  notable  in  the
complaint was the applicants tried to evoke textbook-level anthropological
expertise in order to argue that they form a family:
Related  persons  living  under  one  roof,  and  specifically  a  father,
mother and children, constitute a family in the accepted sense of the
term. According to this definition, the three applicants form a family
based  on  consanguinity  and  thus  on  a  non-marital  union.  The  term
"kinship" covers all those social relationships resulting from
consanguinity or marriage.76
Jolie v. Belgium, Commission decision, p. 253
72 See also Chavdarov v. Bulgaria, paras 49 and 56.
73 Jolie v. Belgium, no. 11418/85, Commission decision 14 May 1986. See also Jolie et Lebrun
contre la Belgique, no. 11418/85, Rapport de la Commission, 8 October 1987 (friendly settlement).
74 Jolie v. Belgium, Commission decision, p. 252-253.
75 Jolie et Lebrun contre la Belgique, no. 11418/85, Rapport de la Commission, 8 October 1987
(friendly settlement).
76 The passage referred to is from an introductory textbook to anthropology: "La parenté est
l’ensemble des relations sociales qui résultent de la consanguinité (réelle ou simplement affirmée), ou
de l’alliance par mariage. On sait, depuis Morgan, que les relations de parenté et les usages qui les
accompagnent obéissent à un ordre interne. C’est pourquoi les anthropologues parlent de systèmes de
parenté. Ces systèmes de parenté sont de nature sociale et non biologique: sont parents dans une
société donnée, ceux qui se considèrent comme tels, que cela coïncide ou non avec la réalité biologique.
Tout se passe comme si l’homme, pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent à lui, avait mis un certain
ordre dans ses relations avec ses semblables, en les classant. Parents, alliés et étrangers sont
départagés" (Colleyn 1979: 63).
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Consanguinity is offered here as the basis of relatedness, together with being
members of the same household. The expert knowledge offered is of a
rudimentary kind, cited from an introductory textbook to social anthropology
(see Colleyn 1979: 63).
Keegan v. Ireland from 199477 is  one of  the clearest  examples and a key
judgement  among the  case  law of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  on
how the position of unmarried fathers has been, in the recent history of some
jurisdictions, much weaker than the unmarried mother such as in Marckx v.
Belgium. In Keegan,  a  man  and  a  woman  had  been  in  a  relationship  and
cohabiting for about a year,  and they agreed to try to have a child together.
They got engaged, too, whilst cohabiting but separated soon after the
engagement. However, later in the same year the woman gave birth to a child.
Whilst  pregnant,  the  woman  arranged  to  give  the  child  up  for  adoption,  of
which  the  father  was  informed  with  a  letter  after  the  birth  of  the  child.
According  to  the  law  in  place  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  at  the  time,  an
unmarried  man  could  be  the  guardian  of  his  child  only  if  the  court  had
appointed him as such. Keegan instituted proceedings to be appointed the
guardian  of  the  child  and  to  obtain  custody78. The first instance court, the
Circuit  Court  decided  in  favour  of  him,  awarding  him  guardianship  and
custody79.
The  mother  of  the  child  and  the  prospective  adoptive  parents  appealed
against  him,  and  the  second  instance,  the  High  Court,  saw  no  reason  for
denying  his  rights  as  a  father.  The  mother  and  the  prospective  adoptive
parents obtained an opinion from the Supreme Court,  the highest  instance,
which  sent  the  case  back  to  the  High  Court.  The  Supreme  Court  judge
interpreted  the  legislation  in  place  to  refer  merely  to  the  possibility  of
obtaining guardianship80. The High Court re-examined the case, and, among
other considerations, heard evidence from an expert witness, “a consultant
child psychiatrist who considered that the child would suffer short-term
trauma if moved to the applicant’s custody. In the longer term she would be
more vulnerable to stress and be less able to cope with it. She would also have
difficulty in forming "trust" relationships”81. By this time, the child was already
more  than  a  year  old  and  had  been  placed  with  the  prospective  adoptive
parents.82
The Supreme Court judge, Justice Barron, reflected on the significance of
issues  related  to  social  class  such  as  the  socio-economic  standing  of  the
adoptive parents and presumed future scholarly achievement of the child as
beneficial factors, but noted that they were not conclusive:
77 Keegan v. Ireland, no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290, paras 6-8.
78 Keegan v. Ireland, paras 6-8.
79 Keegan v. Ireland, para 9.
80 Keegan v. Ireland, paras 10-12.
81 Keegan v. Ireland, para 13.
82 Keegan v. Ireland, paras 6-7.
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…if the child remained with the adopters she would obtain the benefit
of a higher standard of living and would be likely to remain at school
longer. However, [Justice Barron] considered that differences
springing solely from socio-economic causes should not be taken into
account where one of the claimants is a natural parent. In his view "to
do otherwise would be to favour the affluent as against the less well-
off which does not accord with the constitutional obligation to hold all
citizens as human persons equal before the law".
Keegan v. Ireland, para 14
However,  reflecting  on  this  matter  highlights  the  possibility  that  the
prospective  adoptive  parents  were  of  a  different  stratum  of  society  or
otherwise in a disposition that differed from the socio-economic situation of
the father. Justice Barron concluded as follows:
If the child remains where she is, she will if the adoption procedures
are  completed  become  a  member  of  a  family  recognised  by  the
Constitution  and  freed  from  the  danger  of  psychological  trauma
[caused by potential separation from the foster parents]. On the other
hand if she is moved she will not be a member of such a family and in
the short  and long term her future is  likely to be very different.  The
security  of  knowing  herself  to  be  a  member  of  a  loving  and  caring
family would be lost.  If  moved,  she will  I  am sure be a member of  a
loving and caring unit equivalent to a family in her eyes.
Keegan v. Ireland, para 14
Thus, socio-economic standing and presumed scholarly achievement are
reflected  upon  but  dismissed  as  evoking  them  in  the  final  argumentation
would be arguing against the (rather theoretical, it seems) equality before the
law  of  all  Irish  citizens.  However,  the  most  central  argument  in  deciding
between giving both guardianship and custody to a biological parent or foster
parents, not removing the child from the circumstances and the affective
family relations that she had already been able to form was preceded by the
privilege of being able to live and be part of a “family recognised by the [Irish]
Constitution”83.  Here  we  can  see  that  the  definition  of  family  in  the
Constitution of the Republic Ireland, so close to the definition of family in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Chapters 2.1-2.2), has indeed
been  put  to  work  on  the  ground  level  and  not  just  in  theoretico-political
discourse.
In  his  submission  to  the  European  Court,  Keegan  evoked,  Article  8,  and
complained that
…to be consistent with Article 8 (art. 8) the law ought to have conferred
on him a defeasible right to guardianship and, in any competition for
83 See previous quote.
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custody with strangers, there ought to have existed a rebuttable legal
presumption that the child’s  welfare was best  served by being in his
care  and  custody.  He  stressed,  however,  that  he  was  not  seeking  to
overturn the adoption order that had been made in respect of his child.
Keegan v. Ireland, para 46
So,  in  the  European  Court,  Keegan  wished  to  challenge  the  constitutional
impossibility created by the interpretation of the Supreme Court84 of  an
unmarried biological father to have legal standing in the process leading to a
child  being  adopted  by  third  parties.  The  European  Court  wanted  to
distinguish  the  adoption  process  from  the  guardianship  and  custody
proceedings, and argued that the crux of the matter in the case was that the
child was placed for adoption after birth without the knowledge and consent
of the biological father, and that he had no legal standing in how the adoption
proceeded. Thus, as his only recourse was a time-consuming legal process for
guardianship  and  custody,  by  the  end  of  the  process  the  child  had  already
bonded with the prospective adoptive parents taking care of the child.85
The European Court  ruled that  Article  8 and Article  6 (para 1)  had been
violated: Keegan’s right to respect for family life and right to a fair trial had not
been protected. As to the notion of family life, the Court noted that:
For both the applicant and the Commission86, on the other hand, his
links with the child were sufficient to establish family life. They stressed
that  his  daughter  was  the  fruit  of  a  planned  decision  taken  in  the
context of a loving relationship. The Court recalls that the notion of the
"family" in this provision is not confined solely to marriage-based
relationships and may encompass other de facto "family" ties where
the parties are living together outside of marriage… A child born out
of such a relationship is ipso iure part of that "family" unit from the
moment of his birth and by the very fact of it. There thus exists between
the child and his parents a bond amounting to family life even if at the
time of his or her birth the parents are no longer co-habiting or if their
relationship has then ended.
Keegan v. Ireland, paras 43-44
The latter part of this passage has been a widely cited piece of ECHR case law,
placing de facto family ties in the hierarchy of different kinds of family
relations in ECHR case law.
84 Keegan v. Ireland, para 39.
85 Keegan v. Ireland, para 59.
86 ”Commission” refers to the Commission of Human Rights, a screening body that existed in the
ECHR system at the time.
165
The judgement of Kroon and others v. the Netherlands delivered in 199487,
in turn, offers an example of a case where the assumption of paternity within
marriage was in clear contrast with biological and social relations, but with no
legal possibility to re-assign paternity. The complaint was lodged against the
Netherlands  in  1991  by  Kroon,  her  partner  Z.,  and  S.,  a  child  born  of  their
relationship. In 1979, Kroon had married a man called D. The marriage
disintegrated the following year, and Kroon and her husband lost contact.
According  to  official  records,  D.  “left  Amsterdam  in  January  1986  and  his
whereabouts have remained unknown ever since”88. The third applicant, the
child, was born in October 1987 out of the relationship between Kroon and Z.
However, in the register of births he was named as the child of Kroon and D.
Kroon  began  proceedings  to  divorce  D.  one  month  after  S.  was  born.  The
divorce went through unchallenged. Kroon and Z. requested the Amsterdam
registrar in 1988 to enable Z. to recognise him as his son. The registrar refused
the  request.  S.  had  been  born  when Kroon was  still  married  to  D.,  and  the
registrar was unable to fulfil the request of Kroon and Z. under Dutch law if D.
did not return and bring proceedings to deny his paternity of S.
Kroon  and  Z.  filed  a  complaint  in  the  Amsterdam  Regional  Court
complaining that while it was possible for the legal father of a child born in
wedlock to deny his paternity, the mother was not able to deny that her former
husband was the father of her child. The Regional Court refused their request
in 1989, saying that
In spite of the justified wish of Mrs Kroon and Mr [Z.] to have biological
realities officially recognised, their request had to be refused since,
under the law as it stood, [S.] was the legitimate child of Mr [D.]. There
were only limited exceptions to the rule that the husband of the mother
was presumed to be the father of a child born in wedlock.
Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, para 11
After  the  judgement  of  the  Regional  Court,  Kroon  and  Z.  appealed  to  the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which said that Article 8 applied but that there
had been no violation of it. The applicants took the case to the Supreme Court,
which agreed with the Court of Appeal that solving the problem at hand and
developing the law was not within the powers of the judiciary. The European
Court found that “family life” existed between Z. and S., partly because three
other children had been born to Kroon and Z. (whom he had recognised) and
Z. contributed to the upkeep of his children even though the parents did not
live together. The Court found that Article 8 was applicable and that there had
been a violation of Article 8, stating that “in the Court’s opinion, ‘respect’ for
‘family  life’  requires  that  biological  and  social  reality  prevail  over  a  legal
87 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 18535/91, judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no.
297-C.
88 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, para 11.
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presumption which, as in the present case, flies in the face of both established
fact and the wishes of those concerned without actually benefiting anyone”89.
It is perhaps here in Kroon that the dissection of biological, legal and social
relations is most aptly illustrated, and how the marital assumption of paternity
may have far-reaching implications.
In a more recent case of Chavdarov v. Bulgaria from 201090 a man had
entered  into  a  relationship  with  a  woman who was  still  married  to  another
man. The man and the woman had three children together, but the estranged
husband of  the  woman was  named as  the  father  on  the  birth  certificates  of
these  children.  The  mother  left  the  family  when  all  the  children  were  still
underage and the man stayed with the children, residing with them and taking
day-to-day care of them. He consulted a lawyer in order to be able to establish
himself as the legal father of the children, but this was legally impossible apart
from seeking to adopt the children. Compared to all the other cases where the
European Court has strongly argued in favour of the combination of social and
biological relations over merely legal relations, it is peculiar that a violation of
Article 8 was not found in Chavdarov.  Both the Bulgarian Government and
the European Court dwelt on the fact that the mother and her husband had
not opened legal proceedings for the disavowal of paternity. It was also pointed
out by the European Court more than once in the text of the case, in a highly
neutralised  tone,  that  no  one  had  interfered  in  or  laid  obstacles  to  the
biologico-social father and the children living together91. The case shows that
in the context of a biological and social father taking care of his children, the
system might privilege the marital assumption so far that adoption is offered
as a possibility, almost like in Marckx v. Belgium. As to living together with no
interference,  the same kind of  rhetoric  surfaces in the argumentation of  the
British Government in X,  Y  and  Z  v.  the  United  Kingdom92. In both cases,
individuals sharing close personal relations were free to live together as they
pleased according to their Governments, and the European Court did not, due
to  technical  and  legal  obstacles,  grasp  the  opportunity  to  amend  the  legal
relations in question to correspond to social reality.
5.4 REJECTION OF PATERNITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
DNA TESTING
Fatherhood  is  not  always  a  desired  state  of  affairs.  There  is  a  wealth  of
judgements and decisions in the case law of  the European Court  of  Human
89 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, para 40.
90 Chavdarov v. Bulgaria, no. 3465/03, 21 December 2010.
91 Chavdarov v. Bulgaria, paras 49 and 56.
92 See X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 46: “The Government pointed out that the
applicants were not restrained in any way from living together as a "family" and they asserted that the
concerns expressed by them were highly theoretical”.
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Rights  where  presumed  and  probable  fathers  avoid  the  law,  or  use  the
possibilities that law offers to undo paternity attributed through marriage,
recognition  or  a  court  decision.  In  the  case  of  maternity,  the  rejection  of
motherhood is structured differently than in paternity, but as the practice of
anonymous  birth  demonstrates,  the  identity  of  the  birth  mother  may  be
effectively concealed with the help of the state. The judgement of Rasmussen
v. Denmark from 198493 is an important judgement in weighing the concept
of equality between men and women in the attribution of filiation. In the case,
a  husband  and  wife  who  had  two  children,  divorced.  The  man  had  doubts
about  whether  he  was  the  father  of  the  younger  child,  but  did  not  try  to
institute paternity proceedings within the time-limit set by Danish law at the
time  due  to  an  agreement  with  his  ex-wife  that  she  would  waive  rights  to
maintenance and he would refrain from a legal case rebutting his paternity of
the younger child.
In the European Court, he
… complained of the fact that… his right to contest his paternity of a
child born during the marriage was subject to time-limits, whereas his
former wife was entitled to institute paternity proceedings at any time.
He alleged that he had been the victim of discrimination on the ground
of sex, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction
with Article  6 (art.  14+6) (right to a fair trial,  including the right of
access  to  court)  and  with  Article  8  (art.  14+8)  (right  to  respect  for
private and family life).
Rasmussen v. Denmark, para 27
The  European  Court  found  no  violation  of  these  Articles,  as  it  left  a  wide
margin of appreciation to the Danish Government. The Court argued that the
existence of time limits for opening paternity proceedings could be backed up
with the need to support legal certainty and to safeguard the interests of the
child  in  question.  Denmark  was  in  no  way  an  exception  in  this  regard
compared to other Member States of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, it
was elaborated by the European Court that the time limits benefited the wives
because  a  mother’s  interests  often  coincided  with  the  interests  of  the  child,
women  ending  up  as  the  custodians  in  most  situations  of  separation  or
divorce.94 However, the existence of strict time-bars has since been
condemned by the European Court, for example, in the case fathers rejecting
maritally attributed paternity such as in Mizzi v. Malta95 as well as in many
judgements concerning the right of children seeking knowledge of their
paternity.
93 Rasmussen v. Denmark, no. 8777/79, 28 November 1984, Series A no. 87.
94 Rasmussen v. Denmark, para 41.
95 Mizzi v. Malta, no. 26111/02, ECHR-2006 (extracts), para 10.
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Shofman v. Russia from 200696 concerned a situation in many ways like
Rasmussen, but the father only became aware of the possibility that the child
born in wedlock might not be his biological child at the time of divorce when
the time-limit for contesting paternity had run out. DNA testing offered proof
that he was not the father of the child. The European Court found a violation
in this case, arguing that
According  to  the  Court’s  case-law,  the  situation  in  which  a  legal
presumption is allowed to prevail over biological and social reality,
without regard to both established facts and the wishes of those
concerned and without actually benefiting anyone, is not compatible,
even having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the State, with
the obligation to secure effective “respect” for private and family life...
The Court considers that the fact that the applicant was prevented
from disclaiming paternity because he did not discover that he might
not  be  the  father  until  more  than  a  year  after  he  learnt  of  the
registration of the birth was not proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued. It follows that a fair balance has not been struck between the
general  interest  of  the  protection  of  legal  certainty  of  family
relationships and the applicant’s right to have the legal presumption
of his paternity reviewed in the light of the biological evidence.
Shofman v. Russia, paras 44-45
Thus,  the  existence  of  the  possibility  of  finding  genetic  evidence  made  a
difference and should have been given a chance,  even though the child had
been benefiting of a paternal relationship. In a concurring opinion in the case
material, Judge Lorenzen of the European Court reminds that
The  assessment  of  to  what  extent  and  under  what  conditions  a
registered  paternity  may  be  contested  is  very  difficult  involving  a
number of conflicting interests. Thus the “biological reality” is only one
of them, and it may in the circumstances of a given case be outweighed
by  for  instance  the  interests  of  the  child,  the  child’s  mother  or  the
society in preserving the stability of the legal status of persons...
Shofman v. Russia, concurring opinion of Judge Lorenzen
The judgement of Mizzi v. Malta from 200697 involved the case of a man who
claimed  the  assumption  of  fatherhood  within  marriage  had  worked  against
him, as he suspected and later confirmed that he was not the father of a child
born to his  wife when he was still  married to her.  The complaint  was made
against the state of Malta in 2002 when Mizzi was in his sixties and his
presumed daughter was an adult. Four years after getting married Mizzi and
his wife ceased to live together. Four months later X gave birth to Y. Mizzi had
96 Shofman v. Russia, no. 74826/01, 24 November 2005.
97 Mizzi v. Malta, no. 26111/02, ECHR-2006 (extracts), para 10
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suspicions that Y might not be his child and wanted to carry out blood tests. X
refused to have a blood test carried out, which intensified Mizzi’s suspicions
that he was not Y’s biological father. However, a test would not have been of
much help as Maltese law at the time did not allow a man in his circumstances
to challenge the legal assumption of fatherhood. He was registered as the legal
father under the assumption that he was Y’s biological father. Mizzi and his
wife soon separated legally and a few years later the marriage was annulled by
the  Vatican.  Y  contacted  him after  1993  and  said  she  wanted  to  carry  out  a
blood test. Tests were carried out in Switzerland and they proved that Mizzi
was not Y’s biological father. Mizzi began a legal process in 1996 in the Civil
Court  in  order  to  establish  that  he  had  a  right  to  bring  action  in  order  to
disavow his paternity of Y98.
As Mizzi and his wife had been cohabiting at the time when Y was conceived
and he had been aware of  her birth,  he could not have challenged the legal
assumption of fatherhood under relevant Maltese law at the time. The Maltese
Civil Code in force in 1967 allowed the paternity of a child born in wedlock to
be challenged if cohabitation by the couple at the time of conception had been
physically  impossible,  if  they had been legally  separated,  or  if  the birth had
been concealed from the husband, when he was allowed to repudiate the child
on  the  basis  of  adultery.  The  Civil  Code  was  amended  in  1993,  after  which
adultery  was  an  accepted  reason  for  a  husband  to  repudiate  a  child  if  he
produced  further  evidence,  such  as  scientific  tests,  and  acted  within  six
months of the birth99. In the European Court, Mizzi complained that the legal
presumption of him being the father of the child violated his rights to respect
for  private  and  family  life  under  Article  8  of  the  ECHR.  In  addition,  he
complained about the absence of a possibility to challenge his paternity earlier
within the Maltese legal system. In its final judgement, the Court concluded
that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article
8.
Legal time-bars for establishing paternity were the bone of contention in a
number of judgements given concerning Finland in 2010100 and 2013101. From
the 1920s onwards, Finnish paternity legislation allowed recognition of
paternity by the father for children born out of wedlock, but paternity could
not be established if the presumed father was against it. In 1975, new paternity
legislation was enacted in order to ameliorate the legal status of children born
out of wedlock. However, strict time limits were instituted so that children
born before the entry into force of the Act on 1 October 1976 had to institute
paternity proceedings within five years of this date, after that they were not
98 Mizzi v. Malta, paras 9-14.
99 Mizzi v. Malta, paras 15-27.
100 Grönmark v. Finland, no. 17038/04, 6 July 2010, Backlund v. Finland, no. 36498/05, 6 July
2010.
101 Laakso v. Finland, no. 7361/05, §15 January 2013, Röman v. Finland, no. 13072/05, 29
January 2013.
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covered  by  the  legislation.  Also,  if  the  presumed father  was  dead,  paternity
proceedings could not be instituted by the presumed child. The European
Court  eventually  declared  this  rigid  time-limit  as  a  violation  of  Article  8  in
Grönmark v. Finland and Backlund v. Finland,  decided on the same day in
2010102.  This  was  a  considerable  step  in  protecting  the  right  to  identifying
information on one’s origins and for equality between persons born in and out
of wedlock. Several complaints were taken as far as the ECHR as many persons
in Finland were affected by this legislation and often these cases involved
financial interests in possibly inheriting the presumed fathers.
Mikulić v. Croatia from 2002103 is  often  cited  in  legal  literature  as  an
important case in the area of attributing paternity. Its main import was in the
ineffectiveness of the Croatian authorities to procedurally determine the
paternity: the putative father was unwilling to cooperate, and failed to attend
court sessions and DNA testing opportunities on several occasions. In the end,
his unwillingness to submit himself to a DNA test was taken as a sign of his
probable  genetic  paternity.  In  the  judgement  of A.M.M. v. Romania from
2012104 as well a violation of Article 8 was found as the Romanian authorities
in question had acted ineffectively in order to carry out the judicial procedure
concerning a child’s right to have her paternity established. The problems in
the case arose from the lack of sufficient proof to actually determine the
paternity, but the main crux of the matter was that the right and the interest
of the child to know her origins was not protected well enough by the domestic
authorities as the presumed father was not pursued effectively enough to
conclude on the matter.  The description of  possible forms of  proof  paints a
picture  of  the  variety  of  proof  that  may  be  produced  to  support  a  paternity
claim in the jurisdiction in question, Romania: testimonials, documents, the
testimonial of the defendant party to the paternity claim, presumption and
scientific proof105.
In Jäggi v. Switzerland from 2006106 the applicant was a person in his 60s
who wished to have his putative father’s physical remains disinterred from a
grave in order to carry out a DNA test. He complained to the European Court
that the refusal of the Swiss authorities to allow this constituted a violation of
Article 8, arguing that “the right to know one’s parentage lay at the heart of the
right to respect for private life”107. It was specifically asserted in the case that
”the proceedings brought by the applicant were intended solely to establish the
102 Grönmark v. Finland and Backlund v. Finland.
103 Mikulić v. Croatia, no. 53176/99, ECHR 2002-I.
104 A.M.M. v. Romania, no. 2151/10, 14 February 2012.
105 A.M.M. v. Romania, para 49
106 Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, ECHR 2006-X. The issue of wishing to discover one’s
genetic paternity at a later age has also surfaced in Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, no. 23890/02, 20
December 2007, Brauer v. Germany, no. 3545/04, 28 May 2009 and Pascaud v. France, no.
19535/08, 16 June 2011.
107 Jäggi v. Switzerland, para 23.
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biological  ties  between  him  and  his  putative  father  and  did  not  in  any  way
concern his inheritance rights”108. At the European Court, he complained that
he had suffered a violation under Article 8 pertaining to his private life and
that there had also been a violation of Article 14 in taken in conjunction with
Article  8:  this  meant  that  he  argued  that  he  ”had  been  subjected  to
discrimination  that  had  not  been  based  on  objective  grounds  in  that  the
Federal Court had taken into account his state of health and advanced age as
reasons for justifying the refusal to perform a DNA test”109 on the remains of
a deceased man who was presumed to be his biological father. In its reasoning,
the Court came to the conclusion that Article 8 had been violated. It argued
that
Although it is true that, as the Federal Court observed in its judgement,
the applicant, now aged 67, has been able to develop his personality
even  in  the  absence  of  certainty  as  to  the  identity  of  his  biological
father, it must be admitted that an individual’s interest in discovering
his parentage does not disappear with age, quite the reverse.
Moreover, the applicant has shown a genuine interest in ascertaining
his  father’s  identity,  since  he  has  tried  throughout  his  life  to  obtain
conclusive information on the subject. Such conduct implies mental
and  psychological  suffering,  even  if  this  has  not  been  medically
attested.
Jäggi v. Switzerland, para 40
The European Court also touched upon the fact that the remains would have
been exhumed in a certain number of years as the lease on the grave was going
to expire and that it was the applicant who had succeeded in renewing the lease
of the grave. The outcome of the case goes to show that the European Court
has attached great weight to the right to know one’s origins, as in this case such
a  right  was  deemed  more  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  Convention
rights  than  the  right  of  the  recognised  and  official  close  relatives  of  the
deceased person to leave his grave untouched.
In Kalacheva v. Russia from 2009110 the  applicant  was  the  mother  of  a
child who had been born from a concealed relationship with a married man,
A. After a court order, DNA evidence was obtained and said to prove that A.
was  the  genetic  father  of  Kalacheva’s  daughter  born  in  2003.  Due  to
procedural shortcomings in the taking of the blood test, A. was able to dispute
the validity of the samples taken111.  The  shortcomings  in  the  signatures
attached to the samples were described by the Government:
108 Jäggi v. Switzerland, para 26.
109 Jäggi v. Switzerland, para 48.
110 Kalacheva v. Russia, no. 3451/05, 7 May 2009.
111 Kalacheva v. Russia, paras 5-12.
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Blood sampling was conducted on… in the presence of the parties, their
lawyers and four medical  workers,  including a person who took the
samples. However, there were only two signatures on the envelopes
with the samples instead of the three required; furthermore, these
signatures were not decoded as there were no names or positions next
to them.
Kalacheva v. Russia, para 24
Due to these shortcomings in the samples taken by the local public bureau of
forensic medical examinations, the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan
dismissed the evidence produced112. According to Russian law, it was the court
which  should  have  ordered  a  second  DNA  examination,  but  the  domestic
courts failed to do so113. The European Court found a violation of Article 8. The
European Court reasoned that
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that today a DNA test is the
only scientific method of determining accurately the paternity of the
child in question; and its probative value substantially outweighs any
other evidence presented by the parties to prove or disprove the fact of
an intimate relationship. Furthermore, the applicant suggested that
she  and  the  defendant  had  concealed  their  relationship;  hence  the
genetic examination could have been the only persuasive evidence of
the disputed paternity.
Kalacheva v. Russia, para 34
Thus, the importance of DNA testing is acknowledged when the matter at hand
specifically  concerns  the  establishment  of  paternity  as  a  biological
relationship.  Even  though  the  applicant  was  the  mother  of  the  child,  the
interests  of  the  child  in  establishing  her  paternity  should  have  made  the
domestic courts order a second DNA test after dismissing the first one due to
the argumentation of A., the presumed father. The judgement of the European
Court offers both legal argumentation in favour of establishing a child’s origin
and  the  interests  of  the  mother  against  the  proceduro-legal  stance  of  the
presumed father and the judicial system that did not effectively seek to find an
answer to the questions posed in the case.
Scientific methods providing unconclusive results such as comparing blood
groups  before  the  advent  of  DNA  testing  sometimes  played  a  part  in
misattributing  paternity  from a  genetic  point  of  view.  Such  was  the  case  of
Ostace v. Romania114 from 2014 where a legal father had been unable to re-
open a case of judicially attributed paternity, judged in the early 1980s when
DNA testing was not available. Due to DNA evidence obtained when the child
112 Kalacheva v. Russia, paras 9-11.
113 Kalacheva v. Russia, para 36.
114 Ostace v. Romania, no. 12547/06, 25 February 2014.
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was an adult and cooperated with his father in the testing process, the genetic
relation  between  them was  disproven.  In  the  judgement  of Tavli v. Turkey
from 2006115 a man had been barred from reopening a case of misattributed
paternity  as  the  Turkish  courts  did  not  regard  the  later  emergence  of  DNA
testing that would have counted as a force majeure for not having this proof
at hand in 1982. The paternity had been attributed to him by a court in 1982
due to blood group testing that showed that he could be the father, because he
and his fiancée had lived together before getting married and because the child
was born in wedlock. In 1997, DNA testing proved that he was not the genetic
father of the child in question. In the judgement, the European Court found a
violation of Article 8, noting that
….  the  fact  that  the  applicant  was  prevented  from  disclaiming
paternity,  because  scientific  progress  was  not  considered  to  be  a
condition for retrial… was not proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued. It follows that a fair balance has not been struck between the
general  interest  of  the  protection  of  legal  certainty  of  family
relationships and the applicant's right to have the legal presumption
of his paternity reviewed in the light of the biological evidence… The
Court is of the opinion that domestic courts should interpret the
existing legislation in light of scientific progress and the social
repercussions that follow.
Tavlı v. Turkey, para 36
Likewise, in the judgement of Iyilik v. Turkey from 2011116, a Turkish man was
not given the possibility to re-open a case of paternity assumed on the basis of
marriage where the disavowal of paternity involved blood-group testing in the
1960s. The difference to Tavli was that the applicant in Iyilik wanted his adult
daughter  to  be  obliged  to  undertake  a  DNA  test  so  that  he  could  find  out
whether or not she was his daughter. It is noted in the case material that he
expressly wanted to establish this  as he was writing up his  will  and did not
want a genetically unrelated person to inherit him. The European Court did
not find a violation of Article 8 and noted that despite the emergence of DNA
testing  and  the  possibility  to  obtain  genetic  proof  on  paternity,  it  had  been
established in ECHR case law that  in order to protect  third parties,  such as
children benefiting from a long-lasting relation of legal filiation, they could not
be forced to undertake medical tests such as DNA tests117.
115 Tavlı v. Turkey, no. 11449/02, 9 November 2006.
116 İyilik v. Turkey, no. 2899/05, 6 December 2011.
117 İyilik v. Turkey, para 33.
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5.5 DISCUSSION: MATERNITY, PATERNITY AND
INCOMMENSURABILITY
’A new order of the European family’ needs to be established around
the  child,  with  due  respect  for  the  rights  of  parents.  The  European
Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on the
rights of the Child provide the framework for this. Biological
parentage of a child should, under normal circumstances, go hand in
hand with social and legal parentage. These three factors should only
be  divorced,  in  practical  terms,  if  one  of  the  parents  has  failed,  or
voluntarily consented to the child’s adoption. In short, the joint
responsibility of the true parents of the child should be favoured by the
legal  and  social  systems  whenever  possible,  even  in  the  event  of
separation  or  divorce,  and  even  where  a  new ’re-grouped’  family  is
formed.
M.-T. Meulders-Klein (1996: 520)
The maternity cases discussed in this chapter are the very few and important
judgements in the case law of the European Court regarding the constitution
and the rejection of maternal filiation. Marckx v. Belgium from 1979 acts as a
starting point for the empirical analysis of parental relations of consanguinity
and filiation in this study, as it demonstrates that not even maternity comes
into existence without a pre-existing legal framework and an accepted political
and legal consensus, and for this principle to be regarded as a human rights
norm there has to be consensus between States, for example, in the form on
intergovernmental  treaties.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  articulation  of
human rights in the context of parent-child relations it is a seminal case as it
places  children  born  within  and  outside  marriage  on  an  equal  footing  with
regard to maternal filiation. In Marckx v. Belgium it  was also stressed that
different forms of family should be legally recognised. In many ways, Marckx
illustrates the idea of the ‘core family’ of a mother and child(ren) as seen by
Fineman, who argues that “the mother-child formation would be the ‘natural’
or core family unit – it would be the base entity around which social policy and
legal  rules  are  fashioned”  (1995:  5-6).  Fineman’s  argument  is  based  in  the
Anglo-American political context of single mothers as a ‘deviant’ category, but
this notion is useful also when applied to the legacy of Marckx v. Belgium and
the bundle of relations that a child’s parentage is built on.
The case of Marckx does  not  touch  upon the  paternity  of  the  child  so  it
engages  only  with  certain  issues,  but  in  illustrating  the  historical  need  to
recognise the capacity of birth mothers to be able to assume parenthood over
their children it is vital. The essential outcome of the case, from the normative
point of view, is that the marital status of the mother of a child must not act as
an impediment to the establishment of officially sanctioned relations between
a child – and her wider family and network of relatives through the mother.
Even though most legal systems in Europe have for long been favourable to
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assuming  an  incontestable  bond  between  a  birth  mother  and  the  child  she
gives birth to, the Marckx judgement demonstrates that even this bond is not
self-evident or somehow outside the realm of administrative formalities. The
case  illustrates  the  meaning  of  legal  fictions  and  rules,  acts  of  formal
recognition  and  the  power  of  law  in  the  making  of  maternity  and  officially
recognised mother-child relations. To take the argument to the extreme, one
could say that in the realm of parentage, nothing follows merely on the basis
of nature.
Marckx acts as a prime example of how, from a sociological point of view,
a biological and physical event such as the birth of a child is not enough to form
a recognised bond within the society in question unless there are social and
legal structures in place making this possible. Nedelsky’s perspective (see
Chapter 3.3) is also neatly applicable to Marckx: by restructuring, or in this
case simplifying, the legal relation of a mother’s entitlement to a child and a
child’s  entitlement  to  her  mother,  a  child  otherwise  in  the  situation  of  a
foundling was able to have a full legal parent by the virtue of being born to her
and not just through a cumbersome and possibly humiliating adoption process
between two consanguineous persons connected corporeally and immediately
by  the  fact  of  birth.  The  core  value  here  could  be  called  equality  between
children  born  in  and  out  of  wedlock  and  between  married  and  unmarried
mothers.  This  could  be  characterised  as  a  relational  right  of  offering
motherhood special protection in the spirit of the social protection offered by
Article 25(2) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights118 in order to protect
the well-being of the mother, the child and the bond that they already share
due to genetic similitude, gestation and the intention of the mother.
Whereas Marckx was in many ways a story with a happy ending, the cases
described  in  the  second sub-chapter  offer  a  description  of  the  other  side  of
rejected maternity: possible ambivalence on the part of the birth mother
concerning giving the child away,  and the perennial  problem of  the right to
know one’s origins. Odièvre v. France, Kearns v. France and X. v. the United
Kingdom illustrate situations where a birth mother wants renounce her rights
to the child she has given birth to, but also the problems following from these
practices: in Odièvre, the ‘right to know’ of the child given for adoption as a
result of anonymous birth, and in Kearns and X., the problems associated with
the desire to reverse the renouncement of maternity. In both cases, the relation
between  the  adoptive  parents  and  the  adopted  child  is  what  prevails  as  the
most protected form of family life.
Expecting mothers are given the possibility to benefit from the mater
semper certa est principle, but if they opt out of it and do not claim the child
back in the period granted to them by law, the State places the child in the
hands of adoptive parents and makes them the legally recognised parents of
the child. In the French context of anonymous birth, the privacy and secrecy
118 “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born
in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.”
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of persons involved in is heavily protected. As the relation between the mother
and the child was never affirmed, there is nothing that would link a person like
Odièvre to her biological mother, or to her biological siblings with whom she
wanted  to  establish  links  in  search  of  her  identity.  In Kearns, the mother
claimed that she did not have a correct impression about the period of time
within which she could claim her child back,  and thus tried to convince the
French courts that her consent to giving the child up for adoption should be
concerned invalid. In her case the legal relation between the child and her
adoptive parents had already been established. In both Odièvre and Kearns,
the  principle  of  not  overturning  administrative  decisions  is  given  great
importance. What Law has joined together, mere mortals must never separate.
Johnston, B., R. and J. and Keegan all illustrate the difficulties that have
been in place in different European jurisdictions concerning the recognition of
the  potential  for  full  parental  subjectivity  on  unmarried  men.  Much  in  the
same way as Marckx, they highlight the importance of recognising the
potential  of  both  unmarried  men  and  women  as  relationally  embedded
individuals  regardless  of  their  legal  status.  All  these  complaints  show  the
importance  that  status,  in  this  case  being  an  unmarried  adult,  has  had  in
defining  the  possibility  of  becoming  a  legal  parent  to  one’s  child.  Biological
parentage, maternity or paternity, was not under dispute in any of these cases,
but  the  message  was  that  without  the  legal  protection  and  standing  that
marriage could give, it could be both women or men who were not seen as full
parental subjects. The effect, of course, was that children were left with less
protection and privileges, such as rights to be acknowledged as the immediate
relative of one’s mother, father or child or effects relating to the transmission
of property.
As can be seen in Odièvre, Godelli and several paternity cases119 described
above, the desire to discover more about one’s biological origins might be even
more accentuated in adult age than when younger, as the European Court has
noted in Jäggi v. Switzerland:  “it  must  be  admitted  that  an  individual’s
interest  in discovering his  parentage does not disappear with age,  quite the
reverse”120.  In  many  of  the  paternity  cases,  the  European  Court  has  offered
strong protection to the right to know one’s biological parentage and origins,
but as seen in Odièvre, the legacy of the Napoleonic Code that has judged the
conditionality  of  women  as  full  parental  subjects  leaves  children  with  little
possibilities to find out enough to satisfy the will to know one’s origins. From
Nedelsky’s perspective of restructuring relations through rights to protect the
value of knowing one’s origins, the solution might be further accentuating the
interest of the child over the interest of the parent to remain anonymous, as
for  example  several  civil  society  groups  and  organisation  in  France  have
advocated (see Ensellem 2004).
119 Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, ECHR 2006-X, Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, no. 23890/02, 20
December 2007, Pascaud v. France, no. 19535/08, 16 June 2011.
120 See Jäggi v. Switzerland, para 40.
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Iacub  argues  that  in  the  process  of  making  all  children  equal  in  their
relations  to  their  parents,  the  maternal  womb  has  replaced  Napoleonic
marriage as the “ideal institutional matrix” (2004: 333)121 and that instead of
enhancing liberty and equality, the limits of constraint and inequality have
merely assumed new forms of appearance. According to Iacub, the womb is no
less  arbitrary  than  marriage  in  demarcating  the  line  between  ‘true’  and
‘fictitious’ filiation: according to her, moralism concerning the family has not
disappeared; it has just changed location (2004: 335). Taking the maternal
womb as the point of reference in determining filiation has not made men and
women equal  in matters of  procreation.  Iacub argues in several  passages of
L’Empire du ventre that in the current system of positive and negative rights
of procreation women have become the “sole masters of procreation”122 (2004:
338)  –  women have  the  ultimate  right  to  decide,  once  pregnant,  whether  a
child will be born or not, and whether they will keep the child or give it away
for  adoption,  regardless  of  whether  anonymous  birth  is  available  in  a  given
jurisdiction or not. Furthermore, Iacub argues that the former inequalities
between married and unmarried women have been replaced with inequalities
between fertile and infertile women.
Iacub presents interesting points, but in her ultra-liberal ethos she seems
to dismiss some important points of consideration. In her argumentation,
Iacub presents a sharp division between ‘real’  and ‘fictitious’  filiation which
does not seem to hold: she contrasts mothers who have given birth and become
‘real’ mothers in the spirit of mater semper certa est and mothers who have
resorted to ‘fictitious’ forms of creating ties of filiation through adoption or
surrogacy  arrangements.  Her  criticism  of  this  divide  misses  its  target,  as
adoption  as  a  legally  created  and  confirmed  relation  does  not  seem  to  be
threatened by a stamp of ‘fictitious’ filiation. Judging by the relevant case law
from the European Court, adoptive family relations, and legal relations within
them  in  particular,  emerge  as  the  most  valued  form  of  family  relations  in
situations of conflict. In Iacub’s utopia of reproduction, origins would have no
importance (2004: 350). However, in real life, as for example relevant ECHR
case law shows,  origins matter to many people and they are willing to go to
great  lengths to find out more about them. Their  experiences should not be
overlooked, regardless of the reasons they have for an interest in knowing their
origins,  as  not  all  act  with  a  motivation  related  to  financial  gain,  as  the
genealogical  and  “symbolic”  relations  discovered  this  way  seem  to  be  of
importance. The question then is, how to construct a system where biological,
legal, social and gendered relations would be in balance?
Iacub  champions  a  logic  of décisions procreatives, procreative decisions
(2004: 352) where both men and women would be able to reject parenthood.
121 ”En prétendant égaliser le statut de tous les enfants vis-à-vis de leurs parents, on a substitué au
mariage napoléonien, en tant que matrice institutionnelle idéale, le ventre maternel” (Iacub 2004:
333).
122 “… seules maîtresses de procreation”.
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If a child is born who is unwanted by one or both the consanguineous parents,
a man has the possibility of avoiding fatherhood on the level of social relations
and everyday life. However, in the legal realm this does not really exist: if he is
pursued  as  the  father  of  a  child,  he  does  not  really  have  an  option  of  not
becoming a father except when it can be proven that he is not the man to be
sought. Machado (2008) has offered an analysis of the practise of Portuguese
courts where, in her terms, maternity has been subject to being ‘moralised’ and
paternity to being ‘biologised’. This ties in with the debate on the importance
of  knowing  one’s  origins,  but  this  might  call  for  further  distinction  on  the
elements of ‘biologised’ paternity. Undoubtedly, with the advent of scientific
proof  in  finding  out  who  is  genetically  related  to  whom,  in  many  cases  the
simple and uncontestable scientific ‘truth’ may be found out. But is the focus
too  much  on  mere  genetics,  what  about  the  other  aspects  of  ‘biological
relations’ or consanguinity? Does it count who has been intimately involved
with  the  mother  at  the  time  of  conception,  or  who  has  shared  the  mother’s
everyday life when she has been expecting the child?
Genetic relations offer an important, but by far not the only aspect of
biological or consanguineous relations understood in a more comprehensive
manner. DNA testing offers the possibility for finding out genetic truth, but it
is not decisive in determining the existence of a legal relation between a father
and a child: if enough time has passed and the child has been able to benefit
from a lasting relation with a legally and socially attributed father, that is then
what the relation between a father and a child rests on. Thus, a genetic relation
as  a  marker  of  consanguinity  lays  the  ground  for  establishing  or  de-
establishing filiation when the foundations for this relation are still being laid.
The importance given to different forms of relatedness by different parties
counts,  too:  a  child,  even  as  an  adult,  cannot  be  obliged  to  undergo  DNA
testing, there has to be a joint interest in establishing the genetic truth between
the father and the child. From a Nedelskyan viewpoint, scientific proof may
help in restructuring relations in the form of offering information on one’s
origins, which may still be completely separate to establishing legal relations
with a person with whom one shares genetic substance.
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6 FILIATION: ADOPTION AND ASSISTED
PROCREATION
Becoming nomadic unfolds by constructing communities where the
notion of transcience, of passing, is acknowledged in a sober secular
manner that binds us to the multiple “others” in a vital web of complex
inter-relation. Kinship systems and social bonding, like political
agency, can be rethought differently and differentially, moving away
from  the  blood,  earth  and  origin  of  the  classical  social  contract.  A
nomadic politics of becoming-minoritarian is a posthumanist, vitalist,
nonunitarian, and yet accountable recomposition of a missing people.
Rosi Braidotti (2012: xvii)
In  this  chapter,  relevant  case  law  from  the  European  Court  concerning
adoption and assisted reproduction is analysed in order to see who may adopt
and what kind of different forms of adoption take place, who may have access
to assisted reproduction and/or the use of donated gametes and what kind of
implications these types of family formation have on how family relations are
seen  in  a  European  culture  of  human  rights.  Adoption  and  assisted
reproduction  are  modes  of  creating  family  relations  which  both  give  rise  to
fervent debate on who is  entitled to benefit  from these practices in order to
become a parent. Who, a couple or an individual, may adopt a child and create
a legal relationship with her/him and in what kind of circumstances? Who may
obtain access to assisted reproduction services, be they State-subsidised or
not? What can and cannot be done with sperm, ova, embryos and wombs in
assisted reproduction?
There is a variety of cases in the case law of the European Court that touch
upon adoption in different forms. Apart from its social, everyday nature,
adoption is a legal relation par excellence.  Adoption takes many forms: full
adoption or second-parent adoption by a married opposite-sex couple, which
is  the  norm  shared  and  held  dear  across  Member  States  of  the  Council  of
Europe. Depending on the legislation in place in a given State, adoption may
be  open  to  cohabiting  couples,  second-parent  adoption  and  either  of  these
might be open to opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples or both. As noted by
the 19th century scholar Henry Maine (1861), cited by David Schneider (1987:
172),  adoption  is  an  age-old,  even  ancient  mode  of  constructing  legally  and
socially binding family relations in the absence of a genetic link. It does not
always concern a married opposite-sex couple adopting a child they have not
known beforehand. Adoption may take place within a household when a step-
parent wishes to adopt his or her spouse’s or partner’s child (second-parent
adoption), by a single person or within an extended family.
In  the  first  two  sub-chapters,  I  analyse  who  may  adopt  within  and
according  to  the  law  of  a  certain  State,  under  what  conditions  and  to  what
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extent  these  claims  can  be  addressed  as  human  rights  issues.  Some  of  the
judgements  and  decisions  discussed  in  this  chapter  might  involve
international  adoption,  but  the  focus  is  on  the  characteristics  and  the
evaluation of the potential adoptive parental subject and what kind of relations
s/he is allowed to create. Complaints to the European Court dealing with the
right to bring an internationally adopted child over a border1 might be related
to judgements discussed in this chapter, but they remain outside the scope of
this  analysis.  A  number  of  complaints  may  be  found  in  the  ECHR  system
relating to adoption or fostering within an extended family, for example
between aunts or uncles and nieces or nephews2. Second-parent adoption
forms an intriguing field of analysis that has been under recent scrutiny in the
European Court of Human Rights especially from the point of view of same-
sex couples, namely female couples. In the Grand Chamber judgement of X.
and others v. Austria from 20133 and  the  judgement  of Gas and Dubois v.
France from 20124, the key cases in this sections, this was the case, albeit with
a  rather  different  set  of  facts  in  the  two  cases.  Obviously,  second-parent
adoption may be sought and takes place in a variety of contexts in which the
availability of gender-neutral marriage is not the crux of the matter. The case
of Emonet v. Switzerland from 20075 acts as an example of that.
Assisted reproduction, on the other hand, is often an extension of coital
reproduction if gametes of the opposite-sex couple in question are used. The
cases discussed in the last two sub-chapters concern the principles of assisted
reproduction: whose cells may be used in the production of new individuals
and the relations around them? How about embryos produced in the process
of in vitro fertilisation,  how  may  they  be  used?  And  if  children  are  born
through surrogacy arrangements, what are the legal and administrative risks
related to such a process? The donation of sperm and eggs for the purposes of
assisted reproduction give rise to heated debates and a variety of legislative
outcomes. The use of the couple’s own cells is usually seen as least
problematic,  but  often  donated  sperm  or  eggs  might  be  needed  in  order  to
succeed in these treatments. The use of donated sperm has been practiced or
tolerated more often than the use of donated eggs, which seems to be the most
difficult  question  and  remains  illegal  in  many  European  states,  too.
1 See Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, 28 June 2007, Pini and Others v.
Romania, nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, ECHR 2004-V (extracts).
2 In some cases this is kafala, the Muslim equivalent of fostering/adoption, falling somewhat in
between these two categories. However, as these complaints concern crossing borders on the basis of
an existing or a disputed family relation, they fall outside the scope of this study, as international
adoption, immigration, deportation and family reunification have been left out of the data (see Chapter
3.3). See judgement of Chbihi Loudoudi and Others v. Belgium, no. 52265/10, 16 December 2014 (not
in data).
3 X and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 19010/07, ECHR 2013.
4 Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, ECHR 2012.
5 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, no. 39051/03, 13 December 2007.
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Furthermore, the use of embryos fertilised and frozen in certain forms of
treatment gives rise to moral reflection and legal problems as well. Recently in
2014,  the  first  judgements  in  ECHR case  law concerning  the  recognition  of
parental relations between commissioning parents and children born through
surrogacy arrangements outside Europe, Mennesson v. France6 and Labassee
v. France7, have been given, and they are of utmost importance to an analysis
of the recognition of family relations in ECHR case law.
6.1 WHO MAY ADOPT? SUBJECTS FIT FOR FILIATION
First I discuss two key cases relating to adoption, Fretté v. France from 20028
and E.B. v. France from 20089 which concern the possibility  of  single non-
heterosexual people to adopt10. This is followed by other relevant ECHR case
law.  In  recent  debates  concerning  the  possibility  of  same-sex  marriage,  the
question of adoption has often been in a central position. The principle of
extending  the  rights  and  benefits  that  marriage  entails  to  same-sex  couples
very often includes the right to seek the possibility of adoption. This needs to
be phrased in such a conditional manner, because what is at stake is not really
a  right  to  adopt.  There  may  be  various  kinds  of  obstacles  that  couples  or
individuals  face  when  wishing  to  adopt,  as  those  applying  for  adoption  go
through  a  process  of  evaluation  regarding  their  suitability  as  potential
adoptive  parents.  In  many  countries,  homosexuality  has  long  been  a
categorical bar to be seen as a suitable adoptive parent. This has been ruled
against in E.B. v. France in 2008 in the case of individuals applying as single
applicants for authorisation to adopt. However, in the case of international
adoption due to restrictions put in place either by the States of the prospective
adoptive parents or the States where children are adopted from, there may be
a variety of factors that influence the possibility to adopt, such as the age of the
prospective adoptive parents, characteristics relating to their health and other
factors11. These criteria may vary and are open to critical discussion, but they
go  to  show  that  adoption  as  a  whole  is  a  field  where  a  variety  of  factors
influence the suitability of a given person to be regarded as a suitable adoptive
parent and that rights accorded in E.B. refer merely to the right to be evaluated
according to a fair set of criteria when applying for an adoption license.
Fretté v. France from 2002 and E.B. v. France 2008 are judgements only
six years apart in time where the European Court came up with two completely
6 Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts).
7 Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11, 26 June 2014.
8 Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, ECHR 2002-I.
9 E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008.
10 For an earlier and more detailed analysis of Fretté v. France and E.B. v. France by the author,
see Hart (2009).
11 See Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, no. 25762/07, ECHR 2010 (extracts).
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opposing judgements on the suitability of non-heterosexuals as single
prospective adoptive parents. In Fretté, a single man was denied authorisation
to adopt by the French social services and administrative courts on the basis
of his homosexuality12, and the European Court ruled that this was within the
margin  of  appreciation  of  the  State.  What  was  perhaps  most  interesting  in
Fretté was  how  the  role  of  scientific  knowledge  on  the  advisability  of
childrearing by homosexuals was presented. The French Government relied in
its  arguments  on  a  precautionary  principle  due  to  the  lack  of  scientific
consensus on the matter:
It  must  be  observed  that  the  scientific  community  –  particularly
experts on childhood, psychiatrists and psychologists – is divided over
the  possible  consequences  of  a  child  being  adopted  by  one  or  more
homosexual parents, especially bearing in mind the limited number of
scientific studies conducted on the subject to date. In addition, there
are wide differences in national and international opinion, not to
mention the fact that there are not enough children to adopt to satisfy
demand.
Fretté v. France, para 42
In the European Court, Fretté argued that many studies had proven that views
relating to the unsuitability of homosexuals as parents were unfounded:
Through  the  assumption  that  homosexuals  were  less  loving  and
attentive parents, social prejudice denied the common humanity of
heterosexuals and homosexuals – although the latter had the same
feelings and aptitudes. Numerous scientific studies had demonstrated
the  irrationality  of  that  assumption  and  none  had  provided  any
evidence  of  the  supposed  “uncertainties  that  would  affect  the  child's
development” if he was adopted by a homosexual – uncertainties on
which the [French] Government's argument was based.
Fretté v. France, para 35
The debate continued a few years later in E.B. v. France and the judgement of
Fretté was overturned in 2008 by the Grand Chamber of the European Court.
In this case, the applicant, B., was a woman who lived together with another
woman. The Grand Chamber decided that there had been a breach of Article
14 (principle of non-discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 (right
to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention. The Court
articulated that E.B. had been discriminated against in the sphere of’ private
life’ (Article 8) on the basis of her sexual orientation (Article 14). Thus, the
issue was not seen to fall into the category of ‘family life’13. The temporal and
12 Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, ECHR 2002-I.
13 E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008.
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political context might have played a part in the European Court finding such
a different outcome in E.B. than Fretté.
A revised version of the European Convention on the Adoption of Children
was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council Europe on 7th May
2008. The text of the judgement refers explicitly to the revised Convention14,
which  stipulates  that  adoption  should  be  open  to  different-sex  couples  and
single people, and that States Parties are free to extend the provision to same-
sex couples as well if they choose15. In contrast to the discussion on the best
interest of the potential adopted child(ren) and the role of scientific consensus
on  child-rearing  by  homosexuals  in Fretté,  in  the  case  of E.B. the  most
considerable bone of contention was whether the difference in treatment
accorded  to  B.  compared  to  heterosexual  single  applicants  was  due  to  her
particular circumstances, namely living with another woman and her partner’s
reported  lack  of  interest  in  the  adoption  process  when  interviewed,  or  to  a
more general  reluctance from the French social  services as an institution to
grant openly non-heterosexual persons authorisation to adopt. From a
theoretical point of view, E.B. also contained more detectable references to the
‘structuralist social contract’ and the ‘symbolic order’ of heterosexual
parenting (see Robcis 2013 and Chapter 1.2).
B. started her application process with the aim of adopting a child in 1998.
She was a nursery school teacher in her late thirties and she was cohabiting
with  a  female  partner,  R.,  a  psychologist16.  A  report  from  the  local  social
services bureau stated that the women did not “regard themselves as a couple,
and R., although concerned by her partner’s application to adopt a child, does
not feel committed by it”17. Despite the case concerning individual adoption by
B.,  R.’s  reported  detachment  from  the  application  process  became  a
substantial factor affecting the way the case was discussed all the way up to the
European Court. There were certain similarities between Fretté and E.B.: in
both cases,  the individual  applicants were teachers and on a personal  level,
they were described in the case material by the evaluating authorities as having
qualities that were required from an adoptive parent. In both cases, too, the
‘lifestyle’ of the applicant, i.e. homosexuality, became a fact that influenced the
outcome of the process.
In another report given in B.’s application process for adoption, a
psychologist asked “…[h]ow certain can we be that the child will find a stable
and reliable paternal referent?”18, pointing out that “…[l]et us not forget that
children forge their identity with an image of both parents…” and that “…all
14 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (revised), adopted in the 118th Session of the
Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg, 7 May 2008).
15 E.B. v. France, para 29.
16 E.B. v. France, para 8.
17 E.B. v. France, para 10.
18 E.B. v. France, para 11.
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the studies on parenthood show that a child needs both its parents”19. Another
psychologist  from  the  children’s  welfare  services  recommended  that  the
application should be refused because the potential adoptive child would face
“a  certain  number  of  risks  relating  to  the  construction  of  his  or  her
personality”20.  The  psychologist  referred  to  the  reluctance  of  B.  and  R.  to
identify as a couple and that the child would have only a maternal role model.
The psychologist asked: “In the extreme, how can rejection of the male figure
not amount to rejection of the child’s own image? (A child eligible for adoption
has a biological father whose symbolic existence must be preserved, but will
this be in [B.’s] capabilities?)”21.
After pursuing her case in the French administrative courts to the highest
level, B. applied to the European Court and evoked Article 14 in conjunction
with  Article  8,  arguing  that  she  had  been  subject  to  discrimination  which
interfered with her right to respect for private life. She argued that “the
opportunity  or  chance  of  applying  for  authorisation  to  adopt  fell  within  the
scope  of  Article  8  both  with  regard  to  ‘private  life’,  since  it  concerned  the
creation of a new relationship with another individual, and ‘family life’, since
it was an attempt to create a family life with the child being adopted”22. In the
European Court, the French Government argued that in Fretté the difference
in treatment was based on Fretté’s homosexuality, but in B.’s case it was other
factors  that  had  led  to  her  lack  of  success  in  the  application  process  for
adoption and in the handling of the case in the French legal system:
… the Government pointed out that many professionals considered
that a model of sexual difference was an important factor in a child’s
identity and that it was perfectly understandable that the social
services of the département should take into consideration the lack of
markers enabling a child to construct its identity with reference to a
father figure.
E.B. v. France, para 38
As the debates described in Chapter 1 show, there have certainly been “many
professionals” and intellectuals in France, be it practitioners, psychoanalysts,
philosophers  or  social  scientists  who  actively  defended  the  ‘symbolic  order’
and the French ideal of a heterosexual nuclear family as a universal, republican
and psychically balanced institution (Robcis 2004, 2013). These debates are
also referred to in comments submitted by Robert Wintemute, a legal scholar
and  activist,  to  the  European  Court  in  B.’s  case  on  behalf  of  several  non-
19 E.B. v. France, para 11.
20 E.B. v. France, para 13.
21 E.B. v. France, para 13.
22 E.B. v. France, para 35.
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governmental organisations as third-party interveners23. In the comments, it
is  stated  that  “…  [t]he  rigid  position  of  French  administrative  officials  and
courts,  on  access  by  lesbian  and  gay  individuals  to  individual  adoption,  is
probably  a  result…  of  the  influence  of  a  branch  of  French  psychoanalytic
theory which believes that a child must have maternal and paternal references
in the home in order to construct its psychological identity” (Wintemute 2005:
para 32). Furthermore, the case material in E.B. reads that “with regard to the
ground  based  on  the  lack  of  a  paternal  referent,  [B.]  argued  that  while  the
majority  of  French  psychoanalysts  believed  that  a  child  needed  a  dual
maternal and paternal referent, there was no empirical evidence for that belief
and it had been disputed by many other psychotherapists.”24 Lack of ‘scientific
consensus’, or any consensus for that matter, seems to cut both ways and to be
a lasting state of affairs.
When ruling on the case, the European Court found that Article 14 applied
in  conjunction  with  Article  8,  or  that  the  Articles  on  the  prohibition  of
discrimination and on respect for private and family life were applicable to the
case.  Regarding to the two main points made by the French Government to
justify  why  B.  was  refused  an  adoption  licence,  the  Court  scrutinised  the
requirement of a ‘paternal referent’ more critically: “In the Court's view, [this]
ground might… have led to an arbitrary refusal and have served as a pretext
for rejecting the applicant’s application on grounds of her homosexuality”25.
Moreover, the Court observed that “these two main grounds form part of an
overall  assessment  of  the  applicant’s  situation.  For  this  reason,  the  Court
considers that they should not be considered alternatively, but concurrently.
Consequently,  the  illegitimacy  of  one  of  the  grounds  has  the  effect  of
contaminating the entire decision”26. This ‘contamination theory’ was seen as
a very contentious legal argument, and the dissenting judges are very critical
of it in their dissenting opinions.27
The judgement of Schwizgebel v. Switzerland from 201028 comes
somewhat close to Fretté and E.B. in  the  sense  that  it  concerned  a  single
woman wishing to adopt who was barred by the relevant authorities to adopt
a  second child  after  she  had  been  successful  in  adopting  one  child  through
international  adoption.  In  her  case,  it  was  mainly  her  age  that  acted  as  an
obstacle to the proposed adoption of a second child. However, in the material
23 This is also called an amicus curiae brief (comments by a third party admitted by the Court to
enlighten the issue at hand) by FIDH (Federation Internationale des Droits de l’Homme), ILGA-
Europe (International Lesbian and Gay Association), APGL (Association des Parents et futurs parents
gays et lesbiens), BAAF (British Association for Adoption and Fostering). See Wintemute (2005).
24 E.B. v. France, para 54.
25 E.B. v. France, p. 22, para 73.
26 E.B. v. France, p. 24, para 80.
27 E.B. v. France, dissenting opinions of Judge Zupančič and Judge Loucaides.
28 Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, no. 25762/07, ECHR 2010 (extracts).
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cited  in  the  case,  it  emerges  that  her  specific  circumstances  as  an  adoptive
parent played a role as well:
[The)  Court  of  Justice  for  the  Canton  of  Geneva…  did  not  call  into
question the fact that the applicant’s educational qualities, based on
love,  respect  and  Christian  values,  were  recognised.  Moreover,  the
court considered that the applicant had sufficient resources as a result
of her salaried jobs. It took the view, however, that the adoption of a
second child could unfairly affect the situation of [the first adopted
child]. Moreover, it found that the applicant had underestimated the
specific difficulties of adoption, and in particular international
adoption.
Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, para 19
Schwizgebel complained to the European Court that she had been
discriminated against because of her age under Article 14 taken in conjunction
with Article 8 and that “claimed to be a victim of discrimination in relation to
women who could nowadays have biological children at that age”29. The
European  Court  found  no  violation  of  the  rights  evoked,  as  it  unanimously
considered the issue of age-limits regarding adoption to be within the margin
of appreciation of the State.
A decision further back in time, Di Lazzaro against Italy from 199730, also
concerned the possibility of single people to adopt. Di Lazzaro complained of
the  fact  that  single  people  were  not  allowed to  adopt  in  Italy  on  a  par  with
married couples, despite Italy being party to the adoption convention of the
Council  of  Europe  from  1967.  Adoption  by  single  people  was  possible  if  a
married couple who had applied to adopt were hit by separation or death of
the other spouse, if a single person sought to adopt a child to whom s/he was
related up to the sixth degree and in cases involving seriously ill or disabled
children. The Italian courts involved in the process were unanimously of the
opinion that being party to the Convention on adoption meant that it opened
the  possibility  for  Italian  legislators  to  make  adoption  possible  for  single
people, but that they were not obliged to place (married) couples and single
people in the same position vis-à-vis adoption. The European Commission on
Human Rights also rejected the application as inadmissible.
Likewise, the inadmissibility decision of Lang-Lüssi against Switzerland
from 199531 concerned a couple who had been able to adopt a child from Brazil
and have the adoption authorised by Brazilian and Hungarian authorities, as
the couple were of Hungarian nationality in addition to being Swiss citizens
and living in Switzerland. However, the Swiss authorities did not authorise the
adoption due to age limits in place – the couple were 55 and 44 years older
29 Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, para 43.
30 Di Lazzaro v. Italy, no. 31924/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997.
31 Lang-Lüssi v. Switzerland, no. 22206/93, Commission decision of 06 September 1995.
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than X, the adopted child. A variety of reasons were given against authorising
the adoption, such as the motives given by the couple for the adoption (they
had had a child of their own who died in an accident), anticipated problems in
puberty for X, possibly due to the age difference, and X being an only child,
overly  protected  and  spoiled  in  their  care.  Furthermore,  bringing  X  to  the
country without proper authorisation acted against them. X was placed in a
different family by the Swiss authorities. The Swiss authorities were not bound
by  the  adoption  decisions  made  by  Brazilian  or  Hungarian  authorities.  An
expert opinion commissioned by the Swiss authorities constituted that judging
by the facts of the case, it was not in the best interest of X to be placed in the
care of the couple. In front of the European Commission of Human Rights, the
couple  had  evoked  Article  8  of  the  Convention,  but  their  application  was
deemed inadmissible.
The decision of Pitzalis and Lo Sordo against Italy from 199232 was related
to Lang-Lüssi, but concerned solely the existence of an age limit of 40 years
between adoptive parents and adoptees. Apart from the length of the
proceedings, it was deemed inadmissible. The decision of X.  v.  the
Netherlands from 198133 also concerned an age limit of 40 years, but also that
the potential adoptive child should not be above schooling age. The
substantive question in the case was that more stringent criteria were set for
adopting a foreign child (Polish, in this case) compared to adopting a Dutch
child. X.  v.  Belgium  and  Netherlands from 197534 concerned  not  just  a
difference in age between the applicant and the child he sought to adopt that
he  had  already  taken  care  of  for  several  years,  but  also  their  different
nationalities as well as X.’s status as an unmarried individual. X was of Dutch
nationality  but  living  in  Belgium.  Regarding  the  fact  that  it  concerns  an
unmarried person, it resonates with Marckx v. Belgium and the need for an
unmarried mother to adopt her biological child in order to be recognised as a
parent. Couplehood was seen as essential:
However,  even  assuming  that  the  right  to  found  a  family  may  be
considered irrespective of marriage, the problem is not solved. Article
12 recognises in fact the right of man and woman at the age of consent
to  found  a  family  i.e.  to  have  children.  The  existence  of  a  couple  is
fundamental.
X. v. Belgium and the Netherlands, p.77
Thus, the possibility to form family relations by adoption is confined, in the
most  part,  to  individuals  whose  status  fits  to  the  grid  of  genders  and
generations: marriage between a man and a woman, a limited difference in age
that pays resemblance to having had the children by natural means, and to a
32 Pitzalis and Lo Surdo v. Italy, no. 15296/89, Commission decision of 13 May 1992.
33 X. v. the Netherlands, no. 8896/80, Commission decision of 10 March 1981.
34 X. v. Belgium and the Netherlands, no. 6482/74, Commission decision of 10 July 1975.
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certain  extent,  the  same  nationality.  On  the  other  hand,  as  seen  also  in
Giubergia and others against Italy from 199035 the risk of child trafficking is
always existent in cross-border fostering and adoption, and thus stringent
policy in authorising international adoptions is needed. Complaints
concerning adoption tend to, for the most part, keep adoption as a restricted
category in forming family relations. However, in the great majority of cases,
once  the  criteria  set  for  prospective  adoptive  parents  are  met,  adoptive
relations  enjoy  a  high  degree  of  legal  protection,  as  noted  in  Chapter  5.1
concerning maternity and anonymous birth in conjunction with the cases of
Kearns v. France from 200836 and X  v.  the  United  Kingdom from 197737.
However, adoptive relations may, in exceptional circumstances, be undone, as
some judgements and decisions demonstrate38.
6.2 SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
The Grand Chamber judgement of X. and others v. Austria from 201339, the
key case in this sub-chapter, concerns a female couple where one of the women
was the biological, legal and social mother and the sole guardian of her child,
and  she  and  her  female  partner  sought  the  possibility  of  second-parent
adoption  from  the  Austrian  authorities.  The  child  had  been  born  outside
marriage and had been living with his mother and her partner since the age of
five years. The child had a father and a legally valid relationship with him, and
the father and child enjoyed regular contact. There were two large questions
in this case: the first one was that Austrian legislation offered the possibility of
second-parent adoption to married opposite-sex couples without severing the
tie  with  the  other  biological  parent,  but  this  was  impossible  for  same-sex
couples. If a same-sex couple sought second-parent adoption, this could lead
to the closest parent, in this case the biological mother and the sole guardian,
losing her status as a mother, which clearly would have been against the child’s
interests.
The other question complicating the case at  hand was that  the child had
two parents, a mother and a father, and the father’s consent was needed for an
adoption to take place. In X. and others, the father was against the proposed
adoption,  and  the  mother  and  her  partner  argued  that  the  court  should
override  his  view  as,  according  to  them,  he  had  “displayed  the  utmost
35 Giubergia; Giubergia-Gaveglia; Giubergia; Cruz v. Italy, no. 15131/89, Commission decision of
5 March 1990, discussed in Chapter 6.2.
36 Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, 10 January 2008.
37 X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7626/76, Commission decision of 11 July 1977.
38 See Ageyevy v. Russia, no. 7075/10, 9 September 2013, Kurochkin v. Ukraine, no. 42276/08,
20 May 2010 and X. v. France, no. 9993/82, Commission decision of 5 October 1982.
39 X and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 19010/07, ECHR 2013.
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antagonism”40 towards their de facto family unit. While exhausting their legal
remedies  in  the  Austrian  courts,  the  couple  had  argued  that  “the  refusal  by
the… father to consent to the adoption was not justified as he had been acting
against the interests of the child”41 and that the mother’s partner’s interest in
the adoption “outweighed [the] father’s interest in objecting to it”42. The issue
of possible discrimination arose from the fact that if the unmarried female
couple in question had been composed of a woman and a man, “the District
Court would have carried out a detailed examination and would have had to
deliver a separate decision”43 on whether the adoption sought would have been
in the child’s interests. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights ruled in the case of X and others that discrimination had taken place
under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 compared to unmarried
opposite-sex couples, but not compared to married couples. The crux of the
matter was that their case could not be examined due to legal impossibility of
investigating it further compared to unmarried opposite-sex couples.
The judgement of Gas  and  Dubois  v.  France from 201244 concerned a
female couple from France who had had a child with the help of anonymous
donor insemination in Belgium, as assisted reproduction services have for a
long time been legally unavailable for lesbian couples in France. After giving
birth  in  2000,  the  birth  mother  was  the  only  legal  parent  of  the  child.  The
couple in question concluded a Pacs in 2002, but this form of civil unions does
not entail a legal relationship to one’s partner’s child.45 The couple wanted to
make the birth mother’s partner into an adoptive parent to the child by simple
adoption (adoption simple),  a  lighter  form  of  adoption  than  full  adoption
(adoption plénière) where all ties are terminated irrevocably and the child is
issued  with  a  new  birth  certificate.  However,  in  simple  adoption,  parental
rights  were  transferred  completely  to  the  adoptive  parent  if  the  child  was
underage. The only exception to this was in the case of married couples, where
they could jointly become the child’s parents. In theory, the birth mother could
have  passed  parental  rights  to  the  social  mother,  who  could  have  then
delegated parental rights partly back to her, so both of them would have been
parents to a certain extent.46 The problem was pretty much the same as in X
and others v. Austria: it was not possible to have two female parents, so the
birth mother would have lost her rights if they were passed to the other one.
Their application was refused, and the authorities argued that it was not in the
child’s interest to have the birth mother’s status altered even temporarily47.
40 X and Others v. Austria, para 14.
41 X and Others v. Austria, para 65.
42 X and Others v. Austria, para 65.
43 X and Others v. Austria, para 65.
44 Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, ECHR 2012.
45 Gas and Dubois v. France, paras 9-10.
46 Gas and Dubois v. France, paras 11-16.
47 Gas and Dubois v. France, para 15.
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The European Court found no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of
discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private
and family life). Thus, it saw that Gas and Dubois had not been discriminated
against  compared  to  a  married  opposite-sex  couple,  who  would  have  been
eligible to seek second-parent adoption in such a case.48
Emonet and others v. Switzerland from 200849 involved an adult woman,
her  mother  and  the  mother’s  cohabiting  male  partner.  The  adult  woman’s
father was deceased. All three had been living together for about six years
before the woman married and left her family home to live with her husband.
However,  the  marriage  broke  down,  and  due  to  an  illness  and  an  ensuing
disability,  she  was  dependent  on  the  care  given  by  her  mother  and  her
mother’s partner. They decided that they wanted the mother’s partner to adopt
her so that they could become a family also in the legal sense of the term.50 In
2000,  the  mother’s  partner,  Mr  Emonet,  applied  for  an  adoption  with  the
Canton of Geneva Court of Justice with documents proving the approval of the
woman to be adopted (Ms E) and her mother (Ms F). According to the case
material,  the  Court  of  Justice  pronounced  the  adoption  without  hearing  or
consulting the applicants about the effects of the adoption the following year.51
After the adoption had been pronounced by the Court of Justice, cantonal civil
status authorities informed the applicants that the pronounced adoption
meant that  the legal  relationship between the mother and the daughter had
been severed, that the mother’s partner was now her only parent and she
would have Mr Emonet’s surname. The mother and daughter objected to this
and asked their legal relationship to be restored.52 The reason for severing the
relationship  was  that  Ms  F  and  Mr  Emonet  were  not  spouses  as  they  were
cohabiting,  and  the  law  in  place  dictated  that  second-parent  adoption  was
possible only when the couple in question were married.53
After exhausting the legal remedies and possibilities of appeal available to
them  in  Switzerland,  they  complained  to  the  European  Court,  arguing  that
their  right  to  respect  for  family  life  under  Article  8  had  been  violated.  The
Swiss Government argued that especially as the applicants were represented
by a legal counsel, they should have been aware of the legal consequences of
their situation, and that ignorance of the law was not a problem the State could
be held accountable for.54 The European Court noted that they did share de
facto family life:
48 Gas and Dubois v. France, paras 68 and 73.
49 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, no. 39051/03, 13 December 2007.
50 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, paras 9-11.
51 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, see paras 13 and 51.
52 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 14.
53 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 15.
54 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 30.
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In the present case one of the partners in the couple is the biological
mother of the adopted person, who was about 30 years old when she
was adopted. The three applicants all lived together from 1986 to 1992,
then the first applicant left the family home to live with her husband,
whom  she  divorced  in  1998.  Since  2000  she  has  needed  care  and
support, which the other two applicants provide. The Court therefore
considers that what amounts to a de facto family tie exists between the
three applicants[.]
Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 37
The European Court stressed that regardless of whether they were represented
by  a  legal  professional  or  not,  everyone  is  expected  to  know  the  law.
Nevertheless,  it  found that  they  could  not  be  blamed for  not  knowing  what
kind of “far-reaching consequences” the request for adoption would entail and
found a violation of Article 855. In conclusion, it noted in the spirit of Kroon
and others v. the Netherlands that respecting
…the applicants’ family life required that biological and social reality
be taken into account to avoid the blind, mechanical application of the
provisions of the law to this very particular situation for which they
were clearly not intended. Failure to take such considerations into
account flew in the face of the wishes of the persons concerned, without
actually benefiting anybody.
Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 86
Emonet provides a further example of the differences between adoption within
marriage and outside it, as the marital relationship has indeed been seen in
many  jurisdictions  as  opening  the  possibility  to  rearrange  family  ties  to
conform  to  the  ideal  of  the  two-parent  family  of  an  opposite-sex  couple.
Outside marriage, regardless of enduring cohabitation between a couple, a
request  for  adoption  is  seen  as  providing  protection  and  security  to  a  child
legally abandoned by her original parent(s). It is open to debate whether the
marital requirement is essential, but as debates on same-sex marriage show,
the  creation  of  a  legally  valid  couple  relationship  is  not  just  something  an
authority  such  as  the  State  sees  fit  to  require  in  certain  contexts  such  as
adoption, but also a privileged status that many couples wish to acquire.
A  darker  angle  to  intra-familial  adoption  may  be  deduced  from  two
inadmissibility decisions concerning Italy in 1990, N.Q., M.S. and S.S. v.
Italy56 and Giubergia and others v. Italy57. Both of these cases concerned a
Philippinean  woman  giving  birth  to  a  child  who  was  then  recognised  by  a
55 Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, para 85.
56 N.Q., M.S. and S.S. v. Italy, 12612/86, Commission decision of 9 March 1990
57 Giubergia; Giubergia-Gaveglia; Giubergia; Cruz v. Italy, no. 15131/89, Commission decision of
5 March 1990.
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married Italian man to be his child born out of wedlock. In the first complaint,
the  child  was  born  to  a  Philippinean  maid  working  in  Rome  who  did  not
officially recognise the child at birth due to the availability of anonymous birth
in Italy. The child was recognised by a married man who claimed to have had
an affair with the mother and that he was the child’s biological father. A Child
Court suspected the applicants, due to their contradicting testimonies, of
having made a pact that the mother would hand the child over to the married
couple concerned as they were childless and that the alleged father of the child
had recognised the child in order to avoid a formal adoption procedure. The
child was taken away from the applicants and placed into state care.58
In the complaint made by Giubergia and others v. Italy59 a married couple
had already legally adopted one child from the Philippines. During a journey
to the Philippines, the husband recognised a child to be his own and brought
her to Italy. In Italy, he tried to incorporate the child into his family as a child
born out of wedlock he claimed he had fathered during an earlier trip to the
Philippines. The tribunal in question dismissed this request and ordered for
the child to be taken into state care. This case was a highly mediatised event,
where the applicants, a married couple, made appeals to various high-profile
figures  in  Italy  and  gathered  wide  public  support  (see  Scobie  1989  and
Haberman 1990). In order to curb trafficking in children, the tribunal did not
waive. The Commission (ECHR), too, deemed the complaint inadmissible.
However, judging by the facts presented, Giubergia if  not  both cases might
have  concerned  a  private  surrogacy  arrangement  and  definitely  act  as  a
prelude to later surrogacy-related judgements from 2014, Mennesson v.
France and Labassee v. France (see Chapter 6.4).
6.3 ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND LGBT PERSONS
Dividing the cases discussed in this study into neat categories of analysis is not
always straightforward. The case of Gas and Dubois v. France could very well
be categorised under assisted reproduction for same-sex couples, but the
temporal contexts do matter: in the 2000s and 2010s, it is not a news item that
female couples have babies with the help of donor insemination, and the legal
question in the case was more about second-parent adoption, and merited to
be discussed together with X.  and  others  v.  Austria,  a  very  similar  case.
However, complaints similar to Gas and Dubois have appeared in the ECHR
already  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  concerning  both  transgender  persons  and
lesbian women. In the Grand Chamber judgement of X. Y. and Z. v. the United
Kingdom from 199760, a key case in many ways, a transgender person, X, and
his partner, Y, sought recognition of parental status for their child, Z, who had
58 N.Q., M.S. and S.S. v. Italy.
59 Giubergia; Giubergia-Gaveglia; Giubergia; Cruz v. Italy.
60 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II.
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been conceived with donated sperm from a third party and clinically assisted
insemination.  There  are  also  other  cases  discussed  in  this  sub-chapter  that
resulted in inadmissibility decisions in earlier years.
In X. Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom from 1997, X, a post-operative male-
to-female transgender person, and Y, his female partner, were asked to apply
for parental recognition of X as the father of the possible child to be born from
medically assisted insemination by the ethics committee of the hospital that
granted them permission for the treatment. When X and Y first applied for
assisted reproduction services with donor sperm, the ethics committee refused
to  grant  them  this  treatment.  X  and  Y  appealed,  providing  the  ethics
committee with research findings according to which, for example, “in a study
of thirty-seven children raised by transsexual or homosexual parents or carers,
there  was  no  evidence  of  abnormal  sexual  orientation  or  any  other  adverse
effect”61. After the appeal, the ethics committee gave its consent to provide X
and Y with the requested treatment.
The committee “asked X to acknowledge himself to be the father of the child
within  the  meaning  of  the  English  1990  Human  Fertility  and  Embryology
Act”62.  Under  this  piece  of  legislation,  the  male  partner  of  an  unmarried
woman giving birth by AID would be legally  designated as the father of  the
child, not the sperm donor. First, X enquired from the Registrar General 63
whether he could be registered as the father of Z. He got a reply stating that
“only  a  biological  man  could  be  regarded  as  a  father  for  the  purposes  of
registration”64. X and Y tried to register X as the father on Z’s birth certificate,
but they were not permitted to do so, and this part of the certificate was left
blank. At the time, English law did not recognise that a person’s sex could be
changed by medical treatment. Despite X having undergone gender
reassignment  surgery,  living  as  a  man  and  acting  as  Z’s  father,  the  English
courts  treated  the  cohabitation  of  X  and  Y  as  a  relationship  between  two
women. X and Y were encouraged to get a ‘joint residence order’, obtainable
through the courts, which would have given X parental responsibility over Z
until she reached majority.
The  European  Commission  on  Human  Rights  declared  the  complaints
made  by  X  and  Y  under  Articles  8  and  14  admissible  and  dismissed  the
complaints under Articles 12 and 13 that had also been filed. The Commission
was of the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 8 and that it was
not necessary to consider whether there had been a violation of Article 14. In
their  submissions  to  the  European  Court,  X  and  Y  argued  that  they  shared
61 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 15. The reference given in the case material is Green
1978.
62 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 15.
63 Synonymous with the General Register Office of England and Wales, the government authority
responsible for the registration of births, deaths and marriages, but since 2005, also of same-sex civil
partnerships and gender recognition for transgender persons.
64 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 17.
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‘family life’  since the birth of  their  first  child,  Z.  They drew attention to the
doctrine of evolutive interpretation of the European Convention in the
jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court, where “social reality, rather
than formal legal status, was decisive”65.  They  also  argued  that  due  to  X’s
gender reassignment process and the social role he had assumed in the family,
“to all appearances, the applicants lived as a traditional family”66. In turn, the
British  Government  maintained  that  as  X’s  biological  sex  could  not  be
completely  modified  to  that  of  a  male,  X  and  Y  were  to  be  treated  as  two
cohabiting women and that a family could not be established by two persons
of the same sex who were unrelated. Furthermore, the Government argued
that X could not be seen to share family life with Z, as they were not related to
each  other  by  “blood,  marriage  or  adoption”67.  According  to  English  legal
discourse these are the cornerstones of legally valid kinship ties.
Interestingly enough, the Commission was of the opinion that “aside from
the fact that X was registered at birth as a woman and was therefore under a
legal  incapacity  to  marry  Y  or  be  registered  as  Z’s  father,  the  applicants’
situation was indistinguishable from the traditional notion of ‘family life’”68
Thus it is likeness to the ‘traditional’ family model that gave this case a better
footing according to the Commission, which had dismissed previous cases of
families  formed  by  lesbian  couples  as  inadmissible.  The  European  Court
expressed that ‘family life’ under Article 8 was not limited to families formed
by married couples. Other de facto relationships  could  be  included  in  the
notion of family life, as in the cases of Marckx v. Belgium (1979), Keegan v.
Ireland (1994) and Kroon  and  others  v.  the  Netherlands (1994).  As  to  the
essence  of  family  life,  the  Court  makes  the  following  statement,  which  has
since been widely cited in the case law of the ECHR and relevant literature:
When deciding whether a relationship can be said to amount to ‘family
life’, a number of factors may be relevant, including whether the couple
live together,  the length of  their relationship and whether they have
demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children
together or by any other means.
X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 36
The Court came to the conclusion that de facto family ties linked X, Y and Z
and  that  Article  8  applied.  X  and  Y  elaborated  some  of  the  consequences
following from the absence of a legal family tie between X and Z. For example,
Z was not allowed to inherit  X without the existence of  a  will  or  succeed to
some tenancies in the event of X’s death.
65 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 33.
66 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 33.
67 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 33.
68 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 35.
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The Government representative maintained that X, Y and Z were free to
live together as a family and that the concerns expressed above were “highly
theoretical”69. A joint residence order would give X certain parental rights and
duties. Interestingly, the Court observed that “the community as a whole has
an interest in maintaining a coherent system of family law which places the
best interests of the child at the forefront”70 and  it  was  “not  clear  that  [an
amendment to the law] would necessarily be to the advantage of [children such
as Z]”71. The Court absolved itself from any greater responsibility towards the
‘best interest’ of Z by saying that “there is uncertainty with regard to how the
interests  of  children  in  Z’s  position  can  best  be  protected”72 as  well  as  by
concluding that:
Given that transsexuality [sic] raises complex scientific,  legal,  moral
and  social  issues,  in  respect  of  which  there  is  no  generally  shared
approach among the Contracting States, the Court is of the opinion
that  Article  8  (art.  8)  cannot,  in  this  context,  be  taken  to  imply  an
obligation for the respondent State formally to recognise as the father
of a child a person who is not the biological father. That being so, the
fact  that the law of  the United Kingdom does not allow special  legal
recognition of the relationship between X and Z does not amount to a
failure to respect family life within the meaning of that provision (art.
8).  It  follows  that  there  has  been  no  violation  of  Article  8  of  the
Convention (art. 8).
X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 52
The Court did not elaborate what these ‘complex issues’ in question are, but
backed up the decision with a lack of  European consensus on the matter.  It
found that article 8 was applicable but that there was no violation of it (14 votes
to 6) and that there was no need to consider the case under article 14 (17 votes
to 3). The legal situation of transgender persons differs substantially from that
of  homosexuals  and  bisexuals  in  many  ways.  What  this  particular  case
highlights is that unlike in parenting by same-sex couples, transgender
parenting  often  conforms  to  prevalent  gender  roles  and  the  model  of  the
heterosexual family, and as can be seen from the above description, X and Y
were arguing their case very much on their similarity to a ‘traditional family’.
In his concurring opinion, judge de Meyer touched upon the same issue of
similitude: “There is certainly family life between Y and Z. However, between
X and the two other applicants there is only the ‘appearances’ of ‘family ties’” 73.
Furthermore,  de  Meyer  states  that  “it  is  self-evident  that  a  person  who  is
69 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 46.
70 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 46.
71 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 46.
72 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, para 51.
73 Concurring opinion of judge de Meyer, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom.
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manifestly  not  the  father  of  a  child  has  no  right  to  be  recognised  as  her
father”74.What  makes  a  kinship  relation  ‘manifest’?  Adherence  to  the
‘symbolic  order’  and  the  presence  of  two  different  sexes?  In  his  concurring
opinion,  Judge  Pettiti  notes  that  “family,  in  general,  cannot  be  a  mere
aggregate of the individuals living under one roof” and that “the ethical and
social dimension of a family cannot be ignored or underestimated”75. He also
questioned  the  ability  of  transgendered  persons  to  raise  children:  “Studies
have shown that not all transsexuals have the same aptitude for family life…
as a non-transsexual”76, referring to research done under the auspices of the
International Freudian Association77. Moreover, he points out:
The growing number of precarious and unstable family situations is
creating new difficulties for children of first and second families,
whether legitimate, natural, successive or superimposed, and will in
the future call for thoughtful consideration of the identity of the family
and  the  meaning  of  the  family  life  which  Article  8…  is  intended  to
protect, taking into account the fact that priority must be given to the
interests of the child and its future.
Concurring opinion of judge Pettiti, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom
Thus, Judge Pettiti did not refer just to family formation by transgender
persons, but to a more general concern over the acceptability of various forms
of  family  life  in  Member  States  and  the  challenges  they  posed  to  a  rather
uniform and frozen view of family life, a nuclear family based on a relationship
of heterosexual couple of cisgender (the opposite of ‘transgender’) persons.
However,  nothing  in  the  case  material  had  given  an  indication  that  the
relationship of X and Y was in any way “precarious and unstable”78. Rather,
the  uncertainties  of  their  family  life  are  created  rather  by  the  lack  of
recognition by UK authorities and outsiders. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Vilhjálmsson submits that “under United Kingdom law it is now possible for
the register  to contain statements that  are not in conformity with biological
facts but are based on legal considerations”79 referring to the abovementioned
74 Concurring opinion of judge de Meyer, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom.
75 Concurring opinion of judge Pettiti, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom.
76 Concurring opinion of judge Pettiti, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom.
77 In his concurring opinion, Louis-Edmond Pettiti gives only the following details of the sources
he refers to: “voir étude collective d’Alby et autres - Association internationale freudienne - "Identité
sexuelle et transsexuels" (“see collective study by Alby and others, International Freudian Association,
‘Sexual identity and transsexuals’”) and a “Que-sais je?” book (a series of short paperback
introductions into various topics published in the French-speaking world) by L. Pettiti, called “Les
transsexuels” as a source for his argumentation. For the Que-sais je? book, see Pettiti 1992. The study
referred to as “Alby and others” might be Alby et al. 1996, see Sources.
78 See previous quote.
79 Dissenting opinion of judge Vilhjálmsson, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom.
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1990  Act  where  the  male  partner  (husband  or  cohabitee)  of  the  woman
impregnated by means of assisted reproduction is treated as the father of the
child. This statement highlights the role given to legal fictions in creating legal
parental ties.
In  the  decision  of C.  and  L.  M.  v.  United  Kingdom from 198980 an
Australian woman had filed a complaint with her child against being deported
from Britain where the applicant had been residing since 1984. In 1986, she
applied  to  remain  in  the  country  in  permanent  employment  as  well  as  for
permanent residence due to her relationship to E., a British national resident
in the United Kingdom. Her residence application was rejected as lesbian
relationships were not recognised in the immigration rules at the time. After
having her child by artificial insemination, C. was being supported by E. In her
complaint, C. evoked Articles 8, 12 (right to marry and to found a family) and
14, when in most of these cases only Articles 8 and 14 have been evoked. The
Commission found that the lesbian relationship in question involved private
life  under  Article  8.  However,  the  State’s  rights  to  impose  immigration
controls overrode this, as in other kinds of relationships, but the Commission
admitted that C. and E. were treated differently compared to if they had been
a different-sex couple.
In Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands from 199281 a Dutch
lesbian couple sought joint parental authority for a child they had had together
by artificial insemination. They requested that they be jointly vested with the
parental authority of the child they were raising together. The claim was struck
down by three different levels of the Dutch judicial system. Only the biological
mother had legal family ties with her son under Dutch law as, at the time: “only
a  man,  whether  the  biological  father  of  the  child  or  not,  can  recognise  a
child.”82 The applicants evoked article 14 in conjunction with article 8 of the
Convention. They complained that they were subject to discrimination as they
were not able to enjoy their rights under article 8 regarding parental authority
on  the  same  footing  as  heterosexuals,  and  that  their  child  was  being
“discriminated  against  on  the  ground of  his  birth  and  status  in  comparison
with legitimate children”83. The Commission admitted that the provisions in
article 8 are there to protect ‘illegitimate’ as well as ‘legitimate’ families,
referring to the Marckx v. Belgium judgement from 1979, and that “there may
be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life”84.
However, the Commission stated that it had previously decided in the Simpson
v. United Kingdom that  “a  stable  homosexual  relationship  between  two
women  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  right  to  respect  for  family  life
80 C. and L. M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, Commission decision of 9 October 1989.
81 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, no. 15666/89, Commission decision of 19 May
1992.
82 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, “The Facts”
83 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, “The Law”.
84 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, “The Law”.
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ensured by article 8”85. Nevertheless, the Commission did acknowledge that
what is at hand is a family-like situation, as it notes that the applicants are free
to “live together as a family”86.  This  kind of  a  ‘freedom to live together’  has
been the argument put forth by Governments and ECHR bodies in many cases
involving family situations which have not all been characterised by sexual
minority or transgender issues: B.,  R.  and  J.  v.  the  Federal  Republic  of
Germany, Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, X, Y and Z v. the
United Kingdom and most lately, Chavdarov v. Bulgaria.
6.4 USE OF GAMETES, EMBRYOS AND WOMBS
Whether one may obtain access to assisted reproduction services depends
completely on the legislation of the state one resides in, and as noted above in
the case of Gas and Dubois v. France, “reproductive tourism” may take place
depending on whether certain forms of assisted reproduction are not available.
In many states,  single women and women with female partners may obtain
these services in the private sector at their own cost. State-subsidised assisted
reproduction services tend to be available only for opposite-sex couples, and
in  some states,  they  need  to  be  married.  A  completely  different  question  is
what forms of assisted reproduction are available. This is a dynamic field of
study, as both technological innovations and politico-legal processes influence
it. New forms of treatment may be studied and invented, but whether they are
legally available or not is a different question. Surrogacy, in turn, acts as the
extreme form of assisted reproduction, as it does not concern merely the use
of donated eggs of sperm, but the use of the bodily functions of a third party to
produce  a  living  person.  The  use  of  surrogate  mothers  is  rare  in  Western
Europe  due  legal  restrictions,  and  commercial  services  in  this  area  may
generally  be  obtained,  for  example  in  the  United  States  and  some  Eastern
European and Asian States.
The  Grand Chamber  judgement  case  of S.H. and others v. Austria from
201187 touched  upon  the  use  of  donated  eggs  and  sperm  in  assisted
reproduction.  The  applicants  were  two  couples,  of  which  the  first  one  was
made up of a woman who suffered from blocked fallopian tubes, meaning that
she could produce ova, but had to resort to in vitro fertilisation. Her husband
was infertile, meaning that they would have needed to use donated sperm from
an third party in their in vitro treatment process. However, this was forbidden
by Austrian law, even though the use of donated sperm in in vivo fertilisation,
meaning directly inseminating a fertile woman with sperm from a third party
was allowed by the law. The second couple was a made up of a woman who
suffered from agonadism, meaning that  she did not produce ova.  Thus,  she
85 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, “The Law”.
86 Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke v. the Netherlands, “The Law”.
87 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 57813/00, ECHR 2011.
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and her husband, who was fertile, needed to resort to in vitro fertilisation with
a donated egg from a third party. This was not allowed in Austrian law, which
allowed in vitro fertilisation only with eggs and sperm from the couple to be
treated. Allowing insemination with donated sperm was an exception in the
law,  due  to  the  simplicity  and  the  fact  that  historically,  this  technique  of
assisted reproduction dated from an earlier time than in vitro fertilisation.88
In the European Court, this case was subject to two conflicting judgements:
a Chamber judgement in 201089 which found a violation of Article 8 and citing
the illogical nature of the law in question as the main reason for this. However
the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which gave a judgement in late
201190, stating that there had been no violation of Article 8 or any other right
enshrined in the Convention. The text of the case offers also a brief overview
of the practices of the Member States of the Council of Europe on the matter.
In  most  Member  States,  assisted  reproduction  services,  both  public  and
private, were governed by relevant legislation. In a minority of these states,
egg donation, sperm donation or both were not allowed. At the time, sperm
donation  was  prohibited  in  Italy,  Lithuania  and  Turkey.  Donating  eggs  was
prohibited  in  these  three  countries  as  well  as  in  Austria,  Croatia,  Germany,
Norway and Switzerland. Unlike Austria, States that allow sperm donation do
not usually distinguish for which kind of techniques of assisted reproduction
donated sperm may be used.91
The most interesting arguments put forward by the Austrian government
and  the  intervening  third  parties  arguing  in  the  same  lines  (the  German
Government, the Italian Government, and the Catholic NGOs European
Centre for Law and Justice and Aktion Leben) concerned the prohibition of
egg donation. For example, the Austrian government maintained that
In the debate in [the Austrian] Parliament it had been pointed out that
ovum [egg] donation depended on the availability of ova and might
lead to problematic developments such as the exploitation and
humiliation of women, in particular those from an economically
disadvantaged  background.  There  was  also  the  risk  that  pressure
might be put on women undergoing in vitro fertilisation to provide
more  ova  than  strictly  necessary  for  their  own  treatment  to  enable
them to pay for it.
S.H. and Others v. Austria, para 66
Furthermore, the Government of the respondent State, Austria, argued that
“In vitro fertilisation also raised the question of unusual relationships in which
the  social  circumstances  deviated  from  the  biological  ones,  namely,  the
88 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], paras 9-14.
89 See S.H. and Others v. Austria, no. 57813/00, ECHR 2010.
90 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 57813/00, ECHR 2011.
91 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC] paras 35-40.
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division of motherhood into a biological aspect and an aspect of “carrying the
child”  and  perhaps  also  a  social  aspect”92. In turn, the intervening German
government supplied an argument concerning “split motherhood”:
This prohibition [of egg donation] was intended to protect the child’s
welfare by ensuring the unambiguous identity of the mother. Splitting
motherhood into a genetic and a biological mother would result in two
women having a part in the creation of a child and would run counter
to the established principle of unambiguousness of motherhood which
represented a fundamental and basic social consensus. Split
motherhood was contrary to the child’s welfare because the resulting
ambiguousness of the mother’s identity might jeopardise the
development of the child’s personality and lead to considerable
problems in his or her discovery of identity.
S.H. and Others v. Austria, para 70
The most ‘structuralist’ argument came from the Italian government, which,
in  addition  to  the  risks  of  exploitation  of  poor  women,  trafficking  ova  and
premature  births  due  to  IVF  treatment,  put  forth  the  view  that  “to  call
maternal  filiation  into  question  by  splitting  motherhood  would  lead  to  a
weakening of the entire structure of society”93. Interestingly, Italy is also a
country  that  allows  anonymous  birth  to  take  place.  This  “splitting  of
motherhood” into biological motherhood and legal/social motherhood is not
seen, at least in the same way, to “call maternal filiation into question” and to
“lead  to  a  weakening  of  the  entire  structure  of  society”.  Surely,  the mater
semper certa est principle,  or  the  one-pillar  structure  of  (gestational)
maternity as the first and foremost parental relation available to a child, is of
great importance in European legal thinking concerning maternal filiation.
However, in most States this has been interpreted to mean that gestational
motherhood, carrying and giving birth to a child, overruns genetic maternity
in a case where they would be in conflict. Just like a sperm donor does not have
a  right  to  evoke  paternity  when  there  has  been  a  male  partner  giving  his
consent to assisted reproduction and who is named as the father, an egg donor
does  not  have  a  right  to  evoke  maternity  when  the  woman  giving  birth
obviously  has  ‘consented’  to  the  treatment.  This  situation  is,  of  course,
reversed  in  contracted  and  commissioned  surrogacy  arrangements,  but  as
remunerated surrogacy is not available in most European countries, this is not
a widespread concern on a legal level.
The  Grand  Chamber  judgement  of Evans  v.  the  United  Kingdom from
200794 is also significant, as it concerns the use of embryos after separation
and  divorce.  Evans,  the  female  party  to  the  couple  in  question,  had  pre-
92 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], para 67.
93 S.H. and Others v. Austria, para 73.
94 Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, 7 March 2006.
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cancerous tumours developing in her ovaries, which meant that eggs could be
harvested for in vitro fertilisation but that her ovaries should be removed after
the harvesting.95 She and her male partner sought fertility treatment services
and consented to the use of their eggs and sperm for the purposes of assisted
reproduction  to  create  embryos  from  their  cells.  Evans  underwent  an
operation where her ovaries were removed and she was told to wait for two
years before embryos could be implanted into her uterus. During this two-year
period, her relationship with her partner broke down. He asked their fertility
clinic to destroy the embryos, as both of them could withdraw their consent to
the process of assisted reproduction before the embryos were implanted.96
Evans  initiated  legal  proceedings  in  England  in  order  to  prevent  the
destruction  of  the  embryos,  evoking  the  Human  Rights  Act,  the
implementation  of  the  European  Convention  into  English  law.  She  evoked
Articles  8,  12,  and  14  regarding  herself  and  Articles  2  and  8  regarding  the
embryos.97 In  the  first  instance  of  the  case  in  the  Family  Court,  the  judge
decided in favour of J, Evans’ former husband, on the basis that the consent
given by J was to be treated together with the applicant and that it was a right
granted by the Parliament that he could withdraw his consent in order not to
father  a  child  after  separation.  The  judge  also  evoked  the  symmetry  of  the
situation if the sexes of the parties were reversed. A man could be rendered
infertile due to cancer treatment, but his female partner could not be obliged,
after separation, to have the embryos implanted.98 In the Court of Appeal, the
judges  were  not  fully  in  agreement  of  the  comparison  to  be  done  in  the
question:  whether  Evans’s  situation  should  be  compared  to  that  of  infertile
women  with  partners  or  to  that  of  a  fertile  woman.  If  compared  to  fertile
women, Evans’ husband had had the chance to withdraw his consent at a later
stage than if a child had been conceived through coitus. However, they were in
agreement that Evans’ treatment did not constitute discrimination under
Article  14  in  conjunction  with  Article  8.  The  House  of  Lords  did  not  grant
appeal, so the national remedies available to Evans were exhausted.99
In the European Court, Evans evoked Article 2, the right to life regarding
the embryos, as well as Article 8 regarding her right to protection of private
and family life. Regarding Article 2, the Grand Chamber of the European Court
found that “the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal
definition  of  the  beginning  of  life,  the  issue  of  when the  right  to  life  begins
comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers
that States should enjoy in this sphere”100. English law did not grant embryos
independent rights or interests, as was made clear by judges in the Court of
95 Evans v. the United Kingdom, para 14.
96 Evans v. the United Kingdom, paras 15-18.
97 Evans v. the United Kingdom, para 19.
98 Evans v. the United Kingdom, paras 22-23.
99 Evans v. the United Kingdom, paras 24-28.
100 Evans v. the United Kingdom, para 54.
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Appeal in Evans’ case. As to Article 8 regarding Evans, she submitted to the
Court that
The  female's  role  in  IVF  treatment  was  much  more  extensive  and
emotionally involving than that of  the male,  who donated his  sperm
and  had  no  further  active  physical  part  to  play  in  the  process.  The
female  gamete  provider,  by  contrast,  donated  eggs,  from  a  finite
limited  number  available  to  her,  after  a  series  of  sometimes  painful
medical interventions designed to maximise the potential for
harvesting eggs. In the case of a woman with the applicant's medical
history, she would never again have the opportunity to attempt to
create a child using her gametes. Her emotional and physical
investment in the process far surpassed that of the man and justified
the promotion of her Article 8 rights. Instead, the 1990 Act operated so
that the applicant's rights and freedoms in respect of creating a baby
were dependent on J's whim. He was able to embark on the project of
creating embryos with the applicant, offering such assurances as were
necessary  to  convince  her  to  proceed,  and  then  abandon the  project
when he pleased, taking no responsibility for his original decision to
become involved, and under no obligation even to provide an
explanation for his behaviour.
Evans v. the United Kingdom, para 62
The  justifications  given  by  Evans  in  order  to  argue  for  the  possibility  of
exceptions  to  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Human  Fertilisation  and
Embryology Act are interesting, as they do convey a need to examine the case
in a gender-sensitive manner. As noted in other cases discussed in this study,
it is very rare, if non-existent, that the situations of a woman and a man would
be somehow symmetrical regarding procreation, even though legal
conceptions  of  formal  equality  would  like  to  see  and  treat  the  competing
interests of a woman and a man regarding their reproductive capacities in such
a manner. However, in the case of Evans, the scales dipped in favour of her ex-
husband.  As in a variety of  cases regarding adoption,  the Articles related to
marriage, family formation or family life included in the Convention have not
been seen to provide any kind a of a ‘right to a child’ as such through the means
of adoption of assisted reproduction, as both procedures are subject to a heavy
apparatus of legal regulation.
The  culmination  of  assisted  reproduction  is  surrogacy,  that  is,  a  woman
giving  birth  to  a  child  conceived  with  the  help  of  assisted  reproduction
techniques and the child is then taken care of by the couple or person acting
as the commissioning parent(s). Surrogacy arrangements are outlawed either
completely  or  in  commercial  terms  in  most  European  States.  In  2014,  two
judgements were given by the ECHR concerning the legal recognition of
children born to French couples in the United States, Mennesson v. France101
101 Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts).
203
and Labassee v. France102, on which the judgements were given on the same
day. In Mennesson, a French couple had gone to the United States to obtain
surrogacy services. The children born were twins who were born to a surrogate
mother in the State of California, with the help of a donated egg and sperm
obtained from Mr Mennesson. In the European Court, the couple wished to
specify “that, in accordance with Californian law, the “surrogate mother” was
not remunerated but merely received expenses… she and her husband were
both high earners and therefore had a much higher income than the applicants
and  that  it  had  been  an  act  of  solidarity  on  her  part”103. The surrogacy
arrangement was thus conducted in a developed State where it was legally
regulated and the interests of the commissioning couple were protected, so
this case does not reflect such a great socio-economic disparity between the
commissioning parents and the surrogate mother as in some other countries
which are popular surrogacy destinations such as India104.
Already  during  the  pregnancy  a  judgement  was  issued  by  the  Supreme
Court  of  California  after  an  application  by  the  Mennesson  couple  and  the
surrogate mother stating “that the first applicant would be the “genetic father”
and the second applicant the “legal mother” of any child to whom the surrogate
mother gave birth within the following four months. The judgement specified
the particulars that were to be entered in the birth certificate and stated that
the  first  and  second  applicants  should  be  recorded  as  the  father  and
mother.”105 After the birth of twins in 2000, Mr Mennesson went to the local
consulate of France to enter the births of the children to the register of births,
deaths  and  marriages  and  to  have  their  names  entered  to  his  passport.
According to the applicants, many other commissioning parents had been able
to obtain such a service. However, the consulate rejected this as it could not be
proven  that  Ms  Mennesson  had  given  birth.  The  file  was  sent  to  the  public
prosecutors’  office in Nantes.  The public  prosecutor came to the conclusion
that  obtaining  surrogacy  services  in  a  State  where  it  was  legal  was  not  a
punishable  offence  in  France.  The  details  of  the  birth  certificates  of  the
children were entered into the register of births, death and marriages.106
However, the Nantes public prosecutor began legal proceedings against the
Mennessons to have these entries to the register annulled. The argument was
that “an agreement whereby a woman undertook to conceive and bear a child
and  relinquish  it  at  birth  was  null  and  void  in  accordance  with  the  public-
policy principle that the human body and civil status are inalienable”107. The
102 Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11, 26 June 2014.
103 Mennesson v. France, para 8.
104 See pending applications to the European Court of Human Rights, Foulon v. France (no.
9063/14) and Bouvet v. France (no. 10410/14) (European Court of Human Rights 2015b)
105 Mennesson v. France, para 9.
106 Mennesson v. France, paras 9-17.
107 Mennesson v. France, para 18.
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views of the French civil courts varied on the matter, but the final word was
given by the Court of Cassation in 2011 when it noted that
… the refusal to register the particulars of a birth certificate drawn up
in execution of a foreign court decision, based on the incompatibility of
that decision with French international public policy, is justified where
that decision contains provisions which conflict with essential
principles  of  French  law.  According  to  the  current  position  under
domestic law, it is contrary to the principle of inalienability of civil
status  –  a  fundamental  principle  of  French  law  –  to  give  effect,  in
terms of the legal parent-child relationship, to a surrogacy agreement,
which, while it may be lawful in another country, is null and void on
public-policy grounds…
Cited in Mennesson v. France, para 27
Furthermore,  the  same Court  noted  that  the  outcome of  the  case  “does  not
deprive the children of the legal parent-child relationship recognised under
Californian  law  and  does  not  prevent  them  from  living  with  Mr  and  Mrs
Mennesson in France”108.  The  Court  of  Cassation  also  reviewed  the  case  in
light of ECHR jurisprudence109 and expressly stated that this outcome did not
violate the right of the children under Article 8 of the European Convention or
the  paramount  concern  of  their  best  interests  under  the  Convention  on  the
Rights of the Child.110
As the children had obtained citizenship and passports of the United States
by virtue of being born on U.S. soil, they could leave the United States soon
after  their  birth  and  go  to  France  with  the  Mennessons.  Various  legal  and
practical problems were created by the lack of a legal parent-child relation: the
children did not have French nationality, French passports or valid residence
permits.  As  minors  they  could  not  be  deported,  but  when  attaining  their
majority they faced the possibility of expulsion. They had no particular rights
vis-à-vis  their  parents  such  as  inheritance  rights.  If  the  parents  were  to
divorce,  the  mother  had  no  legal  standing  towards  the  children  to  obtain
access to them, and if the father were to die she was not regarded as a guardian.
The parents and children and especially the mother and children were legal
strangers to each other, which led to a “legally clandestine”111 family life.112 The
children went to school and led a normal quotidian life with their parents, but
as minors officially unrelated to anyone in the country. The applicants
described the practicalities of dealing with public authorities as follows:
108 Cited in Mennesson v. France, para 27.
109 Namely Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, 28 June 2007.
110 Mennesson v. France, para 27.
111 Mennesson v. France, para 26.
112 Mennesson v. France, para 68.
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For administrative steps for which French nationality or an official
legal  parent-child  relationship  were  required  (registration  of  the
children for social-security purposes, enrolment at the school canteen
or outdoor centre, or applications for financial assistance from the
Family  Allowances  Office),  they  had  to  produce  the  US  birth
certificates together with an officially sworn translation in order to
prove that the children were theirs, and the success of their application
depended on the good will of the person dealing with it.
Mennesson v. France, para 68
The European Court, too, discussed the freedom of living together in a de facto
family unit not infringing Article 8 rights in the strictest sense, an approach it
had vindicated when not recognising the wishes of the applicants to have their
family relations recognised in Kerkhoven, Hinke and Hinke (see sub-chapter
6.3) and Chavdarov (see sub-chapter 5.3):
[The European Court] notes that the applicants do not claim that it has
been impossible to overcome the difficulties they referred to and have
not shown that the inability to obtain recognition of the legal parent-
child relationship under French law has prevented them from enjoying
in France their right to respect for their family life. In that connection
it observes that they were all four able to settle in France shortly after
the  birth  of  the  third  and fourth  applicants,  are  in  a  position  to  live
there together in conditions broadly comparable to those of other
families and that there is  nothing to suggest  that they are at  risk of
being separated by the authorities on account of their situation under
French law...
Mennesson v. France, para 68
The European Court found that the rights of the parents under Article 8 had
not  been  violated,  but  it  took  up  the  issue  of  the  rights  of  the  children  and
scrutinised  it  with  more  care  than  the  French  courts  had.  It  stressed  the
importance of the children in question to be able to construct their identity as
“respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish
details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal
parent-child relationship”113. The Court noted that nationality and inheritance
were among the practical issues affected by the lack of a legal relationship.
In light of the analysis of the constitution of paternity performed in this
study in sub-chapters 5.3 and 5.4, it is notable that in the Mennesson case the
genetic relationship between the intended father and the children was not
given  particular  significance  by  the  French  authorities,  as  the  practice  of
recognition  by  the  father  is  a  way  of  incorporating  children  born  through
surrogacy into the intended family unit. It could be stated that in this case, the
113 Mennesson v. France, para 96
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genetic relation of paternity did not amount to a “biological” relation, if that
would be understood as encompassing coital, genetic and co-gestational
relations between a father and child. In turn, the European Court saw the right
to  know one’s  genetic  origins  and  paternity  as  a  significant  issue  under  the
establishment of identity:
Not only was the relationship between the third and fourth applicants
and their biological father not recognised when registration of the
details of the birth certificates was requested, but formal recognition
by means of a declaration of paternity or adoption or through the
effect of de facto enjoyment  of  civil  status  would  fall  foul  of  the
prohibition established by the Court of Cassation in its case-law in that
regard… The  Court  considers,  having  regard  to  the  consequences  of
this serious restriction on the identity and right to respect for private
life of the third and fourth applicants, that by thus preventing both the
recognition and establishment under domestic law of their legal
relationship with their biological father, the respondent State
overstepped the permissible limits of its margin of appreciation.
Mennesson v. France, para 100
Thus, the importance of knowing one’s origins and identity led to the Court
finding that the lack of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship, in this
case the genetic relationship between the commissioning father and the
children born of the surrogacy arrangement, infringed the right to respect for
private life of the Mennesson twins under Article 8 of the Convention. Unlike
the French Courts, the European Court took the best interests of the children
seriously, mandating that despite the surrogacy arrangement, which was null
and  void  under  French  law,  their  rights  as  persons  had  to  be  taken  into
consideration.
The facts in the complaint of Labassee v. France were very similar, except
that there was only one child, and the substantive content of the judgements
is the same: the rights of the parents under Article 8 had not been violated, but
the right to respect for private life of the child had been violated 114. As this child
had also been born through a surrogacy arrangement in the United States, she
had obtained U.S. citizenship and was not stateless. However, perhaps it was
just the fact that the children were not stateless that made it possible for the
authorities to let them remain in a legal limbo. Labassee contains references
to  various  studies  on  the  subject  of  bioethics,  surrogacy  and  filiation  in
France115. It also contains a comparative survey of the legality of surrogacy in
the Member States of the Council of Europe.116 One of the expert reports was
a State-commissioned study by a working group led by Irène Théry (Théry and
Leroyer  2014).  In  this  report  is  it  proposed  that  the  family  situations  of
114 Labassee v. France, para 81.
115 Labassee v. France, paras 28-30.
116 Labassee v. France, paras 31-33.
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children  born  abroad  as  a  result  of  surrogacy  arrangements  should  be
recognised  as  it  is  in  the  child’s  interests  to  establish  legal  relations  to  the
commissioning  parents.  However,  Théry  and  Leroyer  also  state  that  France
should engage firmly in the creation of  an international  legal  instrument to
combat the “enslavement” of women by surrogacy organisations (Théry and
Leroyer 2014: 198).
6.5 DISCUSSION: WHAT ARE FAMILIES MADE OF?
What is  the contemporary voice that enters into the language of  the
law to disrupt its  univocal  workings? … when there are two men or
two women who parent, are we to assume that some primary division
of gendered roles organizes their psychic places within the scene,  so
that  the  empirical  contingency  of  two  same-gendered  parents  is
nevertheless straightened out by the presocial psychic place of the
Mother and the Father into which they enter? Does it make sense on
these occasions to insist that there are symbolic positions of Mother
and Father that every psyche must accept regardless of the social form
that  kinship  takes?  Or  is  that  a  way  of  reinstating  a  heterosexual
organization of parenting at the psychic level that can accommodate
all manner of gender variation at the social level?
Judith Butler (2000: 69)
Adoption and assisted reproduction are fields where the dynamics and rules
of  filiation  are  at  their  barest:  as  these  situations  are  often  stripped  of  the
commonsensical logic of biological relations, and the significance of genetic
and  gestational  ties  are  discussed  in  more  detail.  These  kinds  of  cases  also
bring forth the rationales that dictate the constitution of parent-child relations
in European legal cultures. In recent years, these areas have been much
debated in the context  of  dyadic same-sex adult  relations,  be it  adoption by
same-sex  couples  or  the  availability  of  assisted  reproduction  services  for
different kinds of couples and individuals. However, as especially the cases of
S.H. and others v.  Austria and Evans v. the United Kingdom demonstrate,
some  of  the  weightiest  and  complex  cases  in  the  case  law  of  the  European
Court in this area do not deal with the problematics of gender, sexuality and
identity, but the engenderment of life itself.
In adoption, status is still of great importance, as persons willing to adopt
are valued in a hierarchical fashion according to their marital status as well as
health, wealth and personal capabilities. However, in the context of this study,
status refers mainly to whether one is married to a person of the opposite sex
or  not,  and  by  outcome,  to  one’s  sex  within  a  binary  system  of  parentage,
adoptive mothers and fathers. Single people are caught in a trap of both status
and identity: their unmarried status is a disadvantage as a potential adoptive
parents, and their sexual identities may come under scrutiny as well, as in the
cases of E.B. and Fretté. So far, there has not been a case in the ECHR system
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which would have involved the impossibility  to adopt jointly for a  same-sex
couple, but as same-sex marriage and/or joint adoption for same-sex couples
(the  two  do  not  always  go  hand  in  hand)  have  become  possible  in  many
European states, cases like this will probably appear in the future. Due to the
very high contextuality of adoption as it rests on a very personal evaluation of
those applying for authorisation to adopt, it is hard to see how re-structuring
the field of adoption from the perspective of human rights would function
apart from eradicating the most blatant discrimination as in Fretté v. France
and E.B. v. France. Even though the possibility of same-sex couples to adopt
has been a fervently debated issue in many European polities in recent years,
adoption itself remains a very specialised practice through which only certain
people  are  able  to  construct  family  relations.  The  range  of  criteria  that  one
needs to fulfil in order to become an adoptive parent is so wide that eradicating
sexual orientation among them as irrelevant is more important on the level of
principle rather than opening realistic possibilities of adoption to many people
either as potential adoptive parents or to children being adopted.
It is open to dispute whether the sex of the three different biological/legal
and  social  parental  figures  in X  and  others  v.  Austria is  relevant  from  a
relational  point  of  view.  The  social  parents  at  birth  may  be  a  woman and  a
man,  as  in  X  and  others,  or  two  women  as  in Gas  and  Dubois  v.  France.
However,  a  biological  father,  if  he is  recognised as a legal  father at  birth or
shortly after, occupies a certain position and status that is specific to his sex,
just  like  a  childbearing  woman is  in  the  primary  position  when it  comes  to
attaching parents to a child at the time of birth. Legally, the crux of the matter
in X and others v. Austria was that the State was not obliged to examine if the
second-parent  adoption  proposed  by  the  child’s  mother  and  her  female
partner would have been in the child’s interests due to the sex of the proposed
adoptive parent. From a relational point of view, it is evident was that the child
already  had  another  birth  parent,  the  father,  and  there  was  no  evidence
presented  in  the  case  material  as  such  pointing  towards  him being  an  unfit
parent. It was the mother and her partner who argued that it was in the child’s
interest to be adopted by the mother’s partner, and the father opposed. In Gas
and Dubois,  the  child  had  only  one  legal  parent,  and  would  have  probably
benefited from having the other birth parent recognised.
From a relational perspective X and others leaves us with the question of
how easily  a  legally  recognised  parent  may  be  changed:  as  the  father  had  a
biological, legal and social relation with the child, there would have to be very
weighty  reasons  for  undoing  his  legal  relation  to  the  child  against  his  will.
Thus, as to the contextual and relational set-up, the gender-specific set-up of
parentage does leave a reader with a certain set of unease to the antagonism
between separated birth parents and how far that may be allowed to affect the
examination of  the need to perform a second-parent adoption when a child
already  has  two  legal  parents,  male  or  female,  who  take  an  interest  in  the
child’s life. A biological father’s standing vis-à-vis his child may be of a weaker
and a more contingent kind compared to the birth mother, but if he exists as a
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person in the child’s life and not just as a mere sperm donor, he is ‘second-in-
line’ in the imaginary line-up of possible parents, and the genetic relation adds
an  additional  dimension  to  the  relation.  To  recall  the  conclusions  on  the
relinquishment of maternity and subsequent adoption in Odièvre v. France,
Kearns v. France, Godelli v. Italy and X. against the United Kingdom in
Chapter 4, in relation to adoption, what law has once joined, is difficult to pull
apart.  Thus,  once  again,  parenthood  is  first  and  foremost  built  on  the  link
between a birth mother and her child, Fineman’s (1995) “core family” on the
basis of which it may be built further, enlarged or altered.
Cases where transgender persons and same-sex couples have formed
families through assisted reproduction or private arrangements coming close
to assisted reproduction show that on the level of clinical practice or everyday
life, these arrangements have, for quite some time in some Member States,
been mundane events but lacking legal recognition in making them officially
relevant family relations.  This leads us to the question whether becoming a
parent  should  be  possible  for  couples  or  individuals  who  are  incapable  of
giving  birth  to  a  child  because  of  being  male  individuals,  male  couples  or  a
female  without  a  functioning  womb.  With  a  burgeoning  global  market  for
surrogacy services for both infertile opposite-sex couples, male couples and
individuals wishing to obtain surrogacy services, this is a question that indeed
begs for an answer, and the findings of the European Court in Mennesson and
Labassee will probably be addressed in the context of a male commissioning
couple sooner or later.
Iacub  (2004,  2009:  259-282)  suggests  that  as  men  can  become  fathers
without being genitors, this should be possible for women as well with the help
of  surrogacy arrangements.  In her view, this  would be a step towards more
genuine gender equality, and it would open up parenthood for non-
heterosexuals  as  well.  However,  Iacub  (2004,  2009)  does  not  address  any
problems related to surrogacy. When discussing surrogacy arrangements
Iacub (2009) paints a picture of individuals who are willing, free and able to
enter into contracts where the womb, or the ‘empire of the belly’, as she has it,
is not a potential site of physical, economic or psychological exploitation. In
Iacub’s utopia, surrogate mothers are not affected by economic necessity,
external constraint or lack of opportunities when turning their bodies into
merchandise. The point under elaboration here is not that a woman’s sexual
or  reproductive  capacities  would  be  ‘sacred  territory’  in  which  economic
exploitation is the ultimate taboo; the question is about the “inalienability of
civil status” as conceived in Mennesson and Labassee. Allowing remunerated
surrogacy arrangements would create hierarchies and economic inequalities
between women that would outweigh current ‘inequalities’ between fertile and
infertile  women.  A  child  given  up  for  adoption  anywhere  in  the  world  has
always been carried and given birth to by a woman whose rights need to be
respected, as well as those of the child born.
What is most perplexing in the judgements of the European Court in these
cases is that it found in both cases that the private life, or “identity rights” of
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the children born of  surrogacy arrangements had been violated,  but not the
family life of any of the parties. Obviously, the parents had contravened French
law and public policy by seeking surrogacy services abroad, and the reluctance
of both the French courts and the European Court to discuss their rights under
Article 8 was understandable. However, as the children were not taken into
state care due to their legally precarious situation but were allowed to live with
their  parents,  they  had  established  family  relations  to  their  parents.  So,  do
legally unrecognised children born of surrogacy arrangements have family life,
or is that just for “legal families” and children? The ethical questions here are
more complex than in complaints concerning children born out of  wedlock,
but one cannot escape the idea that the reluctance to recognise the legal
existence of children born of surrogacy arrangements, regardless of the illegal
steps  taken  by  their  parents  is  akin  to  punishing  children  for  their  parents’
deeds in the Marckx era. Furthermore, from the point of view of the dichotomy
of status and identity, identity is seen here in a very fundamental form of civil
identity: nationality and recognised kinship relations.
Regardless of the national political and economic contexts of the States
where they are carried out, surrogacy arrangements bring considerable ethical
and  moral  concerns  into  the  spotlight.  In  many  destinations  of  surrogacy
tourism, it might officially not be subject to pure commercial and contractual
responsibility,  but  ‘compensating  expenses’  for  the  woman  acting  as  a
surrogate might just be less controlled. Somewhat in a similar manner than
prostitution, making concessions to a woman’s bodily integrity in exchange for
money might not be her personal choice as she might be pressured into it by
other persons benefiting from the arrangement financially. Even if we assume
that  the  choice  to  become a  surrogate  mother  is  the  woman’s  alone,  taking
advantage of this is problematic from the point of view of the principle of the
“inalienability  of  human  rights  and  civil  status”  argued  by  the  French
government in Mennesson and Labassee. Socio-economic difference between
the intended parents and the surrogate just exacerbate the relational setting
in addition to the core question of whether benefiting from someone else’s
gestational capacity can be sustained, even if the subject herself is willing.
In  these  two  cases  concerning  surrogacy,  the  French  Government  was
defending its relatively sustained legal reluctance to recognise surrogacy,
widely  shared  by  other  (Western)  European  States,  if  not  always  so
pronounced as in French law. However, forbidding surrogacy in a certain State
does not eradicate the problem that if actual persons, minors, have been born,
their rights as persons need to be recognised. Leaving the children in these
cases  in  legal  limbo  sanctioned  by  Courts  and  Governments  seems  highly
suspect as well. As suggested in the expert report cited in Labassee v. France
(Théry and Leroyer 2014), the least that can be done is to grant parental status
on the basis of biological paternity and thus open the possibilities of second-
parent adoption. This brings us to a fundamental question: even though the
practise through which these children have been born does not stand up to
ethical scrutiny from a perspective of the inalienability of the human body, the
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children born should not be made to suffer the consequences of the actions of
their parents. To be consistent, if surrogacy as a practise is not tolerated and
States wish to take their duties to promote human rights seriously, States need
to  take  a  special  interest  in  the  legal  status  of  children  born  from
(international) surrogacy arrangements, perhaps by designating them with
actual State-appointed guardians in the form of officials, and/or to regularise
the relationship these children have with their day-to-day parents. It goes to
note  that  in  these  surrogacy  cases,  there  was  no  question  of  removing  the
children from the care of their parents, even though this happens too, but in
cases where the parents have been deemed unfit by other criteria than just
resorting to surrogacy arrangements117.
Drawing  a  line  noting  what  is  acceptable  or  not,  especially  under  the
umbrella of  a  politically  and ethically  charged notion of  ‘human rights’,  is  a
tricky task and calls for contextuality and flexibility in taking into account the
interests of third parties: in the cases of Mennesson and Labassee, this refers
to the children who did not ask to be born to a situation where they are left to
a legal limbo for years if not a lifetime, a situation created both by their parents
in resorting to transnational surrogacy and the relevant authorities and courts
in  interpreting  the  law  in  a  way  that  left  the  most  vulnerable  parties,  the
children,  without full  legal  protection.  From the point of  view of  this  study,
surrogacy is a form of reproduction that enmeshes consanguinity and filiation
in ways that produce a thoroughly conflicting situation and the most poignant
examples of conflicting interests in the area of reproduction. Furthermore, it
illustrates why the notion of the ‘empire of the belly’ sketched by Iacub (2004)
needs to be taken seriously: to Iacub, it means the supremacy of women in the
area of physical reproduction framed by a simplistic notion of gender equality
that only engages with the idea of symmetrical rights, not an act of judgement
taking into account the principles applied to the process.
In  conclusion  to  analysing  the  case  law  probing  the  limits  of  the
inalienability of the human body and especially the bodily capacities of women
of reproductive ability, I suggest rewriting the Iacub’s notion of the ‘empire of
the belly’ (2004) with the help of Nedelsky’s framework of restructuring
relations through rights that concern reproduction to protect core values such
as the physical integrity of women, risk-assessment relating to processes of
gestation  and  an  ethic  of  not  just  care,  but  elementary  recognition  of  legal
identity for the persons born from surrogacy arrangements. It is no easy task
to accommodate the results of processes where the law and public policy of a
particular State has been contravened such as when seeking surrogacy services
abroad, but the need for a legal identity and ensuing relations to one’s carers
and  to  one’s  State  for  the  persons  born  of  these  arrangements  should  be
safeguarded. Making sure children are not left stateless and regularising their
possibility to stay in their home countries should be the top priority. In many
117 See Frati et al. (2015) and the judgment of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, 27 January 2015
(not in data).
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cases  the  children  are  well  taken  care  of  and  may  live  with  their  intended
parents, but sometimes children born through illicit surrogacy arrangements
are  taken  into  State  care  when  need  may  be.  Regardless  of  the  particular
circumstances  surrounding  each  case,  the  States  in  question  should  take  a
special  interest  in safeguarding both the generally  applicable rights and the
specific circumstances of children born through surrogacy services obtained
abroad, instead of letting them grow up in a legal limbo.
213
CONCLUSION: RELATIONAL SUBJECTS OF
A NEW ERA
Feminists  have  campaigned  for,  and  won,  legal  reforms  that  are
couched in what are now usually called ‘gender neutral’ terms. Such
reforms can mean that that women’s civil rights are safeguarded, but
this  approach  to  reform  can  also  lead  to  curious  results  when,  for
example, attempts are made to incorporate pregnancy into legislation
that  applies  indifferently  to  men  or  women.  Odd  things  happen  to
women when the assumption is made that the only alternative to the
patriarchal  construction  of  sexual  difference  is  the  ostensibly  sex-
neutral ‘individual’.
Carole Pateman (1988: 187)
The  aim of  this  study  has  been  to  examine,  from a  sociological  perspective,
how family relations as a core object of sociological and anthropological
analysis are seen, defined and recognised in a field of intergovernmental
human rights jurisprudence, the legal interpretation of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The motivation behind this endeavour has been
that  opening  this  area  of  study  up  to  extra-legal  analysis  with  the  help  of
notions and methods of social and political sciences is beneficial from many
perspectives. It is valuable for social scientists and other non-lawyers in order
to gain insight into what kind of development takes place in an area of legal
interpretation such as European human rights jurisprudence and for lawyers
to see how the texts they create, study and interpret may be viewed,
understood and sometimes misunderstood from the perspectives of other
disciplines. The workings of law on the domestic level (within States) and on
the international level (between States) are often seen by non-lawyers as
technical, complicated and difficult to understand. Acquired expertise within
a profession such as litigation before international courts and addressing the
claim at hand in the specialist language in question is a valuable specialisation.
However, the essence of the conflicts between the applicants and the States in
the judgements and decisions analysed in this study stem from the mundane
world of the private and intimate sphere of everyday life: who one sleeps, eats
and lives with, or does not.
Many years ago I attended a summer school in international law intended
for Master’s level students and doctoral candidates where the participants had
arrived from different parts of the world. A wide variety of distinguished
international scholars had been invited to act as lecturers. A lecturer who was
indeed a lawyer but rather a scholar in legal and social theory with a special
interest  in  anthropological  theory  wanted  to  explain  an  argument  of  his
concerning the conflict between kinship and totalitarianism. For the purposes
of  this  anecdote,  it  suffices  to  say  that  he  was  trying  to  explain  to  us  that
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kinship  relations  are  an  opposing  force  to  totalitarian  rule.  As  he  started
explaining  the  thought  of  Lévi-Strauss  and  how  the  “exchange  of  women”
figured in creating alliances between kin groups, several critical remarks
emerged from students who apparently heard of these theoretical notions for
the first time. A few students, mainly women, dismissed this piece of thinking
as blatantly patriarchal, thus useless. The lecturer desperately tried to explain
that this was not a description or a prescription on how things were or should
have been in the distant or less distant past. Nevertheless, the rapport between
the lecturer and these outspoken representatives of the audience had turned
sour, and whatever argument he had in mind that he tried to convey to us was
left into oblivion.
I  hope  that  this  anecdote  helps  to  illustrate  why  ‘translating’  knowledge
from one discipline of social and political sciences (broadly understood,
incorporating law and legal theory, too) to another is useful. Learning about
the essential content of the shared canon of humanities and social sciences
such as the thought of Lévi-Strauss is helpful so that we may understand what
a scholar striving to produce interdisciplinary research is talking about, as in
the classroom example above, but also so that we may be able to distinguish
between  different  layers  of  scholarly  work  and  theoretical  thought.  The
‘exchange  of  women’  is  a  notion  derived  from  how  relations  of  alliance,
filiation and cooperation have been played out in indigenous societies, and
Lévi-Strauss  derived  his  theory  on  a  wealth  of  ethnographic  data  on  this
subject  (Lévi-Strauss 1949).  Social  contract  theory is  another example:  18th
century philosophers did not think that an actual contract between the people
at the dawn of society and the ones who ruled them was made, but how people
act  in  society  reflects  a  shared  understanding  of  the  division  of  power  in
society. And without the just as imaginary notion of a social contract, Pateman
(1988)  would  not  have  been  able  to  build  her  argument  of  a  similarly
imaginary “sexual contract” upon which the roles of men and women in society
and reproduction in its physical and material manifestations and divisions of
everyday labour is structured.
This conclusion is structured as follows: First I describe the main import of
each chapter, be it of the theoretical,  historical, methodological or empirical
kind. Then I proceed to discussing what kind of a relational analysis has been
carried out in this study, and whether the questions on restructuring relations
with the help of rights provided by Nedelsky (2012: 235, see Chapter 3.3) have
been useful. Then, I dissect the importance of different types of relations under
each main thematic category, so biological, legal, social and gendered relations
are examined under each thematic category of empirical analysis: alliance,
consanguinity and filiation. The main points of discussion and also normative
reflection that emerge are the role of gendered corporeality and its relation to
human rights thinking. This follows from the continuing divergence between
instituting alliance and filiation and an evaluation of the implications of this
divergence to a gendered notion of family formation as a social practice. It is
also examined what kind of relational and gendered legal subjects emerge
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from the empirical analysis carried out in this study and whether they can be
said to emerge as a result of a rather undeniable historical shift from status to
identity in family law (see Leckey 2008: 248).
I EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM CASE LAW
Chapter  1  starts  off  by  introducing  the  thematic  categories  of alliance,
consanguinity and filiation (Lévi-Strauss  1958:  56)  under  which  I  have
analysed my data but which also act as notions stemming from the importance
of illustrating different modes of kinship relations. Alliance refers to the act of
forming a union, be it cohabitation, marriage or a civil union where two adults
form a household and/or a family unit on the basis of their sexual relationship.
An intimate  couple  relationship  as  a  requirement  for  recognising  a  relation
between two adults  as family life  is  a  definition that  has been criticised,  for
example,  by Fineman (1995) with her notion of  a  “sexual  family” where the
recognition of the family unit rests on a sexual relationship between the two
adults, and this indeed pushes one to think whether this really constitutes a
line that needs to be drawn to recognise a unit of diffuse, enduring solidarity
(Schneider 1987). I argue that this requirement of a sexual relationship acts as
a  more  coy,  modern-day  equivalent  of  the  need  for  consummation  to  take
place  so  that  a  marriage  ‘exists’  and  as  a  reflection  of  the  need  to  control
sexuality.  This  division  between  dyadic  sexual  relations  adhering  to  the
restrictions  in  place  for  marriage  regarding  age  and  degree  of  familial
proximity  is  a  similar  line  that  emerges  from  the  data  in  this  study,  too.
However, broadening the scope of household units protected by legislation in
place  to  privilege  certain  forms  of  family  relations  might  not  protect  any
particular  relational  good,  such  as  in  the  case  of Burden v. the United
Kingdom1, where the wealthy sisters living together sought the same level of
lower taxation as married couples or couples in a civil partnership. Rather, the
legal  privileges accorded to couples on the basis  of  marriage or civil  unions
should be scrutinised and policies reviewed.
The  theoretical  background  for  the  analysis  of  the  data  in  this  study  is
presented by introducing debates on the ‘symbolic order’ of gender and
kinship that took place in France from the 1990 to the 2010s in the wake of
instituting civil unions (Pacs, passed in 1999) and same-sex marriage (passed
in 2013). What this set of debate illustrates is how anthropological theory as
well as psychoanalytical viewpoints were applied to the political dilemma of
whether  or  not  to  open  up  marriage-like  unions,  marriage  and  forms  of
instituting filiation such as full adoption, second-parent adoption and assisted
reproduction services to other than opposite-sex couples, meaning same-sex
couples and single women (see Robcis 2013). This set of thought ties in with a
juxtaposition sketched in this study between singularist proponents of
1 Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, ECHR 2008.
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marriage and filiation as essentially heterosexual institutions, and pluralist
proponents of self-defined subjectivity in the field of family formation,
navigating in the margins of family law depending on the State in question (see
Stacey 2013).
The latter approach may be understood with the help of theoretical thought
from the fields of  feminist  legal  and political  theory packaged as “relational
theory” (Leckey 2008) inspired by multidisciplinary debates on the ethic of
care  (e.g.  Gilligan  1982)  with  a  focus  on  feminist  approaches  to  legal
subjectivity (Lacey 1995, 1996) and what to do with relational thought, human
rights  and  normative  dilemmas  (Nedelsky  2011,  2012).  What  is  called
“relational theory” by Leckey (2008) is be complemented with a discussion of
some strands of relational sociology that helps in framing the questions asked
in this study from the perspective of sociological theory. What emerges from
debates  on  the  essence  of  relational  sociology  is  a  distinction  between  two
outlooks: what I call “transcendentalist”, represented by Donati and Archer
(2015,  see  also  Donati  2011)  and  “transactionalist”,  in  their  own  terms,
represented by Emirbayer (1997), Crossley (2010; 2013) and Dépelteau (2008;
2013).  This  is  based  on  divergent  views  between  these  schools  on  social
ontology: may relations between humans and between humans and
institutions  be  reduced  to  transactions  or  are  relations  thought  to  have
emergent properties and thus to ‘exist’ is their own right? This study favors the
latter approach, mainly because the “transcendentalist” model does not seem
to be equipped to respond to the complexities and the ethical demands posed
by the pluralist family model.ffather
Chapter 2 presents a brief history on the concept of ‘family’ in international
human rights  law and  especially  in  the  founding  document  of  international
human rights law after the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights from 1948. Through an exegesis and a historical analysis of the
drafting of the definition of family in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration it
is shown that the language and style adopted in the drafting process of several
(but not all) Articles of the UDHR was influenced by Catholic social teaching,
especially  through  the  agency  of  Charles  Malik,  a  Neo-Thomist  philosopher
(Morsink 1999). A comparison to an almost identical definition of family in the
Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Ireland  from  1937  shows  that  he  linguistic
guise of the definition of family in the UDHR pays tribute to certain Encyclicals
of the Catholic Church, Rerum Novarum (1891)  and Quadragesimo Anno
(1931) (Kennedy 1998, see also Cere 2009). As such, this historical and textual
similitude lends support to the proponents of a conservative interpretation of
what family is meant to mean in the context of international human rights law.
However, subsequent human rights conventions of the United Nations and
other relevant intergovernmental documents on a global scale and within the
Council of Europe either reflect just certain parts of the legacy of the UDHR or
have  departed  from  the  set  of  thought  it  conveys.  Especially  the  European
Convention  on  Human  Rights  is,  according  to  doctrines  developed  by  the
European Court of Human Rights itself, in its case law interpreted dynamically
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and contextually according to temporally shifting epistemic contexts and
political  and  social  conditions  (see  e.g.  Johnson  2013).  During  the  last  ten
years, there have indeed been many judgements in the European Court of
Human Rights which have fundamentally reconsidered certain areas of
application  in  the  right  to  respect  for  private  and  family  life,  such  as  the
possibility of single non-heterosexual persons to apply for an adoption
licence2, the possibility of second-parent adoption among same-sex couples3
and the duty of the State to offer relationship registration for same-sex couples
as well if it is offered to opposite-sex couples4 and finally, very recently, to offer
same-sex couples some form of civil unions5.
In Chapter 3 the human rights principles evoked in the data of this study
as enshrined in Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article
12  (right  to  marry  and  to  found  a  family)  of  the  European  Convention  on
Human Rights are introduced. Compared to other international human rights
conventions operating on the global level, the ECHR offers a fairly limited view
of family life and marriage as civil rights issues, but in a form that is easier to
apply than the generous formulations found in the Universal Bill of Human
Rights (UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR). Key concepts, techniques and doctrines
of  interpretation  that  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  developed
itself over the decades in its jurisprudence are discussed briefly. Definitions
and typologies of family relations from the European Court and a comparable
sociological account by Théry (1996) are discussed in order to find out what
kind  of  relations  are  analysed  in  this  study:  biological,  legal,  social  and
gendered. This is followed by a description of how the data in this study has
been selected and analysed.
The approach adopted in this study for analysing the data may be described
as ‘relational analysis’ following the “relational approach” described by
Nedelsky  (2012,  see  also  2011:  74-77)  which  acts  rather  as  a  theoretical
orientation and a way of posing questions on the links between ‘rights’ in the
legal sphere and how they protect or affect social relations. Here, ‘relational’
refers to two different layers of interpretation and scrutiny. The first one is a
more practical exercise of reading the judgements and decisions analysed in
this  study to detect  what kind of  relations between the applicants and their
supposed family members are said to exist between them. Biological relations
encompass genetic similitude and gestational relations but a wider sense of the
word  as  well,  referring  to  the  social  aspects  and  effects  of  conception,
pregnancy and childbirth; legal relations entail recognition and support by the
State to the family relations in question; social relations refer to domestic
relations  of  everyday  care,  support  and  cohesion.  This  tripartite  notion  is
complemented with gendered relations, an evident but unarticulated
2 E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008.
3 X and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 19010/07, ECHR 2013.
4 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, ECHR 2013 (extracts).
5 Oliari and others v. Italy, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015, ECHR-IV.
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dimension  in  the  gender-neutral  language  of  ECHR  case  law.  Finally,  the
subject matter at hand is evaluated with a second order of ‘relational analysis’
according to the relational approach articulated by Nedelsky (2012, 2011: 74-
77)  by  examining  how  relations  may  be  restructured  with  the  help  of
interpreting rights in a novel way in order to protect the right to both give and
receive  care  and  to  protect  core  values  such  as  equality,  autonomy  and
integrity.
With this theoretical and historical background and the practical and
analytical approaches described above, the study then proceeds to reading
relevant case law. Certain thematic sub-categories emerge from the wider
categories  of  alliance,  consanguinity  and  filiation.  Chapter  4  focuses  on
alliance  and  the  sub-categories  of  prohibited  degrees  of  relationships  in
marriage, the (lack of a) right to dissolve one’s marriage, transgender marriage
and same-sex  unions  and  marriage.  In  the  case  law discussed  in  these  sub-
chapters, we see who is entitled to establish a State-recognised and protected
category of sexual relationship with whom and how dissolving a marriage and
remarrying  have  not  really  been  seen  as  rights  to  be  protected  on  an
international level of human rights documents and treaties. So far, the
European  Court  has  given  only  modest  support  to  a  right  of  separation  in
marriage in Airey v. Ireland.
Marriage rights of transgender persons and same-sex couples, despite
conforming to the model of ‘sexual marriage’ articulated by Fineman (1995)
raise the question of  whether a State should be interested in the content or
physical appearance of such a relationship, as the emergence of same-sex
marriage in different jurisdictions shows that requirements of consummation
are rather outdated (Iacub 2009: 101-124). The main argument stemming
from the analysis of relevant ECHR case law in this study is that alliance or
recognised unions between two adults are relatively easily transformed into
gender-neutral contracts. In Nedelskyan terms (2011, 2012) the core value of
equality is so easily protected with making alliance possible for both same-sex
and opposite-sex couples of marriageable age and otherwise agreed upon
categories  to  marry  that  it  begins  to  emerge  as  a  basic  requirement  in
contemporary Western societies. In the context of the Council of Europe, this
is supported by the ECHR judgement of Oliari and others v. Italy6 where it is
stated that States Parties should offer some form of civil unions to same-sex
couples.
Chapter  5  on  consanguinity  or  the  genetic,  gestational  and  biological
components of parenthood displays how filiation comes into being in most
cases, as coital reproduction in opposite-sex relationships remains the most
common form of human reproduction. Marckx v. Belgium7 and case law on
6 See Oliari and others v. Italy, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015, ECHR-IV. This
judgement is outside the temporal scope of the data analysed in this study, so it is referred to rather as
a landmark case and as a “sign of the times”.
7 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31.
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anonymous birth and unmarried fatherhood illustrate how women and men
have, in different ways, been seen as inadequate parental subjects without the
status conferred to both sexes by opposite-sex marriage, as it has provided the
key  structure  to  regulate  reproduction  and  securing  the  legal  status  and
obligation  to  care  for  children.  Possibilities  for  rejecting  and  undoing
maternity  and  paternity  have  always  existed,  but  as  they  are  structured  so
differently compared to one another, maternity and paternity as biologically
based legal relations are highly incommensurable. Due to the physical limits
to  reproduction  set  by  human  corporeality,  there  is  not  much  space  for
restructuring, in a Nedelskyan manner or not, the relations of female and male
in human reproduction. The key to restructuring feminine and masculine
parentage  in  order  to  make  them  more  equal  as  compared  to  one  another
might  lie  in  further  disassociating  alliance  and  filiation  as  recognised  legal
relations, not dependent from one another.
Chapter 6 builds on the making and unmaking of filiation on the basis on
consanguinity, but highlights the other, more “human-made” forms of filiation
that have also been appropriated by other categories of persons and couples
than just opposite-sex couples. Adoption as a form of instituting filiation
comes across as conceptually simple but difficult in practice due to its highly
regulated nature. Judging who is suitable and fit to act as an adoptive parent
is a process that lays a huge responsibility to State authorities and vests them
with  the  task  to  direct  considerable  resources  on  evaluating  who  fits  the
category of suitable potential adoptive parents. Assisted reproduction, in turn,
depending on how it  is  carried out,  offers a  wide spectrum of  practices that
range from fairly simple (insemination with legally available donated sperm)
to expensive and physically demanding treatments such as in vitro fertilisation
(IVF). Surrogacy acts as an extreme example of assisted reproduction, but its
level of legality and enforceability, from legally prohibited, purely altruist, an
“expenses only” basis to contractually enforceable and thus remunerated
varies from State to State8.
The  thematically  selected  case  law  data  analysed  in  this  study  provides
ample evidence for an argument that consanguineous (biogenetically based)
maternity and paternity are substantively incommensurable when disputed in
legal contexts and enduringly difficult to discuss in simplistic terms of gender
equality calling for symmetry in rights in a relation of filiation to a child. This
should not be taken as an argument against the viability of a pluralist view of
acceptable  forms  of  family  life  in  society,  but  rather  as  a  critique  within  a
pluralist outlook on these issues. Due to contemporary conceptualisation of
women  as  fully  competent  legal  parental  subjects,  potential  or  actual,  in
Western industrialised societies, in itself a historically recent construction,
and reasons of corporeality (processes of pregnancy and childbirth) the scales
of justice tend to tip often towards the interests of the adult female subject in
8 See Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts) and Labassee v. France, no.
65941/11, 26 June 2014.
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grand  questions  of  personal  entitlement  to  a  child  who  has  been  born.
Children, when born, are in a historically just as novel way conceptualised as
a category of rights-bearers of their own (see Kelly 2005). The data analysed
reveals a hierarchy of entitlement to establishing parental relations, where
birth  mothers,  supposedly  consanguineous  fathers  recognised  at  birth,  full
adoptive parents and co-parents through second-parent adoption inhabit
different positions vis-à-vis a child. This hierarchy is open to debate, but it is
helpful in evaluating the importance given to questions of knowledge of one’s
origins and the limits of the (in)alienability of human bodily capacities.
Intersecting categories of legal sex, gender identity and choice of partner
produce contexts where individuals may have various entitlements, claims and
wishes. However, these intersecting categories often boil down to legal sex and
physical  reproductive  capacities  in  which  women  and  men  inhabit
asymmetrical positions, and this poses an enduring practical and ethical
barrier in trying to reconceive the creation of relations of parent-child filiation
in a gender-symmetrical manner.
Gamete donation and surrogacy emerge in the case law analysed as ethical
and moral considerations of central importance in our time, as it is not enough
that  these  practices  are  legally  regulated  within  a  State,  but  States  need  to
decide how to respond to transnational service-seeking and how to recognise
the existence of persons born of transnational surrogacy arrangements. Thus,
many points in this study culminate in the judgements of Mennesson v. France
and Labassee v. France from 2014, which are among the chronologically latest
cases  analysed  in  this  study.  Deciding  what  “is  right”  within  a  jurisdiction,
either  by  legislators  or  courts,  is  not  enough,  as  rules  may  need  to  be
contingently accommodated to recognise the basic human rights, such as legal
identity, legally relevant parental relations and nationality of children born
from these  arrangements.  This  problem of  how to  treat  children  born  from
discouraged forms of reproduction in the case of surrogacy resonates with the
case of Marckx v. Belgium from 1979, as children were left without certain
rights and entitlements due to the actions of their parents in times when the
line  of  demarcation  was  the  marital  status  of  the  parents.  In  the  1970s,  the
bone of contention was the legal status of children born out of wedlock, and in
the  2010s,  it  was  whether  children  born  through  a  surrogacy  arrangement
abroad have a legal relationship to their parents in their home country or not.
States in the West, East, North and South would need to regulate this through
international treaties as well as paying due attention to the status of children
born through surrogacy arrangements. In conclusion to this study, the
emergence and the existence of ‘relational subjects” in the fields of family law
and  international  human  rights  law  is  examined.  What  might  be  the
repercussions of “restructuring relations through rights” (Nedelsky 2011: 313)
in the sphere of family life in order to protect the inalienable rights of children,
women and men involved in processes of human reproduction?
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II RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
As the study above shows, the relationship between human rights thinking and
the  legal  recognition  of  family  relationships  is  both  intriguing  and
problematic:  intriguing  mainly  due  to  the  richness  of  social  and  cultural
variety  in  the  empirical  data  that  shows  how  people  set  themselves  into
relation with one another, forming couples, becoming parents and setting up
households  and  family  units.  ‘Family’,  as  the  theoretical  and  legal  thinking
exposed  in  Chapters  1  and  2  demonstrate,  has  been  conceptualised  and
defined  in  many  ways  as  a  field  which,  in  the  theoretical  imagination  of
philosophers, anthropologist and lawyers, too, is seen either as preceding
larger society or as the kernel and smaller-scale image of larger communities,
societies  and  States.  However,  by  focusing  on  the  positive  import  of  both
liberal individualist human rights thinking and perspectives of relational
theories in different scholarly fields, it is possible to dissect this often
monolithic and mystified concept into different kinds of relations, both
between  individuals  and  between  individuals  and  institutions  to  see  what
normative goods may or should be protected in giving value and importance
in the eyes of States to certain kinds of personal relations.
As  fervent  debates  surrounding  the  possibility  of  same-sex  marriage
demonstrate (see McClain and Cere 2013), despite the complicated history of
marriage as a highly variable institution both historically and geographically
(see e.g. Cott 2000), there is lot to it that draws also modern-day couples, both
opposite-sex and same-sex, to seek the status State-recognised alliance brings.
In Europe, North America and a great many other Western(ised) States, the
dominant  interpretation  of  what  family  is,  or  might  be,  has  very  much
departed  from  what  was  probably  meant  by  the  drafters  of  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. This could be seen a few decades ago when the
status of unmarried mothers and children born out of wedlock was amended
after Marckx v. Belgium in 1979 and it  can be seen today when debates on
same-sex marriage, civil unions and shared parenthood for same-sex couples
are on the agenda. In this study, it is argued that the judgement of Marckx v.
Belgium and  later  maternity-related  case  law  from  the  European  Court  of
Human Rights9 give support to the idea that the bi-generational unit of mother
and child is the kind of a consanguineous ‘core family’ (Fineman 1995) around
which other forms of parenthood are constructed. The forms of rejecting legal
maternity after birth and the possibilities of disintegration of this unit in the
case  of  anonymous  birth  and  child  abandonment  highlight  the  fragile
foundations of women as full parental subjects in the legal sense. Fatherhood,
in  non-conflictual  cases,  is  a  consanguineous  relation  that  is  subject  to  a
relation of trust between the mother and father in order to take legal shape. It
takes  the  form  of  a  pre-existing  or  retroactive  contract  (marriage  or
9 Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III, Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, 10
January 2008, Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09, 25 September 2012.
Conclusion: Relational Subjects of a New Era
222
legitimation  by  marriage)  or  the  recognition  of  paternity  or  second-parent
adoption (cohabitation or other forms of relations between parents) to come
into  being.  However,  mere  consanguinity  is  never  enough,  as  filiation
instituted by recognition of paternity according to commonly agreed rules is
what counts as a parent-child relation.
The shortcomings of the bundle of social and anthropological theory that
Robcis (2013) calls the ‘structuralist social contract’ are evident when it comes
to viewing kinship and family as historical formations. However, it is akin to
the idea of kinship articulating the difference of the sexes and of generations
as  a  theoretical  abstraction  (Théry  1999:  166)  as  it  draws  attention  to  what
might  be  either  cross-culturally  shared  or  close  to  universal  in  the  realm of
kinship, family and reproduction. An often evoked example of this might be
the incest taboo, or the fact that in general, family formation does not stray far
from the ‘symbolic order’ of kinship and gender as it is a dominant, but not
immutable  model  of  intelligibility  of  the  language  applied  to  close  personal
relations. In turn, recent mobilisation in the area of changing family law has
either been driven by universalist human rights argumentation, feminist and
non-heterosexual subjectivities or a mixture of all of these. (See McClain and
Cere 2013.) However, gender-neutrality, often ‘achieved’ with the means of
deploying formal, gender-neutral language and principles in law and politics,
often runs the risk of turning into a practice of gender-blindness (Lacey 1996;
Pateman 1988: 187).
Legal  relations  act  as  the  strongest  form of  family  relations  due  to  their
State-sanctioned role, but are subject to proof of genetic, gestational and social
relations. Biological relations are played out on different levels: genetic,
gestational and corporeal, corporeal meaning everything that affects the
physical integrity of the human body. Alone, genetic ties do not suffice to
create  a  family  relations.  Social  relations,  in  turn,  are  played  out  in  the
everyday interactions of persons who live together, be the relations between
them  recognised  by  law  or  not.  They  are  the  most  tangible  form  of  family
relations: with whom and where one lives, eats, and sleeps and is taken care
of, and are increasingly of prime importance if the parentage of a child needs
to be established on the basis of everyday personal ties. All of these relations
are gendered, and gender acts both as a hierarchy and a line of division against
which the core value of equality is reflected. Through the data analysed in the
three empirical  chapters in this  study (4,  5  and 6),  it  is  shown that alliance
(marriage and other forms of couplehood) may be politically, legally and
bureaucratically  changed  more  easily  to  a  gender-neutral  direction  than
filiation. Filiation, in turn, brings out the divergent corporeal investment and
involvement of women and men as well as ensuing ethical considerations, of
which the trickiest questions that emerge in the case law of the ECHR are the
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right to know one’s origins10, gamete donation11 and surrogacy12. To most of
these questions the answer is not a simple yes or no, but rather whose interests
are at stake and how they should be taken into consideration. A variety of case
law dealing with abandonment of newborn children, paternity recognition
sought by (adult) children, adoption and different forms of assisted
reproduction pose different, but intertwining questions on the extent to which
the  bodily  substances  and  reproductive  capacities  on  humans  may  be
benefited from in the light of human rights principles.
III GENDER, CORPOREALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Women and men, be they of any sexual identity or tied by any form of alliance,
are never on an equal footing when it comes to corporeality and reproduction.
Limits set to the inalienability of the human person in both its conceptual and
corporeal form are at the heart of what human rights are about, and this has
implications  to  how  adoption  and  assisted  reproduction  are  evaluated  and
administered by legislators. From the perspective of a dynamic and temporally
shifting interpretation of human rights principles as shared notions
concerning what can be done with human persons and human bodies, there
are  no  decisive  answers  to  where  the  limits  of  acceptable  and  legally
sanctioned  behaviour  may  be  drawn.  So,  for  example,  sperm  donation  is  a
widely condoned practice, whereas egg donation is less widely condoned13 (see
also Héritier 1985, 1996). Surrogacy is a more extreme example of a practice
that has been either banned completely in many States or banned in its
commercial  form,  and  it  has  been  viewed  as  a  practice  that  affects  the
“inalienability of the human body and civil status”14.
In the light of the surrogacy cases discussed in Chapter 5 I suggest turning
Iacub’s (2004) idea of the “empire of the belly” on its head, as it may be argued
that  the  maternal  womb  is  a  vital  space  through  which  all  humans  pass
through. Iacub’s argument is that the sanctity of Napoleonic marriage in the
French context has been replaced with the privileged and sanctified
importance given to fertile female bodies and maternal wombs. However,
Iacub does not really engage with human rights thinking or the protection of
women as a vulnerable category of persons on the global scale on the basis of
their fertility, the inalienability of the human body or any other attempts to
10 For example, Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003-III, Jäggi v. Switzerland, no.
58757/00, ECHR 2006-X.
11 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], no. 57813/00, ECHR 2011.
12 Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France.
13 See comparative survey of legislation among Member States of the Council of Europe in S.H. and
Others v. Austria, paras 35-40.
14 Mennesson v. France, paras 55 and 58. Mennesson contains a brief note on the legal status of
surrogacy arrangements in Europe, see para 78.
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conceptualise human dignity either from a conceptual or a normative point of
view. Obviously, the use of donated gametes, too, raises similar but less severe
problems  relating  to  the  inalienability  of  the  human body  as  it  involves  the
alienation of one’s genetic imprint to be passed on to other generations. Thus,
gamete donation is opposed by certain persons, institutions and legislatures
on the basis of ethical or even human rights based arguments. However, it has
been clinically condoned and legislatively allowed and well established in
many Member States of the Council of Europe and beyond. What is at stake
here is to what extent the practice of gamete donation is related to the
inalienability of the human body: if one may take something out of one’s body
with  at  least  relatively  little  pain  and  medical  risks,  is  it  fair  to  the  subject
herself is she is willing to do so? Is she willing to do so because there is a reward
other than being able to help other people have children, perhaps of a financial
kind?
The main conceptual distinction that I wish to make on the basis on this
study  is  that  as  pointed  out  several  times  in  the  analysis  is  that  in  light  of
relevant case law from the European Court of Human Rights, alliance (adult-
adult relations) is more easily transformed to a gender-neutral relation than
filiation (parent-child relations). This is not a normative argument against a
pluralist view of family formation and family life. It is a critique of and perhaps
a counterpoint to the sometimes simplistic notions that some pluralist
advocates and organisations put forward when arguing for “more rights” to the
persons they represent, be their frame of reference that of infertility, non-
heterosexuality,  transgender  issues  or  some  or  all  of  the  above.  The
disassociation  of  filiation  and  State-recognised  forms  of  alliance  has  been
developing for decades across European States and the industrialised West as
a  whole  (Kiernan  2001,  Bradley  2001)  meaning  that  giving  birth  outside
marriage  does  not  carry  the  social  stigma  and  uncomfortable  legal
consequences that it once did, of which Marckx v. Belgium acts as a historical
reminder  in  the  context  of  the  Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe.
Filiation is structured and flows somewhat differently than alliance, and the
pain  felt  and  political  battles  fought  out  to  preserve  marriage  as  it  was
generally known in the context of the 20th century as a union of a man and a
woman for the sake of procreation and reproduction within that union stems
from trying to preserve a world-view where alliance and filiation form a neat
package  conforming  to  the  grid  of  genders  and  generations,  the  “symbolic
order” of kinship and gender (see Robcis 2013).
It  goes  to  note  that  emphasising  the  corporeality  of  reproduction  and
making  normative  arguments  that  point  to  the  asymmetry  and
incommensurability of maternity and paternity as legal identities and bundles
of rights might be interpreted as going against some of the core content of the
political projects advocated by many activists committed to the lesbian, gay,
bisexual  and  transgender  (LGBT)  cause  of  “family  rights”.  However,  the
sincere  attempt  in  this  study  has  been  to  obtain  an  understanding  of  what
‘family  relations’  consist  of  within  the  authoritative  and  supranational  legal
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culture of European human rights jurisprudence. Legal spousal and parental
subjectivities are built on the foundation of the legal categories of sex that
individuals are assigned to in society, which may be modified physically and
legally in certain circumstances. How individuals are seen as subjects either as
partners to other subjects or responsible for children depends on political and
legal  subjectivities  opened  up  to  them  by  collectivities  such  as  the  national
legislature or political and legal thought in academia. The empirical data
evident in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and analysed
in  this  study  makes  one  confront  various  issues  that  need  to  be  taken  into
consideration  when  instituting  legal  change,  such  as  the  importance  of
possibility  to  access  information  on  one’s  genetic  origins  or  making  a
distinction between the use of genetic material compared to the use of bodily
processes and capacities that give birth to new rights-bearers.
I  hope that  that  the approach adopted in this  study has helped in seeing
applicants  to  the  European  Court  as  “relational  subjects”  who  argue  their
complaints to a supranational institution with the intention to make
interpersonal relations that exist in their narratives worthy of State
recognition. Respect for the “irreducible difference” that Lacey (1996: 150)
refers to in the opening quote to this study is often difficult to apply to practice
as it requires us to take another person’s experiences seriously and to engage
with how s/he sees it. I would not go as far as to argue that recent legislative
changes in Europe concerning the definition of marriage or ways of instituting
filiation would stem from purely subjective motivations where subjects wish
to succumb the law to their desires or phantasies (a view put forward by e.g.
Pierre  Legendre,  see  Théry  2007:  583),  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that
despite good intentions not all  parties to debates concerning what family is
have  thought  seriously  of  balancing  the  interests  and  rights  of  all  parties
concerned. The issue of access to information on one’s genetic origins, be it in
the context of anonymous birth, adoption or assisted reproduction with
donated gametes acts as a poignant reminder of this, as those who engage in
the arduous legal processes related to this are of the second generation. Thus
it is the task of collectivities and national legislatures to weigh how far the
‘right to know’ vital information on one’s origins may be protected. It has been
argued  in  this  study  that  a  historical  shift  from  status,  which  rests  on  the
distinctions  made  between  the  legal  sexes  and  being  married  or  not,  to
identity,  which  encompasses  a  wide  variety  of  issues  of  legal  identity,
genealogy and nationality and knowledge on one’s genetic origins to one’s
sexual and gender identity can be identified in the case law of the European
Court  of  Human  Rights.  However,  the  question  remains  whether  focus  on
individual identities is enough, or should “respect for each other’s irreducible
difference” (Lacey 1996: 150) focus more on relations between subjects as it is
those life-sustaining relations of dependence, possession and care that make
us what we are.
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AFTERTHOUGHT: ESTABLISHING FILIATION
Maybe all we can know happens at the only “level” of social reality we
have: the level of very specific fields of transaction where we make
each  other  as  lovers,  friends,  caring  people,  haters,  enemies,  or
egocentric persons who can support or hurt each other. Maybe there is
nothing else than us making our way through these various, complex,
and quite unstable fields of transaction.
François Dépelteau (2013: 177)
It is always difficult to give practical applications based on scholarly work, as
taking various perspectives and counterpoints to them into account usually
does not deliver clear bullet-pointed answers.  However,  on the basis  of  this
study, it may be argued that principles found in ECHR case law point towards
a certain model centered around the dyad of a child and pregnant woman in
instituting filiation. What is recommended here is that in undisputed
situations of expected childbirth, it should be possible for the pregnant woman
and  her  partner,  male  or  female,  to  establish  a  valid  agreement  of  the
presumption of parentage before the birth of the child. This already exists in
some  States,  where  an  unmarried  opposite-sex  couple  may  declare  the
recognition of paternity before the birth, of course open to dispute if needed 15.
Likewise,  in  States  where  the  female  partner  of  a  pregnant  woman  may  be
recognised  as  the  child’s  other  parent  at  birth,  this  has  been  taken  care  of.
However, the crux of the matter is that this should not depend on the female
couple being married on in a civil union, if the child is conceived with the help
of assisted procreation at a private or public fertility clinic.
The  presumption  of  parentage  should  be  available  when  biological  and
social relations are expected to converge and to create legal relations. Thus, it
should be possible for an expecting mother (pregnant woman) to enter into an
agreement regarding parentage of the child to be born with her partner when
there  are  no  other  adults  competing  for  this  privilege,  which  is  the  case  in
medically  assisted  procreation.  Consent  to  the  procedure  would  act  as  an
agreement  on  the  presumption  of  parentage  in  the  same  way  as  marriage,
recognition of paternity or second-parent adoption do. However, in many
States  such  a  parental  relation  concerning  an  unmarried  father  or  a  female
partner may be created only after birth. The rationale is that if possible, the
child  to  be  born  would  have  two  official  parents  at  birth,  not  just  the  birth
mother.  This  model  aims  to  respect  the  origins  of  the  child  and  the
circumstances the child is  born into,  but in a way the respects the different
forms of parentage that might be involved. The focus on what is agreed upon
15 For example, this has been instituted in the new Act on Paternity in Finland, taking effect 1 January
2016, where cohabiting opposite-sex couples may give a declaration of paternity before the birth at a
public maternity clinic. This way, the child obtains two parents at birth just like a child born to a married
opposite-sex couple.
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is  entering  an  agreement  on  taking  responsibility  of  a  child  –  regarding
regulated or unregulated surrogacy, a birth mother would be the one solely in
charge of giving or not giving the child away. Thus, agreements on parentage
would not be a tool for opting out of maternity at birth or for claiming as one’s
own  a  child  to  who  one  does  not  have  a  recognisable  link  through  a
relationship of cohabitation, civil union or marriage to the birth mother.
In its classic form, marriage acts as an agreement and a pre-declaration of
the joint parentage of the children born to the wife as the husband’s own, and
this  would be the case for female couples as well  if  same-sex marriage with
recognition of parentage within it is possible in the State in question. A shared
address is the usual circumstance uniting the couple, and/or a shared life on
the  basis  of  other  criteria.  Up  until  the  birth  of  a  child,  the  partner  of  the
expecting  mother  would  be  regarded  as  having  entered  into  a  relation  of
responsibility towards the child, which would then be realised and confirmed
after  birth  when  the  details  and  identity  of  the  child  are  entered  into  a
population register. An agreement could be entered into provisionally after a
certain number of  weeks the pregnancy has lasted such as the limit  of  legal
abortions. Once established, the agreement would act in much the same way
as the presumption of paternity in marriage. However, there would be no need
for intrusive questions on one’s sexuality, sexual relations or understandings
of fidelity in the procedures relating to declaration of paternity.
In most situations, an agreement would lead to the partner of the mother
to be recognised as the other parent automatically,  as  in the case of  women
giving birth in opposite-sex marriage. If the filiation of a child would need to
be disavowed, this procedure would progress in the same way as paternity is
rejected and disputed within marriage, according to set criteria. DNA testing
could  be  applied  if  the  father  had  been  under  the  impression  that  he  is
biologically  related  to  the  child.  However,  in  cases  of  assisted  reproduction
with the help of donated gametes (sperm or eggs) filiation could not be rejected
due  to  the  absence  of  a  genetic  relation.  What  would  matter  would  be  the
agreement of  the parental  parties regarding what kind of  relations (marital,
genetic, social) the filiation in question is based. An agreement on parentage
could  act  as  a  device  of  greater  transparency  regarding  a  child’s  origins  if
information on how to access data on one’s genetic origins would be included
in the documents. In cases of missing genetic relations between parents and
children, i.e. in adoption or the use of donated gametes, an agreement could
be made in addition to a marriage contract. Expecting mothers could reject the
affirmation of paternity according to the same rules as are in place in national
legislation.  Second-parent  adoption  after  the  birth  of  the  child  would  be
applicable only in situations where the parent-to-be would have appeared in
the  child’s  life  after  birth.  Joint  adoption  would  be,  in  itself,  a  form  of  an
agreement on parentage, which would be established post facto on the basis of
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